







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THE
HISTORY
OF
GREECE,

FROM THE
ACCESSION OF ALEXANDER OF MACEDON,
TILL ITS
FINAL SUBJECTION TO THE ROMAN POWER;
IN EIGHT BOOKS.

BY JOHN GAST, D. D.
ARCHDEACON OF GLANDELAGH.

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O F T H E

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PHILIP ascended the throne ¹ with the general applause of all Macedon ². The extraordinary care bestowed on his education, the instructions he was

BOOK
V.

Sect. I.

The last Philip ascends the throne of Macedon:

¹ OLYMP. CXXXIX. 4. BEFORE CHRIST 216.

² See Polyb. Casaub. Oct. p 1371 de virt. & vitiis.

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V.

Sect. 1.

His character.

Prosperous
state of Ma-
cedon at his
accession.The Aetolians
invade Achaia.

known to have received from the late king, the opportunity he had enjoyed of observing the virtues of that excellent prince, together with the high expectations which his own natural endowments had taught his subjects to form of him, induced them to hope, that in him Antigonus would be revived; and, though only in his seventeenth year at the time of his accession, his manner of entering on the government strengthened these expectations: intelligent, affable, munificent, attentive to the several duties of the royal station, he appeared to have no other end in view but the happiness of Macedon, and to have every qualification necessary to accomplish that great object.

Macedon, at the same time, had never been in a more flourishing condition. The wise policy of the last reign had restored industry and opulence; her cities were populous; her lands cultivated, and covered with inhabitants; and her armies high in reputation for discipline and courage. The barbarian borderers had been lately humbled; and even that spirit of hostility, which for ages had animated the councils of Greece against Macedon, had almost died away. Who could have thought, that these were the times, and this the prince, destined to humble this ancient kingdom, and to prepare the way for its final ruin!

The Aetolians^{*} were the first people to disturb the peace of Greece. The jealousy, which they had long entertained of the Achaean states, was much increased

^{*} Polyb. L. iv. c. 3. & seq. Plut. in Arato.

by that importance which Achaia had assumed from her alliance with Macedon; and no sooner were they relieved from the dread of Antigonus, than the Aetolian bands poured again into Peloponnesus. They landed on the Achaean coast, which after ravaging, they proceeded to a strong hold they possessed on the Messenian frontier; from whence they made severe depredations on all the country around. These, however, were said to have been only private adventurers, who went forth merely for the sake of plunder, without the authority, and, as it was pretended, even without the knowledge of the Aetolian government.

Timoxenus, then general of Achaia, whose term of office was nearly expired, declining to march against them, Aratus, general-elect, assumed the command, and taking the field, required them instantly to leave Peloponnesus. They promised they would: but Aratus, although he had already dismissed a part of his force, suspecting the sincerity of their intentions, and finding, as he thought, a favorable opportunity of chastising these unprovoked plunderers, attacked them on their march near Caphyae, a town of Arcadia; but meeting with an unexpected and vigorous resistance, he was entirely defeated.

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V.
Sect. I.
Aratus marches against them.

and is defeated,

The blame of this discomfiture fell wholly on Aratus. He had presumed to act, though not in office; he had weakened his army, whilst the enemy was yet in the field; and he had exposed his troops to slaughter by his rashness and the ill-digested orders he had given. To answer to these articles of charge, he was summoned before the convention of the

partly by his own fault,

B O O K

V.

Sect. I.

and partly by
the fault of
the Achaeans.

Aratus applies
to Philip for
aid.

Achaean states; and he had probably been condemned, had not an open confession of his error deprecated the resentment of his judges. The fault, nevertheless, was not altogether to be imputed to him. It appears, that the Achaean troops had been deficient in discipline and in courage. The pernicious effects of their having called in the aid of foreign arms, both Polybius * and Plutarch † inform us, began already to be felt. And the Achaeans, who thought no enterprize too arduous, whilst left to the exertion of their own vigor; those men, who with such glory to themselves had established the liberties of Achaia, now reposing themselves on the power of Macedon, had sunk insensibly into sloth, timidity, and weakness.

The evil was not at present to be remedied. And nothing remained to the Achaeans but the alternative of making friends of the Aetolians, by admitting them to a share in the administration of Grecian affairs (an object which the Aetolians seem long to have had in view) or to implore the assistance of the Macedonian king. The former must have been a measure of wiser policy; as the strength of Greece would then have been collected into one formidable confederacy; and the different states, by pursuing separate interests, had not hastened the ruin of their common liberties. But the pride of Aratus led him to a more pernicious choice. He could not bear that Achaia should yield up, or even divide a sovereignty, which however was now little more than nominal;

* See Polyb. L. iv. c. 7.

† Plutarch. in Arato.

and still less that she should receive orders from those to whom she had been accustomed to prescribe them. Aratus, besides, had been the first person to call in the Macedonians to the support of the Achaean body; and he would not seem to condemn a measure, which had originated from himself. Unfortunately for Greece, the counsels of Aratus prevailed.

Philip received the application with pleasure. To see himself, at the opening of his reign, the acknowledged arbiter of Greece, and to have the first of the Peloponnesian states taking shelter under his protection, were circumstances too flattering for a young prince, to be considered with indifference; whilst his compliance with the request of the Achaeans gave him an opportunity, at the same time, of showing his regard to the injunctions of the late king, who had charged him to cultivate the friendship of Aratus, and to pay particular attention to the counsels of that experienced statesman.

He accordingly promised, as soon as he had settled the affairs of his own kingdom, to repair to Corinth, in order to meet the convention of the states in alliance with Achaia; and in conjunction with them to settle their plan of future operations.

During these transactions, the Aetolians had committed a fresh act of violence, far more outrageous, as their enemies affected to represent it, than any thing they had yet been guilty of*. Making a new inroad into Peloponnesus, they had sacked Cynaetha, a city of Arcadia, putting to the sword most of the

B O O K

V.

Sect. I.

Philip's pride
gratified by
this applica-
tion:he promises to
co-operate
with Achaia.The Aetolian
sack Cynaetha.

* See Polyb. L. iv. c. 17.

B O O K inhabitants, and laying the place in ruins. The
V. inhabitants of Cynaetha had, it seems, been long
Sect. I. noted for fierce and barbarous manners. Some time
before the present period, one party of them had
risen against another, whom they drove into banish-
ment; but the exiles, on certain conditions, having
obtained their recal, contrived to betray the city
to the Aetolians, who, without distinction of friend
or foe, exterminated the whole inhabitants. How
far the wickedness of the Cynaetheans might afford
an apology for this inhuman proceeding, it is now
difficult to say. So exceedingly great, it certainly
appears, was their profligacy, that they were held in
such abhorrence by the rest of the Arcadians, that
into some of their cities it was even deemed a defile-
ment to admit them. What makes this profligacy
the more worthy of historical notice, is the extra-
ordinary manner in which ancient writers account
for it.

The neglect
of music the
cause of its
misfortunes:

They ascribe it⁷ to a neglect of the study of music.
The Arcadians, say they, being accustomed, from
the unkindly soil they had to cultivate, to a tough
and hardy life, and breathing an air keen and incle-
ment, required some gentler relaxation to soften and
humanize their minds, which might otherwise have
contracted an asperity similar to that of the country
they inhabited; and this alteration, experience taught
them, music had the power of effecting in a greater
degree than any other species of amusement. Music
was accordingly, with them, the great national

⁷ See Polyb. L. iv. c. 20, 21. & Athen. Deipnos. L. xiv.

object. Their children, from the time they first began to speak, were instructed to sing hymns to the gods, and to chant the praises of their ancient chiefs; and this study they were, by the laws of Arcadia, to continue until the age of thirty, no other amusement being allowed among them, nor any other art held in equal estimation. At their sacred festivals, the boys and men were obliged to make trial of their skill, and to celebrate the solemnity with melody, song, and dance. And even at their convivial meetings, every person was in his turn to raise some instructive song; which to be incapable of doing, was ignominious in the highest degree. But the Cynaethans, history tells us, having departed from the institutions of their ancestors, had degenerated into savage ferocity, delighting in cruelty, perfidy, and every vicious habit which debases the nature of man.

B O O K

V.

Sect. I.

The fact, however strange it may be esteemed in our present state of cold and artificial manners, is far from being incredible. The music here spoken of, Polybius expressly tells us, consisted of hymns and paeans in honor of their deities and ancient heroes⁸, and was altogether of the moral class, conveying to the mind whatever was awful and effecting in their religion, their policy, or national events. So that songs such as these, aided besides by that power of melody⁹, in which, if there is truth in the records

accounted for.

⁸ ὕμνους καὶ παιᾶνας, οἷς ἕκαστος κατὰ τὰ πατρία τοὺς ἐπιχωρίους ἡρώας καὶ θεοὺς ὑμνοῦσι.

See Polyb. L. iv. c. 20.

⁹ Dr. Brown (Union of Poetry and Music, sect. 5.) insists that the boasted efficacy of ancient music among the Greek

B o o k of ancient days, the Grecian artists avowedly excel-
 v. led, could not fail, especially when operating on
 Sect. I. young and uncorrupted minds, to inspire exalted
 sentiments, and to make the heart beat high in the

tribes was chiefly owing to the powerful and affecting song, which, according to him, derived but little aid from the musical accompaniment, their melody being exceedingly simple and inartificial. And he criticises Dacier and Montesquieu, for ascribing too much to the manual execution in those early ages. But "their music being simple and inartificial" is one of the very reasons why it was so amazingly powerful, "simplicity in melody" being a necessary requisite, as an ingenious writer confesses, (see Dr. Gregory's *Comparative View of the State and Faculties of Man with those of the Animal World*) "in all music intended to reach the heart, "or even greatly to delight the ear." And thence in part it is, that music has always been of more consequence among the less cultivated, than among what are called highly-civilized nations; the latter, by refining their music, and rendering it more complex, have lessened, if not destroyed, its power of affecting. We may therefore venture to suppose, and the testimony of the most respectable of the ancients justifies the conjecture, that, simple as their instrumental music may have been, and however unacquainted with that concentual harmony, probably the invention of later ages (see Sir John Hawkins's *History of Music*, B. iii. c. 2, 3.) it was nevertheless in strength of expression and deep pathetic force far beyond any thing known amongst us. So that, with all the energy that poetry, generous affection, and tender sentiment, can give (for to these heart-ennobling subjects was the ancient Grecian song altogether sacred) (see Plutarch. de Musica) the songs of Greece had also every advantage that genuine and inspirited melody can bestow. When such a combination took place, among a people of quick and strong perception, and who had not yet attained the art of suppressing their feelings, is it strange that every passion, as we are told was often

cause of virtue¹⁰. No wonder, therefore, that the Cynaetheans, by proscribing so important a part of education, should have suffered in the way we are told; as the effacing of every religious impression,

B O O K
V.
Sect. II

the case, should have confessed its controlling power? — See Hawkins's *History of Music*, prel. disc. p. 12. B. ii. c. 2. p. 166, 167. & B. iii. c. -1. p. 251. See also Harris on *Music, Painting, and Poetry*; and De Guy *Voyage en Grece*, Lettre 36.

¹⁰ It will readily be acknowledged, that several of the effects ascribed by the writers of Greece to their ancient music (such as, stimulating or controlling the passions; the relieving from bodily pain or infirmity, &c. &c.) are to be understood allegorically, or to be considered as the enthusiastic flights of a yet rude, and therefore wondering people. Nevertheless, when we see the legislator seriously employing himself in regulating the music to be permitted within the state, on account of *the influence* which, he tells us, *it had on the public manners*, it is impossible not to perceive, that their music must have had a power, which, whether the cause is in our manners or our musical expression, we now seek for in vain. Ecprepes, a Spartan Ephore, Plutarch (in Agide) informs us, cut off two of the nine strings from the instrument of Phrynis the musician, in order to check the voluptuousness of the music which this artist was introducing, and *which might destroy the harmony of the state*. And some years after, Timotheus was prosecuted and banished from Sparta, for having attempted the like innovation in the strings of the lyre, *to the corruption of the Spartan youth*. The decree Boethius has preserved to us —

“Whereas Timotheus the Milesian, coming to our city,
“has deformed the ancient music, and, laying aside the use
“of the seven-stringed lyre, and introducing a multiplicity
“of notes, endeavours *to corrupt the ears of our youth*,
“by means of these his novel and complicated conceits,
“which he calls *chromatic*, by him employed in the room

B O O K and a total depravation of manners, must evidently
v. have followed.

SECT. I. But how great soever the contempt in which the Cynaetheans were held, the destruction of their city by the Aetolians excited much indignation throughout Peloponnesus; and the Achaean confederates being now met at Corinth, it was urged before them, as a new instance of that spirit of violence, of which the Aetolians stood accused. In such an assembly, convened under the influence of Aratus and his friends, in which the king of Macedon himself presided, every charge against the Aetolians was readily admitted. The whole convention, with joint suffrages, agreed, that the Aetolians were guilty; that reparation should be demanded; and that, unless it was obtained, war should forthwith be declared against them; and the direction of it committed to the Macedonian king.

“ of our *established*, *orderly*, and *simple* music — It
“ therefore seemeth good to us, the King and Ephori, after
“ having cut off the superfluous strings of his lyre, and
“ leaving only seven thereon, to banish the said Timotheus
“ out of our dominions, that every one beholding the
“ wholesome severity of this city, may be deterred from
“ bringing in amongst us any *unbecoming* customs.” — See Hawkins’s History of Music, B. ii. c. 7. and Principles and Power of Harmony. See also Boethius de Musica; & Decretum Lacedaemon. contra Timotheum miles. E. Codd. Mssis. Oxoniensibus, Oxon. 1777.

Compare what this curious monument says, and what likewise Polybius and other ancient writers relate concerning the Arcadian music, with the utmost that can be said of our music, considered as an instrument of national virtue; and how striking must our inferiority appear!

Such was the beginning of the *social war*¹¹, so called from the association entered into by the several states engaged against Aetolia. It commenced the first year of the 140th Olympiad, the same in which Hannibal laid siege to Saguntum, and continued for the space of three years after. Though this war was not attended with any overthrow of states, nor remarkable revolution of power, it was nevertheless in two respects of pernicious consequence to Greece; it gave to Philip an ascendant in the Grecian councils, of which a fatal use was afterwards made by that ambitious prince; and it aggravated that animosity and deep-rankling hatred, which had long subsisted between state and state, and which ended at last in the utter subversion of them all.

Philip began his operations in a manner that afforded little benefit to his Achaean allies. The Aetolians, by their frequent inroads into the countries that lay between them and the Macedonian frontiers, were become the terror of all the nations of those parts. The Epirots in particular, no longer the respectable people they once had been, were now fallen under a kind of subjection to the Aetolians; and, though disposed to follow the Macedonian banners, they were with-held by a dread of the Aetolian power. Philip formed the plan of restraining these incursions, which, whilst Greece appeared as the ostensible object of his care, tended at the same time to the security of his own kingdom. He accordingly laid siege to Ambracos¹², an important fortress, com-

B O O K
V.
Sect. I.
Social war.

Philip lays
siege to Am-
bracos, and
takes it;

¹¹ Πόλεμος συμμαχικός. — See Polyb. L. ii. c. 36.

¹² See Polyb. L. iv. c. 7. 61. & Palmerii Græc. Ant. L. ii. c. 7.

BOOK V. Sect. I. manding Ambracia and the country adjacent, which properly belonged to Epiro, but was now in the hands of the Aetolians. Having reduced this fortress, he put the Epirots in possession of it, and prepared to carry the war into the heart of Aetolia.

the Aetolians
invade Ma-
cedon.

The fierceness of the Aetolian spirit was in no shape humbled by this loss; on the contrary, whilst the enemy was thus at their gates, they detached a large body of forces, to invade Macedon; who, after committing great devastation wherever they appeared, pushed on as far as Dium¹³, a place of note near the Thermaic gulph, famed for its sumptuous temples, which were enriched by valuable offerings, and adorned with the monuments and statues of the Macedonian kings. This city the Aetolians laid in ruins; they spared not even the sacred edifices; and they carried off immense spoils. About the same time, another Aetolian band had passed over into Achaia¹⁴, and nearly surprised Aegium, one of the cities of the Achaean league; whilst a third army, in conjunction with the Eleans, had fallen on that part of Achaia which bordered on Elis, ravaged the territory of Dymé, Pharae, and Tritaea, and taken Teichos, a strong castle in that neighbourhood, by which they kept in awe all the country around.

and make
incursions into
Achaia:

distress of the
Achaean:

Meanwhile, every resource seemed to fail the Achaeans. They had sent to Philip to hasten to their assistance; but the ravages of the Aetolians, joined to the hostile movements of the Dardani-
ans,

¹³ Polyb. L. iv. c. 62.

¹⁴ Polyb. L. iv. c. 57.

had already made his own dominions the first and most necessary object of his attention. Aratus, the general of Achaia, judged it imprudent to risk a battle, to which he knew himself unequal, as the mercenaries in the Achaean service had mutinied for want of pay; and the native Achaeans alone were not to be depended on. Their Peloponnesian confederates were all, at the same time, either spiritless or disaffected. Even the Messenians¹⁵, in whose cause chiefly Achaia had at the beginning taken up arms, were unwilling and afraid to act against the Aetolians, who kept a formidable garrison at Phialea¹⁶ on their frontiers, from whence they could at any time lay Messenia waste. Whilst the Spartans, though under no such apprehensions, and notwithstanding their having, at the late convention, pledged themselves to Achaia, had now massacred or banished¹⁷ all their own citizens who were supposed to be in the interest of the Achaeans, and had openly declared against them.

the Spartans
renounce their
alliance,

It will be necessary to explain the causes of this sudden revolution in the Spartan councils; and from them we shall be instructed what was the condition of Sparta at this period.

¹⁵ See Polyb. L. iv. c. 31.

¹⁶ Polybius (L. iv. c. 3, 6. & 31.) makes mention of Phigalea, a strong-hold on the Messenian borders; and (L. iv. c. 79.) of the Φιαλείς or people of Phialea, a strong-hold likewise on the borders of Messenia. From several circumstances it is probable, that it is the same strong-hold which is spoken of in all these places.

¹⁷ Polyb. L. iv. c. 34 & seq.

B O O K

V.

Sect. 1.

from what
causes.

Since the battle of Selasia, where, as already related, Cleomenes was defeated by Antigonus Doson king of Macedon, the Spartans, amidst their greatest humiliation, had ever been impatient of the domination of Achaia; to which the haughtiness of that republic had in all probability very much contributed. When the Aetolians, after the death of Antigonus, first invaded Peloponnesus, they had been disposed to join them; but the Ephori then in office could not agree about the expediency of the measure; two of them being strenuous in the cause of Achaia, the other three on the side of the Aetolians; upon which an insurrection having ensued, the Ephori in the interest of the Achaeans were slain. The arrival of Philip at Corinth, and the association of the Peloponnesian states against Aetolia, checked for a time this turbulence of spirit; and though most of the Spartans were secretly friends to the Aetolians, they found it adviseable to disguise their sentiments, and to appear well affected to the Achaean confederacy.

The following year encouraged other views. The Achaeans, harassed by the Aetolians, and unsupported by the king of Macedon, became less considerable; and the Aetolians openly solicited the alliance of the Spartan people. Their party was powerful; and the proposal had, without doubt, been accepted, had not the Ephori, who were then all devoted to the interests of Achaia, vigorously opposed it. This opposition proved fatal to these magistrates. They were shortly after massacred in the temple of Minerva, whilst they were employed

in the performance of certain sacred rites; and other Ephori, of whose compliance the friends of Aetolia were well assured, were appointed in their room. In consequence of these transactions, the Spartans renounced all connexion with the Achæan states, and declared the Aetolians their allies.

Such was the situation of affairs at Sparta, when tidings arrived, that Cleomenes, of whose return they still cherished hopes, had died in Egypt. The Ephori laid hold on this occasion; and, under the appearance of zeal for the ancient Spartan polity, proposed, even at the expense of their own power, that the regal government should be restored. The nomination they made explained fully their purpose. On the throne of the elder branch they placed an infant, named Agesipolis, of the royal line, and grandson to that Cleombrotus, who had been advanced to the regal dignity upon the expulsion of Leonidas. The other throne they filled with Lycurgus, an ambitious partisan of their own party, although he had not the least right by inheritance, and several princes of the younger branch were still alive; but Polybius ¹ tells us, that Lycurgus had bought the suffrages of the Ephori, at the rate of a talent to each.

By these arrangements, amongst other favorite objects, the Ephori effectually secured the political union of Sparta with the Aetolians; Lycurgus ratifying all the stipulations they had made, and commencing immediate hostilities against the Achæan confederates.

¹ L. iv. c. 35.

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V.

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Cleomenes
dies in Egypt

Interested
conduct of
the Ephori

they sell the
Spartan
throne to Ly-
curgus,

who confirms
all their acts

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Philip
marches into
Peloponnesus;

Above a year had elapsed, since the alliance had been formed against Achaia; during which time, Philip had performed but little of what he had promised. The Dardanians, however, who had threatened the Macedonian borders, having, upon his approach, retired homeward, he now found himself at leisure to attend to the distressed situation of his Peloponnesian friends; and, though in the depth of winter, he set out¹⁹ with the utmost secrecy for Corinth, where a part of his forces lay.

surprises a
party of Ele-
ans;

The Aetolians, and the states in their alliance, had not the least suspicion of his having left Macedon: they had entertained an early contempt of Philip, on account of his youth; and the success, with which they had carried on their depredations, had confirmed them in an opinion, that they had nothing of consequence to fear from him. They soon found themselves to be mistaken. Philip having advised the Achaeans of his arrival, and summoned them to join his standard, surprised a party of Eleans, who, lulled into security, had gone forth to ravage the Sicyonian territories, and cut to pieces or took prisoners almost the whole body; out of two thousand five hundred men, scarcely one hundred escaping. From thence, notwithstanding the rugged precipices and deep snows in his march, he advanced to Psophis, a remarkable strong-hold within the confines of Arcadia, of which the Eleans had got possession. The situation of this place, together with the severity of the season, seemed to render

lays siege to
Psophis,

¹⁹ Polyb. L. iv. c. 67 & seq.

any attempt against it impracticable. It was a square fortification, surrounded with strong walls. On three sides the approaches to it were defended either by the Erymanthus, a deep and impetuous river, or by rapid torrents, all of them swollen high with the winter-floods; and on the fourth side, it was covered by a hill difficult of ascent and well fortified. Philip, nevertheless, surmounted all these obstructions; he brought his scaling ladders to bear against it; and he pushed on the assault with so much vigor, and in so many different parts at once, that he soon made himself master of it. Lasion and Stratum, two other cities in that neighbourhood, the Eleans had also surprised; but, terrified at the fate of Psophis, they immediately abandoned them.

Elis, one of the finest regions of Greece in point of cultivation, and rich in every species of rural wealth, was now open to Philip. Through this country he spread devastation; pursuing the Eleans even to their mountains, and carrying off cattle and other plunder to an immense amount. He next entered Tryphalia, a district of Peloponnesus to the southward of Elis, which had some towns capable of defence, garrisoned by the Eleans and Aetolians; but in six days he reduced them all.

The reduction of these places brought about also that of Phialea, on the Messenian borders. Phialea had for some years been under the domination of the Aetolians; who, as we have already observed, on all occasions infested from thence the Messenian territories, controlling the councils of that people,

B O O K and permitting them to have neither friend nor foe,
V. but in common with themselves: but now, deriving
Sect. I. courage from the success of Philip's arms, and the report of his advancing to their assistance, the inhabitants rose upon the Aetolians, and forced them to evacuate their city. This event had important consequences; the Messenian states recovered their independence, and, no longer intimidated by their Aetolian oppressors, declared immediately on the side of Macedon.

the temperate
 use he makes
 of his victories:

The capacity and vigor shown by Philip in the course of this expedition, which he had completed in the short space of a few weeks, during the severity of the winter-season, received an additional lustre from the temperate use he made of his victories. He granted peace to all who sued for it. Of the places which he had reduced, he retained few in his own possession. In some, content with having expelled the Aetolian garrisons, he re-established the former inhabitants, and restored to them their ancient polity. Other cities he bestowed on his Peloponnesian confederates: the Achaean states, in particular, he had gratified with Psophis, the most important strong-hold in this part of Greece; and which to them was an acquisition of great importance, as it strengthened their frontier towards that quarter. His whole conduct, indeed, seemed to proceed on the same generous plan which Antigonus had formerly adopted. The friend of liberty, and the enemy of oppression, his martial exploits carried with them no appearance of selfish ambition; but seemed only to have in view the advantage of his

allies, and the defence of Peloponnesus against the encroachments of Aetolian usurpation. B O O K
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But amidst all these fair appearances, a strange alteration ^{2°} began to discover itself in the character of Philip, who had now retired to Argos, and there kept his court. Some time before the death of Antigonus, that excellent prince, sensible of his declining health, and apprehensive of the consequences which the intrigues of faction might occasion under a minority, had appointed the different persons to whom the principal administration of affairs was, upon his demise, to be intrusted. At the head of the council of regency he had placed Apelles, whom he also appointed tutor to the young king; a man versed in affairs of state, and supposed to be of strict integrity; but all was artful fallacy and deception. Under a plausible outside, he concealed the greatest duplicity of heart, the imperiousness of a tyrant, and an insatiable lust of power. Leontius, with the title of captain of the cuirassiers, Antigonus had named to the command of the army; Megaleas was appointed secretary of state; Taurion to be king's lieutenant in Peloponnesus; and Alexander to be captain of the life-guard. These dispositions had been implicitly acquiesced in by Philip: and Apelles was at this time prime minister, and the royal favorite. Of the other chief-officers of the crown, Megaleas and Leontius were the creatures of the minister, and paid an implicit obedience to his instructions. Apelles, who in Macedon Sect. i.
adopts other
principles:

character of
his ministers; their pride,

^{2°} Polyb. L. iv. c. 76. 82. & seq. Plutarch. in Arato.

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acted without control, was soon disgusted at the rigid firmness and unpliant character of the republican Greeks; who frequently presumed to dispute his orders, and to talk of laws and privileges, which and duplicity; they would not suffer to be infringed. He therefore resolved to humble them: and, so early as the late expedition into Elis, he had given directions to the several Macedonian officers, to take every opportunity of treating them with contempt and injustice, particularly in the division of the plunder, and in the distribution of quarters; with strict injunctions, should they presume to complain, to charge them with mutiny, and to punish them accordingly. The Macedonians, Polybius observes ²¹, had, by a similar policy, established their dominion over the nations of Thessaly, who had now only the shadow of liberty remaining; and Apelles expected, that he should with as little difficulty effect the same in Peloponnesus. But the Achaeans were not so easily to be subdued. They applied directly to Aratus, who, with a becoming spirit, remonstrated to Philip against the conduct of his ministers. Philip saw that matters were not yet ripe for the execution of the intended project: he therefore temporized; and, affecting to throw the blame on his servants, commanded them to desist from giving offence to his Achaean allies.

they are opposed by
Aratus,

whom they
endeavour to
supplant:

Some other method of accomplishing their designs was now to be employed. Aratus, at this time, had the lead in the Achaean councils, and the person

²¹ L. iv. c. 76.

who was supported by his recommendation, was always sure to succeed to the appointment of General of Achaia. That it might not, therefore, be in his power again to obstruct the views of Macedon, Apelles laid his plan to withdraw from this statesman the confidence of the Achaeans, by throwing the administration of affairs into other hands; and he accordingly advised Philip to attach himself to the party in opposition to Aratus²². Philip entered readily into the views of his minister, and immediately set out for Achaia, in order, by his presence, to influence, if possible, the approaching election of General. The most eminent and the worthiest of the Achaeans were all the friends of Aratus; but to be the friend of Aratus was now a crime. Philip supported, therefore, the election of Eperatus, whose only merit was his enmity to this great man; yet, without abilities, and without personal weight, Eperatus, by dint of the intrigues, the threatenings, and the bribes, which Philip and his ministers employed, defeated the united opposition of Aratus and every honest Achaean. He was elected. To counterbalance, however, this unpopular measure, and to strengthen himself in the affections of the Achaean people, Philip laid siege to Teichos²³, the fortress of which the Aetolians had possessed themselves the preceding year, took it, and restored it to the Achaeans of Dymé, to whom it belonged; and, having made an inroad into Elis, he presented

²² Polyb. L. iv. c. 23. Plutarch in Arato.

²³ Polyb. L. iv. c. 84.

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the Dymeans, and the cities in that neighbourhood, with all the plunder he had carried off.

are disap-
pointed:

Philip was now, in his own imagination, master of Achaia; the administration was devoted to him; and the wealth and vigor of that republic, he fancied absolutely at his disposal; but he soon found what an empty phantom he had been pursuing. The season for action approached; provisions were necessary for the subsistence of the army, and funds were wanted for their pay. The new general was applied to upon this occasion; but no magazines had been provided; and the treasury was exhausted; Eperatus had neither credit nor invention for immediate resource; and the king had to suffer the mortification of courting the interest of Aratus, in order to obtain supplies of money and stores; to apologize for the affront he had cast upon him; and to confess himself indebted to him, even for the means of carrying on the war.

invent an
accusation
against him:

Apelles, however, still persisted. Nothing less than the destruction of Aratus was now his object. He accused him of holding a treasonable correspondence with the enemy. Philip had sent overtures of peace, with large offers of protection, to the Eleans, on condition of their renouncing the friendship of Aetolia: and the Eleans had rejected the proposal. Apelles²⁴ pretended to have proof, that the obstinacy of the Elean people was owing to secret instructions they had received from Aratus; and with this he had the insolence, in the presence of the king, to

²⁴ Polyb. ubi sup.

charge both Aratus and his son; in the most solemn manner averring the truth of what he had alledged against them. But this charge failed also of its effect. Aratus found means fully to prove his innocence; and Philip, from this time, either ashamed of the mean practices he had been induced to countenance, or more probably, convinced that he could not act with vigor without Aratus, affected to place much confidence in that Achaean statesman, and to give less attention to the suggestions of his enemies.

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but are defeated:

But, whatever might be the dissimulation of Philip, Apelles was transported with indignation at this appearance of favour to the man he hated. He had formed a plan for the subjection of Greece; and, in return for so important a service, had promised himself whatever the gratitude of his master had to bestow; but now, amidst these visions of greatness, he saw himself supplanted by the man, whom he had marked out for destruction. Urged then by ambition, disappointment, jealousy, and revenge, he conceived a design far more atrocious than any he had yet imagined. In conjunction with Megaleas and Leontius, a formal conspiracy²⁵ was entered into for defeating the views of the king in whatever he should undertake; of exposing his troops to distress and discomfiture, and of encompassing him with such insuperable difficulties, as might either compel him to abandon a war, which his ministers were not allowed to guide, or to meet his ruin in the prosecution of it. Apelles was still

resolve to compass the destruction of Aratus, though at the expense of their master.

²⁵ See Polyb. L. v. c. 2 & seq.

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at the head of administration, and had powerful influence over the several departments of government throughout the kingdom of Macedon. The more effectually to execute what he and his accomplices had projected, it was agreed, that under the pretence of public service, the first should remove to Chalcis in Euboea, where he might find opportunities of intercepting all remittances from Philip's hereditary dominions. Meanwhile, it was to be the province of Megaleas and Leontius to throw obstacles in the way of every expedition that promised advantage to their sovereign and his Achaean confederates; to mislead the king into ruinous measures; and even, if found necessary, to spread disaffection and mutiny in the army, in order to render its operations feeble and ineffectual.

Philip soon felt the fatal effects of this treasonable combination. Disappointed of the customary supplies, he was reduced to great distress. To whatever measure Aratus recommended, the king's officers urged numberless objections; and in their turn, rather to distract than to promote the public operations, proposed attempts generally useless and often impracticable. Aratus at length prevailed on the king to attack the Aetolians in their maritime settlements, as the only method of annoying them effectually; and he proposed to begin by a descent on Cephallenia, an island in the Ionian sea, near the coast of Peloponnesus; the great resort of the Aetolian pirates, from whence they continually infested the neighbouring coasts of Achaia, Acarnania, and Epire. This attempt, however, was attended

Philip attempts the island of Cephallenia,

with real difficulties. Ships were to be procured, and mariners to be trained; the Macedonians not being conversant in naval affairs. The enemy at the same time had many vessels in actual service; and there was not a creek or a current in those seas with which they were not well acquainted. Aratus nevertheless persevered, and Philip soon saw himself in a condition to appear before Palaea, one of the chief cities of the island; which he certainly must have taken, had he not been prevented by Leontius. A practicable breach had been made, and the assault ordered; but that traitor, who still kept the command, contrived to have the party, that mounted the breach, repulsed; when Philip, seeing his troops dispirited at this check; and uncertain upon whom to fix the charge of treachery, in vexation raised the siege ²⁶.

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is baffled by
his ministers:

The Macedonian ministry thought they had now carried their point. But they deceived themselves. Aratus, notwithstanding this disgrace, besought the king not to abandon the expedition, but to endeavour to make an impression upon Aetolia itself, where he might have an opportunity of revenging the wrongs of Greece, and of essentially distressing the common enemy. Philip felt himself strongly inclined to follow this advice. He could not but remember the sacking of Dium by the Aetolians; the barbarity and rapine which had marked their incursions into Epire; and the sacrilegious ruin of the famous and revered oracle of Dodona,

by Aratus's
advice invades
Aetolia,

²⁶ Polyb. L. v. c. 4.

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with success.

which they had spoiled of its treasures, and levelled with the ground ²⁷.

To cover this design, however, from the enemy, the fleet had instructions not to touch at any part of the Aetolian coast ²⁸, but to shape their course to Leucas, the famed promontory ²⁹ of Acarnania, across which had been cut a canal, which opened into the Ambracian gulph. Through this canal the fleet was to make its way, and, proceeding up the gulph, was to land the forces on the upper part of the Acarnanian coast, within a few hours march of the Aetolian confines. Leontius, who now saw clearly into Aratus's plan, trembled for the issue. The Aetolians could scarcely escape destruction. They had, he knew, but a small part of their forces at home, Dorymachus, the Aetolian general, having marched with a considerable body to invade Thessaly, with the view of forcing Philip to fly to the defence of his own dominions. The Aetolians, at the same time, had received no intimation of the intended invasion, and on that side especially were unsuspicious of any hostile attempt. He endeavoured, however, to baffle Aratus, if possible. Under various pretences, he endeavoured to gain time. He talked of encamping; of halting but for a few hours; of not exhausting the troops, fatigued already by constant service. But all his representations

²⁷ See Polyb. L. iv. c. 67.

²⁸ Polyb. L. v. c. 5. & seq.

²⁹ See Mr. Addison's elegant account of the virtues ascribed to this promontory by the pagan world. Spect. N° 223. 227. 233.

served only to increase the ardor of Aratus, who entreated Philip not to listen to any proposal of delay, but to push on, day and night, success depending entirely on the rapidity of their march. The second day from their landing they entered Thermum, one of the most remarkable citadels of Aetolia, if not of Greece, for situation and opulence. It was seated on the brow of a craggy mountain, encompassed on every side by a rocky and hilly country, and though without wall or defence, but what nature had formed around it, seemed to defy every hostile approach; the only road, that led to it, being a narrow rugged path, of steep ascent, skirted either by thick woods, or deep lakes, by yawning precipices, or tremendous rocks. This remarkable strong-hold, the boldest foe had never dared to attempt: and here was deposited the chief wealth of Aetolia; their stores; their arms; their treasure; all that was elegant or curious in workmanship of which Greece could boast, paintings and statues, splendid porticoes and sumptuous temples, adorning a city where the Aetolian estates held their conventions, and their annual fairs; where they celebrated their national feasts and sacrifices; and where was sent every thing in Aetolia of value and magnificence, for the double purpose of ostentation and security.

Philip had now the fairest opportunity of satiating his revenge; which Polybius himself³⁰, the professed enemy of the Aetolians, acknowledges he

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He surprises
Thermum,
and lays it in
ruins;

³⁰ I. v. c. 9.

B O O K indulged to an excess altogether unjustifiable. Not
V. content with having abandoned the place to pillage,
Sect. 1. he afterwards laid it in ruins. Of more than two
 thousand statues, such only were spared as appeared
 to have been dedicated to the gods; the rest being
 either broken in pieces or defaced; the temples were
 rifled, and the sacred ornaments, which the piety
 of ages had dedicated, were defaced or torn down;
 and when the soldiers had selected from the booty
 all the precious things, which they thought they
 should be able to carry off, they collected the rest
 into a heap, and set them on fire; whereby fifty
 thousand suits of armour, besides an immense
 quantity of rich stuffs, were consumed. The same
 success which attended Philip in his march to
 Thermum, he also met with in his return, having
 had the precaution to secure by strong guards all
 the important passes on the way. Some flying par-
 ties hung indeed upon his rear, and followed him
 to the place of embarkation; but they were not
 able to make any sensible impression: and, by the
 time Dorymachus, who upon the first advice
 hastened homeward, had reached Aetolia, the
 Macedonians had retired.

returns into
 Peloponnesus
 and ravages
 Laconia.

Philip resolved to follow his blow, before the
 enemy had recovered from the consternation which
 this bold enterprise had spread among them. Having
 embarked his troops, and committed some slight
 ravages along that part of the Aetolian coast which
 lay on the Ionian sea, he entered again the Corinthian
 gulph, landed at Lechaëum, and marched into
 Laconia; Lycurgus the Spartan king having, during

the late siege of Palaea, committed devastation in the Messenian territories, for which Philip now meant to make reprisals. The Spartans had just heard of the sacking of Thermum, and were preparing to send succours to their Aetolian confederates, when they discovered the Macedonian army within a short distance of Sparta. The sudden appearance of the enemy, the report of their operations, and the amazing expedition they had used, left the Spartans without the power of defence. They kept within the city, whilst the Macedonians, uncontrolled, extended their depredations to the utmost verge of Laconia on the sea of Crete; laying waste with fire and sword the fairest parts of the country, and destroying, wherever they moved, every trace of cultivation. On their return, the Spartans prepared to intercept them, but here again they failed, their troops were put to flight, and the Macedonians carried off a prodigious booty.

What renders these spirited operations more honorable to Philip's military character, is the difficult situation in which he found himself at the time they were executed; beset with obstructions, which his treacherous ministry were incessantly raising to his measures; deeply distressed in mind from the discoveries he had already made; and still more perplexed from the grounds he had to suspect that much more was yet to be discovered. A more minute detail of these dark treasons will not be improper in this place. Though matters of a private nature, they are closely connected with the transactions we record.

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Sect. I.

Treasonable
practices of
the king's
ministers.

The king
suspects
them, but
temporizes,

We have mentioned the disloyal machinations of Apelles, and the ministers in combination with him, to embarrass and defeat their royal master in whatever he should undertake, rather than suffer Aratus to guide his councils. The attempt on Thermum, and the success that attended it, had inflamed their resentment higher than ever. Megaleas and Leontius, who accompanied the king in that expedition, had employed every artifice to disappoint him, but, as we have seen, they had been baffled. The sullen gloom³¹ that sat on their countenances, in the midst of the general joy upon the safe return of the army to the place of embarkation, plainly demonstrated their treacherous wishes, and struck the observation of the king in so forcible a manner, that, from this appearance, combined with other circumstances, he was strengthened in his suspicions, that villany and treason had taken root among them; and the conduct of Megaleas soon afforded proofs of what he suspected. Determined at any rate to destroy Aratus, he contrived, under color of an affray, to instigate ruffians to attempt his life; and he had probably effected his purpose, had not the intervention of Philip himself, whom the uproar had called forth, compelled the assailants to desist. When summoned on this account before the king, Megaleas had even the insolence to avow his intentions, and his unchanged resolution of executing them: and Philip, who in the art of temporizing was exceeded by none, contented himself at present with putting him under arrest, and imposing on him a fine of twenty talents; for

³¹ See Polyb. L. v. 14, 15.

which Leontius binding himself as security, the B O O K
V.
arrest was soon after removed.

The Laconian expedition now engrossing all the Sect. 1.
king's thoughts, the matter rested here for the present. But upon the return of the army from Laconia and counters
acts them:
to the Corinthian isthmus, Leontius³², uneasy at the suspected situation of Megaleas, in whose condemnation he was conscious he must be finally involved, formed a scheme to intimidate the king from proceeding farther in this inquiry, under pretence that there were dangerous discontents in the army, on account of what had been already done; and, his interest among the soldiery being powerful, he even excited an insurrection. This, however, availed him little. Philip, with great vigor and address, suppressed the mutiny upon it's first breaking out; but appeared to take no pains to be informed by whom it had been fomented. This unexpected indifference struck Leontius and his associate with new terror: they began to dread that the king knew more of their proceedings than they had suspected; and that his affected calmness was grounded on temporizing dissimulation. Under the impression of this fear, they dispatched messengers to Apelles, to hasten his appearance at court, in order that his influence might restore their drooping cause. He appeared accordingly; but the king, who had been already apprized of his criminal connexions, received him with a coolness so striking, that Megaleas, who now saw that he had no protection to expect, fled:

³² Polyb. L. v. c. 26. & seq.

B O O K leaving Leontius, his security, to be responsible
 V. for his fine; which accordingly Philip immediately
 Sect. I. demanded.

makes a full
 discovery of
 their treason,

The guilt of great ministers is seldom more than suspected during their day of favor; it is their disgrace which completes the discovery. The fullest evidence now poured in from every quarter. It appeared, that Apelles had possessed himself of an authority not inferior to that of the king; and that he had used it to the most treasonable of purposes; that he had usurped an absolute dominion over the royal revenues, and, with a design to ruin the king's affairs, had diverted them from the public service; that he had, in his own name, and by his sole authority, issued orders of the first importance, and received and answered all dispatches, without even consulting his master; that every department throughout Macedon was filled with his creatures, who looked up to no sovereign but him, and were prepared to execute whatever he should command: — that Leontius, in like manner, had established such an interest among the military, as to be able to command them as he pleased; and that the discomfiture at Palaea, and the repeated disappointments which had of late cramped the king's operations, had all originated in him: — Megaleas had entertained a treasonable correspondence with the enemy, and, by letter under his own hand, had encouraged the Aetolians to prosecute the war, assuring them of the low state of the king's finances, and throwing out against him many illiberal reflections. Such daring treasons against his honor, his crown, and his life,
 fully

fully justified the utmost rigor on the part of Philip. B O O K
Apelles and his son were seized and executed. Leon- V.
tius had been imprisoned upon Megaleas's flight, Sect. 1.
and the army had interceded in his behalf; but and punishes
Philip, not intimidated, ordered him also to be them with
immediately put to death. Whilst Megaleas, who the utmost
had fled to Thebes, hearing that the king was in severity.
pursuit of him, endeavoured to expiate his crimes
by putting a voluntary period to his life.

B O O K V.

S E C T I O N II.

C O N T E N T S.

Philip treats Aratus with dissimulation — forms a connexion with Demetrius of Pharos. — The history and character of Demetrius — he prevails on Philip to aim at the subjection of all Greece; and to join Hannibal against the Romans — Philip finds his schemes opposed by Aratus — has him taken off by poison — and behaves to his son in a manner still more cruel and flagitious — prepares a considerable force to act against the Romans — his pusillanimity — defeat — and flight. — The Romans stir up the Aetolians against him — the fatal consequences of this measure to Greece. — Philip makes peace with the Aetolians — and with Rome — with what view — conspires with Antiochus to deprive the infant king of Egypt of his paternal kingdom — besieges Abydos — is reproved and threatened by an ambassador from Rome — his haughty answer — dreadful ruin of Abydos.

B O O K

V.

Sect. 2.

Seeming advantages to Aratus from the removal

THE removal of the Macedonian ministers promised considerable advantages to Aratus. They had been avowedly his enemies; his destruction was one principal article of their original plan; and he had taken, therefore, an active part against them during the late inquiry. To his sagacity and zeal Philip

owed most of the material discoveries he had made; and the king seemed to acknowledge his services, by the unbounded confidence he now reposed in him; living with him as his friend, and paying uncommon attention to his counsels.

B O O K

V.

Sect. 2.

of the Macedonian ministers:

This fair appearance of trust and royal favor was, nevertheless, all fallacy and artifice. It soon appeared, that Philip still entertained the same insidious designs against the liberties of his Peloponnesian confederates, in which Apelles had led the way; and, however highly he might affect to prize Aratus, it became evident, that he considered him merely as the instrument of his ambition, to be employed whilst serviceable; and, when he ceased to answer his views, to be removed as dangerous, or cast aside as useless.

Philip acts deceitfully towards him;

In fact, the crime of the late ministry, in the eyes of Philip, was not, that they had endeavoured to lessen the importance of Aratus in the Peloponnesian states, or to reduce those Greek republics under subjection to Macedon. So far they had acted in concurrence with the views of their royal master. Their crime was, that they had not suffered Aratus to take the lead, when it became necessary to the interests of Philip; and that, instead of acquiescing in that subordination which the complection of the times rendered expedient, they had rashly adopted pernicious counsels; and, in their attempt to overthrow this Achaean chief, endeavoured to involve their sovereign with him in one common ruin.

entertains views hostile to the Grecian liberties:

The war still continued, though its operations were now for the most part languid and uninteresting.

Philip changes his plan;

B O O K ing; the several states being rather employed in
v. adding to the strength of their own frontiers, than

Sect. 2. in annoying those of the enemy. Twice had a negotiation for peace been set on foot, under the mediation of Rhodes and other maritime powers, but without effect; when on a sudden Philip declared his resolution of putting an immediate end to the war¹. This measure, however precipitate and mysterious it might appear, when the profound dissimulation of that prince is considered, had nevertheless been formed upon motives, which he had long revolved in his mind. It will be necessary to explain what these motives were, as they have an important influence on the subsequent fortunes of the Grecian people.

on what account.

Demetrius of
Pharos assists
the Romans
against Teuta;
is rewarded
by them for
his services;

Towards the latter end of the reign of Antigonus, the Romans had, for the first time, passed over into Illyricum², the north-west boundary of Greece, and bordering upon Macedon, to revenge an insult offered to their ambassadors by Teuta, queen of a district of that country. At the same time, a prince named Demetrius reigned in Pharos an island on the Illyrian coast, which, together with a few places on the neighbouring continent, formed the whole of his possessions. Whether from hatred of the Illyrian princess, whose resentment, Polybius³ tells us, he had reason to dread, or in hopes of sharing her spoils, he had joined the Romans, and at the close of the war, which ended in the defeat of Teuta, had been rewarded with a considerable addition to

¹ OLYMP. cxi. 4. BEFORE CHRIST 212.

² Polyb. L. ii. c. 11.

³ Ubi sup.

his little principality. But, after their departure, emboldened by a report, that the Gauls threatened Italy, and that Hannibal also was preparing to invade it, he renounced the fealty he had promised them, strengthened himself in men and ships, passed beyond the limits they had prescribed for his conduct, infested the islands and coasts around, and even destroyed cities, in which the Romans had an immediate property *. Of these outrages complaint having been brought to Rome, the Roman forces returned, and expelled him from his dominions. In this reverse of fortune, he had taken refuge at the court of Philip. His misfortunes, his military reputation, his impetuous and enterprising spirit, suited to the natural genius of Philip himself, gained favor with the king, which he cultivated with assiduity and art. He penetrated into his character; addressed himself to his fears, to his vanity, to his ambition. "Such abilities as his," he told him, "were meanly employed in the petty wars in which he was engaged, when so noble an object as Italy was in view; that, instead of fighting the battles of one republic of Greece against another, it ought rather to be his policy to extend his dominion over them all, and to mould these now disjointed states into one solid mass of empire; which, beloved as he was by some of them, and dreaded by others, he might effect without much difficulty; that, were the Romans once to establish themselves in the neighbourhood of Macedonia, it would not be long ere that kingdom would

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revolts against them;

is deprived of all his possessions;

flies to Philip;

and incites him to enter into alliance with the Carthaginians, and attack the Romans;

* Polyb. L. iii. c. 16 & seq.

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find herself reduced to the same abject situation to which Illyricum was already humbled; that the Carthaginians were then on their march to rescue the liberties of mankind from Roman usurpation, that a more favorable opportunity never could offer, as his friendship, whilst the issue of the war was yet doubtful, would be of value at Carthage; but, should once the Roman power be subdued, he might then find enemies, where now he might have friends and allies⁵. ”

Philip listens
to him;

The most frivolous arguments, when our own passions plead on the same side, become powerful. Philip, inattentive to the dangers he was plunging into, saw nothing before him but victory, glory, and dominion. He enjoined, however, the strictest secrecy to Demetrius, until it was known what progress Hannibal should make. He had faithful accounts transmitted to him of all his motions. His passage of the Rhône, his march over the Alps, his victory at the Ticinus, and again at the Trebia, had successively added to the hopes and exultations of Philip; but the tidings of his having overthrown and slain a Roman consul at the lake Trasimenus, and of his being master of Etruria, proved decisive. Philip, without farther delay, resolved to put an end to the war in Greece, to enter into alliance with Hannibal, and to pour all his forces into Italy.

Aratus en-
deavours to

Aratus⁶ would have dissuaded him from this imprudent project; but his representations were

⁵ Polyb. L. v. c. 101. Just. L. xxix. c. 2.

⁶ Polyb. de virtutibus & vitiis, p. 1371.

disregarded. The other part of Philip's plan, "to
 " make himself absolute lord of Greece," he was
 obliged to manage, however, with greater caution. He had already, by intrigue and artful services,
 contrived to form a strong interest among the
 Argives; among the Arcadians; as well as among
 some of the Achaean cities; and these, he expected,
 would lead the way to the subjection of all the
 Peloponnesian states. To accomplish this great
 object, it was necessary to be master at the same
 time, of the citadel of Corinth, and of the castle
 of Ithome, two fortresses, emphatically called *the*
fetters of Peloponnesus. The first was already in
 his power; and the other he hoped soon to possess.
 Ithome was situated in the Messenian territories;
 and the dissensions which then prevailed in that
 state, seemed greatly to favor his views. The
 people complained of the tyranny and oppression
 of the nobles; and the nobles were jealous of the
 unbounded spirit of liberty which predominated
 among the people. To both parties Philip pre-
 tended to be a friend, and both parties he deceived.
 The nobles he encouraged not to give way; the
 people not to submit. His mediation served only
 to pour oil upon the flames; and the contending
 factions had recourse to violence. The people
 prevailed; and, after much bloodshed, possessed
 themselves of Ithome: when Philip, under pretence
 of offering sacrifices for their prosperity to Ithomean
 Jupiter, had address to get admission into the
 fortress. Yet, even in this stage, he was disap-
 pointed of his object. Demetrius of Pharos, and

B O O K

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dissuade Philip,
but in vain.Philip forms a
strong interest
in several of
the Grecian
states;has a design
on Messenia;

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but is pre-
vented by
Aratus.

Causes Aratus
to be taken off
by poison;

Aratus, had both accompanied him, though with different views. Demetrius, privy to the fraud meditated by Philip, was incessant in urging him on to the execution of his purpose: whilst Aratus, suspicious of his design, was watchful to defeat it. The instant, therefore, that Philip's intention^{*} became apparent, he remonstrated against it in the most spirited manner; reminded him of the honorable part the late Antigonus had acted towards the Grecian states; and intreated him to reflect, in what a disadvantageous light he must stand, should he, who had been considered as their protector, become the invader of their common liberties. Shame, or more probably the fear of a formidable opposition, which he saw Aratus was prepared to raise, induced him to desist.

From that time Philip's real character began to display itself. Aratus and his son, who now perceived but too evidently the treacherous views of their Macedonian ally, withdrew immediately their confidence; and this step precipitated their destruction, which Philip appears already to have meditated. The disappointment of Ithome still dwelt upon his mind; and he had long felt with indignant pride the superior and impracticable virtue of those republican chiefs. Their avowed diffidence of his principles and honor, had convinced him that he could now no longer conciliate their friendship, but at the expense of the great object of his ambition, the subjugation of Greece; and he resolved they

^{*} Polyb. Excerpt. L. vii. Plutarch in Arato.

should live no longer to disturb his pursuits¹. B O O K
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Sect. 2.
 Taurion, who commanded under Philip in Peloponnesus, was the instrument he employed: he lived in intimacy with Aratus, and soon found an opportunity of executing his master's orders. Poison was the means: to prevent detection, the deadly preparation was not to destroy life at once, but to undermine it, and waste it away by slow degrees, that the disease might have the appearance of a natural decay. But Aratus was not so deceived. His friend Cephalon, Plutarch² tells us, visiting him one day, and observing with concern, that he spit blood, "such, Cephalon," replied Aratus, "are the fruits of royal friendship."

Before this period, in violation of the rights of hospitality, generally held in the highest reverence by the pagan world, Philip had privately seduced Polycratia³, the wife of the younger Aratus, who, in the confidence of friendship, had received him into his family. The elder Aratus had indeed suspected the intrigue, but in tenderness to his son had concealed his suspicion. Philip now, however, gloried in the action, and not only prevailed on the wife to elope, but contrived to have a poisonous draught administered to the husband, which, from the quality of the ingredients, or the strength of his constitution, deprived him not immediately of life, but disordered his understanding to such a deplorable degree of imbecility, as led him to the

corrupts the
wife of the
younger
Aratus,

and with a
poisonous
draught disor-
ders the hus-
band's under-
standing.

¹ Polyb. Excerpt. L. viii. Plutarch in Arato.

² Plut. ub sup.

³ Plutarch. ub sup. Liv. L. xxvii. c. 31.

B O O K

V.

Sect. 2.

The opinion
to be enter-
tained of this
prince,

commission of actions so abominable and ignominious, that his death, in the flower of his age, was considered at length as the greatest blessing that could have befallen his family or himself.

When it is remembered, by what strong ties Philip was bound to Aratus; the many important services which he had received from him; the regard which he owed to the dying charge of the excellent Antigonus; the attachment and almost filial reverence which he affected towards him; when it is considered, too, that the crimes above-mentioned were the deeds of a prince, celebrated till then for integrity of soul and generosity of sentiment, one would almost question the historian's testimony. Polybius¹¹ accounts for this extraordinary alteration, upon the supposition of his having been perverted by the Pharian Demetrius, a daring and most unprincipled statesman; whilst Plutarch¹², is of opinion, that the virtues of which Philip had made a show in the early part of his reign were all feigned¹³; and that, as opportunity invited, as his fears diminished, and his power increased, he discovered those vicious principles which dark policy had taught him hitherto to

¹¹ Polyb. L. v. c. 12. Et de virtut. & vitiis, p. 1371.

¹² In Arato.

¹³ It is evident, from Polybius's own account, that, antecedently to any influence which Demetrius of Pharos could have had on him, he had been privy to all the machinations of Apelles and his fellows, and only then disavowed them, when he found, they were not likely to succeed.

conceal. If so, such deep dissimulation, such B O O K
 finished and unrelenting profligacy of mind, at so V.
 early a season of life, is hardly to be paralleled in Sect. 2,
 history; for at this period his twenty-fourth year
 was not yet completed; and Plutarch's honest and of the
 indignation, at the review of such a character, judgments
 led him to pronounce, that the many and severe that befel him
 misfortunes, which befel him in the succeeding afterwards,
 part of his reign, were judgments of heaven for
 his atrocious crimes: "The vengeance," says he,
 "of Jupiter, the patron of hospitality and of friend-
 "ship, visiting him for the breach of both, and
 "pursuing him through life."

Amidst the abhorrence, however, which the Aratus himself
 guilt of Philip naturally excites, it may be of use to blame for
 to observe, that to Aratus's own mistaken counsels, calling in the
 the calamities that overwhelmed him were in a great Macedonian
 measure to be imputed. Jealous first of Cleomenes, power,
 and afterwards of the Aetolians, he had called in
 that very Macedonian power, which in the end
 destroyed him; and in his last hours he had the
 mortification to reflect, that his country, his family
 and himself, were the victims of an ill-directed am-
 bition, which sought too eagerly the aggrandize-
 ment of Achaia at the expense of the rest of Greece.
 Yet, with some blemishes, Aratus was certainly
 one of the greatest men of antiquity. An able
 statesman, and a firm patriot, by his genius,
 vigor, and perseverance, he gave to his republic
 that form and splendor which raised it to the first
 rank among the states of Greece; and, had he
 been less jealous of Sparta and of Aetolia, history
 perhaps had not left us a more finished character.

B O O K

V.

Sect. 2.

Philip sends
an embassy to
Hannibal;his ambassa-
dors are taken
by the Ro-
mans;he sends a
second em-
bassy, and con-
cludes a
treaty;

Philip, in the mean time, had seriously resolved to pass into Italy, and to co-operate with Hannibal in humbling the Roman power. With this view, he had sent ambassadors to the Carthaginian general; but they had been intercepted soon after their landing on the Italian coast. Pretending, however, that their errand was to Rome, they in a little time obtained their release, and made their way to Hannibal, with whom they concluded a treaty; but on their return, being taken at sea by a Roman squadron, they were sent with all their papers to Rome. This intelligence, however, did not discourage Philip. Another embassy was immediately dispatched, and a second ratification of the treaty was obtained. If we are to believe Livy¹⁴, Philip engaged "to furnish a fleet of two hundred ships, "to be employed in spreading devastation along "the Italian coasts; and also to assist Hannibal "with a considerable body of land-forces:" in return for which, when Rome and Italy should be finally reduced, the sole possession of which the Carthaginians were to retain, Hannibal was to pass into Epire at the head of a Carthaginian army, to carry on the war there in any manner Philip should desire; and, having made a conquest of the whole country, to yield up to him those parts of it, and those islands, that lay convenient for Macedon¹⁵.

¹⁴ See Liv. L. xxiii. c. 33.

¹⁵ The treaty, which we find in Polybius (Excerpt. L. vii. c. 2.) is of a different tenor, and seems to be conceived in more modest terms. It contains only general stipulations of mutual amity and aid between Carthage and Macedon, and

It is not the business of the present work, to enter into a detail of the wars which Philip had to sustain against the Romans. They belong to another history. It will be sufficient to take a summary view of the principal events, as far as they affect the fortunes of Greece.

Philip's first exploits discovered little of that spirit, which his bold stipulations with Hannibal seemed to promise. He had equipped a considerable fleet, and, setting sail from Macedon, coasted along the eastern shore of Peloponnesus, doubled the cape of Malea, entered the Ionian gulph, and advanced as high as the mouth of the Aous, on which stood the city of Apollonia; when, receiving advice that the Roman fleet, which lay off Sicily, had weighed anchor to give him battle, seized with a panic, he immediately hastened back to Cephalenia, hauled his vessels on shore, crossed over into Peloponnesus, as if called away by some urgent business, and made his escape into Macedon¹⁶.

His next attempt ended in a manner equally disgraceful. He had surpris'd Oricum, on the coast of Epirus, an unwalled and defenceless sea-port, con-

B O O K
V.
Sect. 2.

enters the
Ionian gulph
with a consi-
derable fleet;

steers down to
the coast of
Epirus, takes
Oricum, and
lays siege to
Apollonia;

that *the one* should have the same friends and enemies as *the other*, except where otherwise bound by antecedent treaties; with a particular clause, by which the Carthaginians obliged themselves, in case of a peace with the Romans, to insist previously on their evacuating Corcyra, Pharos, and all the islands which they held along the coasts of Illyricum and Epirus, and on their restoring to liberty all *those of the family* (ὁμήϊους) of the Pharian Demetrius, whom they had prisoners.

¹⁶ Polyb. L. v. c. 110.

B O O K

V.

Sect. 2.

is surprised
and defeated
by the Ro-
mans.

Reals away
homeward.

considerable only on account of its situation, as from thence there was a short course to Italy. Marcus Valerius Laevinus, the Roman commander at Brundisium, who knew Philip's connexions with Hannibal, and had instructions from Rome to observe him, upon the first information of his having possessed himself of this port, hastened to dislodge him. Philip had in the mean while marched to Apollonia, situated at a short distance from Oricum, and laid siege to it. Into this place, before Philip had the least idea of his approach, Laevinus contrived to introduce a chosen body of Romans; who, together with the garrison, having sallied out in the night, broke into Philip's camp, and with much slaughter routed the whole Macedonian army, the king himself, half-naked, escaping with difficulty. He made towards his fleet, which lay off Apollonia, on the Aous, with an intention of pushing to sea; but, Laevinus having blocked up the mouth of the river, Philip, after running his vessels aground, or setting them on fire, was obliged to steal homeward across the mountains¹⁷.

The embarrassed situation, however, of the Romans did not permit them to attend to this Macedonian war. The flower of their nation had lately fallen at Cannae. Posthumus with his whole army had been cut off by the Gauls. Campania had revolted. The faith of Calabria was doubtful. And, exclusive of the variety of armaments, which these complicated dangers rendered necessary, they had wars to sustain in Spain, in Sicily, and in Sardinia.

¹⁷ Liv. L. xxiv. c. 40.

It was therefore determined to endeavour, if possible, to raise enemies against Philip in Greece, that he might be employed at home in defending his own dominions. Valerius Laevinus applied accordingly to the Aetolians, of all the Greeks the most likely to listen to such an overture. He found in them the very temper of mind he wished. Naturally warlike, they entertained a violent resentment of what they had suffered from Macedon in the course of the last war, and they looked impatiently for opportunities of revenge. These favorable dispositions Laevinus took care to cultivate by the most lavish promises on the part of Rome: "they were," he told them, "the first nation beyond sea, with whom Rome had deigned to make alliance, and they might therefore be assured of holding a more distinguished place in her friendship than any other people": Philip had been hitherto a troublesome and a faithless neighbour; he should henceforth be disabled from injuring them: and Acarnania, which they had formerly possessed, should

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V.
Sect. 2.
The Romans
stir up the
Aetolians
against Philip.

"Aetolos eo in majore futuros honore," says Livy (L. xxvi. c. 24) "quod gentium transmarinarum in amicitiam primi venissent." This, however, is not true. It appears from Polybius (L. iii. c. 22. 24. & 25) that so early as the consulship of Junius Brutus and Marcus Horatius, immediately after the expulsion of the kings, the Romans had made a treaty of amity with the Carthaginians; and that this amity was solemnly renewed on two subsequent occasions. And that such a treaty subsisted between Rome and Carthage, and had been thrice ratified Livy himself (L. ix. c. 43) acknowledges. The language of negotiation had, it seems, its tricks and subterfuges in ancient days as well as in modern.

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V.

Sect. 2.

“ be restored to them.” The Aetolians believed these flattering declarations, and they hastened to conclude a treaty with the Roman ambassador, of which the principal articles were, “ that the Aetolians “ should wage immediate war against Philip by land, “ which the Romans were to support by a fleet of “ twenty galleys; that, whatever conquests might “ be made from the confines of Aetolia to Corcyra, “ the cities, buildings, and territory, should belong “ to the Aetolians; the other plunder of every kind “ to the Romans; and that the Romans should “ endeavour to put the Aetolians in possession of “ Acarnania.” The Aetolians made it their request, that in this treaty of alliance the Eleans and Spartans, together with Attalus king of Pergamus, with Pleuratus and Scerdiletus princes of Illyricum, should, if agreeable to them, be also included. Nothing could conspire better with Laevinus’s views. The more enemies Philip had to contend with, the less he was to be feared. Laevinus, on the conclusion of this treaty, immediately employed his arms in reducing Zacynthus, a small island on the Peloponnesian coast, with Oeniadae and Naxos, two cities situate in that part of Acarnania bordering on Aetolia; which, as an earnest of what they might expect from the generosity of Rome, he instantly gave up to the Aetolians; and, having thus lighted up the torch of war in Greece¹⁹, he retired to Corcyra²⁰.

From this period the humiliation and final subjection of the Grecian states advanced; for some

¹⁹ OLYMP. cxli. 4. BEFORE CHRIST. 206.

²⁰ Liv. xxvi. c. 24.

time,

time, by slow degrees, but afterwards with wonderful rapidity. The Romans, having once obtained a footing in Greece, soon found means to establish themselves there with firmness; at first the confederates, and, ere long, the imperious controllers of that very people, who had opened to them the gates of Greece; extending their influence from city to city, by artfully availing themselves of the credulity, the domestic feuds, the ambition, and the avarice, of the different leaders; always ready to support the weaker against the mightier, that, the strength of each individual state being broken by degrees, it should be less difficult in time to accomplish the destruction of the whole; covering all the while their ambitious views with the smooth semblance of moderation, equity, and friendship; until, the vigor of Greece being on every side gradually undermined, the whole tide of the Roman power rushing in, it was totally overwhelmed.

Among the many calamities, which the unfortunate introduction of the Romans brought immediately upon Greece, it had the effect to give Philip a stronger interest in most of the Grecian states than he had ever before possessed²¹. It was now no longer remembered, that he was the flagitious tyrant, who had rewarded hospitality with libidinous violation and treacherous murder, and had harboured projects the most hostile to public liberty; the people now even looked up to him as the champion of freedom, and their bulwark against the barbarians (for so they styled the Romans) whom the perfidious Aetolians had

B O O K
V.
Sect. 2.
Fatal consequences to Greece of the Romans obtaining a footing in it;

the influence it had on the Achaean councils;

²¹ Polyb. Excerpt. L. x. c. 38. Just. L. xxix. c. 4.

B O O K

V.

Sect. 2.

and on those
of the other
Peloponnesian
states.

invited into Greece; in consequence of which, not only the Greeks to the north of the Corinthian isthmus, but even the Achaean league, prepared to arm in his support. The Achaeans, in particular, were at the same time stimulated by apprehensions of immediate danger to themselves. Between them and the Aetolians as we have seen, an inveterate enmity had long subsisted, and in the present posture of affairs they had nothing to expect from the latter but hostility and devastation. The Spartans too, and the Eleans, the ancient enemies of Achaia, now in avowed confederacy with the Romans and Aetolians, were also on their frontiers. The Spartans especially, proud of their alliance with Rome, seemed to have resumed all their ancient spirit, and to meditate the recovery of that sovereignty they had formerly claimed over the rest of the Peloponnesian nations. The prince at present on the Spartan throne, was at the same time of a warlike and enterprising temper. Lycurgus, who had purchased the kingdom of the Ephori, having died, after a short and turbulent²² reign, Machanidas, another adventurer, had usurped the throne; and having expelled the young king Agesiopolis, reigned now the sole tyrant of Sparta; and,

²² Chilon, a prince of the royal line of Sparta, formed the plan of dethroning Lycurgus; and, with a party of his friends, having fallen on the Ephori, who had sold the kingdom to him, put them all to the sword; but Lycurgus himself made his escape. And the Spartan people, though Chilon promised them a new division of lands, refusing to join him, he was obliged to abandon the design, and to go into banishment.— See Polyb. L. iv. c. 81.

whether impelled by his own disposition, or the situation of affairs at home, he gladly availed himself of the opportunity of leading out his Spartans to war.

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During these emotions in Peloponnesus, the tumult of arms had already spread throughout the northern provinces of Greece. Philip, now sensible of the dangers he had brought upon himself, exerted a vigor far different from what he had lately shown. He began by securing his frontiers against the bordering nations, whom the present embarrassments of Macedon, and perhaps the expectation of support from Rome, might encourage to renew their incursions; he even carried the war into Illyricum²³, and had taken Lissus and Acrolissus; the former, the most considerable city in that country, and the other, a fortress of remarkable strength, at some short distance, hitherto supposed to be impregnable; so that most of the other cities of those parts, terrified at the vigor and rapidity of his progress, opened their gates without resistance. These successes were followed by his marching to the relief of the Acarnanians, whom the Aetolians were preparing to invade: they had implored aid of Philip; but before he reached their borders, the Aetolians had retired. The like spirited measures he pursued throughout Thessaly and the countries adjacent, counteracting the Aetolian influence, wherever he suspected it to prevail, and putting in a posture of defence every place, which he thought to be in danger of an attack from the enemy.

Philip exerts uncommon vigor;

takes Lissus and Acrolissus;

marches to the relief of the Acarnanians,

and strengthens himself in Thessaly.

Hitherto, the Aetolians had gained little by their alliance with Rome. Their great object had been the

The Aetolians receive little

²³ Polyb. Excert. L. viii. c. 10, 11.

B O O K

V.

Sect. 2.

benefit from
their alliance
with Rome;

reduction of Acarnania ; but the report, that Philip was on his march to relieve it, together with the desperate resolution of the Acarnanians²⁴, who, determined not to survive their liberties, had armed all their males from fifteen years to sixty, and bound them under a heavy curse, never to quit the field of battle unless victorious, had obliged them to abandon the attempt. And although Laevinus, at the return of spring, had re-entered Greece, the whole of his operations amounted only to the taking of Anticyra, a city of the Locri, on the north-side of the Corinthian gulph; the spoils of which, with all the prisoners, he seized on as Roman property, leaving to the Aetolians, according to the strict letter of his treaty, the bare soil and a desolated city²⁵. And soon after which he set out for Rome, to take possession of the consulship, to which he had been elected.

but, from their
hatred of Phi-
lip, continue
the war;

Stimulated, however, by their hatred of Philip, and of the states confederated with him, they disregarded these discouragements, and pressed the war with the same ardor with which they had at first engaged. Sulpicius, who had been appointed to the command of the fleet on the Ionian station, in the room of Laevinus, had sent them a supply of near a thousand men; and they had likewise received succours from Attalus. They immediately passed over into Peloponnesus, and in conjunction with the Spartans, fell upon Achaia; but as they were returning homeward laden with plunder, they were

defeated by
Philip in two
engagements.

²⁴ Liv. xxvi. c. 25. Polyb. L. xvi. c. 17. & fragm. p. 1519.

²⁵ Ibid. L. xxvi. c. 26.

met by Philip, who, having had notice of the distressed condition of the Achaeans, was hastening to their assistance; a battle immediately ensued, and the Aetolians were defeated. Undaunted, however, they a second time engaged; but were not more fortunate; they were again discomfited, with the loss of a great part of their army, the remainder with difficulty saving themselves in one of the neighbouring cities. Philip's success, however, roused the jealousy of some of the adjoining states. They saw the danger with which they were threatened, should the power of Macedon be increased by the reduction of Aetolia; and they interested themselves in mediating a peace²⁶. Philip listened readily to the proposal, his ambitious views leading him to other wars; and a peace was on the point of being concluded, when the Romans, to whom the prolongation of the war in Greece was of the utmost importance, sent their fleet to the support of the Aetolians; who, being emboldened also by assurances they at the same time received from Asia, that Attalus was preparing to join them with a considerable force, set Philip at defiance; and, in the style of victory, talked of conditions, to which they knew he could not give his consent²⁷.

B O O K
V.
Sect. 2.

Peace proposed by the neighbouring states;

Philip willing to treat;

rejected by the Aetolians.

This, however, was by no means prejudicial to Philip; it gave, on the contrary, his Greek confederates a high opinion of his moderation and

²⁶ The principal mediators were, the Athenians, the Rhodians, the people of Chios, and the king of Egypt.

²⁷ See Liv. L. xxvii. c. 30.

B O O K

V.

Sect. 2.

Philip sets out
from the Ne-
mean games,
and repulses
the Romans;

peaceful purposes; whilst it strengthened their indignation against the Aetolians. These favorable dispositions he soon found a brilliant opportunity of cultivating. He was assisting at the celebration of the Nemean games, when tidings arrived that the Romans had landed, and were ravaging the country from Corinth to Sicyon. He instantly set out, attacked the enemy, obliged them to fly to their ships, recovered the booty they had taken, and was again at Argos before the games were concluded. This rapid and splendid achievement against Roman troops, gave to Philip a high degree of lustre in the eyes of Greece, now assembled at the Nemean solemnity; which he greatly improved by the affability and familiar deportment he affected towards these republicans, who, accustomed to liberty, were wonderfully flattered in beholding a prince in the height of power, and just crowned with victory, mix freely among them, and, divesting himself of the pomp of royalty, wear the garb and manners of a fellow-citizen²⁸.

distinguishes
himself in a
second engage-
ment;

His next enterprise, though not so successful, was not less honorable to his valor. The Aetolians having got possession of Elis, near the borders of Achaia, Philip advanced in order to dislodge them; but, upon giving them battle, he found they were stronger than he had conceived, and that they had Roman soldiers among them; Sulpicius, who lay off the Peloponnesian coast, having, unobserved by Philip, contrived to reinforce

²⁸ Liv. L. xxvii. c. 31.

the Aetolian garrison with five thousand men. He nevertheless charged the enemy with vigor; when, his horse being killed under him, he continued to fight on foot, until, numbers being slain on every side, and the enemy pressing on, he must undoubtedly have been taken or killed, had not his men, by one bold effort, rushed in and borne him off. Disappointed in his design on Elis, he did not, however, return without success. There stood at some distance a strong castle, in which the Elean peasants had taken shelter, with their flocks and herds, the principal wealth of the country; this castle he surprised, and carried off twenty thousand head of cattle, together with four thousand prisoners.

B O O K

V.

Sect. 2.

overpowered
by numbers;yet surprises
a strong castle,
and carries off
immense plunder:

But²⁹, amidst all this exertion of vigor, and seeming regard for the independence of Greece, the unprincipled profligacy of Philip's character still betrayed itself. Not long before this period, he had, a second time, attempted the liberties of the Messenians, but had been baffled by the manly stand they had made against him; the Pharian Demetrius, to whom he had committed the conduct of his plan, having lost his life in the attempt³⁰. At Argos he had, at the same time, incurred much disgrace by his excessive dissoluteness; invading, with the most daring licentiousness, the honor of private families, and employing even terror and violence³¹, where the powers of seduction failed.

his dissoluteness renders
him odious;

²⁹ Liv. L. xxvii. c. 32. ³⁰ Polyb. L. iii. c. 19.

³¹ Liv. ubi supra.

BOOK

V.

Sect. 2.

returns to
Macedon.Philopoemen
begins to
distinguish
himself;

his character.

Happily for his Peloponnesian confederates, the necessities of Macedon called him away; a report of his death having encouraged domestic insurrections, and the inroads of hostile borderers.

Notwithstanding Philip's departure, the military operations of the Achaean states suffered no interruption: a very important alteration having taken place in relation to that people, who now, instead of placing their whole dependence on foreign aid, displayed abilities and resources equal to the most spirited enterprise. It was by Philopoemen³² this change had been effected. Originally of Megalopolis in Arcadia, this great man had distinguished himself, from his early years, by ardent exertions for the liberties of his country, and a strenuous opposition to the Spartan power, then the most formidable in Peloponnesus; having chosen even to abandon his property, and submit to the miseries of exile, rather than live in subjection to the Spartans, who had made themselves masters of his native city. Aratus, about the same time, was employed in strengthening the commonwealth of Achaia, in order to form it into an effectual barrier against the ambitious attempts of his Spartan neighbours. The disinterested and enlarged views of Aratus, attached Philopoemen³³ to his interests; he co-operated in many of his schemes, and was active in bringing over several of the Arcadian citizens to join the Achaean league. Soon after the

³² Polyb. Excerpt. L. xi. c. 7. Plutarch in Philopoem.

³³ Polyb. L. ii. c. 40.

death of Aratus, the integrity and military capacity of Philopoemen gave him the principal lead in the Achaean councils, in the conduct of which, though inferior to Aratus in political abilities, he equalled him in zeal for the cause of freedom; and, in the martial line, he far surpassed him. War, indeed, was peculiarly his province; so that, although he wished to resemble Epaminondas, whom he had proposed for his model, it was only in his military genius, according to Plutarch¹⁴, in his activity, his sagacity, and his contempt of riches, that the parallel was strong; but, to the mildness, the gravity, and the wisdom of that illustrious Greek, the character of Philopoemen could never rise; the department of arms, says this historian, being far more suited to his genius than the administration of civil affairs. The first great battle, in which Philopoemen distinguished himself remarkably, was that of Selasia; the success of that memorable day being in a great measure decided by a judicious movement of the corps which he commanded¹⁵. He passed afterwards into Crete, in order to perfect himself in some parts of the military science, for which the Cretans were famed. But it was not in the field of war alone that Philopoemen showed his genius, for military affairs. They were his constant occupation; in his walks, even in his journeys, in his rural sports, his whole attention was employed in observing the difficulties of steep or broken grounds;

B O O K
V.
Sect. 23

¹⁴ Ubi supra.

¹⁵ Polyb. L. ii. c. 67, 68.

BOOK the advantages which might be derived from passes, woods, inclosed fields, or open plains; the difference made by rivers, ditches, and defiles, with every situation, where the ranks of an army should be extended in front or in file. By this singular and incessant attention to the military line, he acquired an extraordinary knowledge and readiness in martial affairs; no emergency, however sudden, finding him unprepared. When advanced to be general of Achaia, he saw with concern the state to which a foreign yoke had reduced his countrymen, and he conceived the noble resolution of relieving them from their humiliating condition. He altered altogether their discipline; he made them acquainted with hardship and toil; he gave them weightier armour, and weapons of greater execution. Their cavalry, hitherto ostentatious and useless, because mostly composed of young men of rank, who entered into it more from vanity than from public-spirited motives, he modelled so as to render it vigorous and respectable. He turned even to advantage the frivolousness of the Achaeans. The young men of wealth and rank affected much splendor in their dress; this taste for magnificence he persuaded them to transfer to their armour and military accoutrements³⁶. This displayed a great knowledge of the human heart. To combine a love of splendor with a love of arms, will ever have a powerful effect on youthful minds. To have attempted to enforce the simplicity of the ancient

³⁶ Plutarch. in Philopoem. Polyb. Excerpt. L. xi. c. 7.

garb, at the period of refinement to which the Achaeans had then arrived, would only, in all probability, have generated fullness and resistance. Philopoemen judged therefore with wisdom, when he made the foibles of his fellow-citizens subservient to the glory of the state; whilst even the richness of their armour, among men naturally warlike, might powerfully assist the point of honor in the day of battle, and produce wonderful exertions, to prevent the loss, as well as the disgrace, of such armour becoming the property of their foes. The effect indeed of this judicious and insinuating discipline became sensibly felt. The Achaeans recovered much of the prowess of former days; the armies of Aetolia and Elis, who, promising themselves, as usual, an easy victory, had ventured, upon Philip's absence, to attack them, being totally defeated.

Sulpicius had in the mean time engaged in an expedition against Euboea³⁷. Finding that Philip had marched from Peloponnesus, he sailed to Aegina, and wintered in that island, after having made a conquest of it, and sold the inhabitants for slaves. Attalus king of Pergamus having afterwards joined him with his fleet, as soon as the season permitted, they shaped their course towards Euboea. Of all the provinces of Greece, this, though an island, was one of the most considerable for fertility of soil, extent of territory, and situation³⁸. To the east,

The Romans
with Attalus
attack Eu-
boea.

³⁷ Liv. L. xxviii. c. 5 & seq.

³⁸ See Strabo, L. x. p. 306.

B O O K

V.

Sect. 2.

it opened to the trade of Asia, and the numerous islands that cover the Hellespontine and Aegean seas, and, to the west, it reached along the coasts of Locris, Boeotia, and Attica, from the Maliac bay to the promontory of Sunium; being divided from the continent by a channel, so exceedingly narrow in one part, as to admit a bridge over it. Opposite to this pass was Chalcis, the principal city of the island, accounted, from its advantageous seat, the key to this quarter of Greece. The king of Macedon had a very valuable stake in these parts; most of the cities, both of Euboea and the adjacent continent, being held by Macedonian garrisons.

Philip makes
vigorous
preparations:

Philip was not inattentive to the designs of the enemy. He had settled the affairs of his own kingdom in the best manner he could, and had moved down to Demetrias in Thessaly; he had assembled a numerous force, and given assurances of effectual support to all his allies. Signals by fire ³⁹ he ordered to be made from the heights of Euboea, and from Peparethus, a small island at some distance from it, and also from certain mountains of Phocis and Thessaly, that he might thereby have regular and speedy intelligence of the enemy's motions, in order to hasten to the relief of places in most immediate danger ⁴⁰. With all these spirited and judicious preparations, Philip did not remain merely on the defensive. He endeavoured to surprise Heraclea, a

³⁹ See Polyb. L. x. c. 42, 43, 44.

⁴⁰ Liv. ubi sup.

city on the confines of Thessaly, where the Aetolian states had assembled in order to confer with Attalus; but before Philip got thither, the convention was dissolved, and he could only lay waste the country all around. In the mean time, Oreum, one of the strongest cities of Euboea, was taken by the Romans; having been betrayed to them by the governor, whom they had corrupted. Encouraged by this success, Sulpicius had laid siege to Chalcis. But the strength of the place, and the vigorous defence made by the commanding officer, who was not to be tampered with, added to a report that Philip was approaching, obliged him to abandon the attempt. Whilst Philip, however, was employed in saving Chalcis, Opus, a wealthy city of the Locri, his allies, was stormed and plundered by Attalus; and though the king of Macedon, upon the first advice of the movements of Attalus, marched towards Opus with all possible expedition, and warmly pursued the plunderers, who had hastily retired on his approach, they nevertheless escaped to their fleet on the Euripus, and secured all the booty they had taken.

In this fluctuating manner had the war continued six years, neither the Aetolian confederates, nor those of Macedon, having much cause to boast; when a sudden revolution in the fortunes of Philip left him arbiter of Greece. Attalus was called away to the defence of his own kingdom, which Prusias of Bithynia was preparing to invade: and the Romans also, to whom the defeat of Asdrubal had opened other views, and tired at the same time

B O O K

V.

Sect. 2.

loses Oreum
by the
treachery of
the governor,but saves
Chalcis.Attalus
storms and
plunders
Opus.The Romans
and Attalus
retire from
Greece.

B O O K of a war, the events of which were indecisive, and
V. the issue doubtful, withdrew from Euboea, and
Sect. 2. soon after failed homeward.

Machanidas,
 tyrant of
 Sparta, slain
 in battle by
 Philopoemen;

These changes were followed by an event very unfavorable to the interests of the Aetolians. Machanidas of Sparta, the most warlike and powerful of their Grecian confederates, fell " in battle by the hands of Philopoemen. Upon the departure of the Romans and Attalus, Philip had returned to Macedon, to oppose the inroads of the bordering nations; and Machanidas, who had long sought occasion to reduce all Peloponnesus, availed himself of his absence, and at the head of a considerable army advanced towards Mantinea, a city of Arcadia under the protection of the Achaean states. Philopoemen was at this time general of Achaia. He observed all the tyrant's motions; and, assembling immediately his forces, gave him battle. The victory at first inclined to the side of Sparta; Machanidas, who had begun the charge with great vigor, having broken and put to flight the left wing, composed of a body of Tarentines and other auxiliaries; but urging the pursuit too far, and separating himself from the rest of his army, Philopoemen marked his opportunity; and falling upon the main body of the Spartans, defeated them totally. Machanidas, who saw the confusion of the Spartan line, hastened back; but, Philopoemen having possessed himself of a ditch, intersecting the field of battle, across

* OLYMP. cxliii. 2. BEFORE CHRIST 202.

which it was necessary for Machanidas to pass, in order to rejoin his troops; as he was attempting to spur his horse over it, Philopoemen killed him with his javelin⁴². The death, however, of Machanidas did not restore liberty to Sparta; he was succeeded by Nabis, another tyrant, much inferior to him in military abilities, but infinitely more flagitious and cruel.

B O O K
V.
Sect. 2.

Nabis suc-
ceeds him.

Every thing now, in appearance, favored the ambitious designs of Philip. The Aetolians could no longer oppose his arms; and Italy lay open to him: where, notwithstanding the declining state of the Carthaginian affairs, he might still have made a powerful diversion in favor of Hannibal. But he had at present adopted other views. He not only, therefore, made peace with the Aetolians, but entered also into terms with the Romans; who, though they affected to be displeased with the Aetolian states for having listened to an accommodation with Philip, soon after followed their example, relieving themselves with secret satisfaction from a war, which, whatever they might boast, had certainly greatly embarrassed them.

Philip makes
peace with
the Aetolians
and Romans:

The cause of this alteration in the Macedonian councils deserves notice.

Ptolemy Philopator was at this time on the throne of Egypt, a prince of the most dissolute manners; and, though in the prime of life, languishing under an infirm and decayed constitution, the consequence of vicious excesses. He had only

this alteration
occasioned by
his views on
Egypt;

⁴² Polyb. Excerpt. L. xi. c. 7. Plutarch in Philopoem.

B O O K one child, an infant son, whose weakly constitution afforded but a precarious hope of long life.

V.
Sect. 2. This complection of Egyptian affairs seemed to open new and magnificent objects for Philip's ambition. He had already entered into a negotiation ⁴³ with

endeavours
to strengthen
himself in the
neighbour-

hood of the
Egyptian pro-
vinces;

besieges Cius,

and takes it.

His cruelties
provoke in
dignation;

Antiochus of Syria, in relation to the partition of the Egyptian monarchy, in case of Philopator's demise: and he now resolved to strengthen himself in those parts of Asia and Europe, through which he might, upon occasion, open himself a way into the adjoining Egyptian provinces. Under pretence, therefore, of assisting Prusias king of Bithynia, his son-in-law, he passed over to Cius⁴⁴, a free city on the Bithynian frontiers, laid siege to it, and took it; putting to the sword, or selling for slaves, all the inhabitants, and seizing on all the rich plunder ⁴⁵. His views, in this severity, were probably the amassing of treasure, and at the same time, the making his name formidable in that country, near to which the Egyptian king had large possessions. The neighbouring states, however, provoked at the cruelties he had been guilty of at Cius, and perhaps suspecting that he had

⁴³ Polyb. Excerpt. L. xv. c. 20.

⁴⁴ Ibid. c. 21.

⁴⁵ It appears from Polybius, (Excerpt. L. xv. c. 21.) that these Cianeans were a people exceedingly corrupted, employed in the oppressing, and the compassing of the destruction of, each other. Continual feuds were the natural consequence of such a spirit. Philip availed himself of the opportunity, which these feuds afforded him, and laid their city in ruins.

designs

designs also against them, took up arms; which immediately involved him in a new war with Attalus and the Rhodians. He attempted Pergamus, the capital city of Attalus; but was disappointed in every effort against it. He laid waste, however, the open country, and obtained some trifling advantages by sea; but he was at length defeated, with the loss of most of his ships and seamen.

B O O K

V.

Sect. 2.

he attempts
Pergamus;

fails;

lays the coun-
try waste.

Meanwhile, Philopator was dead, and Antiochus, in consequence of his compact with Philip, had already begun the reduction of Coelosyria and Palestine. Upon the first tidings of this event, Philip hastened to secure those places to the northward of Macedon, which belonged to Egypt; and, entering the Thracian Chersonese, attacked the strong-holds which the Egyptians held there, and, either by intrigue or force of arms, ejected all their garrisons. Crossing over, he laid siege to Abydos⁴⁶, the most important place of this part of the Asiatic coast; it commanded the pass of the Hellespont on that side, as Sestos did on the side of Europe; and whoever was master of it, had in his hands the key of Asia. Philip found here a resistance he little expected. Spirited up by promises of aid from Attalus and the Rhodians, the inhabitants, who abhorred Philip, had determined to bury themselves under the ruins of their city, rather than to submit to his dominion. He was not, however, discouraged. The more difficulties he had to combat, the more strenuously he pushed the siege; and, notwith.

Philopator

king of

Egypt dies;

Antiochus and

Philip hasten

to divide his

dominions.

Philip attacks

the Thracian

Chersonese.

⁴⁶ Liv. L. xxxi. c. 14. & 16.

B O O K

V.

Sect. 2.

The Romans
jealous of
Philip;

receive com-
plaints against
him from Atta-
lus and the
Rhodians;

from the
Athenians;

from Egypt.

standing the most obstinate defence, he soon reduced the garrison to the last extremity.

But, whilst employed in these ruthless works of ambition, he saw not the storm which threatened to retaliate upon himself the miseries with which his lust of empire had overwhelmed other states. The Romans, distressed by the Carthaginian war, had unwillingly consented to a peace with Macedon; but that war was at an end: and they now wished for a pretence to break with a prince, whose power, if not humbled, might one day become too formidable. A pretence soon offered, Philip stood charged with having, in direct violation of the treaty subsisting between him and Rome, sent supplies both of men and money to Hannibal. Attalus and the Rhodians likewise complained, that, regardless of their being expressly comprised in that treaty, he had waged war against them. The Athenians accused him of infractions of the same treaty in relation to them; they had been acknowledged by the Romans as their allies; and yet Philip had assisted the Acarnanians in their invasion of Attica. The Egyptian ministry also, terrified at the dangers which threatened their young prince from the rapacity of Antiochus and Philip, sued to Rome for protection against the confederate kings, and implored the senate and Roman people to accept of the guardianship of the infant Ptolemy, and to superintend the administration of his kingdom ⁴⁷.

⁴⁷ These complaints had a plausible appearance, the accusation from Athens excepted. Even the Roman historian *,

* Liv. L. xxxi. c. 14.

Every thing that tended to criminate Philip was heard favorably in the Roman senate. They had, however, the policy to begin by that act, which did most honor to Rome. Ambassadors were immediately dispatched into Egypt, to take upon them the guardianship of the young king, in the name of the senate and Roman people, and to command Antiochus to withdraw from the Egyptian territories. The youngest of the ambassadors, Marcus Aemilius, had also instructions, on his way to Egypt, to inform Philip of the intentions of the Roman senate. Aemilius found Philip before Abydos, in a situation which must probably have not a little heightened that impatient ferocity for which he was remarkable; at the head of an army flushed with victory; on the point of carrying the city he was besieging; and in high exultation from the alliance he had lately concluded with Antiochus. Philip seemed to feel the importance of his situation; yet, unabashed at the Macedonian monarch's de-

B O O K

V.

Sect. 2.

The Romans
declare them-
selves the
guardians of
the young
king of Egypt.

The Roman
ambassador
finds Philip;
before Abydos

delivers the
orders of the
senate:

though the Athenians were now in the interests of Rome, observes with indignation the meanness they showed on this occasion. In fact, they themselves had been the aggressors. They had cruelly murdered two young men of Acarnania, who had innocently strayed into the temple of Eleusis, at the time of the mystical celebration, and by the questions they asked, had betrayed their ignorance of the rites of initiation. Provoked at this, the Acarnanians, together with some Macedonian troops, had ravaged Attica. And the Athenians, not having the spirit either to support the outrage they had committed, or to make due reparation for it, called in a foreign force, and, in the gratification of their revenge, assisted in subverting the liberties of their country.

B O O K portment, the Roman delivered his orders with
V. dignity and firmness. He charged Philip not to
- Sect. 2. attack the possessions of the crown of Egypt; nor
to wage war against any of the Grecian states; and
to submit to fair arbitration the discussion of the
matters in dispute between him, Attalus, and the
Rhodians. — Philip's pride could endure no longer.
the firmness of "Attalus and Rhodes" replied he, "provoked
the Roman on "the war, of which they complain. They them-
this occasion; "selves were the aggressors." — "And were the
"Athenians," said Aemilius, "were the people
"of Cius, were the unhappy Abydonians, the
Philip's bold "aggressors also?" — "The boastful inexperience
reply. "of youth," interrupted the king; "thy grace-
"fulness of person, perhaps; and, still more, the
"name of Roman, that thou bearest; inspire thee
"with this haughtiness. It is my wish, that Rome
"may prove faithful to the treaties which subsist
"between us. But, should she be disposed to try
"again the issue of arms, I trust, with the pro-
"tection of the gods, to render the Macedonian
"name as formidable as that of Roman."

Abydos is
reduced to
great straits,

Soon after the departure of Aemilius, followed
the destruction of Abydos". No hope of escape
remaining, the Abydonians determined to man the
breaches with the few fighting men they had left;
to resist, until they were all either slain or disabled;
and then, having put to the sword their women
and children, to consume with fire what remained

" Polyb. L. xvi. c. 19. Liv. L. xxxi. c. 17, 18.

" OLYMP. cxliv. 1. BEFORE CHRIST 199.

of the city. This desperate resolution was executed B O O K
 in part, when some of the priests, though solemnly V.
 sworn to the execution of the dreadful resolution, Sect. 2.
 found it to be more than humanity could bear, and taken;
 and opened the gates of the city to Philip. Upon
 the entrance of the Macedonians was exhibited one
 of the most tremendous scenes recorded in history;
 fathers, husbands, in every quarter of the city, Despair of the
 plunging the poniard into the breasts, or dashing Abydonians.
 out the brains, of their dearest connexions; and
 then, pierced by their own hands, expiring on
 heaps of mangled carcases. Philip himself felt the
 horror of the sight. He would have checked the
 fury of the infatuated multitude; but in vain; and
 was at last obliged to draw off his troops, and to
 allow them three days for completing the carnage.
 So that, the prisoners excepted, hardly one man
 survived of this unhappy and devoted people *.

* Polyb. ubi sup.

HISTORY OF GREECE.

BOOK VI.

SECTION I.

CONTENTS.

Second Macedonian war — Sulpicius the consul enters Greece — Villius succeeds him — Flamininus is appointed to the consulship, and conduct of the war — his abilities — vigor — success — detaches the most considerable of the Grecian states, particularly the Aetolians and Achaeans, from their connexion with Macedon — draws Philip into an engagement — defeats him — compels him to accept of peace on terms highly disadvantageous — ingratiate himself with the Grecian states, by making a pompous proclamation of their freedom, at the Isthmian and Nemean games — insidiousness of this grant — the Aetolians avow their jealousy; condemn the peace with Macedon; and charge the proconsul with entertaining unfriendly designs against Greece — under a pretence of a zeal for liberty, he proposes making war on Nabis tyrant of Sparta, lately his confederate against Philip — the Aetolians object to this war — the other Grecian states

cooperate with Flaminius. — Nabis attacked, and reduced to extremity — Flaminius, against the opinion of his Greek confederates, concludes a treaty with him; and by artifice extorts their consent — his motives — he returns to Rome, having first obtained the freedom of all the Romans who were in slavery throughout Greece.

ROME could hardly have chosen a conjuncture more favorable to her ambitious designs, than that which marks the commencement of the second Macedonian war: Carthage was subdued; all remains of revolt and popular tumult had subsided throughout Italy; Sicily, the prize so long contended for, in fertility and opulence the pride of the western world, was now, together with most of the adjacent islands, annexed to her dominions; even those nations, whom her arms had not reached, heard with terror the fame of a power, to which Hannibal had proved unequal.

Philip, on the other hand, instead of availing himself of the barrier pointed out by nature for his defence, seemed to be laying himself open to invasion and discomfiture. He was on hostile terms with most of the circumjacent nations. He had lost the affection and confidence of the most considerable of the Grecian states. From Egypt no succours were to be expected; and from Asia but few. The Rhodians, who, on account of their maritime strength, might have been powerful allies, had by his depredations, and ill-timed attempts, been compelled to take part with his enemies. And

B O O K

VI.

Sect. I.

Prosperous
state of Roman
affairs at the
beginning of
the second
Macedonian
war;

situation of
those of Ma-
cedon.

B O O K

VI.

Sect. 1.

Antiochus, of whose alliance he made his boast, was too intent on his own schemes of empire, and too remote from Macedon, to be anxious about the fate of a kingdom, on which, he injudiciously imagined, the prosperity of Syria did not at all depend.

The consul
Sulpicius en-
ters Greece;

sends a fleet
to the relief
of Athens,
besieged by
Philip's
forces;

surprises
Chalcis and
lays it in
ruins.

Resentment
of Philip;
he attempts
to wreak his
vengeance on
Athens;

Three years had elapsed, since peace had been concluded with Philip, when the Romans, under the command of the consul Sulpicius, landed on the coast of Epire. The ostensible cause of this expedition was the relief of Athens, then besieged by Philip. Accordingly, part of the Roman fleet was detached to Attica, and was soon after joined by the combined fleets of Attalus and the Rhodians. Philip was fired with indignation against the Athenians, whom he looked upon as the cause of the war, and marked them out as objects of his keenest vengeance. To add to his resentment, the Roman commander had detached from the coast of Attica, some armed vessels to Chalcis, which surprised the city, destroyed the arsenals and military stores, and left the place a smoking ruin. Philip, who lay at Demetrius in Thessaly when tidings were brought him of this event, immediately set out, at the head of a chosen body of men, in hopes of overtaking the enemy; but, disappointed of his aim, he advanced towards Attica, continuing his march all night, with the design of surprising Athens, and of treating it as the Romans had treated Chalcis. He had probably succeeded, had not one¹ of those

¹ Ἡμεροδρόμος — See Polluc. Onomast. L. i. c. 7.

couriers, whom the Greeks usually employed on occasions of dispatch, descried him on his march, and alarmed the Athenians. Finding that he could not carry this point, he took his revenge in another manner. The country of Attica was every where adorned with the most exquisite works of art, stately temples, sumptuous villas, statues of finished beauty, and noble sepulchral monuments; in which the richness of the marble, though of the most perfect kind, was of small value, when compared with what had been stamped upon it by the hand of the artist. All of them fell victims to his fury, the temples excepted; he spared not even those awful remembrances of the illustrious dead, which the violence of war had hitherto respected. He then attempted Eleusis, and afterwards the Piraeus, but failed in both; and having made a short excursion into Peloponnesus, he returned again, with redoubled rage, and destroyed even the temples, which till now he had seemed to venerate; mangling and defacing every work of art in such a manner, that scarce a vestige of symmetry or beauty remained ^a.

The Athenians, on their part, had recourse to the only weapons, they were now expert in, the invectives of their orators, and the acrimony of their popular decrees. It was resolved, “that Philip should for ever be the object of the execration of the Athenian people — that whatever statues had been raised to him, or to any of the Macedonian princes, should be thrown down; whatever

B O O K
VI.

Sect. I.

is disappointed;
ed;

lays waste
the country
around it.

Manner in
which the
Athenians
vented their
resentment;

^a Liv. L. xxxi. c. 24. 26.

B O O K

VI.

Sect. I.

“ had been enacted in their favor rescinded ; and
 “ the several festivals and orders of priests , which
 “ had been instituted in their honor abolished — that
 “ every place , in which had been set up any inscrip-
 “ tion or memorial in praise of Philip , should hence-
 “ forth be accounted profane and defiled — that in
 “ all their solemn feasts , when their priests were to
 “ implore a blessing on Athens and her allies , they
 “ should pronounce curses against him , his kin-
 “ dred , his arms by sea and land , and the whole
 “ Macedonian name and nation — in a word , that
 “ whatever had in ancient times been decreed
 “ against the Pisistratidae , should operate in full
 “ force against Philip — and that whosoever pro-
 “ posed any mitigation of the resolutions now
 “ formed , should be adjudged a traitor to his
 “ country , and be forthwith put to death ³. ”

their excess
 of flattery
 to the Romans
 and their
 allies.

Nor was Athens less extravagant in her adulations of those , from whom she had received assistance. The Romans and Attalus were distinguished particularly by the most fulsome honors ; solemn processions of all the priests and priestesses attended their entrance into Athens , as if celebrating the reception of tutelary deities. Every Rhodian born was decreed a denizen of Athens. And , in further compliment to Attalus , one of their tribes assumed the name of Attalis ⁴. Into such meanness has corruption of manners the power of betraying the mind of man !

The Achaeans
 and Aetolians
 refuse to assist
 Philip.

Philip soon found , that from the other parts of Greece he had something yet more formidable

³ Liv. L. xxxi. c. 44.

⁴ Polyb. Legat. iii. p. 1092. Liv. L. xxxi. c. 14, 15.

to dread, than the wordy war of the frivolous Athenians. He had applied to the Achaean states, in their convention at Argos, for succours, offering to repel the attacks of Nabis, who was infesting their frontiers, on condition that some of his cities should be garrisoned by a body of their best troops. But the Achaeans, well apprized of his insidious views, rejected the proposal⁵. He applied afterwards, with as little success, to the national convention of the Aetolian states; ambassadors from Athens and the Roman consul having appeared in the assembly, and urged their complaints in so forcible a manner, that, had not Democritus, then praetor of Aetolia, bribed, as it was suspected, by Philip, put off the final determination of the matter till the next assembly, war had unquestionably been immediately declared against him⁶.

Meanwhile, Sulpicius, who was encamped on the banks of the Apfus⁷, had sent off a detachment, with directions to penetrate through the countries that covered the western borders of Macedon, and attempt an impression on the Macedonian frontier⁸.

Sulpicius endeavours to penetrate to the western frontier of Macedon.

⁵ It was probably on this occasion that Philip attempted the life of Philopoemen; Plutarch (in Philopoem.) informing us, that he meant to have had him assassinated at Argos. This honest Greek, who was too much a friend to his country to be in amity with Philip, no doubt opposed his demand; and that prince, to whom crimes are said to have been familiar, meditated an effectual revenge.

⁶ Liv. L. xxxi. c. 32.

⁷ A river of Illyricum, which empties itself into the Ionian gulph between Apollonia and Dyrrachium.

⁸ Liv. L. xxxi. c. 27 & seq.

B O O K

VI.

Sect. I.

Philip's apprehensions.

Unhappy impression made on the minds of the Macedonians;

from what cause.

This operation had all the effect that could be expected from it. The castles and strong-holds in this part of the country, though advantageously situated in the midst of defiles and broken precipices, were taken by the Romans; while the Illyrians, the Dardanians, the Athamanes, terrified at the progress of the Roman arms, declared against Philip. Encouraged by these fair appearances, the consul entered the country of the Dassaretii, from which there was said to be an easy passage into Macedon, and got possession of all the towns throughout the canton; dismay and desolation spreading on every side as he advanced. Philip himself began to tremble for the safety of his kingdom; he drew near to those parts which seemed to be most in danger, and employed all his military skill, of which historians allow him a large share, in watching, and, as occasion offered, obstructing the motions of the enemy: when an unlucky event⁹ not only damped his vigor for the present, but left such an impression on his spirits, as well as on the minds of his subjects, as is thought to have had a considerable influence on their subsequent fortunes. A troop of Macedonian horsemen had encountered a party of Roman cavalry, and, a skirmish ensuing, forty of the former were slain, and of the Romans thirty-five. Among the Greeks the rites of sepulture were highly revered; Philip, therefore, to show the respect he had for his gallant soldiers, removed the bodies of the Macedonians to his camp, in order to the celebration

⁹ Liv. L. xxxi. c. 34.

of their funeral obsequies. Hitherto the Macedonians, whose wars had chiefly been with the nations of Greece and Illyricum, had been only accustomed to wounds made by the spear, the javelin, and the arrow, which in their appearance had nothing hideous; but when they saw the bodies of their companions mangled by wide-yawning wounds; when they beheld their headless trunks, entire limbs lopped from the mutilated carcase, with all the shocking marks of slaughter, which the broad Spanish faulchion is suited to inflict; they were struck with horror and dismay. Even Philip shuddered at the thoughts of encountering such a foe, and was observed, for a considerable time afterwards, carefully to avoid any decisive action; contenting himself with skirmishes, and with cutting off occasionally some straggling parties of the enemy's foragers.

In this languid and indecisive kind of war two years elapsed, during the consulship of Sulpicius, and that of his successor Villius, not much to the honor of the Roman commanders; whose spiritless or interested conduct was said to be the cause that nothing more had been effected. From this protracted war, however, Philip had reaped no advantage. He had met with discomfiture in almost every attempt; his frontiers had suffered severe depredation; and, far from strengthening himself with new allies, the Aetolians, who at first had preserved a kind of neutrality, had now avowedly espoused the cause of Rome, and appeared against him in the field.

B O O K

VI.

Sect. 1.

State of the
war during
the consul-
ships of Sul-
picius and
Villius his
successor.

B O O K

VI.

Sect. I.

Flamininus is appointed to conduct the Macedonian war:

his character;

Thus stood affairs at the close of the second year of the war, when the command of the Roman army devolved on the new consul, Titus Quintius Flamininus. The important share this Roman had in effecting the humiliation of Greece, and the subtilty and dark perfidiousness of those councils, with the conduct of which he was intrusted, render his character¹ the object of particular attention.

Though not remarkably eminent for military abilities, he was, however, what a Roman in those days generally was, a soldier, and well acquainted with the science of war. But his excellence chiefly consisted in the business of negotiation. Gentle and conciliating in his manner, he knew how to employ every art to gain the confidence of those, to whom he was deputed. Impenetrable in his designs, yet wearing the captivating show of cordiality and frankness, he coolly marked every opportunity, and improved every advantage that could serve the schemes he had in view. To Greece he professed himself the zealous vindicator of her liberties; though in effect their most refined destroyer: conducting himself, in every step, with such complete dissimulation, that, even to this day, it is, with some, a question, whether he was not guiltless of the treacherous policy which Rome practised on this occasion; and, in the honesty of his heart, promised what he believed was to be religiously fulfilled.

how raised to the consulship;

He had been elected to the consulship when he had not completed his thirtieth year, and without

¹ See Polyb. passim. Liv. L. xxxii. & seq. Plut. in Flamin.

passing through the intermediate offices of aedile and praetor. This extraordinary distinction, as Plutarch ¹¹ informs us, he owed chiefly to the reputation he had obtained among the Tarentines, over whom he had been appointed governor towards the end of Hannibal's war. Encouraged by these colonists with promises of powerful support, he stood for the consulship, and carried it; the people warmly espousing his interest, in opposition even to some of their own tribunes, and the senate underhand favoring his pretensions. Having drawn lots with his colleague, he had for his allotment the Macedonian war. The prospect of so noble a field roused all his ambition; and he was resolved to pursue it with activity and ardor. It had been usual with the consuls to waste a considerable portion of their year at home, in the enjoyment of official parade: hence they seldom joined the army until the season was far advanced. Flamininus adopted a different plan. Regardless of the pomp of Rome, he hastened over into Greece, as soon as the necessary religious ceremonies were over, at which his office obliged him to preside.

B O O K
VI.
Sect. I.

his spirited
manner of
entering on
the duties of
his office:

He found Villius in that part of Epirus called Chaonia, near the mouth of the ¹² Aous, in a situation rather disgraceful to a Roman consul, in sight of the enemy, without daring to attack them.

dislodges
Philip from
a strong post,

¹¹ In Flamin.

¹² Plutarch (in Philopoem.) calls it the Apfus. It appears from Livy (L. xxxii. c. 5.) as well as from several circumstances, that it should be the Aous. See Palmer. Græc. Antiq. L. i. c. 26.

B O O K Philip, trusting to the slender abilities of Villius;
VI. had ventured to look the Romans in the face, and
Sect. 1. had intrenched himself in such a manner as gave him
 a very formidable appearance¹³. He was posted in
 a narrow vale, through which the Aous rolled a
 deep and rapid stream. The banks of the river
 were steep and narrow, and secured by strong in-
 trenchments; on either side rose high and rugged
 mountains, and he had taken possession of all the
 hollows and defiles. Flamininus having taken the
 command, employed some days in reconnoitring
 the situation of the enemy, and considering the
 practicability of forcing their lines. At length, by
 means of some neighbouring shepherds, he discovered
 a path, which led to the summit by a winding
 course. Having detached a party to occupy the
 heights which hung over the Macedonian camp, on
 seeing the concerted signal, he began the¹⁴ attack.
 In the heat of the engagement, the shouts of the
 Romans on the hills, who now poured down on
 the Macedonians, threw them into the utmost con-
 fusion, and soon completed their overthrow; Philip,
 with the remains of his army, making his escape
 through the straits of the mountains into Thessaly,
 and from thence into Macedon¹⁵.

and puts him
to flight:

¹³ Livy (L. xxxii. c. 10.) gives us an account of an inter-
 view between Philip and the consul, of which no mention is
 made by Plutarch, and which, all circumstances considered,
 appears exceedingly improbable.

¹⁴ OLYMP. cxlv. 2. BEFORE CHRIST 194.

¹⁵ Liv. L. xxxii. c. 11, 12.

It would have little availed to have pursued Philip through a country, with every strong pass and intricate winding of which he was intimately acquainted. Flamininus adopted a method of operation ¹⁶ far more effectual: he prepared to destroy all remains of power or influence which his enemy possessed among the Grecian states, and, if possible, finally to dissolve every connexion of interests between Greece and Macedon. This plan, artfully laid, was carried into execution with the most consummate skill. He began his progress at Epire, through which he marched, not as an enemy, but as a protector. Philip, in his flight, had marked his route with plunder and devastation. Flamininus, on the contrary, committed no hostility; and restrained his soldiers from every act of depredation; so that the Epirots, instead of being active in the cause of Macedon, to which, before this consul's arrival, they were well affected, now offered themselves as his guides, or enlisted under his banners. From Epire he marched into Thessaly, and took possession of almost every place of strength in the country; conquering opposition by lenity and persuasion, and employing arms only where gentler means had proved ineffectual. Meanwhile, Lucius, brother to Flamininus, who commanded the Roman fleet, had reached the eastern coast of Greece; and, being joined by the fleets of Attalus and the Rhodians, made a descent on Euboea, where Philip, as we have already seen, had many important set-

detaches several of the Grecian states from their connexion with Macedon;

¹⁶ Plut. in Flamin. Liv. L. xxxii. c. 13 & seq.

B O O K

VI.

Sect. I.

endeavours
to gain over
the states of
Achaia;

and, in this
view, lays
siege to Co-
rinth.

Philip also
sends ambaf-
sadors to the
Achaean diet.

lements. Philocles, who commanded on the island, was defeated; and Eretria and Carystus, two considerable cities, were taken. Flamininus, after a short stay in Thessaly, hastened into Phocis, with the design of extending his conquests towards the southern provinces of Greece. His great object was, to gain over the states of Achaia to the interests of Rome; for which purpose, he gave instructions to his brother, to send a joint embassy to Achaia, in the name of the Romans, Attalus, and the Rhodians, requesting a convention of the Achaean states, in order to propose to them a treaty of alliance with the Romans; while the combined fleets, entering the Corinthian gulph, were to be stationed¹⁷ off Cenchreae, one of the Corinthian ports, under color of laying siege to Corinth, then possessed by Philip; but, in fact, the more powerfully to enforce the object of the embassy. Alarmed at a measure of the highest consequence to him, Philip likewise dispatched ambassadors to plead his cause at the ensuing diet, which was appointed to be held at Sicyon; directing them to place in the strongest and clearest point of view, the validity of the treaties subsisting between Macedon and the Achaeans, and to remind them of the solemn oaths by which they had pledged themselves: oaths rendered, if possible, more strikingly awful by a customary yearly renewal. Upon the opening of the diet, the several ambassadors having first been heard, the members were called upon to deliver

¹⁷ Liv. L. xxiii. c. 19 & seq.

their sentiments; but a sullen silence ensued: stunned by the variety of dangers they saw around them, they were either at a loss what opinion to give, or fearful of delivering it. Aristæus, general for the year, and the devoted creature of Rome, having urged the convention in vain, at last took the lead, declaring himself, in the most decided manner, in favor of the Romans: "The success," he said, "of whose arms in Epire, in Thessaly, in Euboea, was the clearest proof of their power to protect those whose friendship they condescended to solicit; whose fleets and armies, whilst Philip was lurking in his own fastnesses, were now in sight of Achaia; whose chief motive, in their Grecian expedition, was to deliver them from the yoke of Macedon, under which they had long groaned; and who mildly deigned to request, what they might easily command." At the same time, he poured forth the bitterest invectives against the Macedonian king, whose crimes, whether real or imputed, he dwelt on with every possible aggravation. This servile strain, so unworthy of the first magistrate of a yet free people, raised an outcry of indignation, not only from the friends of Philip, but from all, who had a real concern for the liberties of their country. The Macedonian party in the convention was considerable, and attached to Philip by particular acts of kindness; there were, besides, many of the Achæans, who, though they disliked the king's personal character, and were cautious of reposing much confidence in him, had, with great reason, no less gloomy apprehensions from this

B O O K

VI.

Sect. 1.

Aristæus,
the general
of the year,
declares for
the Romans.

B O O K

VI.

Sect. I.

Violent con-
tests in the
Achaean diet:

foreign power, which they saw establishing itself in the midst of their country, and considered the supporting of the royal house of Macedon as a measure of the highest moment to the general welfare of Greece. The assembly now became a scene of wild uproar; some, with indecent clamor, supporting the interests of Rome, while others as loudly and indecently opposed them. Both parties seemed callous to every tender or sacred tie, breathing all the virulence of civil discord, and mutually accusing their opponents with harbouring the most traitorous designs. What heightened the embarrassment, the numbers on each side appeared nearly equal; and even of the council of ten, a majority of whom was requisite to the formation of a decree, five were for Macedon, and five for Rome. In this state of turbulence and irresolution had the diet continued two days; and on the third, by the laws of Achaia, it was to be dissolved. Next day, however, seemed likely to end as the preceding, each party making more strenuous exertions, as the hour of decision approached; when Rhisafus of Pellene, a member of the diet, and in the interests of Rome, but whose son Memnon, one of the council of ten, notwithstanding his father's repeated entreaties, had steadily refused to abandon the side of Macedon, once more attempted to shake the resolution of his son, solemnly swearing, that he would, with his own hand, put him to death, if he did not desist from an opposition, which must involve his country in ruin. A striking instance this, both of the virulence of party-spirit, and of

the ferocity even of Grecian manners in those times ! Awed by his father's menaces, Memnon changed sides, and the question was carried in favor of Rome.

B O O K

VI.

Sect. I.

the question
carried in fa-
vor of Rome.

It is worthy of notice, that the deputies from Megalopolis, Argos, and Dymé withdrew, as soon as it was perceived what would be the determination of the convention, to avoid giving a sanction, by their presence, to resolutions so injurious to Philip. The Dyméans, particularly, alledged their obligations to the Macedonian king, who had ransomed several of their fellow-citizens that had been sold for slaves by the Romans, and restored them to their families. This generous reason, Livy ¹⁸ says, met the approbation even of Philip's enemies; which leads us to suppose, that he was not altogether so profligate a monarch as the writers of those days, who seem to be the adulators of Rome, rather than historians, have represented him.

Noble spirit
of some of
the Achaean
deputies.

Soon after this affair was brought to a conclusion, the siege of Corinth was raised. It had been promised by the Roman consul to the Achaeans; but it was now pretended, that the obstinate defence made by a number of Roman deserters, together with the reinforcements which the Macedonians had thrown into the garrison, had forced Flamininus to abandon the siege; which, were it even to end successfully, was likely to be bought at too high a rate. Probably, the determination of the Achaean diet had rendered the siege no longer necessary.

Flamininus,
having gained
his purpose,
raises the siege
of Corinth.

¹⁸ Ubi sup.

B O O K About the same time, too, Argos had been betrayed
VI. by some of its citizens into the hands of Philip ¹⁹.
Sect. I. So that, after all that the Achaean states had
 resolved, this prince still remained master of two
 of the principal cities of Peloponnesus.

Philip,
 alarmed, ap-
 plies for an
 interview
 with the con-
 sul;

obtains it.

Artful con-
 duct of Fla-
 minius;

Philip, however, was alarmed. Though possessed of these two cities, yet their distant situation afforded him but a precarious and expensive tenure. He clearly foresaw the approaching fate of Macedon; abandoned by her most useful confederates, deprived of her wonted resources, and reduced to a narrow and naked frontier. Urged by the embarrassment of his situation, he requested a conference with the Roman consul; who made choice of Nicaea, a sea-port on the Maliac bay, for the place of interview ²⁰. Flamininus repaired thither, attended by the chief leaders of the Aetolian and Achaean states; by Amynder king of the Athamanes; by the ambassador of the king of Pergamus; and the commander of the Rhodian fleet. This pompous retinue not only administered to the consul's pride, but answered also certain political ends; it gave him an opportunity of making a plausible display to his allies of his attention to their several interests; and it afforded him the means of humbling Philip, to whom it must have been a severe mortification to see so considerable a part of the strength of Greece on the side of his adversary. The Macedonian

¹⁹ Liv. L. xxxii. c. 25.

²⁰ Polyb. Excerpt. L. xvii. c. 1 & seq. Liv. L. xxxii. c. 32 & seq.

king, as he approached the shore; for he had come by sea, could not suppress his indignation, and, being invited by the consul to land, declined it. "Whom do you fear?" said Flamininus. "I fear none but the immortal gods," answered Philip; "but I suspect the faith of those by whom I see you surrounded, especially your Aetolians." The consul observed, that, in all cases of this kind, there was reciprocal danger: "But in the present case," replied Philip, "the temptation is not equal; for should mischief befall Phaeneas (the Aetolian praetor, who accompanied Flamininus) Aetolia may easily get another praetor; but if I am taken off, who is to succeed me on the throne of Macedon?" After a short pause, the consul requested the king to make his proposals, which, as the interview had been appointed at his solicitation, were properly to come from him. "It belongs not to the vanquished to propose," answered the Macedonian, "it is theirs only to accept." — "If so," resumed the consul. "I shall at once name the conditions, without which no peace is to be expected: — You are to evacuate those places you hold in Greece, and relinquish all claim to every part of it — you are to give up all prisoners and deserters belonging to Rome and her allies — you are to surrender the cities you have taken in Illyricum, since the conclusion of the last peace, and the places belonging to the crown of Egypt, you seized on the death of Philopator. — These our allies have, besides, demands of their own; it is just they should be heard and attended to."

his haughty
and peremp-
tory condi-
tions, on
which alone
peace was to
be had.

B O O K

VI.

Sect. I.

Demands
made on Phi-
lip by Atta-
lus and the
other allies
of Rome.

The ambassador of king Attalus then demanded the restoration of the ships and prisoners taken in the engagement off the island of Chios, and that he should indemnify Attalus for the ravages committed in his dominions. The Rhodians required Peraea, a certain district on the continent of Asia, opposite to Rhodes, which had formerly belonged to them; together with the evacuation of all the cities and sea-ports ²¹ he possessed on the Asiatic coast: the Achaeans claimed Argos and Corinth: and the Aetolians, besides the demand of certain cities in Theffaly, insisted on an ample compensation for all the losses sustained by them and their allies;

²¹ Whatever opinion we may be induced to form of Philip's moral character, it clearly appears, from the demands made on him by the Rhodians, that he must have been a prince of great abilities, and strenuous in promoting the strength and opulence of his kingdom. In the beginning of his reign, when invited by Aratus into Peloponnesus, the Macedonians had no marine, they had scarcely a seaman; and yet, in about twenty-two years after, we find him in possession of many considerable sea-ports; and that he had established a number of mercantile settlements (portus & emporia) along the Asiatic coast; while he, at the same time, possessed such a navy, as to be in a condition to dispute the empire of the Archipelago with the Rhodians, in those days the greatest maritime power in Greece. This accounts for the Rhodian enmity. They suspected, that he meant to rival them in the Levant-trade, the principal source of their wealth. Thus mercantile jealousy drove them into the arms of the Romans. They had soon cause to repent! Instead of a competitor, they brought upon themselves imperious masters, the slightest contradiction to whose will was a crime worthy of extermination.

and his total and final exclusion from the Grecian territories.

B O O K
VI.

Sect. I.

From the various charges against Philip, which Polybius and Livy have preserved to us, and in which, without doubt, whatever could make against him is accurately recorded, it appears evidently, that he had only done what ambitious monarchs generally do, and that, however guilty he might be in the eye of reason, those very states, which preferred these complaints, the Aetolians especially, and even the Romans, those spirited assertors of the rights of mankind, were at least equally criminal. In reality, his guilt consisted in being at the head of a kingdom of great ancient reputation, and still supposed to be of considerable strength, which obstructed the meditated plan of Roman domination. Philip seems to have been aware of the Roman designs, and by his tameness on this occasion, so different from his former character, to have endeavoured either to lead them to gentler purposes, or to display to other nations what *they* might in future times expect from the insatiable rapacity of Rome. Notwithstanding the extent of the demands made on him, many of them ill-founded, and the asperity of language with which they were urged, he calmly labored to remove the obstructions which he saw industriously thrown in the way of peace, yielding point after point, far beyond what could have been expected from a prince not yet of desperate fortunes. To the Romans, he said, he was ready to resign whatever they had asked, those possessions in Greece excepted, which had descended to him

How far Philip appears to have been guilty:

his remarkable temper in the course of this conference,

his concessions.

B O O K
VI.
Sect. I.

from his ancestors. Of his Asiatic settlements he desired to retain nothing but Bargylia and Jassus²², two places on the coast of Caria, valuable from the commercial advantages they enjoyed; Jassus, in particular, from it's fishery. Whatever else he held in Asia, he consented to abandon to Attalus and the Rhodians, together with their ships of war, and all the prisoners then alive. And, as the ambassador of Attalus had charged him with having laid waste his master's gardens and orchards, since such matters were not unworthy royal notice, he would send over gardeners and trees to new-plant them. Of the Achaeans he complained much; they had become unprovoked enemies, in contradiction to their own public acts, in which every possible honor had repeatedly been decreed to him; and in violation of a number of treaties solemnly sworn to: he agreed, however, that both Argos and Corinth should be restored to them. But his resentment ran highest against the Aetolians. There was,

²² Bargylia, on the coast of Caria; Jassus, a small island opposite to it. Of this Jassus there is a pleasantry related by Strabo (L. xiv. p. 453. Casaub.) A musician landed there, and was performing to a crowded audience; when on a sudden, upon the ringing of a certain bell, the usual signal for the opening of the fish-market, the whole assembly went off, one person excepted. The musician, well pleased to find that his performance had power at least over one; began to compliment him upon the excellence of his taste, "who had not, like the rest of his countrymen, suffered the fish-bell to call him away." — "The fish-bell!" replied he; "why, has the fish-bell rung?" and immediately hurried after his companions. The man was deaf, and had not heard the bell.

previous to this event, as has been already mentioned, an avowed enmity between them; which was now increased by the indecent petulance of the Aetolian delegates, in the course of the present congress. In the very first conference, Alexander the Aetolian had attacked the king with remarkable acrimony, and, upon his attempting a reply, Phaeneas interrupted him in these insolent terms: "You talk like a fool"²³: all that remains for the vanquished is submission to the commands of the conqueror." "True," said Philip, "that is clear even to a blind man"²⁴: a tart, but justly-merited

B O O K

VI.

Sect. I.

²³ Φάσκων αὐτὸν ληρῆιν! δὲν γὰρ ἢ μαχόμενον νικᾶν, ἢ ποιῆν τοῖς κρείττοσι τὸ προσταττόμενον. See Exc. Polyb. L. xvii. c. 4.

²⁴ Polybius and Livy blame Philip's pleasantry on this occasion. *Erat dicacior*, says the Roman historian, *quam regem decet*, & *ne inter seria quidem risu satis temperans*. Is it not strange, that they have not at the same time passed any censure on the illiberal attack of the Aetolian praetor, nor on the Roman consul's sarcastical reproach. At the close of the first day's conference, Philip requested that he might have a copy of the several demands produced against him, and be allowed time to deliberate concerning them: *for*, said he, *I am here alone, I have no counsellor with me*. — *With good reason are you alone*, answered Flaminius; *you have destroyed every faithful counsellor you had*. He had put to death some of his subjects on various suspicions. Philip replied only, with a smile of indignation *Μειδιᾶσας Σαρδόνιον*. Mr. Hume (Essay 14) imputes this illiberality of language to the manners of the times. The reflections of Polybius and Livy seem to say otherwise. But why should not their censure fall in part on the Roman and Aetolian? And why is it aimed wholly at the king of Macedon? Are we to suspect, that *his being a king*, and the enemy of Rome, were the circumstances that aggravated the charge against him?

B O O K repartee: Phaeneas, it seems, had weak eyes. In
VI. discussing their demands, he therefore began by
Sect. I. expressing the utmost astonishment and indignation,
 that those should talk of excluding him from Greece,
 who knew not even the limits of the country,
 and were themselves Greeks but in part, several
 of the provinces of Aetolia lying beyond the
 boundaries of ancient Greece. What injuries they
 had suffered, he said, were no more than the
 customary and unavoidable consequences of war.
 And as to allies, they had none; influenced merely
 by the allurements of pay and depredation, they
 fought indiscriminately for any state, Aetolians being
 often to be found in two opposite armies. That,
 however, he would deliver up to them Larrissa
 and Pharsalus, two cities lying convenient for their
 frontiers; but that he could not possibly evacuate
 the other Thessalian cities which they claimed,
 consistently with his own safety.

Philip's
 answer not
 deemed satis-
 factory:

desires time to
 send ambassa-
 dors to Rome.

Flamininus
 grants it.

In these altercations two days had elapsed, and
 peace seemed to be as distant as ever; Philip's
 relinquishing all claim to every part of Greece,
 and engaging never to pass beyond the boundaries
 of Macedon, being, exclusively of particular de-
 mands, a preliminary from which none of the allied
 states would depart. Philip's only resource now,
 was an application to the consul, for permission
 to send ambassadors to lay his proposals before the
 senate of Rome; which, if not deemed equitable
 and satisfactory, he protested that he would sub-
 mit implicitly to the conditions and award of the
 conscript fathers. This request, hardly indeed to

be refused, was graciously complied with, and a two months truce accordingly granted; with this previous stipulation, that he should immediately withdraw his garrisons from Locris and Phocis. Besides gaining this important point, the consul had other views in complying with what Philip requested. It was winter, and the army could not act; so that no military operation was suspended by it. And the election of new consuls was at hand, when he might possibly be superseded. His plan therefore was, to have the appearance of finishing the war by treaty, if he should find he was to be recalled, or to have it in his power to pursue it, if continued in the command.

B O O K
VI.
Sect. 1.

and with
what views.

The senate gratified Flamininus to the utmost of his wishes. They continued him in the command; with full powers either to prosecute or to end the war, as he should judge expedient. What they really meant was easy for him to understand. The Macedonian ambassadors, it is true, had been admitted to an audience; but not till the deputies from Flamininus, with the ministers of the several Grecian states, had been examined, and the senate fully informed of the situation of Macedonian affairs, with whatever the interests of Rome required. When therefore the person, who was at the head of the embassy from Philip, began to enter upon his master's defence, the senate, instead of suffering him to proceed, stopped him with this short question, "Has your master authorized you to give up Demetrias in Thessaly, Chalcis in Euboea, and Corinth?" termed by the Macedonians, the

Flamininus
continued in
the command.

Philip's am-
bassadors are
treated with
mockery at
Rome.

B O O K *fetters of Greece.* The ambassadors, in confusion,
 VI. making answer, that they had not received any
 Sect. I. instructions in relation to these points, were ordered
 instantly to withdraw, and full powers sent to Flami-
 ninus; who thenceforth refused to receive any farther
 proposals from Philip, unless he previously renounced
 all claim to every part of Greece.

Philip under
 the necessity
 of turning
 his thoughts
 to war:

gives up Argos
 to Nabis.

That unfortunate monarch, now hopeless of any
 equitable conditions from Rome, and probably
 roused to a more spirited exertion by the mockery
 with which he saw he had been treated, employed
 his utmost vigor in providing for his defence. Argos
 was too distant to be of effectual service; and was
 not to be retained without a force he could ill spare;
 he therefore resolved to abandon it²⁵, and in a
 manner, as he imagined, more pregnant with
 mischief, than if it had still been held by a Mace-
 donian garrison. Nabis was at this time the scourge
 of Peloponnesus; history records him for one of the
 most profligate tyrants that ever disgraced a throne;
 he maintained himself in the sovereignty of Sparta
 by means of an army of mercenaries, composed
 of the most cruel and flagitious of outcasts, whom
 he daily exercised in deeds of villany, violence,
 and bloodshed. Against the Achaeans in particular,
 on whom Philip would gladly have been revenged,
 Nabis professed a deadly enmity. Philip offered
 to put him in possession of Argos, on condition of
 his restoring it when Macedon was again in tran-
 quillity; and, the more strongly to cement the

²⁵ Liv. L. xxxii. c. 38, 39.

alliance, he proposed to give his daughters in marriage to the tyrant's sons. Whatever Philip asked, Nabis promised to perform; and, such is the fidelity of tyrants, no sooner was he master of Argos, than he offered his services to Flamininus; who, not very delicate in his choice of means, provided advantage could be derived from them, received him without hesitation among the allies of Rome, and accepted of his tendered succours.

Philip merited the deceit with which he was repaid. The case of the unhappy Argives was infinitely more to be lamented. Nabis immediately put in practice his usual subtilties, to discover the wealth of every man in Argos, and plundered them of all. And so low did his rapaciousness descend, as to employ his wife Apega to extort from the Argive ladies, by artifice or terror, whatever jewels or ornamental trinkets they possessed. It appears, that avarice was the ruling passion of this wretched miscreant. Polybius²⁶ makes mention of an extraordinary instrument of extortion, devised by him, which upon a less grave authority we should be apt to account fabulous. He had contrived a figure of iron, in form like Apega, to move with springs, whose arms and breast were furnished with a number of spikes. This machine, dressed out as if it had really been the queen, was seated in his apartment; and when he found his solicitations for money ineffectual, "Apega," he would say, "will perhaps plead more forcibly;"

²⁶ Exc. L. xiii. c. 5.

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VI.

Sect. 1.

The perfidiousness of
Nabis;

his character.

and cruelties.

B O O K

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Sect. 1.

and, raising up the figure, caused the arms to cling round and press the body of the unhappy delinquent, who generally expired under the torturing embrace.

The Romans
and Macedo-
nians take
the field.

Flamininus
prevails on
the Boeotians
to enter into
alliance with
him,

by what arti-
fice.

Soon as the season permitted, the two armies hastened to take the field, and began to move towards Thessaly. Previous to this measure, Flamininus had finished a transaction of considerable importance. Philip was known to have a powerful interest among the Boeotians; they had hitherto observed a kind of a neutrality, but it was uncertain how long they might retain the same pacific appearances, and in the present situation of affairs the proconsul earnestly wished to engage them, if possible, to act decidedly for Rome. The difficulty was, how to effectuate his purpose. The arts of persuasion and intrigue had been so repeatedly employed throughout Greece, that their notoriety hindered their effect; and on the Boeotians, a rough people, they had already probably been tried in vain. So that Flamininus found it necessary to have recourse to a different and unhackneyed scheme; and, as the execution was of a delicate nature, to take the management upon himself. Attalus and the proconsul set out²⁷ attended by a small retinue, as on a friendly visit to Thebes, where the convention of the Boeotian states was usually held. The slenderness of the train raised no alarm, and the Thebans opened their gates with an unsuspecting cordiality; their chief magistrate himself, to do the greater honor to the Roman general, and

²⁷ Liv. L. xxxii. c. 1, 2. Plut. in Flaminio.

perhaps

perhaps in the secret, going forth to meet him. B O O K
 But scarcely was he within the walls, when a body VI.
 of two thousand spearmen, whom the winding of Sect. 1.
 the hills had hitherto concealed, appeared in fight,
 and, mixing with the proconsul's attendants,
 entered the city. Flaminius, nevertheless, still
 affected the language of peace; and, an assembly
 having been convened, made it his suit, with
 all the rhetoric of respectful entreaty, that the
 Boeotians would be pleased to admit him into their
 friendship and alliance; in support of which, At-
 talus, the faithful advocate of Rome, spoke with
 such vehemence, that in the midst of his harangue
 he fell down speechless; and, being immediately
 conveyed on board his fleet, which sailed for Asia,
 he soon after expired. But there was, indeed, little
 necessity for argument to convince the Boeotians
 of the propriety of a measure, which was supported
 by two thousand men in arms; they readily agreed
 to all the proconsul's requisitions. This kind of
 fraud²³, we learn from history began now to be
 practised by the Romans. Time was, when they

²³ There is, however, good reason to suspect, that
 Flaminius had soon recourse to other means, far worse
 than even deceit, to secure the influence he had thus
 acquired. Livy (L. xxxiii. c. 27, 28, 29) shall furnish
 the account. The Thebans, a great number of whom,
 notwithstanding the low state of Philip's fortunes, (it being
 soon after his defeat) were still attached strongly to him,
 had, in opposition to the Roman party, chosen for Boeo-
 tarch one Barcillas, in the Macedonian interest, and who
 had lately served in the armies of Macedon. By way of

B O O K would have scorned the acquisition of a victory
 VI. gained at the price of treachery. But, having
 Sect. 1.

retaliation, proper instruments were employed, and Barcillas was assassinated. But the authors of his assassination having been traced out, it was found, that one of the chief leaders among the partisans of Rome was the principal person concerned; who, upon the discovery, immediately fled to Athens, then Flamininus's place of residence. The character and connexions of the man, the place he fled to, the protection he found, together with some other circumstances, not mentioned by this historian, fixed the suspicions of all Thebes on Flamininus. And so exasperated on account of it, Livy himself (*ibid.* c. 29.) confesses, was the whole Theban nation against all of Roman race, (*effervit ea caedes Thebanos Boeotosque omnes ad execrabile odium Romanorum*) that they murdered every Roman soldier they could find, and were not to be checked but by the march of a Roman army into Boeotia. — Polybius (*Legat.* viii. p. 1103.) is yet more particular. The conspirators, he expressly tells us, applied to Flamininus, and communicated their plan to him: he promised not to give any hindrance to it, though he was unwilling to appear himself in the business; but referred them to Alexamenes, a trusty Aetolian in the Roman interest, in concert with whom they carried the scheme into execution. Polybius calls the Boeotarch Brachyllas.

Flamininus afterwards made peace with the Boeotians, by the mediation of the Achaean states. And, from a circumstance mentioned by Livy (*ibid.* c. 29.) we may collect, that there was something exceedingly pitiable in the case of the Boeotians. The Achaeans resolved, should Flamininus not consent to a peace, to march themselves to the assistance of the Boeotians, and join them against Rome: (*ni impetrassent pacem Boeotis, bellum simul gerere decreverunt*) Nothing but the strongest conviction of the justice of the Boeotian cause could have drawn such a

declined from their ancient simplicity, they had lost much ²⁹ of that blunt and inartificial courage for which they were remarkable in their earlier ages. Such, unhappily, has been the progress of manners among all nations, the advancement of refinement produces the decline of virtue.

After some movements of little consequence, the two armies advanced ³⁰ from the southern parts of Thessaly towards Scotussa, a city near the Peneus; the Macedonians, in quest of forage; and the Romans, to deprive them of it, by laying waste the country. As they had taken different routes, they had encamped near to each other without knowing it, being separated only by a range of hills, called *Cynoccephalae* ³¹. Philip, uncertain as to the position of the Roman army, had detached a party to the top of the hills, to reconnoitre, if possible, the situation of the enemy; who unexpectedly fell in with a detachment of Romans, that had marched with the like design to discover Philip. By reason of the haziness of the morning, the Macedonians did not discover the Romans till they were within reach of their weapons, when a skirmish immediately ensued; and each party, as they happened to be declaration from the Achaeans, at this time much fallen from their independence, and in strict connexion with the Roman people.

²⁹ See the second and third sections of this book; and section the first of book the seventh.

³⁰ See Polyb. Excerpt. L. xvii. c. 14 & seq. Liv. L. xxxiii. c. 3 & seq.

³¹ The *dogs-heads*, from the appearance which their summits exhibited.

B O O K pressed, sending to their respective camps for reinforcement, in a short time a general engagement became almost unavoidable³².

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Sect. 1.

Philip averse
to the engagement;

he addresses
his army.

Flamininus
addresses his.

It appears that Philip, whether under the impression of some discouraging omen, as Plutarch³³ seems to think, or, according to Polybius, disliking the ground, which was ill-suited to the operations of his infantry, would have deferred the decision to some future day. But the advantage being at first on the side of the Macedonians, and his army, encouraged by the success of their fellow-soldiers, eagerly soliciting to be led against the enemy, he at length yielded to their ardor, and drew up his whole forces, conjuring them³⁴, as they passed, “to show themselves mindful of their ancestors, and not to permit Macedon, illustrious by so many glorious achievements, to bend to the yoke of Rome.” Flamininus, having formed his troops, employed, with no less anxiety, every argument which he supposed likely to inspire the most vigorous exertions. He reminded them, “of their recent conquests in Italy, in Sicily, in Spain, in Afric, over nations no way inferior to whatever Macedon had to boast, even in the days of her glory; that those, with whom they were now to engage, were Macedonians

³² OLYMP. cxlv. 3. BEFORE CHRIST 193.

³³ Some days before, haranguing his men, he perceived that the place he was speaking from was burial-ground; which circumstance, having been noticed by the soldiers, cast a deep gloom over the whole army. As soon as Philip observed it, he withdrew. Omens of this kind were superstitiously attended to by the ancients.

³⁴ Just. L. xx. c. 4.

only in name ; not , as the Romans , great by their own exploits ; but deriving whatever distinction they enjoyed from the remembrance of the achievements of their forefathers , being themselves a degenerate race , who with difficulty repelled even the predatory incursions of a few neighbouring barbarians³⁵.”

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The right wing of the Macedonians had reached the heights before the enemy, and, having preserved in their march all that compactness and depth, which constituted the strength of the Macedonian phalanx, bore down with their whole weight upon the Romans, now ascending the hill ; who, unable to withstand the shock, gave way on every side, and had been totally routed, but for the timely support of the Aetolian horse. On the left, the Macedonians fought not with the same advantage. They had formed later than the other wing ; and a precipitate march , over broken ground , had thrown the troops into disorder. Flamininus perceiving their situation , and directing his attack where their broken lines admitted of an impression , without much difficulty completed the confusion ; their arms which in a great measure derived their power of execution from being interwoven together , and wrought as it were into one mass , added to their embarrassment , becoming , in the hands of the single soldier , unwieldy and almost useless. Meanwhile, discomfiture began also to reach the right wing. A legionary tribune, observing that this

The victory doubtful, at length decisive in favor of Rome.

³⁵ Just. L. xxx. c. 4.

B O O K VI. **Sect. 1.** was the only part of the Macedonian army which still maintained the dispute, wheeled round with a few chosen men, and made an attack on the rear of the phalanx. Here the Macedonians, from their order of battle, were incapable of resistance; for the phalanx could only advance, and the men were precluded from all power of facing about, by the closeness of their ranks, and the length of their interwoven spears^s. The Romans having opened, therefore, to themselves a passage, slaughtered the Macedonians with impunity; who, finding they could make no resistance, threw down their arms, dispersed, and fled. Philip, who, according to Polybius, had performed the duties both of the general and the soldier, seeing the day irretrievably lost, retreated towards Tempe, on his way to Macedon, endeavouring, as he retired, to collect the scattered remains of his army, more than one half of which had either been made prisoners, or fallen in the field of battle; but he previously dispatched messengers to his head-quarters at Larissa, with directions to have all his papers destroyed. Had they fallen into the hands of the Romans, the consequences might have been fatal to his friends, of whom he had still numbers in almost every Grecian state.

Philip obtains
a truce,

This victory, important as it was, became yet more considerable by the effect which it had on the councils of the Macedonian king, who immediately sent a deputation to Flamininus, desiring a

^s See Polyb. L. xvii. c. 25, 26, 27, 28.

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admitted to a
conference;
submits to the
conditions
offered.

Flamininus
grants him a
peace;
conditions.

truce for the burial of the dead, and begging that the proconsul would again admit him to a conference. Both these requests being complied with, the Roman general found little difficulty in adjusting the preliminaries of peace: Philip, now completely humbled, readily accepting even the most mortifying conditions; and the senate, approving of the plan laid down by Flamininus, he was empowered, jointly with ten commissioners sent from Rome, to grant a peace to Philip on the following terms³⁷.

“ All the Greek cities, both in Asia and in Europe, to be free, and restored to the enjoyment of their own laws³⁸.”

“ Philip, before the next Isthmian games, to deliver up to the Romans all the Greeks he had in any part of his dominions, and to evacuate all the places he possessed, either in Greece or in Asia³⁹.”

“ To give up all prisoners and deserters.

“ To surrender all his decked ships of every kind; five small vessels, and his galley of sixteen banks of oars, excepted⁴⁰.”

³⁷ See Polyb. Legat. ix. Liv. L. xxxiii. c. 30.

³⁸ This article deserves particular notice. From the use to which it was afterwards applied, we shall see with what an insidious policy it was thus worded.

³⁹ The cities in Asia were expressly mentioned, viz. Euromus, Pedasa, Bargyia, Jassus, Abydus, Thasus, Myrina, and Perinthus; all in Asia, or on the Asiatic coast. In relation to Cius, Flamininus was to inform the Bithynian king, what the pleasure of the senate was. See Polyb. Legat. ix.

⁴⁰ This last, by Livy's own confession, was merely a vessel of parade, and probably left with him on account of its unwieldy and useless bulk. — Liv. L. xxxiii. c. 30.

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“ To pay the Romans a thousand talents ; one
 “ half down, the rest at ten equal annual payments.
 And, if we are to believe Livy, “ not to exceed
 “ five hundred men in his military establishment ;
 “ not to have an elephant ; and not to make war
 “ beyond the confines of Macedon, without permis-
 “ sion from the Roman senate.” — These three
 articles, however, Polybius does not mention.

And, as a security for the performance of these
 stipulations, to give hostages ; his son Demetrius
 being one.

Aetolians
 oppose the
 peace ; but are
 over-ruled.

The Aetolians, whose services in the late battle
 gave them, they imagined, a right to interfere,
 warmly opposed the peace. But Flamininus, already
 highly offended at their having appropriated to
 themselves too large a proportion of the spoils,
 magisterially over-ruled their objections. We shall
 see, of what mischiefs this dispute was afterwards
 productive.

Philip's con-
 duct blam-
 able.

Philip's conduct, on this occasion, does little
 honor either to his abilities or to his spirit. Had
 he, instead of exposing himself to a decisive action,
 at once abandoned Greece, which, in his present
 situation, he could not expect to preserve ; had
 he retired to the strong-holds of Macedon, and
 harassed the Romans by occasional excursions ; had
 he, at the same time, sought new resources, either
 among the northern tribes (which he did at last,
 when it was too late) or in the friendship of
 Antiochus, who now began to perceive what *he*
 was to expect, when the fate of Macedon should
 be determined ; he might easily have protracted

the war beyond the term of Flaminius's command; and, if he had not tired out the Romans, might at least have made his advantage, as formerly, of the imbecility or inexperience of the generals sent against him. Even after the fatal blow at Cynoscephalae, had not all judgment and resolution forsaken him, this line of conduct might, in some measure, have been pursued; but, having lost a battle, which he ought not to have fought, subdued by his terrors, he tamely accepted of a peace, which he ought rather to have perished than have submitted to.

It was the policy of the Romans, on this occasion, artfully to disguise what farther views they had on Macedon; and, as if solely actuated by a generous concern for the liberties of Greece, to content themselves with having reduced the power of Philip, and obliged him to withdraw within the ancient boundaries of his hereditary kingdom. Had they at once attempted to deprive him of his crown, despair might have rendered him formidable; the princes of Asia, from interest, if not from affection, might have joined him; and even the Greeks themselves would probably have had suspicions of a design, which delivered them from one danger, only to expose them to a greater.

At the same time, under the specious character of *avengers of oppressed nations*, the Romans had an opportunity of attacking every prince, whom an extent of dominion made considerable, until, none remaining to oppose them, they might without control complete their plan of universal empire.

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VI.
Sect. I.

The subtlety
of the Roman
councils in
granting peace
to Philip.

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Sect. 1.

Flamininus
proceeds to
the settlement
of Greece;
proclaims
freedom, and
the enjoyment
of their own
laws, to all the
states dismem-
bered from
Macedon,

Peace being thus concluded with Philip, Flamininus, with the commissioners, proceeded to arrange the affairs of Greece, and the settlement of those cities and countries which had been dismembered from Macedon.

The Isthmian games were now begun, whither all Greece had repaired with anxious solicitude for their future destiny. When⁴¹, at Flamininus's command, a herald with sound of trumpet stepped forth, and proclaimed, "The senate of Rome, and
" the general Titus Quinctius, having vanquished
" king Philip and the Macedonians, grant freedom,
" with immunity from all garrisons and taxes, and
" the enjoyment of their own laws, to the Corin-
" thians, Phocians, Locrians, Euboeans, Achaeans
" of Pthiotis, Magnesians, Thessalians, and
" Perrhaebians." Many among this vast multitude had not heard the proclamation distinctly; and even those who did, could scarcely believe it, so much did it exceed their expectations; numbers, therefore, from every side calling on the herald to repeat what he had said, the proclamation was made again; which was answered with the loudest and most joyful acclamations. The games were no longer attended to; and the whole assembly crowded around Flamininus, hailing him their protector and preserver; some striving to embrace him, others heaping on him flowers and garlands; so that, had he not retired within his pavilion, he had fallen a

⁴¹ See Polyb. Legat. ix. p. 1108. & seq. Liv. L. xxxiii. c. 32., 33. Plut. in Flaminio.

sacrifice to this burst of joyous gratitude. At the celebration of the Nemaean games, which followed soon after, and at which Flamininus likewise presided, the same proclamation was made. B O O K
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Sect. I.

The states mentioned in this decree were those which had been in subjection to Macedon. The other Grecian communities, however, had not been forgotten. Flamininus informed them, what had been resolved upon in favor of all the faithful allies of Rome. To some an increase of territory was granted. Others were re-established in those possessions, which had been wrested from them in the course of the late wars. The Achaeans had Corinth, Heraea, and Triphylia, restored to them. Even Pleuratus, an Illyrian prince, and Amynder king of the Athamanes, who had aided Flamininus, were rewarded with a portion of Illyricum, and certain castles, which had lately belonged to Philip. And the Orestae, though within the confines of Macedon, were declared free, as a recompence for their early revolt to the Romans. with various
grants to the
several states
in confederacy
with the Ro-
mans.

To these gracious acts were added many others no less pleasing. All the Grecian prisoners of war, in every part of Philip's dominions, returned to their families. The exiles throughout most of the states in confederacy with Rome were recalled; Flamininus himself employing his good offices to suppress faction, and to heal the breaches occasioned by the late civil distractions. Roman garrisons still kept possession of Chalcis, Demetrias, and the citadel of Corinth; but even these he promised should be withdrawn, as soon as it was known what Antiochus Acts of favor
to the Greeks
in general.

B O O K

VI.

Sect. I.

Excessive joy
of Greece;

designed. These conciliating measures, which had also an additional efficacy from Flaminius's affability and courteous deportment, united the greatest part of Greece in the interests of the Romans; even the few individuals, who yet doubted the sincerity of Rome, were cautious, amidst this general exultation and confidence, of uttering their suspicions. So that in their assemblies, and festive meetings, nothing almost was to be heard but effusions of gratitude and praises of the Roman people: "Regard-
" less either of expense or of toil (it was said) they
" had thus interested themselves, merely to obtain
" liberty to Greece: that, except the battles of
" Marathon, of Salamis, of Plataeae, and Ther-
" mopylae, with what Cimon had achieved on
" the banks of the Eurymedon and near Cyprus,
" Greece had fought to no other purpose but to
" bring the yoke upon herself, and to raise monu-
" ments to her own dishonor; but these strangers,
" of whose descent from Grecian ancestors only
" a faint tradition ⁴² remained, and from whom
" neither friendly interposition nor even compas-
" sionate regard were to have been expected, had
" exposed themselves to the greatest dangers, to
" deliver her from oppression."

this joy ill-
founded.

In this kind of language, we learn from Polybius,

⁴² It was an old tradition, of which Virgil has made great use, that the south-east parts of Italy had been peopled with colonies from Greece, long before the foundation of Rome. And no doubt the first inhabitants, if not the founders, of Rome (See Dion. Halicarn.) were adventurers, and perhaps outcasts from these early establishments.

Livy, and Plutarch, did the Greeks of those days speak of this memorable transaction. And, which is more extraordinary, in the same style of panegyric it is mentioned by these historians themselves. It is certainly a mortifying reflection, that these writers have not expressed themselves in another manner; and that they, who lived after the final close of this illusive prospect, and who therefore must have known, beyond a possibility of doubt, for what ends this specious appearance of liberty had been granted³³, had not the spirit to tell posterity, at the conclusion of this pompous recital, "Such was the fond dream, that credulous Greece indulged! little did she think, that all this show of favor was only the prelude to her ruin! and that when Rome appeared the kindest, it was only that she might strike the more effectually!" — But, so justly to be dreaded is the fatal influence of despotism. It checks the pen even of respectable historians³⁴.

B O O K

VI.

Sect. I.

Ancient historians blamable for not speaking of this specious grant according to its true value.

³³ Polybius especially, personally experienced the treachery of Rome, and beheld the liberties of his country expire.

³⁴ Plutarch, however, has thrown in an observation, under which there seems to be couched somewhat more than he chose to say. "Freedom," he tells us, "was twice proclaimed to Greece, by Flamininus, and afterwards by Nero; and by both at Corinth, and at the celebration of the Isthmian games: with this difference, that Nero paid Greece the higher compliment; he himself announced the DECREE OF LIBERTY; Flamininus employed a herald." — What account ought to be made of the freedom conferred by Nero is well known. Did the historian mean that we should draw a parallel?

B O O K

VI.

Sect. I.

Policy of
Rome in this
grant of free-
dom to the
Grecian tribes.

This transaction, however, shows in the strongest light the consummate artifice of Rome. She meditated the subjection of Greece. But, while Antiochus was warlike and enterprising; while Macedon was not yet enslaved; and humbled Carthage still existed; the attempt had been dangerous. Greece, besides, was weak only from disunion; and, if once united at home, an effect which such an attempt would probably have produced, they might have proved again formidable. As the Romans, therefore, had with so much success employed their policy in keeping Macedon disjoined from Hannibal, Antiochus from Philip, and Greece from Macedon; so was the same policy now to be employed in disuniting the several Grecian states, not only from the great powers of Asia and Europe, but likewise from each other. And in no way could this be done so effectually, as by the renovation of their ancient laws and government. Each state having it's own laws, each it's peculiar form of government, each a distinct and independent sovereignty, they would all naturally be engaged in the same proud pretensions, the same jealousies and contests, which had animated them before; and, by affording to the Roman senate opportunities of interfering as arbiters in their differences, or as redressers of their wrongs, gradually and imperceptibly reduce Greece to that vassalage, which that artful people had in view. Besides, *liberty* was the darling object of the Grecian states; they had often been led away even by the name; and the restoration of their *liberties*, though but in appear-

ance, gave the Romans a wonderful influence, especially over the multitude; who, provided they enjoyed their rights of suffrage, the debates of their orators, and the bustle of their public assemblies, imagined themselves blest with all that liberty has most valuable.

B O O K
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Sect. 1.

In this general transport of joy the Aetolians, however, took no share⁴⁵. Discontented, that, in contempt of their representations, a peace should have been granted to Philip; and high in their resentment against Flamininus, who had not treated them, they conceived, as a free people, and a faithful and brave confederate deserved, they in revenge accused the Roman of having sold the peace to Macedon; they charged him with ingratitude to a people, to whose valor he owed the victory, and with assuming to himself a reputation he did not deserve. They accused him also with a want of personal courage; "Whilst I was engaged with the enemy," it was the common vaunt of every Aetolian, "Flamininus was at his prayers⁴⁶;" they even charged the Romans with perfidious designs, and the Greeks with folly in believing their professions: "They boast of having bestowed freedom on Greece, by setting at liberty some distant and inconsiderable places, whilst your principal and most important cities, Demetrias, Chalcis, Corinth, are garrisoned by their troops,

Murmurs of
the Aetolians.

⁴⁵ See Polyb. Legat. vi. Liv. L. xxxiii. c. 31. Plutarch in Flaminio.

⁴⁶ Plutarch. in parallel. Philop. & Flamin.

B O O K VI. Sect. 1. “ they have unfettered the legs, and fixed their yoke upon the neck.” This last accusation, particularly, gave Flamininus much pain, because it was but too well founded. The commissioners had in fact proposed, that the Romans should retain these strong holds as pledges of the fidelity of Greece; and it was only in consequence of the apprehensions excited throughout the Grecian states, by the murmurings of the Aetolians, that the proconsul at last evacuated them. It certainly had been easy for Flamininus to have regained the affections of this brave people, whom on the contrary he endeavoured rather to exasperate, by studied flights, and rejecting claims to which they apparently had a just right. But the pride of the Roman would not bend to such conciliating measures. And perhaps it was more agreeable to the views of Rome, that some sparks of disaffection should remain, from which, at a convenient season, the flame of war might be re-kindled.

Flamininus proposes to make war on Nabis, in order to dispossess him of Argos.

The Aetolians had soon an opportunity of manifesting their discontent. Nabis⁴⁷ still kept possession of Argos; and, as sovereign of Sparta, was also master of a number of sea-ports, and particularly of Gythium, a place of great strength on the Cretan sea, and the most considerable harbour in the southern part of Peloponnesus. Flamininus thought it dangerous, that so considerable a share of power should remain in the hands of a tyrant, on whose faith he could place no dependence; and was besides willing

⁴⁷ Liv. L. xxxiv. c. 22 & seq.

to gratify the Achaeans, who had a natural jealousy of Sparta, by the recovery of Argos, formerly one of their social cities. Having accordingly assembled the confederate states at Corinth, he proposed to attack the tyrant, and dispossess him of Argos; observing, "that this was a matter which related immediately to themselves, and in which he had no other concern, than as a friend to their liberties and welfare; but that it became them to consider, whether to have so ancient a city in slavery, in the heart of Greece, was not of pernicious example, as well as reproachful to them all; and whether therefore they ought not to restore it to the enjoyment of rights, which other Grecian states enjoyed, rather than suffer it to remain in bondage under a tyrant. He closed his speech by telling them, that whatever the majority should decree, he was ready to execute." The Aetolians with great eagerness laid hold of this occasion to inveigh against the Romans, "who manifested," said they, "the sincerity of their concern for the rights of Greece by the partial and nominal liberty they had proclaimed: that it was absurd to talk of a new war, in order to obtain Argos for the Achaeans, whilst the Aetolians were deprived of those cities, which they were to have possessed by express stipulations, and which the Romans themselves with-held from them: that, what the Romans really had in view, was to perpetuate war in Greece; Nabis was now the pretence, another would soon arise, until that ambitious people had so effectually established

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The Aetolians
object to it,
and charge
Flamininus
with insidious
views;

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the other
Grecian states
approve of the
attack upon
Nabis, and join
Flamininus.

“ themselves, that their dispossession would baffle
“ the united powers of Greece.”

These representations, however justly founded, were heard impatiently by all the other states : the Aetolians were not beloved; and the attack upon the tyrant was popular. So that, the war being resolved on by the unanimous suffrages of the whole assembly, the Aetolians excepted, the armies immediately took the field, and, after a fruitless attempt on Argos, advanced, by Flamininus's advice, towards Sparta where Nabis kept his head-quarters, where his most valuable possessions lay, and where, of course, whatever impression they made, would have the greater effect.

Nabis re-
proaches
Flamininus
with dupli-
city.

Nabis was astonished at seeing the Romans turn their arms against him. “ You Romans,” said he, in a conference with the proconsul, “ received me
“ into your alliance; how have I deserved to forfeit
“ it? You talk of Argos; but Argos was already
“ mine, by the voluntary cession of the king of
“ Macedon, when I entered into an alliance with
“ you; and my holding it at that time was not
“ made a ground of objection. Or is it because I
“ am, as you pretend, a tyrant, and guilty of
“ lawless deeds? But was I less a tyrant, or less
“ criminal, at the very time this alliance was
“ made?”

In cases of this kind, the strongest are always the best reasoners. “ The alledged treaty,” the Roman unblushingly replied, “ was altogether null from
“ the beginning : he was a tyrant, and with
“ tyrants Rome could not constitutionally have

“connexion⁴⁸.” Nabis, the most perfidious of men, well deserved this perfidious answer. He had even then, in providing means for his defence, been guilty of new cruelties⁴⁹. He had arrested eighty of the principal citizens of Sparta, that they might not be exposed, he said, to suspicion, during the invasion; promising that, as soon as peace was restored, they should be released; but the ensuing night they were every one murdered. Their estates and wives he bestowed on some of the most favored profligates, of which his army was composed. And, pretending that the Helotae⁵⁰ favored the enemy, he put many thousands of them to the sword.

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Sect. I.

Meanwhile, Flamininus and his confederates made the most vigorous exertion. The Roman fleet, together with the fleets of Pergamus and the Rhodians, had taken or blocked up all the sea-ports belonging to the tyrant; and even Gythium, though at first obstinately defended, at last surrendered. By land, the army, after reducing all the places around, had laid siege to Sparta. Philopoemen, who commanded the Achaeans, had, in the course of these operations, distinguished himself in an extraordinary manner. Besides the particular interest the Achaeans had in the success of this war, and his personal hatred of Nabis, he was actuated by another powerful consideration,

The war
against Nabis
is carried on
with vigor.

⁴⁸ Liv. L. xxxiv. c. 33.

⁴⁹ Liv. L. xxxiv. c. 27.

⁵⁰ The slaves employed in tillage, who had their settlements throughout the country of Laconia.

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“ his desire of showing the Romans, that the
 “ Greeks were not inferior to them in military
 “ prowess. ” It appears, that this brave man could
 not, without indignation, behold his country
 dependent on foreign councils; and, equally an
 enemy to every power that meant to inflave Greece,
 was, on all occasions, as earnest to vindicate her
 liberties against Rome, as he had been against
 Macedon.

The tyrant,
 reduced to
 great straits,
 offers large
 concessions

the Greek con-
 federates re-
 ject his ad-
 vances.

Flamininus
 concludes a
 treaty with
 him :

the absurdity
 and injustice
 of this mea-
 sure :

Nabis, who had been obliged to retire into
 Sparta, now offered not only to cede Argos, but
 also to make other large concessions; but the con-
 federates declared against peace with him on any
 terms. They insisted on the deliverance of Sparta;
 and that he should be expelled from Peloponnesus,
 which could never otherwise hope for permanent
 tranquillity. Flamininus, nevertheless, under vari-
 ous pretences, opposed the continuance of the war;
 and at last, when Sparta appeared on the point of
 being taken, and even Argos, by an insurrec-
 tion of its citizens, had been forced out of the
 tyrant's hands, concluded a treaty with the man
 to whom, when it served his purpose, he had
 made this haughty reply; *Rome can form no treaty
 with a tyrant.*

What makes this step appear the more extraor-
 dinary is, that Agesipolis⁵¹, confessedly lawful

⁵¹ It appears from Polybius (Legat. xlix.) that this un-
 happy prince was afterwards sent on an embassy to Rome
 from the Spartan exiles, and, having in his passage thither
 fallen in with pirates, was slain by them.

heir to the throne of Sparta, whom the tyrant Lycurgus had expelled, was at this very time in the Roman camp, together with a number of Spartan exiles; who, under the protection of Rome, now expected to be restored to their country; and whose interests were all sacrificed on this occasion. The treaty does not even make mention of them, one article excepted, which seems rather a cruel mockery, than a clause in favor of friends and allies. It was stipulated, that the wives of the Spartan exiles (the richest of whom, however, Nabis had already disposed of among his mercenaries) should have permission to join their husbands, if they chose it. The chief of the other articles were, that the tyrant should have no fortified places; that he should surrender all his ships; and pay a certain sum to the Romans.

It appears, from the pains taken by ancient historians to account for this transaction, that it exposed Flamininus to much censure. "Nabis," they tell us, "could not have been destroyed, without involving the Spartans in severe calamities. To spare them, Flamininus was obliged to spare the tyrant. — Lacedemon, besides, was in a condition to stand a long siege; and Antiochus was preparing to invade Greece: the

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the reasons
alleged by
historians for
Flamininus's
conduct:

"Lacedemon, nevertheless, was walled only in part, and, just before the peace granted to Nabis, had been on the point of being taken by storm, the confederate troops having carried part of the town by assault; so that the besieged were under the necessity of setting fire to a quarter of the city, in order to dislodge them.

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the artifice
used to silence
his Greek con-
federates ;

“ consequences might have been fatal, had he
“ found Nabis in arms, and effected a junction
“ with him. — Winter also was approaching, and the
“ army had not the necessary provisions for remain-
“ ing in the field during that inclement season ”.

These arguments Flamininus is said to have advanced in his justification. The last argument, especially, he employed with great art. The Greek confederates were earnest for continuing the war ; “ which it had been better,” they said, “ not to have commenced, if the tyrant is not to be crushed.” — “ I am content ”, replied the Roman ; “ let us then prosecute the war : but, “ we shall want a large reinforcement of troops, and “ a number of expensive machines ; sufficient stores “ must also be provided, and ample provision “ made for the support and convenience of the “ army, without which it will be impossible for “ them to sustain the rigors of a winter-siege. Write, “ therefore, to your respective states, and know “ what proportion of men, money, and provisions, “ they are willing to furnish on this occasion.” — He knew what their answer would be. Low in their finances at best, these republicans had also been exhausted by the repeated wars they had been engaged in. It was therefore left entirely to his determination, either to urge or put an end to the war.

his principal
motives, pro-
bably, for
adopting such
a measure.

Besides the reasons here alledged, there were other motives, as we are informed, which he did not chuse to mention : his fear of being supplanted

⁵³ Liv. L. xxxiv. c. 33.

⁵⁴ Liv. ibid. c. 34.

by a successor; and, what Plutarch^{ss} thinks made the deepest impression on his mind, a jealousy of Philopoemen. It is certain, that this Grecian commander was generally looked upon as the hero of this war; he was placed on a footing of equality by the most zealous of Flamininus's friends; and it mortified the Roman exceedingly, that the exploits of an Arcadian, who had only commanded in some inconsiderable disputes on the confines of his own country, should, in the estimation of Greece, be raised to an equality with his own achievements. Perhaps he considered also, that the Spartans, if now relieved from the tyrant's yoke, might not only become again formidable, but be apt to ascribe their deliverance to the Achaeans and their general; whilst Achaia, from such a revolution, might probably derive a larger share of power, than it was the interest or the intention of Rome she should possess. In continuing Nabis on the Spartan throne, Flamininus acted, therefore, according to the customary policy of Rome: he prevented Sparta's rising from her present debasement, while he left ample matter of anger and contest among the several Peloponnesian states; and thus prepared a plentiful harvest for Rome's ambitious arms.

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Flamininus returned soon after to Rome; and, to the great satisfaction of all Greece, withdrew, as he had promised, all the Roman garrisons. From this, however, it may be suspected, that

Flamininus
returns to
Rome:

^{ss} In Flaminino.

B O O K his fears of Antiochus, which he pleaded in excuse
VI. for the peace with Nabis, were not so strong as
Sect. I. he had pretended: had he really thought that Antiochus was on the point of invading Greece, it can hardly be supposed, that he would have left the country ungarrisoned.

obtains the
 freedom of the
 Romans,
 slaves in
 Greece.

Before his departure, he made it his request to the several Grecian states, as the most acceptable return he could receive from them, to grant him the freedom of all Roman slaves. These prisoners had been taken in the war with Hannibal, and sold by the Carthaginians: "It were a reproach to the Greeks," he added, "should any Roman want liberty in a country that owed its liberty to Rome." — A request highly to his honor! and which was cheerfully complied with; each state ransoming, at the public expense, whatever Romans were found in slavery within their territories. Among the Achaeans only, Livy informs us, twelve hundred were found, whose ransom, at five minae a man", amounted to one hundred talents".

How many of these wretched men must there have been in Greece, when in so small a part of it were found so great a number!

" Liv. L. xxxiv. c. 50.

" L. 16. 2 s. 11 d.

" L. 19, 375.

B O O K VI.

S E C T I O N II.

C O N T E N T S.

Antiochus king of Syria — his prosperity — the Romans, jealous of his power, seek to reduce it — which he resents — resolves to attack the Romans — enters into alliance with the Aetolians — invades Greece — meets the Romans in battle — is defeated at Thermopylae — and afterwards at Magnesia. — The Romans turn their arms against the Aetolians — compel them to submit to what conditions they are pleased to impose — Achaia and Macedon active in behalf of Rome. — The treacherous manner in which the Romans requite their services. — Rome endeavours to break the strength of the commonwealth of Achaia, by seducing it's confederate states — by the intrigues of Roman emissaries, a party of Messenians take up arms against the Achaeans — Philopoemen hastens to suppress the insurgents — falls into their hands — is put to death — Flamininus suspected of having encouraged this flagitious action — grounds for this suspicion — Flamininus's conduct to Cato.

THE humiliation of Antiochus was the object Rome had next in view. The magnificence of his court; the intimate connexion he had formed with Egypt, on whose young king he had just bestowed his daughter in marriage; the reports

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Antiochus
obnoxious to
the Romans.

B O O K disseminated of his immense treasures, numerous
VI. armies, and all the formidable apparatus of war;
Sect. 2 gave this prince a reputation for power far beyond
his reputation. what he really possessed. He was, besides, high
 in fame for political wisdom and martial abilities. By his vigorous conduct he had extinguished a dangerous rebellion, fomented by his own ministers, in the heart of his dominions; and he had restored peace to the eastern provinces of his empire, which, during the three last reigns, had been involved in a state of the utmost confusion. He had also at this period visited the coasts of the Hellespont, formerly subject to the kings of Syria; he had even passed over into Thrace, where he had likewise claims; and he was preparing to raise from it's ruins Lyfimachia, anciently the royal city of Lyfimachus, in order to make it again the seat of government in those countries.

Romans dis-
 semble with
 him during
 the Macedo-
 nian war.

These spirited exertions of a prince, who seemed well able to support his pretensions to countries which the Romans had already marked as their own, roused and stimulated their ambitious jealousy. As long, however, as the fate of Greece and Macedon was doubtful, they had concealed their views, and great care had been taken to keep up a friendly intercourse with Antiochus. Of this we have a remarkable instance from Livy¹. At the beginning of the second Macedonian war, Attalus, then with the consul in Greece, complained to the Roman senate that Antiochus had

¹ L. xxxii. c. 8.

attacked his frontiers; and applied for succours B O O K
 against the invader: it was answered, "that An- VI.
 "tiochus, as well as Attalus, was the ally of Sect. 2.
 Rome; that the Romans could not employ their
 arms in favor of one ally against another; but that
 "they would send ambassadors to Antiochus, to
 "represent that Attalus was engaged in their ser-
 "vice, and would esteem it a kindness done to
 "them, if the Syrian monarch would withdraw
 "from his territories:" with which request An-
 tiochus accordingly complied.

Now, however, they spoke in a very different Different be-
 tone. No sooner was peace concluded with Philip, haviour after
 than it was notified to the ambassadors of Antiochus², Philip's de-
 who then attended Flamininus, "that, by the treaty feat;
 "with Macedon, the Grecian cities, in Asia as
 "well as Europe, had been declared free"; that
 "Rome expected their master would conform to
 "that declaration;" and farther, "that henceforth
 "Asia was to be the boundary of his dominions,
 "and any attempt to make a settlement in Eu-
 "rope would be considered by Rome as an act
 "of hostility." The same notification was after-
 wards repeatedly made to him in person, by com-
 missioners deputed for the purpose. In vain was
 it alledged by the king and his ministers³, "that his resentment
 "he had nothing in common with Philip or his
 "fortunes, and was not therefore interested in the
 "stipulations to which he had agreed; that the

² Liv. L. xxxiii. c. 34.

³ See Section the first of this book.

⁴ See Liv. L. xxxiii. c. 39, 40. & L. xxxv. c. 16.

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Sect. 2.

“ possessions he held in Asia and Europe he inherited from his ancestors; and, as it did not concern him, in what manner the Romans dealt with the cities of Italy, to the liberties of which, though of Grecian origin Rome paid little regard, his treatment of the Asiatic cities did not appear to him at all a Roman concern.” The requisition nevertheless was peremptorily insisted upon. And though he sent ambassadors to remonstrate with the senate, he found it impossible to obtain any mitigation of the imperious mandate.

The deep policy of the Roman councils.

We have in this place a fresh opportunity of admiring the profound policy of the Roman councils. A method of injury, more effectual than the present, could not have been devised against Antiochus. The greater part of the cities of the lower Asia had in some shape or other availed themselves of the weak or turbulent reigns of the late Syrian kings: many of them had assumed an independent sovereignty; some had extended their territories at the expense of the provinces around them; new states had even sprung up amidst the confusion of the times, and risen to a considerable degree of strength and independence. All these states were with good reason apprehensive, that Antiochus would seize the first opportunity of recovering what had been lost by the fault or misfortune of his ancestors. But by the public declaration of the Romans in favor of the Grecian colonists (to which denomination the inhabitants of these cities had a claim) they were not only confirmed in their defection, but became fixed in the interests of Rome.

In her cause, of consequence, the cause of all the Asiatic Greeks seemed necessarily to be involved: whilst Antiochus, in the midst of his own dominions, saw himself encompassed with jealous states or declared adversaries.

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Much art had at the same time been employed to fill Italy with apprehensions of mighty danger from Antiochus⁵; “his forces were already collected, and he was to appear immediately on their coasts;” while the several commissioners, in their return from Asia, labored to confirm this belief, by their pompous accounts of his alarming preparations, and by asserting that all was in readiness for the invasion of the Roman territories. This nevertheless was the tale of artifice, and the contrivance of the Roman chiefs, in order to deceive the Plebeians; who, tired of wars, (which, administering only to the ambition and insolence of the Patricians, afforded the people nothing but bloodshed and toil) had strenuously opposed the last expedition into Greece⁶; and it was expected would more strongly resist the launching into the vast and seemingly boundless tracts of Asia. It is, in fact, plain, from the unprovided condition in which the war found Antiochus, that, whatever hostile purposes he may be supposed to have meditated against Rome, they were not yet ripe for execution. He even seems, from the train of negotiation he entered into, and the instructions to his

Alarming apprehensions of the designs of Antiochus propagated over Italy.

⁵ See Liv. L. xxxiii. c. 44. & L. xxxv. c. 23.

⁶ See Liv. L. xxxi. c. 6.

B O O K ambassadors at Rome, evidently ⁷ to have wished
VI. for peace, and, in order to obtain it, to have been
Sect. 2. inclined to make large concessions; could any thing
 less than the utter humiliation of the crown of
 Syria have satisfied Roman ambition.

Hannibal and
 the Aetolians
 incite Antio-
 chus to war;

their different
 plans.

He soon after, however, abandoned all thoughts
 of accommodation. Hannibal, the sworn enemy
 of Rome, upon the first tidings of his meditating
 a war against the Romans, made his escape from
 Carthage to the Syrian court, and urged him to
 arms. The Aetolians ⁸ also earnestly solicited him
 to come and vindicate the cause of Greece, "en-
 thralled," said they, "more than ever, notwith-
 standing the specious grant of liberty Rome had
 mocked her with." Hannibal ⁹ warmly recom-
 mended the invasion of Italy, where alone, he
 affirmed, the Romans were vulnerable; and with
 a body of only eleven thousand land-forces ¹⁰, and
 a suitable naval equipment, he offered to make a
 descent, and to carry the war into the heart of the
 country; provided Antiochus should appear at the
 same time at the head of a powerful army on the
 western coast of Greece, and make a show of pre-
 paring for an invasion from that quarter; that the
 Romans, perplexed by a variety of dangers, might
 find it the more difficult to obstruct his operations.

Antiochus
 adopts the
 plan of the
 Aetolians.

Notwithstanding the plausibility of this idea, a
 narrow jealousy ¹¹ prevented Antiochus from adopt-

⁷ See Liv. L. xxxiv. c. 58, 59.

⁸ Liv. L. xxxv. c. 22.

⁹ Liv. L. xxxiv. c. 60.

¹⁰ Ten thousand, says Appian (de bello Syr.) p. 147.

¹¹ Liv. *ibid.* c. 42, 43.

ing a plan of operations, of which another was to have the direction; and, if successful, would inherit the largest share of the glory. He chose rather to listen to the Aetolians, who told him ¹², if Greece was made the seat of war, a general insurrection would immediately take place; that not only Thessaly and Euboea, but Nabis, the Achaeans, and even Philip himself, waited impatiently for an opportunity of declaring against the Romans; and that, the instant he entered the Grecian frontiers, he should have ample supplies of men and money pouring in from every quarter. To these assurances, Antiochus listened with a fond attention; and entertained them, in return, with exaggeratal accounts of the mighty armaments he had in readiness; his fleets were to cover the Hellespont, and numerous nations from every part of Asia were already on their march, before whom the Romans would not dare to appear.

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Promises of
the Aetolians;and of An-
tiochus :

The amount of these mutual promises and boasted power was soon ¹³ discovered. When Antiochus entered Greece, the utmost force he could muster was ten thousand foot, five hundred horse, and six elephants; for the support also of which, he informed his confederates of Aetolia they were to provide. Of the Grecian states, the Aetolians had influence to bring over to their party none but the Spartan tyrant, the Acarnanians, with the city of Demetrias in Thessaly; of which they had even acquired possession by the treachery of one of its

ill-supported
by them
both;¹² Liv. L. xxxv. c. 12. 13.¹³ Liv. L. xxxv. c. 43, 44.

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the Achaeans
and Philip
refuse to join
them.

citizens. The Achaeans, at the same time, were, from principle, particularly adverse to any cause espoused by Nabis and the Aetolians. And Philip, besides his dread of the Roman arms, and the consideration that his son Demetrius, with many of his nobles, were then hostages at Rome, had strong reasons to complain of the conduct of Antiochus. Indifferent to Philip's fate, that prince, during the late disastrous war, had not only left him unassisted, but, taking advantage of his situation, had afterwards attempted an establishment on the Thracian Chersonese, where Philip's pretensions were at least equally strong, and where he now saw with indignation, a rival kingdom rising on the confines of Macedon.

Revolution
in Sparta;

A sudden revolution had entirely changed the face of affairs in Sparta¹⁴. The Spartan tyrant; upon the prospect of being joined by the Aetolians and Antiochus, had taken up arms, and laid siege to Gythium, then held by an Achaean garrison for the Romans: and he had even defeated, in a naval combat, Philopoemen, then at the head of the commonwealth of Achaia; who, though highly jealous of the influence the Romans had obtained in Greece, gladly laid hold of an opportunity of making war on the infamous Nabis, and immediately hastened to the assistance of the Gythian garrison. Philopoemen was not expert in naval affairs, and, in his precipitate zeal, he had put to sea with such ships as were ready; most of them old and unfit

¹⁴ See Liv. L. xxxv. c. 25. 30, 35, 36. & Plat. in Philopoem.

for

for service. Nabis, sensible of the advantage, attacked him without delay, destroyed his fleet, he himself narrowly escaping; and, in consequence of this victory, Gythium soon surrendered to the Spartans. This discomfiture did not, however, disconcert Philopoemen. He was soon in a condition to prosecute the war by land; and having, by his judicious conduct, obtained two victories over the tyrant, obliged him to retire towards Sparta, and to provide for the defence of his capital. Nabis, held in detestation at home, could ill maintain himself against enemies abroad; and the Aetolians, beginning to fear that Sparta must, in the end, fall into the hands of the Achaeans, dispatched Alexamenus with a thousand men, under color of succouring Nabis, but with secret instructions to destroy the tyrant, as soon as an opportunity offered, and to make himself master of Sparta. The misconduct of the Aetolian commander rendered the scheme abortive. Soon after his arrival, under the pretence of getting Nabis to review the auxiliary troops, he drew him aside from his guards; and put him to death; but, instead of proclaiming himself the vindicator of the Spartan people, and engaging their confidence, he employed himself and his Aetolians in plundering the city. The citizens, roused to indignation and resistance, attacked these treacherous invaders, and Alexamenus, with most of his men, fell in the tumultuary combat. During the confusion, Philopoemen appeared before their gates, and invited them to accede to the Achaean confe-

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Nabis slain.

The Spartans
accede to the
Achaean
league.

B O O K VI. deracy; they accepted his invitation, and were incorporated into the commonwealth of Achaia.

Sect. 2. Vigor of the Romans; Meanwhile, the Romans hastened to improve the favorable opportunity, which the unhappy policy of the Syrian king and his Grecian confederates presented to them. Their object was the subjection of Antiochus; and he was delivering himself into their hands. A firm union in Greece might have baffled the Roman designs; but the Aetolians were again distracting that country by their infatuated councils. To take advantage of this situation of affairs, the praetor Baebius was dispatched into Thessaly; two fleets were ordered to be fitted out, the one for Sicily, the other for Greece; and Quintius Flamininus, from whose influence among the Grecian states much was expected, had orders, together with three other commissioners, to visit the principal cities, and prevent their defection from the interests of Rome. It was in the course of this service, that he made the memorable reply to the ambassadors of Antiochus, as recorded by historians of those times¹⁵. He met them in the Achaean diet, whither they had come to solicit an alliance with their master, "who," said they, "zealous for the liberties of Greece, waited not until his forces were all assembled, but would be followed by numerous armies from every province of his empire, the Dahae, the Medes, the Caddusians, the Elymaeans, from the stroke of whose weapons there was no escaping." — "This

their fleets and armies dispatched to Greece.

Embassy of Flamininus;

¹⁵ Liv. L. xxxv. c. 48, 49.

“ pompous detail,” answered Flamininus, “ reminds
 “ me of an entertainment, to which I was once
 “ invited by a certain Grecian host; though in
 “ summer, the table was covered with wild fowl
 “ and venison of every species, and all excellent in
 “ their kinds; amazed, I inquired how, at that
 “ season of the year, he could be supplied with such
 “ a variety of delicacies. Be not surprised, my
 “ friend,” replied the honest Greek; “ what you
 “ see is all swine’s flesh; the art of the cook has
 “ given it the various forms and flavors you ad-
 “ mire. In like manner are you to judge of the
 “ various nations which have now been mentioned.
 “ Whatever different appellations the skill of the
 “ orator has bestowed on them, they are in fact
 “ one people; all abject Syrians, strangers them-
 “ selves to liberty, and therefore little capable of
 “ vindicating the liberties of others.”

The Romans, indeed, had little to fear from
 Antiochus. Unable, from the slender force he had
 brought into the field, to exert himself vigorously,
 and depending for the maintenance of his troops
 on the money and provisions which the Aetolians
 could supply, his progress must have been incon-
 siderable, had he even found no enemy to oppose
 him. The acquisition of the principal cities of
 Euboea, and a few towns in Thessaly, and the
 gaining over of Amynder, the petty king of the
 Athamanes, to his interest, were all the exploits
 he had to boast of. But, besides the difficulties
 which arose from his situation, his own conduct
 was, in many respects, feeble and ill-judged. His

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 his answer to
 the ambassa-
 dors of Antio-
 chus.

 Imprudent
 conduct of
 Antiochus;

B O O K VI. Sect. 2. wisest plan had been, a reconciliation with the king of Macedon; and Hannibal earnestly recommended this measure; but, on the contrary, he provoked Philip by new indignities. He set up against him a pretender to his Crown¹⁶, one of the same name, said to be descended from the ancient kings of Macedon, whose sister was wife to the king of the Athamanes; and, that he might establish this adventurer in the affections of the Macedonian people, as well as to insult Philip, he sent him to Cynoscephalae, to inter the bones of those Macedonians¹⁷ who had fallen in the battle; which pious act Philip, in the midst of his embarrassments and distress, had hitherto neglected to perform. But, what was most prejudicial to the affairs of Antiochus, was his dissipation at Chalcis. At his first arrival in Greece, he endeavoured to make himself master of that city, and failed; but, by means of an understanding between him and a party of the citizens, he had carried it upon a second attempt. Instead, however, of making a proper use of this important acquisition, he abandoned himself¹⁸ to the pursuit of a silly amour. Though upwards of fifty, he married a maiden under twenty, the daughter of his host: and, in the festivities of this unseasonable and ill-suited match, he wasted that time which his public affairs demanded; his whole army following his example in unwarrantable and ill-timed indulgences.

his dissipation
at Chalcis;

¹⁶ Liv. L. xxxv. c. 47.

¹⁷ Liv. L. xxxvi. c. 8.

¹⁸ Liv. *ibid.* c. 11.

Upon the election of new consuls, the care of the war in Greece had been allotted to Manius Acilius Glabrio¹⁹, one of the consuls elect; who, as soon as the necessary levies were completed, passed over from Brundisium, and advanced into Thessaly. Alarmed at the approach of the enemy, Antiochus was roused from his lethargy, and took the field; but the numerous forces, which he had boasted were to follow from Asia, had not yet arrived, and four thousand men were the total amount of the Aetolian succours. His only resource was to stop the progress of the Romans by possessing himself of the streights of Thermopylae, and securing the heights of mount Oeta, over which the Persians had made their way in the days of Leonidas. These precautions availed little. Cato²⁰, whose name was afterwards rendered illustrious by his spirited discharge of the Censorial office, having been sent over the mountains at the head of a considerable detachment, soon dislodged the Aetolians to whom the defence of that post had been committed; and, while his victorious troops were pouring down from above, the consul having forced the pass below, a general discomfiture involved the whole Syrian army: Antiochus, who was wounded in the mouth by a stone, escaping only with five hundred men into Chalcis; from whence he retired, with precipitation, to his Asiatic dominions²¹. — What consequences his inconsiderate conduct produced afterwards to his affairs, and the

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the consul
Acilius advances against
him.Battle of
Thermopylae.Antiochus
defeated.¹⁹ Liv. L. xxxvi. c. 14 & seq.²⁰ Plut. in Catone.²¹ OLYMP. cxlvii. 1. BEFORE CHRIST 187.

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The Romans
affect kind-
ness to the
Achaeans and
to Philip.

ruin it entailed on his unhappy kingdom, are matters that belong not to the present history.

Antiochus was defeated and had fled. He was now to be followed into Asia, where his great strength lay, and where, if joined by Greece, he might have proved more formidable than ever. But the first use which the Romans made of their victory was, to annihilate whatever influence the Syrian monarch was thought still to possess among the Grecian states, and to confirm those in the interests of Rome, who had declared against him. They accordingly were lavish of their favors to Philip and the Achaeans. The latter had, in the course of the war, extended their dominions over all Peloponnesus; and the Romans, without expressing the least jealousy of this increase of power, left them in the undisturbed possession of all they had acquired. Philip, in assisting the Romans, had recovered several towns on the side of Thessaly and Athamania which he had formerly held, and which he had been obliged to cede upon the conclusion of the late peace; he was suffered to retain whatever he had taken; his ambassadors, who bore his congratulations to Rome, were treated with distinguished regard; his son Demetrius, and the rest of the Macedonian hostages, were set at liberty; and, soon after, that part of the tribute, which remained unpaid, was remitted. Rome showed lenity even to those, whose fidelity had been most doubtful; the people of Chalcis had their lives and estates secured to them; and the Epirots and Boeotians, though strongly suspected of a connexion with

Lenity to those
states whose
friendship had
been doubtful;

Antiochus, and of having sent him supplies, were pardoned upon their submission. The Aetolians²² themselves might have had favorable terms, the consul offering them peace, provided they renounced all alliance with Syria, and delivered up their chief city, Heraclea, into his hands: but, whether apprehensive that the Romans, when possessed of Heraclea, would impose harder conditions, or prevailed upon by the intrigues of Damocritus, one of their popular leaders, the avowed enemy of Rome, who encouraged them with hopes of immediate succours from Antiochus, they rejected the offer. To the counsels, principally, of this demagogue, was owing their first treaty of alliance with the Syrian king. Damocritus was then chief magistrate of Aetolia; and so violent against the Romans²³, that when Flamininus, at that time ambassador from Rome to the Aetolian states, demanded of him a copy of the decree in favor of Antiochus, "I have other matters," replied he, "to attend to at present; I shall deliver it to you on the banks of the Tiber."

More vigorous measures having thus become necessary, the consul urged the siege of Heraclea²⁴; which, notwithstanding its strength of situation, and the obstinate defence of the Aetolians, did not long resist the Roman arms; the garrison, with Damocritus their turbulent commander, surren-

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offer terms to
the Aetolians,

who reject
them.

The consul
urges the siege
of Heraclea;

takes it;

²² Liv. L. xxxvi. c. 22.

²³ Liv. L. xxxv. c. 33.

²⁴ A city at the foot of the mount Oeta, on the river Asopus, defended by a castle, from its situation supposed to be of great strength.

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prepares to lay
siege to Nau-
pactus :the Aetolians
make overtu-
res,the consul
refuses to treat
with them ;at last admits
their deputies ;takes advan-
tage of their
expressions ;

dering at discretion. Soon after the reduction of Heraclea, Lamia, at a small distance, surrendered also to the Romans; who, following these successes, prepared to attack Naupactus, a sea-port on the Corinthian gulph, of the first consequence to the Aetolian nation. Alarmed at this rapid progress, and disappointed of the aids they expected from Asia, the Aetolians would now gladly have accepted of the peace which they had formerly spurned at; but the consul at first refused to treat with them; and with much difficulty was at length prevailed on to admit the Aetolian deputies into his presence. At the head of this deputation ²⁵ was Phaeneas, of whom mention has been already made; he began his discourse, by bewailing the ill-advised conduct of the Aetolians, who now, repenting of their imprudence, had decreed *to submit themselves to the faith of the Roman people*. It would appear, that Phaeneas did not apprehend the full import of the expressions he had employed; which, as the consul chose to understand them, implied a total surrender of all Aetolia to the Romans. Acilius laying hold on what he had said, "Is it then true, that the Aetolians submit themselves to the faith of Rome?" Phaeneas confirming it; "if it is so," resumed the consul, "let no Aetolian, from henceforth, on any account, public or private, presume to pass over into Asia; and let Dicaearchus ²⁶,

²⁵ Polyb. Legat. xiii. Liv. L. xxxvi. c. 28, 29.

²⁶ One of the Aetolian leaders, who had been active in promoting the treaty with Syria.

“ Menesthratus the Epirot ²⁷, and Amynder, B O O K
 “ with all the Athamanes who have had any share VI.
 “ in his revolt, be delivered into my hands.” — Sect. 2.
 “ The Aetolians,” interrupted Phaeneas, “ in sub-
 “ mitting themselves to the faith of the Romans,
 “ meant to rely upon their generosity, but not to
 “ yield themselves up to servitude. The requisi-
 “ tions which you make, neither the honor of
 “ Aetolia, nor the customs and laws of Greece,
 “ will allow us to comply with.” — “ It is insolent treats them
 “ prevarication,” answered the consul, “ to mention contumeli-
 “ the honor of Aetolia! and the customs and laws ously.
 “ of Greece! It even deserves that I should com-
 “ mand you to be put in chains.” He instantly
 ordered chains to be brought forward; but the
 representations of his chief officers prevented him
 from violating the sacred character of ambassador;
 and a truce of ten days was granted, in order that
 the Aetolian deputies might lay the consul’s demands
 before the general assembly of their nation.

The report made by the deputies, highly exas- The Aetolians
 perated the Aetolians, who seemed resolved to highly exaspe-
 submit to every extremity rather than surrender rated ;
 their liberties to imperious Rome. What made
 them more determined, Polybius ²⁸ informs us,
 was the favorable accounts brought by Nicander,
 one of their chiefs. He had been dispatched to are encour-
 Antiochus, and returned in twelve days, with a aged in vigo-
 considerable supply of money, and the strongest rous measures
by expecta-

²⁷ Who had entered Naupactus with a body of auxiliaries.

²⁸ Ubi supra.

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tions of succours from Asia.

and from Macedon :

assurances, that early in the spring all the forces of Syria should be sent to the assistance of the Aetolians. He added, that he had also had an interview with Philip, having, on his return, as he avoided the Roman camp, fallen in with a party of the Macedonian army. They carried him to their king; who not only set him at liberty, but employed him to inform the Aetolians of his friendly dispositions; that; although their imprudence in calling in foreign aid, first from Rome, and now from Asia, had occasioned the calamitous condition to which Greece was reduced, he nevertheless should forget the injuries he had sustained from them, and expected that they, in return, would bury in oblivion the enmity they bore to him.

are deceived.

There is reason to suspect the truth of this account of Philip. In his present situation, he had an opportunity of recovering much of what he had lost, and was apparently in high favor with the Romans; accordingly, he could hardly have entertained the thoughts here ascribed to him; or, if he had, would scarcely have disclosed them to a people with whom he had generally been on terms of hostility. Whatever may be in this, Nicander's purpose was answered. Ready to believe whatever flattered their hopes, the Aetolians determined to bid defiance to Rome, and drew all their forces to the city of Naupactus, which Acilius, with the whole consular army soon after invested.

Naupactus pressed by the Romans ;

But, with whatever vigor the Aetolians exerted themselves, their bad fortune continued : the promised succours did not appear ; and Naupactus, after a

siege of two months, was reduced to the last extre-
 mity. Philip, meanwhile, was availing himself of
 the war, and, under pretence of fighting the battles
 of Rome, had possessed himself of Demetrias, and
 several considerable districts both in Epire and
 Thessaly. Flamininus, who, since the flight of
 Antiochus, had taken up his residence at Chalcis,
 and was perfectly acquainted with the views of
 the senate in relation to Philip, saw with concern
 the re-establishment of his power, and hastened to
 the Roman camp²⁹, in order to induce the consul
 to pursue different measures. "Do you know,"
 said he to Acilius, "how prejudicial to the interests
 of the republic your conduct is? wasting your
 time in humbling the contemptible Aetolians,
 whose subjection we can effect when we please,
 you are suffering the Macedonian king, Rome's
 most dangerous foe, to render himself more
 powerful than ever." Acilius was soon convinced
 by the reasoning of Flamininus; the only difficulty
 that remained, was to raise the siege without im-
 peachment of the consul's honor; and this difficulty
 Flamininus undertook to remove. The Aetolians
 had applied to him for his mediation; under color
 of which, he advised them to sue to the consul
 for a truce, that they might send ambassadors to
 Rome to implore the clemency of the senate. This
 request he promised to support; and, a suspension
 of arms having accordingly taken place, Philip was
 obliged to discontinue his military operations.

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Sect. 2.

Flamininus
intercedes in
its behalf:

his views;

prevails on the
consul to grant
a truce.

²⁹ Liv. L. xxxvi. c. 34, 35.

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The Aetolians
send ambassa-
dors to Rome;
treated with
severity;

return uncer-
tain of their
fate.

The sequel of the fortunes of the Aetolians, till their final subjection to the Roman power, may, from it's connexion with the preceding narrative, not improperly be recorded here. At Rome their ambassadors found little favor. The only conditions³⁰ they could obtain were, either to pay the republic a thousand talents, a sum which, they declared, far exceeded their abilities; and to have neither friend nor foe, but with the approbation of Rome; or, to submit to the pleasure of the senate. They desired to know, what they were to understand by "*submitting to the pleasure of the senate*;" but a particular explanation was refused, and an implicit obedience to whatever orders the senate should be pleased to issue was peremptorily insisted upon. With this answer they returned home; and in this state of terror the Aetolians remained, uncertain of their future destiny, until the arrival of Lucius Cornelius Scipio, the newly-elected consul, to whom the command in Greece and Asia had been assigned. To him they made their application³¹, but without success, though the Athenians, and even Scipio Africanus, the consul's brother, interceded in their behalf. The severe terms, which the senate had decreed, he also pronounced; but, as a mighty favor, he granted a six months truce, that they might again prosecute their cause at Rome. In fact, this truce, whatever the Aetolians were made to believe, was not less agreeable to

³⁰ Polyb. Legat. xvi. Liv. L. xxxvii. c. i.

³¹ Polyb. Legat. xvii.

Scipio than to them. He was impatient to have the glory of passing into Asia, ground hitherto untrodden by any Roman general; and, if obstructed by an Aetolian war, he feared that he might lose, perhaps, the grand object of his pursuit.

The day of Magnesia decided the fate of Antiochus; and the Romans were now at leisure to attend to the reduction of the Aetolians. These people had rendered themselves more obnoxious than ever. Whilst the Romans were employed in Asia, they had driven Philip not only out of some of their territories, in which he had established himself; but also from others, to which he had a good claim; and had besides recovered Athamania, and restored it to Amynder, to whom it legally belonged. The Romans, not ill-pleased that the power of Philip should be circumscribed, confirmed the kingdom of Athamania to Amynder; but at the same time declared their resentment at the Aetolians, whom they required to evacuate their conquests. What at the same time greatly hurt their cause, was the strange conduct of the ambassadors they had sent to Rome⁵². They had circulated a report, that the Roman armies in Asia were defeated, and the two Scipios taken prisoners; and this piece of intelligence they urged as an argument to induce the Romans to grant the peace they applied for. The Roman indignation was provoked at this insult; the ambassadors were ordered immediately to leave the city, with instructions to the

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VI.
Sect. 2.

The Aetolian
war renewed,
upon various
pretences.

⁵² Liv. L. xxxvii. c. 48, 49.

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The consul
Fulvius lays
siege to Am-
bracia,

which capi-
tulates;

Aetolians never to presume again to send plenipotentiaries to Rome, without the express permission of the Roman commander in Greece.

After the election of new consuls, the Aetolian war was allotted to Marcus Fulvius Nobilior³³: who immediately prepared for the expedition; and began his operations with the siege of Ambracia³⁴. Every thing that ingenuity could devise, or valor achieve, was employed for the defence of this important place. But, deterred by no difficulties, the Romans persevered; when, far inferior to them, both in resources and numbers, the Ambraciots found themselves at last obliged to capitulate. The payment of five hundred Euboic talents was stipulated; two hundred down, the remaining three in six equal payments; and they were to deliver up to the consul, all the prisoners and deserters then in Ambracia³⁵; on which terms the Aetolian garrison

³³ Liv. L. xxxviii. c. 4 & seq.

³⁴ A strong city near the mouth of the Arac̄thus, on the borders of Epirus and Acarnania, formerly belonging to Epirus, but now held by the Aetolians, and the key to the Aetolian dominions.

³⁵ It appears, nevertheless, (Liv. L. xxxviii. c. 43, 44) that Fulvius's proceedings against the Ambraciots, were afterwards disapproved of at Rome; whether upon a principle of justice, or, as Livy thinks, by the contrivance of the consul Aemilius and his party, to whom Fulvius was obnoxious, it is now difficult to determine. However, it was decreed by the senate, "that the Ambraciots should
" not be considered as a conquered people — that they
" should have their laws and liberties restored to them,
" and enjoy again all tolls and customs formerly enjoyed

was permitted to march out unmolested. Amynander was of great service to the Romans on this occasion; he was again their faithful ally; and, to make amends for his late defection, had employed all his influence to bring about the capitulation.

Alarmed at the progress of the Roman arms, the whole Aetolian nation³⁶ applied to the consul for mercy. The requisitions he made were nevertheless so humiliating, that the commissioners sent to treat with him, not thinking themselves authorized to agree to such hard conditions, returned for more full and explicit instructions. But a general despondency had now seized the Aetolians, and the commissioners were hurried back with orders to sign whatever terms were dictated by the imperious conqueror. The most remarkable of these³⁷ were, "That *observance* shall be paid to the *empire* and *majesty* of the Roman people" (such is the insolence of victory) "throughout all Aetolia" — "that the friends and enemies of Rome shall be the friends and enemies of Aetolia" — "that the Aetolians shall immediately pay down to the consul two hundred Euboic talents of silver, of the same
 " by them; the Romans only, with their Latin allies, not
 " to be subject to the payment of any such tolls, &c." —
 and "that as to the paintings and other ornaments, of
 " which their temples had been plundered, and which
 " Fulvius had sent away to Italy, it should be referred
 " to the college of the priests to decide about them." —
 What *their* decision was, may easily be conjectured.

³⁶ Liv. L. xxxviii. c. 8, 9.

³⁷ Polyb. Legat. xxviii. Liv. L. xxxviii. c. 10, 11.

B O O K VI. Sect. 2. “ fineness as the Attic standard, with permission to
 “ pay the third part in gold, a minae of gold to be
 “ accounted equal to ten minae of silver; to pay,
 “ besides, a tribute of fifty talents yearly for six
 “ years, which was to be sent to Rome at their
 “ own risque and charges — that all cities and coun-
 “ tries, with their respective inhabitants, which
 “ have formerly been subject to the Aetolians, and
 “ have, since the time of Flamininus’s consulship,
 “ either by conquest or voluntary surrender become
 “ subject to Rome, shall from henceforth be deemed
 “ the property of the Roman people; and the
 “ Aetolians shall relinquish all claim to them” —
 “ that they shall deliver into the hands of the consul,
 “ forty hostages, to be chosen by him, none under
 “ twelve or above forty years of age; the chief
 “ magistrate of Aetolia, the general of the horse,
 “ and the secretary of state, to be excepted out of the
 “ number; and, in case of the death of any hostage,
 “ another to be given in his room.”

The Roman
 senate, with
 difficulty,
 prevailed on
 to ratify the
 peace;

Even these conditions, when laid before them for approbation, the Roman senate refused at first to confirm; a ratification being at length with difficulty obtained, by the intercession of several Roman patricians, and of the Rhodian and Athenian ambassadors. Damis³⁸, the Athenian, more particularly distinguished himself on this occasion: “Whatever the Aetolians have been guilty of, is not,” said he, “to be laid to the charge of the body of the Aetolian people. In all states, the multitude are

³⁸ Livy calls him Leon.

“ like the sea: the sea, in its natural situation, is
 “ smooth and composed, and not dangerous to the
 “ navigator; but, when ruffled and agitated by
 “ storms, it becomes raging and tremendous. Thus
 “ the Aetolians, when left to themselves, were of
 “ all the Greeks the best affected to the interests of
 “ Rome, and ready to assist in all her enterprises;
 “ but when a Thoas and a Dicaearchus from Asia,
 “ and a Menestus and a Damocritus from Europe,
 “ began to excite a ferment, and to throw the
 “ multitude into commotion, then boisterous coun-
 “ cils and mad resolves naturally followed. Against
 “ the authors of these mischiefs pronounce, there-
 “ fore, as you shall please, but let the multitude
 “ experience your clemency.”

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Nevertheless, all the *clemency* obtained, was a confirmation of the consul's terms, without the least mitigation.

perform it at
 last, without
 any mitigation
 of terms.

This treatment of a people who were the first that opened Greece to the Romans, harsh as it may appear, was exceedingly merciful when compared with what followed, when the final overthrow of the royal house of Macedon left Rome at liberty to avow the genius of her empire. That transaction shall have its place hereafter.

The most important business the Romans had now in contemplation in Greece, was to reduce, within narrower limits, the power of the Macedonian king, and the republic of Achaia which had acquired a formidable increase of territory during the late Syrian and Aetolian wars. The Achaeans, as we have already observed, were masters at present of all

The Romans
 jealous of
 Achaia and
 Macedon.

B O O K VI. Peloponnesus; and Philip had not only recovered most of those provinces of which his wars with Rome had deprived him, but had also made other considerable acquisitions³⁹. The designs upon these allies was a matter to be managed with the greatest delicacy. Both states had been firm in the interests of Rome, and several of the Roman commanders had spoken highly of the support they had received from them. To repay their services with distrust and acts of hostility, because they were no longer necessary, had been to avow the very purposes which Rome was industrious to conceal. The political form of government which prevailed throughout Greece, afforded to the Romans the wished-for opportunity. Though confederated with Achaia, the Peloponnesian cities retained each of them peculiar privileges, and a kind of independent sovereignty, which naturally gave rise to many jealousies and contests. In like manner, Philip had but a limited authority in most of the Grecian states over which he had established his dominion; his title to some of them was controverted, and much was to be done before the rights of the numerous claimants could be adjusted. The Romans saw what advantages were to be derived from these particular circumstances, and took their measures accordingly.

Artifice used
in reducing
the power of
Achaia.

They began with Achaia. Fulvius, when peace was concluded with Aetolia, had adjudged the island Cephallenia to Rome, and fixed his residence there, to be at hand to decide whatever disputes

³⁹ See Liv. L. xxxvi. c. 33, 34.

should arise between the Grecian cities; that island being divided from the coast of Peloponnesus by an arm of the sea only twenty-four miles over, from whence an easy passage lay open into that country. Upon the first dispute, therefore, in Achaia, he passed over * into Peloponnesus. The general convention of the Achaean states had, from ancient time, been held at Aegium; but Philopoemen, now chief magistrate of Achaia, having thought fit to divide among all the cities of the Achaean league, the advantages which those assemblies brought to the place where they were held, had named Argos for the next succeeding diet. This innovation the inhabitants of Aegium opposed, and applied to the Roman consul for his determination. The consul, it appears, behaved on this occasion in the most cautious manner. He favored, as Livy tells us, the cause of the Aegienfes: but finding a great majority to be against them, he concealed his private sentiments, and made no opposition to the appointment of Philopoemen. He had gained, however, the main point he had in view; an appeal had been made to him, and the judicial authority of Rome over the Peloponnesian states was thus virtually acknowledged.

A cause of much greater moment soon presented itself. The Lacedemonian exiles, who had been expelled in the days of the tyrants, and who on account of the domestic feuds still prevailing in Lacedemon, had never been restored, resided in

Case of the
Lacedemo-
nian exiles;

* Liv. L. xxxviii. c. 30 & seq.

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insulted by
the Lacede-
monians.

Philopoemen
espouses their
cause,

and obtains a
decree in
their favor

Lacedemo-
nians refuse
to obey the
decree ;

offer their
city to the
Romans.

Philopoemen
enters Laco-
nia, and lays
it waste.

certain towns along the coast of Laconia, under the protection of Achaean garrisons. The inhabitants of Lacedemon, thus cut off from all intercourse with the sea-coast, bore the restraint impatiently; and to free themselves from it, attacked, in the night-time, one of the maritime towns called Las, but were repulsed by the exiles with the assistance of the Achaean soldiery. Philopoemen, who was still at the head of the Achaean commonwealth, having convened an assembly, represented this attempt upon Las as an insult to the whole Achaean body, and obtained a decree, commanding the Lacedemonians to deliver up the authors of that outrage, on pain of being treated as enemies. Proper officers were sent to Lacedemon, to notify the decree. But this step served only to exasperate the Lacedemonians. They immediately put thirty citizens to death, who were known to be in the Achaean interest, dissolved their alliance with Achaia, and sent ambassadors to Fulvius, entreating him to come and take possession of their city. To revenge this insult, Philopoemen declared war against Lacedemon, and though the season was far advanced, entered the Lacedemonian territory, spreading devastation wherever he came.

On the return of spring, both sides still remaining exceedingly exasperated, Fulvius crossed over into Peloponnesus, and demanded that an assembly should be convened at Elis, in order to discuss the pretensions of Achaia over Lacedemon. After hearing both parties, unable, or perhaps unwilling, to bring the perplexed claims to a final decision, he

advised them to send ambassadors to Rome, and while the cause was depending, to suspend hostilities. They complied; the Achaeans sending as their deputies, Lycortas the father of Polybius, who, as a spirited asserter of the liberties of Achaia, was strenuous in the support of Philopoemen's measures, and Diophanes, a man in appearance of moderate counsels, but in fact devoted to the interests of Rome. Diophanes, accordingly, in his application to the senate, referred the decision of the cause wholly to their arbitration; whilst Lycortas, on the contrary, maintained the decree of Philopoemen, which, he asserted, could not be reversed without making void the regulations of Flamininus, who had committed to Achaia the protection of the sea-coast. The subtle Romans, however, secretly pleased to see the confederates of Achaia in arms against her, framed their answer in such ambiguous terms as left the matter just as they found it; the Lacedemonians insisting, that the determination was in their favor; while the contrary was as strenuously asserted by the Achaeans. The consequence was, that Philopoemen, who had been re-elected chief magistrate, marched to Lacedemon, and demanded by name the authors of the attempt upon Las; promising at the same time that they should not be condemned unheard. Trusting to this promise, these men set out for the Achaean camp, attended by the chief citizens of Lacedemon, who considered their cause as a national concern. But as they entered the camp, they were insulted with reproaches by the exiles, who having engaged

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Both parties
send ambassa-
dors to
Rome;the insidious
answer re-
ceived.Philopoemen
marches to
Lacedemon;

B O O K the Achaean soldiers in their quarrel, suddenly
VI. attacked them with such fury, that seventeen were
Sect. 2 killed upon the spot: the remainder, sixty-three
 in number, were rescued with difficulty by
 Philopoemen, not in order to save them, but that
 it might not be said, they had been put to death
 without trial. Next morning being accordingly
 produced before the multitude, they were con-
 demned, and executed, being hardly allowed the
 semblance of a defence. This severe proceeding
 struck the Lacedemonians with such a panic, that
 they surrendered at discretion; and Philopoemen,
 resolving to humble them effectually, treated them
 as if their city had been taken by storm. He com-
 manded them, "to demolish their walls, to disband
 their mercenaries, to expel the slaves whom the
 tyrants had enfranchised, to restore the exiles, and
 to renounce the laws of Lycurgus; the laws of
 Achaia being to be considered from that time as the
 laws by which Lacedemon was to be governed."¹

his cruel
 treatment of
 the Lacede-
 monians.

The conduct
 of the Ro-
 mans on this
 occasion;

Philopoemen's conduct on this occasion (such
 are the fatal violences into which the spirit of domi-
 nion, success, and revenge, are apt to betray
 us!) was certainly cruel; and in regard to those
 whom he had abandoned to the fury of the exiles,
 highly perfidious. The Romans, however, showed
 nothing of that vigor in behalf of this oppressed
 people, which they had often displayed in more
 trifling matters. Though a solemn appeal had been
 made by the Lacedemonians to Rome, the Roman

¹ See Plut. in Philopoemen.

consul, Lepidus, contented himself with coolly informing the Achaeans, that the senate did not approve of these severe proceedings. And Nicodemus of Elis, having been deputed from the Achaean diet to justify what had been done, received for answer, “ that Rome was not pleased with the “ subversion of the Spartan government, but did “ not annul what the Achaeans had decreed “.”

The infant state of the Rome empire in Asia, and the attention required in marking the designs and controlling the power of those states that bordered on the dominions lately belonging to Antiochus, produced this temporizing policy. Macedonia, besides, was again growing formidable; and the Romans were cautious of provoking Achaia, who, had she at this period boldly declared against Rome, had probably united in her cause not only the greater part of Greece, but many of the neighbouring potentates. Such, at this time was the reputation of the Achaean republic, that her friendship was courted “ by the kings of Pergamus and Egypt. And soon after, Seleucus, having succeeded to the throne of Syria upon the death of his father Antiochus, sent ambassadors to the Achaean states, to solicit their alliance. Eumenes even proposed a subsidy of a hundred and twenty talents, towards the establishment of a fund for the support of the members of the general assembly. Ptolemy presented them with six thousand shields and two hundred talents; and Seleucus

The Republic of Achaia high in reputation at this period; her friendship courted by the kings of Pergamus, Egypt, and Syria.

“ Polyb. Legat. xxxvii. 41.

“ Polyb. Legat. 41.

o o K offered them ten ships of war completely equipped.
 VI. The present from Ptolemy was the only one
 Sect. 2. accepted; to Eumenes particularly they returned
 an answer worthy of a free republic, "that they
 " were rather to deem him an enemy, since he
 " sought to corrupt the members of that venerable
 " assembly; which he would not have attempted,
 " had he not entertained views unfriendly to the
 " liberties of Achaia."

The Romans
 deal craftily
 with the
 Achaeans.

Though Rome in the present situation of her affairs found it necessary to dissemble, she was not inattentive to the councils of state, whose rising importance she beheld with a jealous eye. Caecilius, who, with two other commissioners, had been sent to visit Macedon, had orders in his return to pass through Achaia, and to employ himself in supporting the cause of Sparta, as the most effectual means of diminishing the consequence of the Achaean confederacy. At the same time Rome had taken care to gain over a party among the Achaeans themselves, to oppose Philopoemen, and supplant him if an opportunity offered. Among these was Diophanes already mentioned, and Aristaenus, now first magistrate of the Achaean states, who displayed a striking specimen of his intriguing genius, in rendering abortive the purposed alliance with Ptolemy. We have an account of this transaction from Polybius⁴⁴. It had been carried in the general assembly, "that the treaty of alliance
 " with the Egyptian king should be renewed." To

⁴⁴ Ubi sup.

elude therefore the force of a resolution which interfered with the purposes of Rome, Aristæus produced a number of treaties made at different periods between the Achæans and Egypt, and desired to be informed to which of these the resolution referred; and thus, by perplexing the question, contrived that nothing should be done.

Caecilius showed considerable ability in the execution of his commission. Having obtained an audience of the council, he complained of the treatment the Lacedæmonians had received, but rather in the language of expostulation; tempering his censures with high encomiums on the wisdom of their government, and their zeal for the prosperity of their country. Aristæus, general of the year, with whom probably the whole matter had been previously concerted, made no reply, as if he acknowledged by his silence, that the conduct of Achæia towards the Lacedæmonians did not admit of a justification. Diophanes, however, went farther. He made a formal charge against Philopoemen; imputing to him not only the ruin of Lacedæmon, but the violent measures also which Achæia had lately adopted, particularly the unjust and severe treatment of the Messenian exiles, who had not been restored, as Flamininus had ordained; and this oppression of the Messenians, he represented as the crime of Philopoemen alone.

Philopoemen did not want spirit to defend himself; and he was so effectually supported by Lycortas and other Achæan chiefs, that notwithstanding the opposition of the Roman party, it

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Caecilius
pleads the
cause of La-
cedæmon:

is disap-
pointed;

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demands the
national diet
to be con-
vened;
is refused.

was resolved, “ that nothing should be altered in
“ the decrees, which the Achaean states had en-
“ acted ;” and “ that this answer should be given
“ to Caecilius. ” Highly exasperated, he then
desired, that the national diet should be convened.
But to this it was replied, that by the laws of
Achaia he must produce a letter from the senate
of Rome authorizing his request: and as he had
no such document, he was obliged to return
home, with the mortification that always attends
defeated projects; and with the additional regret
of being baffled by men he held in contempt.

Ambassadors
sent to
Rome from
Achaia and
from Lacede-
mon.

The Achaeans nevertheless thought it necessary,
that their ambassadors “ should immediately follow
him to Rome, and lay before the senate, their
reasons for not complying with his requisition.
They had hardly arrived, when ambassadors from
Sparta also appeared. What was yet more surprising,
the persons employed in this embassy were Areus
and Alcibiades, two of those very exiles lately
restored to their country by means of Philopoe-
men, an action now imputed to him as a crime.
These ungrateful men, either to ingratiate them-
selves with their fellow-citizens, or stimulated by
Rome, had undertaken to plead the cause of Sparta.
They made accordingly a most affecting represen-
tation of the condition to which Lacedemon, once
the pride of Greece, was now reduced; her walls
laid in ruins, her citizens led into slavery, and the
sacred laws of Lycurgus abolished; and concluded

“ Polyb. Legat. xlii.

by praying the Romans to extend their protection to this afflicted people, and to relieve them from despotism and oppression.

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A suit so congenial with the designs of Rome, easily found attention and favor. It was decreed, that three commissioners should be sent to the Achaean diet, in order to determine upon the spot, all matters in dispute between Achaia and the Spartans: and that the Achaeans should be required to convene their general assembly whenever the demand was made by a Roman ambassador; as the senate, on their part, admitted the Achaeans to an audience as often as they desired it⁴⁶.

Commissioners appointed by the Roman senate, to decide between Achaia and Sparta.

When the Achaeans received an account of these proceedings, they could not suppress their indignation. The general assembly was instantly called together; in which it was resolved, “that the Spartans, by their appeal to Rome, had departed from their plighted allegiance to the Achaean states; that Areus and Alcibiades were therefore in rebellion against their rightful lords, and should be adjudged to death.”

Indignation, and angry resolutions of the general assembly of Achaia.

These resolutions, the passionate ebullitions of an impetuous multitude, were as vain as they were intemperate. Areus and Alcibiades, protected by Rome, were beyond their reach, bidding defiance to a power from which, in other circumstances, they had every thing to fear.

Scarcely was the decree enacted, when the Roman commissioners⁴⁷, at the head of whom was

The commissioners arrive;

⁴⁶ Polyb. Legat. xlii.

⁴⁷ Polyb. Legat. xliii. Liv. L. xxxix. c. 35, 36, 37.

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open their
charge with
great haugh-
tiness.

Appius Claudius, arrived at Cleitor in Arcadia, where the Achaean states had been convened; and, what was most mortifying to those people, Areus and Alcibiades accompanied them. The gloomy apprehensions to which this circumstance gave rise, were fully justified by the sequel. The commissioners entered the diet, not as ministers deputed to deliberate with a free state, but rather as judges, invested with full authority to pass sentence, and to punish. "You have incurred," said Appius, "the displeasure of the Roman senate, by your measures: you have perfidiously murdered those Spartans who, on the faith of Philopoemen, had delivered themselves into your hands: and, as if this were unimportant, you afterwards demolished the walls of that ancient city Lacedemon; you deprived her of her laws, and you deprived her of that discipline established by Lycurgus, which for many ages had been her strength and her glory."

Spirited answer of Lycortas.

But neither the haughty port these Roman commissioners assumed, nor the imperious language which they held, could subdue the spirit of Lycortas. He was the friend of Philopoemen, coadjutor in all his councils, and at this time first magistrate of Achaia. From his reply, (which Livy^s, surely a competent witness, has preserved to us) the pretensions of Rome, as well as their foundation, may be easily perceived. "The support which the Achaeans had afforded to the Spartan

" Ubi sup.

exiles," he told Appius, " was in consequence of the alliance Achaia had entered into with Rome; Rome had consigned them to her protection, and, the more effectually to protect them, the Achaeans had taken up arms against the inhabitants of Lacedemon: that, with regard to the slaughter of the Lacedemonians who had surrendered, the Achaeans were guiltless; it was the act of those very exiles, whose cause the Romans were now patronizing, Areus and Alcibiades being bound to answer for that violence, if such it was to be called. In regard to the demolition of the walls of Lacedemon, which the Achaeans acknowledged to be their act, the Spartans, far from complaining on that account, rather owed them thanks; those walls were indeed the disgrace of Sparta, monuments of her servitude, raised in express violation of the institutions of Lycurgus, by the tyrants who had ruled over her, and which that lawgiver, were he to revisit the earth, would rejoice to see in ruins. That the laws of Lycurgus, of which Achaia was said to have deprived her, had, by the management of those tyrants, long since ceased to exist in force, or even to be known in Sparta: the Achaeans finding therefore the bands of government dissolved, and her polity in ruin, had admitted her to a participation of the laws and privileges enjoyed by the whole Achaean body." — " It is, however," continued he, " just matter of surprise to the Achaeans, that they, a free and independent state, and in alliance with Rome, should thus be called upon to account

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“ for their actions, as if they were not the confederates but the slaves of Rome. If the voice of the herald that proclaimed liberty to Greece, meant any thing; if the league that subsists between us, is not an illusion; and if the rights of friendship and alliance are to be held mutually sacred; why may not we as well scrutinize your proceedings in Italy, as you decide upon our transactions in Greece? Admit, then, that we have sacrificed some Lacedemonians to our resentment, has your treatment of Capua’s senators been less severe? or say, that we have levelled the walls of Lacedemon, has not Capua not only beheld her walls in ruins, but her territories, her sole means of subsistence, swallowed up by Roman rapacity? We shall, perhaps, be told, that what freedom remains to us is only in name, and that, in reality, we are the slaves of Rome: I know it well, Appius; and if I must suppress my indignation at the thought, I will. Let me, nevertheless, conjure you, however great the distance is between the Romans and the Achaeans, not to show a more jealous solicitude for the privileges of our common enemies than for those of your own allies. To bring the Lacedemonians to a level with ourselves, we wished them to be governed by the same laws: they want more; though vanquished, they refuse to submit to regulations with which the victors themselves are satisfied; and they require us to infringe compacts, which we have sworn not to violate: No, Romans; we

“honor you, and, if you will so have it, we
 “fear you; but we honor more, we fear more,
 “the immortal Gods!”

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Appius avoided entering into the discussion of arguments, which probably he could not answer; he contented himself with this haughty reply: “A
 “voluntary compliance is more eligible than that
 “which is extorted by force.” At these words, a deep groan, the voice of an injured and an oppressed people, was heard to issue from every part of the assembly. But they felt the inequality of the contest, and that all resistance would be vain. The following humiliating request to the commissioners was therefore the sole result of their deliberations: “that the Romans themselves would rescind whatever part of the decrees of the Achaean diet they wished to have rescinded, and not require a free people to annul what they had sworn to observe.” This apparent submission seems to have softened Appius; he only reversed the decree pronounced against Areus and Alcibiades; and referred them, respecting all other matters, to the pleasure of the senate. It appears as if the senate themselves thought it dangerous, in the present situation of their affairs, to exasperate the Achaeans farther. They seem to have done little more than copy the decision of their commissioners, by decreeing, that those who had been condemned by the Achaeans should be restored, and all sentences repealed that had been pronounced in the assembly of Achaia, against Lacedemon. They only added, by way of softening these stern injunctions, “that for the future,

Reply of the
 commissioner
 Appius.

The expedient
 which the
 Achaeans wife-
 ly employed;

its effect:

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The Messenians revolt :

Philopoemen marches against them ;

the Lacedemonians should be deemed members of the Achaean league, and be subject to its regulations ⁴⁹."

Some other device was now to be employed ; of which Rome, however, might seem innocent, and which at the same time might still more effectually humble the importance of these high-spirited republicans. The Messenians formed a considerable part of the Achaean body : a plan was formed to detach them from the league ; and the execution was committed to Dinocrates, a Messenian leader, bustling and bold, in the confidence of Flamininus, a foe of course to Philopoemen, and ready to engage in any hostile enterprise against the Achaean generals. Philopoemen ⁵⁰, now for the eighth time chief magistrate of Achaia, no sooner had advice of the movements of the Messenians, than, though ill of a fever, he mounted his horse, and being joined by Lycortas, with some Megalopolitan cavalry, advanced to Carone, a fortress belonging to the Messenians ; but finding the enemy already in possession of it, he marched towards Messene, their capital, with the view of taking it by surprise. On his march he was met by Dinocrates, at the head of a small detachment, whom he charged, and defeated ; when, unexpectedly, a body of five hundred horse came up to the assistance of the Messenians, who attacking the Achaeans in their turn, forced them to give way. Philopoemen excelled in this branch of the military art ; he commanded his

⁴⁹ Liv. L. xxxix. c. 48.

⁵⁰ Ibid. c. 49, 50. Plutarch in Philopoem.

men to retreat through defiles and hollow grounds, where the enemy must pursue with disadvantage, he himself covering the rear, and repeatedly facing about to repel the attacks of the pursuers. At length his horse, entangled in rocky ground, stumbled and fell; and the venerable Philopoemen, now in his seventieth year, weak, at the same time, from his late illness, and exhausted by the fatigue of the day, unable by exertion to overcome the shock, remained stunned and senseless on the ground. He was immediately surrounded by Dinocrates and his Messenians, who, proud of their captive, the champion of Achaia, entered the city in triumph. The sight, nevertheless, excited the compassion of the multitude; they remembered Philopoemen's great exploits, and what Messenia in particular, when oppressed by the Spartan tyrant, owed to his gallantry. Thus, instead of an *enemy*, they beheld in him the *deliverer* of their country. Dinocrates and his faction, whose purpose it was to break the strength of the Achaeans by depriving them of their gallant general, beginning to dread the result of these workings of compassion, next morning commanded the executioner to descend into the subterraneous vault where Philopoemen was imprisoned, and put him to death. When the brave Achaean saw him enter with the fatal bowl in his hand, raising himself up, though with difficulty, "Canst thou," said he, "inform me of the fate of Lycortas, and the young men with him?" the executioner answering, they were safe; "then," replied Philopoemen, taking the bowl with a chearful counte-

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falls into their hands.

His magnanimity,

B O O K nance, "we are not altogether wretched;" and
VI. having drank the deadly draught, soon after expired.

Sect. 2. When the Achaeans were informed of this base
and death. transaction, they were fired with indignation.
The Achaeans complain to Lycortas, now appointed chief magistrate in the
Rome, place of Philopoemen, immediately sent a formal
complaint to Rome against the Messenians, and at
the same time demanded that assistance which the
Romans, by treaty, were bound to furnish. The

and are an-
swered with
perfidiousness.

answer was worthy of the policy of Rome. The
Achaeans were told, "that should even the Lace-
" demonians, or the Corinthians, or the Argives,
" separate themselves from the Achean confede-
" racy, the Achaeans were not to wonder if Rome
" looked upon it as a matter that noway con-
" cerned her." Had Rome expressly invited all
Peloponnesus to disclaim all farther dependence on
Achaia, she could not have spoken plainer⁵¹.

Resentment of
the Achaeans;

The Achaeans were still more exasperated by this
perfidious declaration. They instantly flew to arms;
and, led on by Lycortas, marched to Messene⁵²,
threatening destruction to that city, unless all who
had shared in the guilt of Philopoemen's murder were
delivered into their hands. The Messenians, who
in general highly disapproved of Philopoemen's in-
human execution, gladly accepted of the conditions.
Dinocrates, unable to support the idea of falling into
the power of this enraged people, laid violent hands
on himself: several of his associates followed his

they revenge
Philopoe-
men's death.

⁵¹ See Polyb. Legat. li.

⁵² Polyb. Legat. lii. Plutarch in Philopoemen.

example; and the rest being abandoned to the vengeance of the Achaeans, were stoned at the tomb of Philopoemen. The obsequies of their favorite general they celebrated with the greatest splendor, and the most passionate lamentations; Polybius the historian, son to Lycortas, surrounded by the principal nobility of Achaia, bearing his urn; and not only the army, but the inhabitants of all the neighbouring towns, attending the funeral procession from Messene to his native city, Megalopolis, where his ashes were deposited. He was accounted by the Romans themselves, according to Plutarch⁵³, the last of the Greeks. He certainly was the most able as well as the most zealous defender of Grecian liberties, from the time Rome began to extend her influence over this ill-fated people. It appears, that his countrymen carried even their veneration for his memory so far, as to pay him divine honors.

When the Romans found the bad success which had attended the revolt of Messenia, they changed their tone; applauding the Achaeans for having revenged the death of Philopoemen, and assuring their ambassadors of the particular care the senate had taken, that neither arms nor provisions should be sent from Italy to their enemies⁵⁴. But this applause and friendly professions the Achaeans estimated at their real value.

We have not sufficient authority from history to say how far Flamininus was concerned in this criminal transaction, in which he seems to have acted

Flamininus
suspected of
having a share
in the guilt of
Philopoemen's
murder;

⁵³ In Arato.

⁵⁴ Polyb. Legat. li.

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a part. Dinocrates was confessedly his creature; and in exciting ⁵⁵ the Messenians to revolt, acted, it appears evidently, with his privity, if not by his instigation. Flamininus, besides, hated Philopoemen, both as a man whose unseasonable loyalty to his country obstructed the views of Rome, and as his rival in military glory. Whether his instructions to Dinocrates pointed to the execution of Philopoemen, is a circumstance impossible now to be determined; but had not the Messenian expected that Rome would not disavow the action, he probably had not embroiled his hands in the blood of that great man. It is recorded by Polybius ⁵⁶, that Flamininus had, before this period, in conjunction with Dinocrates, formed a plan to throw the Achaean councils into confusion, by supporting the Messenian interest in opposition to that of Achaia; and in order to try his influence among the Peloponnesian states, had required a general assembly to be convened. But Philopoemen, at that time chief magistrate, suspecting some sinister design, demanded that he should first signify in writing, what was to be the business of this convention. As the Roman would not comply with this requisition, Philopoemen refused his request.

But the behaviour of Flamininus bears a more

⁵⁵ It is remarkable, that Livy (L. xxxix. c. 48.) makes slight mention of this revolt; into the causes and progress of which, he says he will not inquire, as being a matter altogether foreign to his object, the history of the Roman people.

⁵⁶ See Polyb. Legat. xlvii. See also De virt. & vitiis, p. 1435.

unfavorable aspect, from the recollection that he himself had adjudged ⁵⁷ Messenia to the Achaeans; and in consequence of this decision, had afterwards prevailed on them to cede Zacynthus to the Romans ⁵⁸. The argument he employed on this occasion, deserves notice. "Achaia," said he to them, "is a kind of tortoise, around which nature has placed a shell by way of armor; and if it thrusts out its head or feet beyond this armor, it is in danger of receiving injury. Your frontier-cities, O Achaeans! are your shell, your natural defence: but whatever acquisitions you make beyond the continent, those are the parts which lying without your shell, are exposed to insult, and which are not to be secured without an expense far greater than their real worth" The shrewdness of the observation, aided by those arts of intrigue in which he excelled, secured the wished-for success.

But the part, which Flamininus acted in relation to Hannibal ⁵⁹, who died the same year with Philopoemen, evinces, that this commander, the boasted favorite of Roman historians, possessed little of that noble generosity of spirit, by which the brave are generally distinguished. After the total overthrow of Antiochus, the Carthaginian, fearing he should be given up to his enemies, had retired to the court of Prusias king of Bithynia, who promised

his base
treatment of
Hannibal.

⁵⁷ Liv. L. xxxvi. c. 31, 32.

⁵⁸ An island lying between Sicily and Peloponnesus, which the Achaeans had lately purchased, and from its situation, of considerable importance to Rome.

⁵⁹ Liv. L. xxxix. c. 51. Plut. in Flaminio.

B O O K VI. Sect. 2. him protection. Flaminius being on an embassy to the Bithynian monarch, in order to negotiate a peace between him and the king of Pergamus, took this opportunity, either in consequence of secret instructions from the senate, or from a mean passion for fame, as Plutarch thinks, to demand, that Hannibal should be delivered into his hands. Prusias at first, according to the last-mentioned historian, earnestly pleaded the rights of hospitality and his plighted faith, of which so dishonorable an action would be an avowed violation. But the Roman, regardless of such considerations, persisted in his demand; and the dastardly Prusias at length agreed to comply. Hannibal, who had but slight dependence on the Bithynian's honor, and, from the time of Flaminius's arrival, suspected the object and result of his machinations, had contrived in the castle of Libyssa, where he resided, subterraneous passages, to favor his escape in case of danger; when having information that his castle was surrounded by soldiers, he had recourse to these secret outlets: but finding them all guarded, and no hope of escaping, he at once formed his resolution. Taking then in his hand the cup which contained the ingredients, long before prepared for such an occasion, "Let us," said he, "deliver Rome from her perpetual dis-
" quietude, since she thinks it tedious to wait for
" the death of a poor yet dreaded old man. What
" a change in Roman manners! their fathers warned
" Pyrrhus, even when in arms against them, of
" the poison that was treacherously prepared for

“ him; while their degenerate sons are not ashamed
 “ of employing their ambassador, a man of con-
 “ sular dignity, to prevail on the perfidious Prusias
 “ to give up a guest to whom he had promised
 “ protection.” Then invoking the gods to take
 “ vengeance on Prusias and his kingdom for his
 violation of hospitality, he swallowed the fatal
 draught, and expired. When an account of this
 transaction reached the senate, several members of
 that august body, Plutarch tells us, expressed the
 highest displeasure at a conduct which disgraced not
 only Flamininus but the Roman name.

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After an instance so notorious, the decision is obvious with regard to the character of this conqueror of Greece.

His conduct to the virtuous Cato was not less dishonorably mean; and though foreign to the present history, it may, further to illustrate the character of this celebrated general, not improperly find a place here. Lucius, brother to Titus Quintus Flamininus, had been guilty of a crime of the blackest die⁶⁶. A favorite boy whom he had carried with him into his province of Gaul, was reproaching him, in the hours of dalliance, for taking him from Rome just before a show of gladiators was to have been exhibited, and thereby depriving him of the pleasure of seeing a man killed; a sight which he most ardently desired. At that instant the proconsul was informed, a Boian Gaul, a man of distinction in his own country,

His flagitious
 treatment of
 Cato.

⁶⁶ Liv. L. xxxix. c. 42. Plut. in Flaminio.

B O O K. was come to take the oaths of allegiance to Rome,
VI. and with his wife and children waited without. He
Sect. 2. immediately ordered him to be admitted. And
 turning to his pathic, “to satisfy thy longing,
 “wilt thou then,” said he, “that I show thee
 “this Gaul in the agonies of death? so saying,
 with his own hands he stabbed the unsuspecting
 Boian. This flagitious action came to the know-
 ledge of Cato, who, when cenfor, charged Lu-
 cius with it, and the fact being fully proved,
 degraded him from the senatorial dignity, not-
 withstanding the most earnest solicitations of his
 brother and his powerful relations. In revenge,
 Titus pursued Cato with unrelenting animosity.
 He leagued against him with his inveterate ene-
 mies By means of a corrupt majority, which he
 had acquired in the senate, he annulled all contracts,
 leases, and bargains, which Cato had entered into
 relative to the public revenue; not on account of any
 defect, but merely because Cato had made them:
 and he took every opportunity, upon the slightest
 grounds, of harassing him with frivolous and
 vexatious prosecutions.

Wretched Greece! what had she to expect from
 an administration directed by men of the character
 we have described! And yet of all the Romans to
 whom the care of Grecian affairs were committed,
 one of the most humane, says history ⁶¹, was
TITUS QUINTIUS FLAMININUS!

⁶¹ See Plutarch. Parallel. Philopoem. & Flaminin.

B O O K VI.

S E C T I O N III.

C O N T E N T S.

Injurious conduct of the Romans to Philip of Macedon — he is required to evacuate Aenos and Maronea — his violent resentment — causes the Maronites to be massacred — is threatened by the Romans — sends his son Demetrius to Rome — his success. — Philip's suspicions of the connexions Demetrius had formed in Rome — encouraged in his suspicions by Perseus — is imposed upon by a forgery — believes Demetrius guilty of designs against his crown and life — causes him to be put to death — discovers his innocence — dies of a broken heart. — His character.

WE are now to view the affairs of Macedon during the period of which we have been speaking. Rome jealous, as we have seen, of the increase of dominion which Philip had acquired in the course of the late wars, seized every opportunity of confining him within narrower limits. Athamania had already been wrested from him, a few inconsiderable fortresses excepted, under pretence of restoring it to its lawful prince. Those cantons of Thessaly, in which he had re-established his authority, were now encouraged to assert their independence; and whatever violence, either here or in the countries adjacent, the Macedonian king had committed

B O O K

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Sect. 3.

The Romans
jealous of
Philip;

B O O K VI. whilst employing his arms on the side of Rome, though perhaps nothing more than the natural consequences of war, were brought into account against him, as wanton outrages for which reparation was to be exacted. Even those parts of Thrace which, chiefly through his means, had been recovered from Antiochus, and to which the Macedonian kings had ancient pretensions, were demanded by Eumenes of Pergamus. A large portion of it had been already decreed to Eumenes, by the ten commissioners employed after the battle of Magnesia, in the partition of the provinces of Antiochus in Europe and the Lower Asia: but not content with this acquisition he now demanded more.

appoint
commissioners
to settle differences.

To all claimants against the Macedonian monarch the Romans gave a favorable hearing. And, as if they had nothing more in view than to make an equitable settlement among all parties, they appointed^{*} three commissioners, Quintus Caecilius, Marcus Baebius, and Tiberius Sempronius, to pass into Greece, where they were to erect themselves into a court of judicature, and to decide upon all differences between Macedon and her adversaries. With this procedure, doubtless exceedingly humiliating to a prince not yet deprived of sovereign power, and still ostensibly numbered among the faithful allies of Rome, Philip found it expedient to comply. He attended the commissioners in their progress through Thessaly; and, however unable at times to suppress his indigna-

^{*} Polyb. Legat. xl. Liv. L. xxxix. c. 24 & seq.

tion, disdained not to put in answers to the various demands which interest or resentment urged against him. "The Thessalians, he stated, far from having any thing to lay justly to his charge, had been guilty of many acts of violence against Macedon; and, without the least title, had deprived him of several cities, which he either possessed by inheritance; or, by express stipulation with the Roman consul, had won with his sword, from the Aetolians and Athamanes then in arms against Rome." — "They complain," he continued, "that I have diverted the course of commerce from Thebes of Pthiotis, whilst in my possession, to Demetrias. But when was it accounted criminal in a prince, to open a new channel of trade? or to allow mariners the choice of their port? They accuse me of preparing an ambuscade for certain deputies sent with their complaints to the Roman commander. In consequence of this pretended ambuscade, let me know what injury these deputies have sustained? In truth, the liberty you have bestowed on these Thessalians has taught them insolence: like slaves newly manumitted, they pride themselves in the exercise of their petulance against those who lately ruled over them. *But,*" added he, with an energy the result of various feelings, "*the sun of all my days has not yet set.*" — Notwithstanding, however, this spirited defence, the commissioners decreed, that the Macedonian garrisons should immediately evacuate the several towns and castles in question, and that Philip should withdraw

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Philip's spirited defence;

disregarded.

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Aenos and
Maronea
claimed by
Eumenes.

Philip ex-
postulates.

northward within the ancient boundaries of Macedon.

From Thessaly the Roman commissioners proceeded to Thessalonica, to adjust the settlement of Thrace, where the more important object of contention lay. Philip had extended himself on this side with great success; and, besides a large portion of territory, had got possession of Aenos and Maronea, two cities on the Hellespont, which from their maritime situation afforded their sovereign many valuable advantages. In Maronea particularly, the most considerable of the two, he kept a strong garrison, and had so far established himself, as to procure the banishment of a numerous body of the citizens, who stood in opposition to his interests. These exiles were now loud against him; supported, privately by the Romans, and openly by Eumenes, who maintained that these cities were appendages of that part of Thrace already adjudged to him; and charged Philip with the most flagrant oppressions. It was easy to perceive from what had passed, the complection of the commissioners; and Philip, judging it now in vain to keep measures with men determined at any rate to side with his adversaries, no longer sought to disguise his sentiments. "It is neither with the Maronites nor with Eumenes," said he, addressing himself to the commissioners, "that the contest now lies; but with you Romans, from whom I have long observed, that I have no justice to expect. The cities of Macedon, which revolted from me to you at the very time a truce

“ subsisted between us, I claimed, and met with
 “ a refusal. Instead of matter of right, had I claimed
 “ them as matter of favor; the favor had been
 “ small for you to grant, as these cities were to
 “ you of little importance, and in the extreme
 “ borders of my kingdom; but it was of moment
 “ to me to have them restored, that their defec-
 “ tion might not encourage others to imitate their
 “ treachery. During the Aetolian war, by desire
 “ of the consul Manius Acilius, I sat down be-
 “ fore Lamia, and was on the point of taking it,
 “ when the consul appeared, demanded it for him-
 “ self, and wrested the conquest out of my hands.
 “ To soften the injury, I was permitted to turn
 “ my arms against some towns, or rather castles,
 “ of Thessaly, Perrhaebia, and Athamania; these
 “ you have *now* taken from me. — Even the claims
 “ of Eumenes are thought preferable to mine, by
 “ his share of the dominions which Antiochus was
 “ possessed of; he, who fought under your ban-
 “ ners, not for your sakes, but for his own, against
 “ an enemy, from whom he had every thing to
 “ fear, and who, if not crushed, had been his
 “ destruction. Antiochus, on the other hand, cour-
 “ ted my friendship, and would have purchased
 “ it at no less a price than the cession of all Greece,
 “ a fleet of fifty decked ships, and three thousand
 “ talents. Regardless of these splendid offers, I
 “ took the field against him, even before your
 “ forces had passed over from Italy; declining nei-
 “ ther toil nor danger to procure you victory.
 “ When Scipio was on his way to Asia, I showed

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B O O K “ myself equally zealous in your service ; I con-
 VI. “ ducted him through Macedon and Thrace, and
 Sect. 3. “ by my presence prevented the opposition which
 “ otherwise he had met with from the barbarous
 “ inhabitants. In return * for all this , I might
 “ reasonably have expected an increase of domi-
 “ nion ; on the contrary , I see myself deprived
 “ not only of what your own grants have bestow-
 “ ed, but also of my hereditary possessions. And
 “ as if I were Antiochus, I am now to be plun-
 “ dered even by Eumenes ; who , not content
 “ with having Lyfimachia and the Chersonese
 “ assigned to him, pretends, that Aenos and Ma-
 “ ronea are included ; in express contradiction to
 “ the very decree on which he grounds his title.
 “ Determine therefore ; am I the foe, or am I still
 “ the ally of Rome ? If the former, proceed as
 “ you have begun, in persecuting me ; if the latter,
 “ abstain from injuring a man, who surely has
 “ deserved a very opposite treatment.”

How liable soever Philip's private character might be to objections, or whatever were the considerations that moved him to join the Romans, certainly their treatment of him was exceedingly perfidious. Livy, from whom we have taken his defence, tells us, that the commissioners themselves were affected : they were more probably embarrassed and ashamed. Unwilling to venture a definitive sentence, against which so much might be said, they only pronounced, that, *if* these two cities had been adjudged to Eumenes by the former commissioners, it was not in their power to reverse

the decree; if, on the other hand, it should appear, that Philip held them by right of conquest, he ought to hold them still; if neither the one nor the other was the case, it must be left to the senate in what way they were to be disposed of; meanwhile, the garrisons should be withdrawn ².”

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This temporizing sentence, however, did not long impose on Philip. His ambassadors whom he had sent to Rome, had orders from the senate to inform their master, that his garrisons must forthwith evacuate the contested cities. The Macedonian king was fired with rage. The scorn of Eumenes, the dupe of Rome, he eagerly wished to have wreaked his vengeance on both; but his power agreed not with his inclination. In this situation he resolved to discharge his fury at least on the Maronites³, whose sollicitations, he supposed, had been employed against him. Onomastus was his lieutenant in Thrace. He intrusted him with orders to Cassander, governor of Maronea, to introduce into the city, in the night before the Macedonian garrison was to march out, a body of his fiercest Thracian mercenaries, who, under pretence of a sudden tumult, should put to the sword all the inhabitants suspected of favoring the opposite interest, without distinction of condition, age, or sex, and leave the place drenched in the blood of its citizens. These cruel orders were but too faithfully executed.

The senate
decide against
Philip;

he revenges
himself on the
Maronites:

² See Liv. L. xxxix. c. 28.

³ Polyb. Legat. xliv. Liv. L. xxxix. c. 34 & seq.

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the indigna-
tion of the
Romans on
this occasion.

Philip's eva-
sive and flagi-
tious conduct.

Upon the first tidings of the massacre, the senate instructed Appius to make inquiry concerning it.

Philip pretended ignorance: "He had heard of a

" popular insurrection at Maronea, occasioned by

" certain petty contests between the friends of

" Eumenes and those of Macedon, in which blood

" had been shed; but as to the aggravating cir-

" cumstances which the Romans mentioned, he

" was altogether a stranger to them." He was

then required to deliver up Onomastus and Cas-

sander, that they might be sent to Rome for exami-

nation. The proposal made him tremble. They

knew too much, and might betray him. "Ono-

" mastus," he replied, "was a necessary person,

" and not to be parted with; besides, having been

" at a considerable distance from Maronea at the

" time of the insurrection, he could not possibly

" have known any thing of it. But Cassander,

" he promised, should be sent to Rome." Nothing,

however, was farther from the intention of Philip

than this compliance. It was attended both with

indignity and danger. Accordingly, Cassander was

taken off by poison, at Epire, in his way to the

Roman capital.

He is alarmed;

The outcry against Philip became now more clamorous than ever. The different states around

were roused, by these recent instances of violence,

to a more lively remembrance of the wrongs they

had already sustained, or the still more painful

apprehensions of what they had yet to dread;

whilst Rome, intent on reducing the power of

Macedon, strengthened these impressions, by en-

couraging

couraging all to whom the Macedonian king was obnoxious, to bring forward their complaints, and to expect her protection. Philip saw the storm gathering, and likely to burst upon him unprepared. In this situation, he employed with the senate, the mediation of his son Demetrius^{*}, who, from his gentle and conciliating deportment whilst an hostage, was thought to be high in favor at Rome. The senate received him with apparent cordiality; and having appointed a day of audience for the ambassadors and deputies who attended with complaints against Philip, they permitted Demetrius to be present, and to speak in justification of his father's conduct; but, instead of availing himself of this permission, the young prince, naturally timid, and thrown into the utmost confusion by the heavy, the unexpected, and the numerous charges brought against his father, became incapable of attempting a reply. With seeming tenderness, the senate asked him, whether the king had not furnished him with some notes or secret instructions, from which he was to speak? Demetrius was weak enough to own he had, and to permit them to be read. Their views were, to discover by this confidential paper, Philip's opinion of Rome, and the secret purposes he had in contemplation. It fully answered the senate's expectations. Interspersed were observations on the iniquitous treatment he had met with — "This was unfair in Caecilius and his fellow-commissioners" — "I had

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sends his son
Demetrius to
Rome;

the Romans
deal artfully
with him;

^{*} See Polyb. Legat. xlii. & xlii. Liv. L. xxxix. c. 46, 47.
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B O O K not, surely, deserved this!" — "thus were my
VI. enemies encouraged to insult me."

Sect. 3. The result was, the senate told Demetrius, that,
affect kindness towards him; on his account, whatever had been improper in
his father's conduct, should be passed over; and
that, from the confidence they had in him, they
were well assured Philip would, for the future,
perform every thing that justice required: that
ambassadors should be sent, to see all matters
properly adjusted; and with special directions to
inform the king, "that from the regard they bore
to the son, they were willing to excuse the father." —
To complete the whole, according to Polybius
and Livy⁵, they took care to inflame the mind of
this vain and unexperienced prince with expectations
of the throne of Macedon; on which, though he
had an elder brother, they gave him hopes he
should shortly be placed.

with what
views.

The Roman annals scarcely afford a stronger
instance of the duplicity of this rapacious people.
To have despoiled at once Philip of his kingdom,
immediately after so many important services re-
ceived from him, for no other ostensible reason,
but because he would not tamely resign whatever
they required, would have been a measure highly
odious as well as dangerous, whilst the spirit of
Achaia was not altogether subdued, nor the extir-
pation of Carthage yet accomplished. A more
secure method was adopted. They practised on
the easy nature of this credulous and unsuspecting

⁵ See Polyb. Legat. xlvi. Liv. L. xxxix. c. 53.

youth; they debauched his affections; they gained him over to the interests of Rome; and had they succeeded in obtaining for him the crown, Macedon had probably, under this passive and Rome-devoted king, sunk gradually, without even one struggle, into the insignificance of a Roman province. Whilst by pointing out Demetrius to the Macedonians as their future sovereign, the senate had another and an important object in view. They set up a formidable party against the reigning prince in the very heart of his dominions; which, besides weakening the authority of Philip, tended to divide the royal family. Distracted thus by jealousies and domestic feuds, the royal house of Macedon must have lost much of its importance, and its strength; and Philip have ended his reign, if he had even been suffered to end it by a natural death, heart-broken and deserted.

Part of this scheme actually succeeded; and it was not owing to the Romans that the whole had not equal success.

Philip had only two sons, Perseus and Demetrius. Demetrius, a prince weak and vain, as we have already seen; but at the same time, open and undisguised, adorned with all the fashionable accomplishments that could be acquired either in Greece or Rome and of manners remarkably placid and engaging. Perseus, on the contrary, of a bustling and turbulent disposition, was at the same time, if the Roman writers are to be credited, ungenerous, sordid, dark, and subtle; under the fairest semblance covering the most flagitious of

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Characters of
Perseus and
Demetrius:

B O O K views. Both princes were in the bloom of life ;

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Sect. 3. Perseus, the eldest, was aged about thirty years when Demetrius returned from Rome ; but born, if we are to believe Plutarch *, of a mother of mean birth, a sempstress of Argos, and of so questionable a character, as to make it doubtful whether he were really Philip's son. Demetrius was five years younger, and the son of his queen, a lady of royal lineage.

Perseus jealous of Demetrius ;

From the difference of their dispositions, as well as from the disproportion of their maternal origin, Perseus had conceived an early jealousy of his brother, whom he looked upon as his rival in a kingdom, to which priority of birth gave him, he conceived, a juster title. The avowed preference shown by the Romans to Demetrius, together with the vanity of this young prince, who was at no pains to disguise his hopes, riveted the antipathy of Perseus : and he took care to poison his father's mind with suspicions of the designs of this aspiring youth, the minion of Rome, and devoted to her interests.

Philip also is prepossessed against him,

Philip was but too well disposed to listen to these insinuations. From the return of Demetrius, a visible alteration had taken place in this unhappy king. Notwithstanding the various artifices he had hitherto employed in order to elude the senate's requisitions, he had at length been obliged, by the arrival of new commissioners, to submit to their imperious commands, and to evacuate all his maritime possessions in Thrace '. And the only fruit

* In Paul. Aemil. & Arato. ' Polyb. Legat. xlii. & xlviii.

he derived from his son's intercession, was the humiliating reflection, that to him he owed his being left in possession of his mutilated kingdom. The imprudent conduct of Demetrius, added to the gloomy thoughts which haunted the unfortunate Philip. He was on all occasions the advocate of the Romans; the power of their arms, their probity, their unblemished faith, were his favorite topics; even their manners and their buildings, at that time confessedly inelegant and ill-contrived, he affected to speak of, as equal if not superior to whatever Macedon had to boast^{*}.

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in his hatred
of the Romans:

Thus agitated by doubts and resentment, Philip resolved to exert his utmost vigor for the recovery of his former independence; and the moment he was again in a condition for war, determined to bid defiance to the Romans. The fortifying of the cities that lay on the sea-coast, or adjacent to the great roads, might have given them umbrage: he therefore began his operations in places more remote⁹, where, being less exposed to their observation, he found means to fill his inland-towns and castles with soldiers, arms, and treasure. At the same time, he transplanted¹⁰ a large body of Barbarians from Thrace and the countries adjacent into his maritime and southern provinces, obliging those Macedonians on whom he had less reliance, to remove northward, and give up their dwellings to those fiercer tribes. So that, throughout Mace-

meditates the
renewing of
war.

^{*} See Liv. L. xl. c. 5.

⁹ Plutarch in Paul. Aemilio.

¹⁰ Liv. L. xl. c. 3.

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don, there was now exhibited a most affecting scene of wailing and desolation; a number of innocent families torn from their native homes, the possessions of their forefathers, and dragged away to distant and inhospitable wilds.

Yet this was mercy, in comparison of what followed.

Philip had, in the course of his reign, sacrificed a number of his subjects, of the noblest blood of Macedon, to his gloomy suspicions; and in his present situation dreaded the vengeance of their children. To relieve the apprehensions of his guilty mind, he ordered that search should be made for the descendants of all those whom he had destroyed, and that they also should be put to death. The most dreadful instances of what the spirit of despotism can perpetrate, followed these inhuman orders: but the melancholy catastrophe of the family of ¹¹ Herodicus, a man of high consideration in Thessaly, as it excited universal compassion, merits a more particular detail. He had fallen by the sword of regal violence; and not satisfied with this, the jealous tyrant had also murdered the husbands of his two daughters, Archo and Theoxena, by whom they left each of them an infant son. Theoxena, though tempted with many rich offers, remained a widow. Archo married Poris, a person of the first distinction among the Aeneatae, a people inhabiting that part of Macedon which lies on the gulph of Thessalonica, anciently

Disastrous
fate of the
family of
Herodicus.

¹¹ Livy *ibid.* c. 4.

known by the name of Thermae. Archo dying a few years after, and leaving a numerous issue, Theoxena, from the tender affection she bore to the dear pledges of her departed sister, consented to become the wife of Poris. Being informed of the tyrant's orders, they were struck with the most alarming fears; and Theoxena, abandoning herself to despair, would have plunged the poniard herself into the bosom both of her own son and of every one of Archo's children, rather than suffer them to fall into the power of the brutal Philip. Poris strove to allay her fears, by promising, that it should be his care to have them conveyed to Athens; and shortly after, set out with his whole family from Theffalonica, his usual residence, in order to attend a solemn sacrifice at Aenea, the chief town of the Aeneatae, in honor of Aeneas their supposed founder; proposing from thence to escape to some of the Euboean ports. Accordingly, the sacrifice ended, they embarked during the night, as if on their return to Theffalonica; but changing their course, stood for Euboea, and would probably have made it, had not the wind proved contrary. At dawn, the king's officers, who had charge to watch the coast, descried their manœuvre, and having manned one of the royal pinnaces, immediately gave chase. Theoxena too evidently saw her danger; the vessel was gaining on them, and a few minutes more had delivered them into the hands of their enemies. Firm in her purpose, she put a dagger into the hand of each of the elder children, charging them to provide instantly for

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 VI. a draught of strong poison; and having, as they
 Sect. 3. expired, committed their bodies to the ocean,
 Poris and herself, last of all, entwined in mutual
 embraces, sought a refuge from intolerable tyranny
 in the bosom of the deep. The vessel was all that
 remained to Philip's ministers of death.

An administration blackened by such enormous crimes, Livy justly observes, called for some signal vengeance from heaven: and the day of vengeance and retribution was fast approaching.

New dissensions in the royal family of Macedon.

That spirit of dissension, which, for a time, had been the reproach of the royal family of Macedon, had apparently subsided. Demetrius had learned caution, and avoided mentioning the Romans; and Perseus, to whom his brother's gentleness scarcely left a pretence for altercation, was less intemperate in his complaints. But though not at open variance, all fraternal cordiality was at an end; Demetrius dreaded Perseus; and Perseus had still a deep jealousy of Demetrius. Things were in this situation when, through the artful management of Perseus, an incident, in itself of little moment, gave vent to the smothered flame, which blazed instantly with a redoubled fierceness.

Martial exercises were, at this time, the principal occupation of the Macedonian court. After a general review of the army ¹², the troops had, according to custom, divided into two bodies, each headed by one of the king's sons, and had engaged

¹² See Liv. L. xl. c. 6 & seq.

in a mock-combat. On this occasion, the division of which Demetrius was the leader, in their eagerness for victory, had charged the other party with rather too much impetuosity, and driven them off their ground; at which Perseus expressed some resentment. The solemnity was followed by entertainments, which the princes gave to their companions and friends.

Perseus retained in his service a number of spies, whom he chiefly employed in watching his brother; one of these had contrived to get admittance into the banqueting-room of Demetrius; and being discovered by some of the guests, he was roughly treated, and expelled. Ignorant of this circumstance, Demetrius, towards the conclusion of the banquet, when elevated with mirth and wine, proposed, that they should visit his brother, and form one convivial society; "and if," said he, "any lurking
"resentment remains for what has happened to-
"day, it will be dissipated by our jollity and good-
"humor." Those who had treated the spy belonging to Perseus in so rough a manner, fearful of the event, privately provided themselves with arms, in case of an insult. Perseus, who had his creatures abroad, had immediate notice of all; and when Demetrius and his companions arrived, ordered the doors to be shut against them, and spoke from a window, charging them with having come with criminal intentions; and next morning he accused Demetrius to the king, of an attempt to assassinate him.

Philip, familiar as he was with deeds of blood,

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Perseus acts
insidiously.

Philip's
anxiety:

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was struck with horror at the relation of Perseus — his two sons, the last hopes of his house, in arms against each other! Whatever might be the issue of the accusation, to him the consequence must be misery; he felt himself the most wretched of fathers: if the accusation was true, Demetrius deserved to die; if not truth, Perseus ought not to live.

He sits in
judgment on
his sons:

his speech.

After some days of anxious solicitude and agitation, he resolved to investigate the horrid truth. Retiring therefore into the inner apartment of his palace with two of his nobles, of whose judgment and unbiaſſed probity he had the highest opinion, he commanded both his sons to appear before him. At sight of them he broke out into passionate lamentations: “Here,” said he, “I sit this day in
“ judgment on my own sons, of all parents the
“ most miserable; certain, whether the charge is
“ proved or disproved, of finding a criminal in
“ one of you. Your dissensions I have long observed, I have long bewailed; but I had hopes,
“ that as your reason advanced to maturity, a
“ sense of what you owe to your country, of what
“ you owe to yourselves, and to me, would have
“ inspired you with better thoughts. Often have
“ I endeavoured to instruct you by the examples
“ of other nations and other times. I have told
“ you how many royal houses and flourishing em-
“ pires domestic discord has overthrown; and
“ how, on the contrary, a firm union at home
“ had, from the most inconsiderable beginnings,
“ raised others to the height of prosperity and
“ power. Remember the fate of Sparta; whilst its

“ two kings acted in concert, it flourished; but,
 “ blasted by their discord, it withered and decayed.
 “ View even the Pergamenian kings, that new
 “ race, whose regal title is an insult to other kings;
 “ by what means have they risen to the large share
 “ of dominion they are now possessed of? By
 “ unanimity and strict concord, the distinctive
 “ characteristics of that family. Among the Romans,
 “ in like manner, think what lustre their greatest
 “ men have derived from the cultivation of this
 “ brotherly union — with what glory the two
 “ elder Scipios, in the war in Spain, fought and
 “ fell by each other’s side — and how again the
 “ two sons of one of those Scipios, one the con-
 “ queror of Hannibal, the other of Antiochus,
 “ labored to adorn the brows of each other with
 “ the wreaths of victory. But, I know it well,
 “ my throne is your object: if I yet live, it is
 “ only because each of you sees a dreaded rival in
 “ his brother; that rival removed, I too shall
 “ fall. — Proceed therefore; since the ears of a
 “ father must be polluted with the narrative of his
 “ sons crimes; proceed; employ every argument
 “ that truth or artifice can furnish; to-day I shall
 “ listen to all, determined from henceforth never
 “ to suffer accusations of this kind either in public
 “ or private to approach me.”

Such is the substance of what the Roman historian
 has put in the mouth of Philip on this occasion;
 certainly, not what he did say, but what he might
 naturally have said, and from which a tolerable
 judgment may be formed of the character and situa-
 tion of this unhappy prince.

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Perseus produces his charge.

The charge brought by Perseus was destitute of proof; the want of this, however, he supplied by peremptory asseverations, insisting on the most minute circumstances that had occurred either in the course of the late solemnity, or during the succeeding night, and giving the most malignant interpretation to the whole; adding, what he knew would have the greatest weight with Philip that Demetrius was, beyond a doubt, acting by the instigation of the Romans, and in full assurance of their support.

Demetrius justifies himself.

The deep atrocity of the crimes of which Demetrius heard himself accused, so foreign to his gentle nature; the boldness with which Perseus had maintained the charge; and the fell rancor discernible through every part of it, overpowered the feeble spirits of the young prince; he melted into tears; and with difficulty was at length encouraged to attempt, in tremulous and faltering accents, his own justification. His defence, though void of art, and delivered under great perturbation of mind, was nevertheless a full refutation of his brother's charge. And whether it was malice or error on the side of Perseus, it was plain, that guilt was not to be imputed to Demetrius.

All determination on the present case was precluded by paternal tenderness. Philip therefore declined pronouncing sentence; and only said, that their future conduct should be the criterion by which he should judge of the truth or the falshood of the allegations which had been produced before him.

Demetrius probably stood acquitted by his father, of any attempt on his brother's life; but what Perseus had thrown out, of his connexion with Rome, and of the consequent dangers to be apprehended, made the deepest impression on his gloomy mind. He held the Romans in detestation, and looked for every kind of insidious treatment and perfidy from that quarter: and though Demetrius was hitherto innocent, yet, open to their insinuations, and allured by the temptation of a crown, he might soon be guilty. Distracted by his doubts, Philip resolved to be satisfied; and fixed upon two noblemen, Philocles and Apelles¹¹, who, as he thought, had no kind of attachment to either of his sons, to proceed as his ambassadors to Rome; with instructions to find out, if possible, with what persons Demetrius corresponded, and what were his designs.

Philip could not have made a worse choice. Perseus, deep in contrivance, indefatigable in the pursuit of his object, and, from his being the eldest born, as well as confessedly the first in his father's favor, considered by the kingdom in general as the presumptive heir, had privately gained over most of the chief men of Macedon. Of all his creatures, none were more devoted to him, than these two trusty counsellors of Philip. Having therefore previously concerted matters with Perseus, they returned to the king with an account that Demetrius was held in the highest esteem at Rome,

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Philip
suspects De-
metrius of
carrying on
a private cor-
respondence
with the
Romans;

sends ambaf-
sadors to
Rome, to
make dis-
coveries;

they impose
on Philip.

¹¹ Liv. L. xl. c. 20. 23, 24.

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and that he certainly appeared to have entertained most unjustifiable views; delivering to him at the same time a letter, which they pretended to have received from Quintius Flamininus. The handwriting of the Roman, and the impress of his signet, the king was well acquainted with, and from the exactness of the imitation, was induced to give entire credit to the contents, more especially as Flamininus had formerly written in commendation of Demetrius, when he last returned from Rome, advising Philip to send him back soon with a more honorable retinue, as nothing could be more agreeable to the senate, or more for the interests of Macedon. The present letter was of a different tenor. The writer owned Demetrius to be blame-worthy, and deprecated the king's anger in his behalf, entreating him "to believe, that, " whatever unwarrantable enterprises the young " prince, through ambition of a throne, might " have designed, yet certainly he had projected " nothing against the life of any of his own blood;" adding, "that as to himself, he was not a man " that could be thought the adviser of an unjust " action."

Philip convinced that Demetrius is guilty.

The suspicions of Philip now gave place to the most dreadful certainty. Demetrius appeared to him evidently guilty of the most atrocious designs; he saw him not only desirous of ascending the throne by supplanting his brother, but scrupling not to wrest the sceptre from the hands even of a father!

Demetrius forms the plan of

The situation of Demetrius had for some time been exceedingly deplorable. Without any share

in his father's affection; the object of his brother's hatred; shunned by the tribe of courtiers, who, as usual, paid their homage where the royal favor was bestowed; and beset with spies, by whom he found himself observed on all occasions, Macedon appeared to him a prison where every thing was disgusting and dreadful. No wonder, therefore, that he wished to provide for his comfort and safety, by escaping to Rome. He communicated his design to Didas, governor of Paeonia, who with much art had insinuated himself into his confidence, and who immediately betrayed him to Perseus, and through Perseus to the king. The discovery set Philip on meditating some violent stroke; and Flamininus's letter confirmed him in his purpose. A dread of the Romans made it inexpedient to proceed against Demetrius by public prosecution for punishment; Philip had recourse therefore to Didas, whom the unsuspecting Demetrius still continued to make the chosen partner of his convivial hours. This villain proved himself the worthy instrument of an inhuman tyrant, and soon seized an opportunity, at a banquet, after a solemn sacrifice, of conveying poison into the cup of the unhappy prince. This did not operate, however, in the speedy and silent manner he had expected, but caused such excruciating torture, as made the villany conspicuous, and drew from Demetrius agonizing complaints against the unnatural authors and vile perpetrators of the deed: till, tired with the slow operation of the baneful potion, Didas completed his enormity by sending two ruffians into his chamber, who,

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escaping to
Rome;is betrayed
by Didas,and treach-
erously put to
death.

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Insolence of
Perseus after
the death of
Demetrius.

Philip
suspects that
Demetrius
was innocent;

is confirmed
in this by
Antigonus;

discovers the
whole truth;

smothering this unfortunate prince, put an end to his life.

Philip did not long continue ignorant of the extent of his guilt, and of his misfortune²². The conduct of Perseus himself, first awakened his suspicions. Having now no rival in his future prospects, instead of that pliant and obsequious conduct, which, whilst Demetrius lived, he had observed towards his father, he now treated him with the most insolent neglect, affecting, on all occasions, the haughty port of independence, and looking towards the throne with an undissembled impatience. A change so visible and so surprising, made Philip call to mind the various circumstances of the late melancholy transaction, to which, in the storm of passion, he had but slightly attended. Suspicions naturally arose, that Demetrius had fallen a sacrifice to treachery. Among all his courtiers, such is often the fate of kings, he had but one friend, Antigonus, his uncle's son; Antigonus had also been the friend of Demetrius, and, from a conviction of his innocence, sincerely lamented his fate. To him the king often made passionate mention of that unhappy prince; bewailing, that his condemnation had been so precipitate, and wishing to be assured whether he had not fallen a victim to villany and artifice.

Philocles and Apelles, in their late embassy to Rome, had employed one Xychus as their secretary. This man Antigonus contrived to have secured, and brought before the king. At first he hesitated;

²² See Liv. L. xl. c. 54 & seq.

but,

but, at sight of the rack, confessed every thing : B O O K
 " That the ambassadors had acted, throughout the VI.
 whole affair, in consequence of instructions they Sect. 3.
 had received from Perseus ; " " that the charge against
 Demetrius was altogether void of foundation ; " and
 " that Xychus himself, by order of his employers,
 had been the forger of the letter from Flamininus."

All, that fierce resentment, the transports of his rage and
 grief, the anguish of remorse, can impress on the remorse.
 human mind, was now felt by the unfortunate
 Philip. Incensed to madness, he ordered the two He executes
 ambassadors to be instantly seized. Apelles had, vengeance on
 upon the first intimation of his danger, fled to one of the
 Italy ; " the other, Philocles, after having been ambassadors ;

" Upon the authority of this circumstance, of " Apelles
 making his escape to Italy," where, had he been guilty of
 the death of Demetrius, he could not have expected to find
 protection, joined with some other circumstances of this re-
 markable story ; such as Philocles's persisting, according to
 some historians, though confronted with Xychus, and in the
 agonies of the rack, in the denial of all ; and the Romans
 refusing, when required by Philip (see Liv. L. xlii. c. 5.) to
 deliver Apelles into his hands ; to which we may add Perseus's
 treatment of this very Apelles, whom, when he came to the
 throne, instead of rewarding, he found means to get into
 his power and put to death ; (see Liv. *ibid.*) Mr. Hooke in
 his Roman History (see B. v. c. 14.) grounds a conjecture,
 that this *charge of forgery* against Perseus and the Macedonian
 ambassadors, was the contrivance of Antigonus, who hoped,
 by means of it, to get the kingdom ; and that Flamininus
 really wrote the letter ascribed to him. And he supposes that,
 sensible of Demetrius's vanity and imprudence, and of the
 many just causes of complaint he had given the king, the
 Roman wrote it out of kindness to the young prince, and in

B O O K confronted with Xychus, was put to death. Some
VI. historians say, that he confirmed what Xychus had
Sect. 3. deposed; others, that he persisted to the last in an
the other obstinate denial¹⁶.

escapes;
he finds it im-
possible to
seize Perseus,

but resolves to
leave the
throne to An-
tigonus;

Perseus nevertheless was evidently the most guilty. But he had little to fear. He kept out of his father's reach; and had Philip attempted to seize him, he might easily, with the formidable party he had at his devotion, have set the feeble and almost deserted monarch at defiance. The king did what he could. He never afterwards suffered him to come into his presence; and declared it to be his determined resolution, that he never should ascend a throne, to which he had attempted to wade through a brother's blood. He likewise talked of settling the crown on Antigonus; a scheme dictated by the

the view of deprecating his father's anger. How far this conjecture deserves to be admitted, the reader may judge. Livy is clear that the letter was a forgery, and Perseus the contriver of it. But it must also be owned, that even Livy's testimony, in cases of this kind, when guilt is to be thrown off Rome upon her enemies, is sometimes questionable. However, allowing the letter to have been really written by Flamininus, it certainly does not follow, that the intention of it was as friendly as Mr. Hooke supposes. In fact, what could have been the design of such a letter, but to excite new terrors in the mind of the unhappy Philip, already a prey to gloomy suspicions? Indeed, this *weapon of destruction* did more than he meant it should. It was also fatal to Demetrius. But at the same time it accomplished the main purpose for which it had been sent; it brought Philip to his grave, and added to the distraction, the weakness, and the reproach of Macedon's royal house.

¹⁶ See Liv. L. xl. c. 55.

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momentary impulse of passion, and which, in the utmost plenitude of his power, and with a much larger portion of life before him, he had probably found it difficult to effect.

But Philip had only a few days longer to live. languishes,
The detection of Perseus's guilt had been to him the stroke of death; for from that moment he dragged out a life of melancholy and languor. Though in this declining state, he still, however, pleased himself with the thought of taking vengeance on the Romans, to whose perfidious councils he chiefly ascribed the ruin that had fallen on his house. Besides the mighty preparations for war, which he had made at home, he had taken into his service the whole tribe of the Bastarnæ¹⁷, a fierce and hardy nation from the other side of the Danube, whom he meant to introduce into Dardania, with the view of exterminating the people of that country, who had sold themselves to Rome, and of pouring afterwards these barbarians through Illyricum into Italy. Antigonus was dispatched to hasten their march. Whilst he was absent on this errand, the king breathed his last at Amphipolis, whither he had removed, in order to welcome his new allies, and see them conducted to their place of destination. Perseus, who was in expectation of his father's death, and had immediate information of it, ascended the throne without opposition. Perseus ascends the throne,

¹⁷ Liv. L. xl. c. 57.

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and puts
Antigonus
to death.

the king had expressed towards him, only served to make him more particularly the object of Perseus's resentment. It was one of the first acts of his reign, to order him to execution.

Philip reigned forty-two years, from the third year of the 139th Olympiad to the first year of the 150th¹; a period of time as busy and eventful as any in the Grecian annals.

Character of
Philip:

It was undoubtedly a misfortune to the Grecian people, that such a prince was on the throne of Macedon when the Romans first invaded them. Under any Macedonian king it had been difficult to have united into one compact body these several states, independent, and therefore naturally jealous, of each other, and from whose jarring interests, contests were perpetually arising; but under a prince like Philip, whose ambitious attempts and repeated treacheries provoked every suspicion, it was impossible. The Romans saw this, and with their usual policy turned it to their own advantage. Philip had besides, if Polybius and Livy may be credited, most of those private vices which mark the tyrant; he was intemperate, libidinous, vindictive, cruel; as a king, unworthy of trust; as a man, an object of detestation.

Yet amidst these deep shades with which we find his character darkened, he appears to have had qualities of a very different cast. His generous and noble acts, as we have already seen, had so endeared him to many of the Achaean confederates,

¹ From about the 218th to the 175th year before Christ.

that when the question was put, whether Achaia should have alliance with Rome or Macedon, the deputies of several of the Achaean cities pleaded his cause with uncommon warmth, in opposition to the ruling party supported by the Roman power; and at last, when their opposition could not avail, left the diet rather than seem, by their presence, to give sanction to a measure injurious to the Macedonian king. The estimation in which he was held by many others of the Grecian states, is not less to his honor. He was also possessed of many amiable accomplishments; and such were the elegance of his court, and the ease and dignity of his manners, that Scipio Africanus himself, who spent some days with Philip in his way to Asia, spoke of him with esteem and high commendation¹⁹. — Was he so able a dissembler? — Or shall we rather say, that, had the accounts of other writers, less under the influence of Rome, reached us, his faults had not been handed down to us with so many heavy aggravations?

As to those excesses of violence and bloodshed which, the case of Aratus excepted, are more particularly the reproach of his later years, even Polybius²⁰ acknowledges, that after the overthrow of Antiochus, when he found his numerous and signal services to Rome repaid with perfidiousness and hostility, a total change in his disposition became conspicuous. The mortification of seeing himself

¹⁹ See Liv. L. xxxvii. c. 7.

²⁰ De virt. & vitiis, p. 1436.

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fallen from the dignity of a sovereign prince, into a state of humiliating dependence on a haughty, powerful, and enterprising republic; and of finding all his secret enemies called forth against him, from every quarter of Greece, by the open encouragement or insidious arts of Rome; were circumstances sufficiently painful; which, added to the distractions of his own family, might, it may easily be supposed, have soured his mind, and rendered his temper, as age advanced, more gloomy and suspicious.

As a king, he had unquestionably great abilities. In war, he often gave proofs both of his courage and his conduct. The marine of Macedon was altogether of his formation; before his time, it had scarcely an existence; under him, it soon became considerable; and by the commercial connexions and settlements which he made in different parts, he so successfully extended the Macedonian trade, as to excite the jealousy of the greatest commercial states of Asia. His conduct in regard to Syria, it must be confessed, was impolitic to a high degree. The ruin of Antiochus, it was obvious, must pave the way to his own. Sound policy pointed out, therefore, an alliance with that prince, and with other powers of Europe and Asia. But in those days²¹, the balance of power was a matter little

²¹ "Le monde de ce temps-là," says an ingenious modern, "n'étoit pas comme notre monde d'aujourd'hui: les voyages, les conquêtes, le commerce, l'établissement des grands états, les inventions des postes, de la boussole, & de l'imprimerie, une certaine police générale, ont facilité les communications, & établi parmi nous un art, qu'on appelle

understood. And from the narrow and confined views which each state had of its own interests; from the want of proper intelligence of the transactions and probable designs of other kingdoms; and from the jealousies which Rome industriously kept alive between nation and nation; every potentate, if not immediately attacked, looked on with unconcern whilst his neighbour was destroyed; not considering, that the fate of one necessarily involved in it the fate of all.

The latter part of his reign shows, that he had a proper sense of his treatment from Rome, and, had he not been broken by the misfortunes of his own house, it is probable she had still found him a vigorous and formidable adversary. So ardent was he to the last, in the pursuit of his favorite scheme of attacking the Romans, that about a year before his death, he ascended to the top of mount Haemus²², an attempt of immense labor, and exceedingly perilous, merely because he had been told, that from the summit of this mountain might be seen the Adriatic sea and the whole country of Italy to the Alps, the destined scene of his future operations. The measure he adopted, of introducing the Bastarnae, was certainly a deep stroke in politics; and, had he lived to have brought his plan to maturity, or had, his successor had the

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ardent to the
last in his
enmity to
Rome :

²² la politique : chacun voit d'un coup d'œil tout ce qui se remue dans l'Univers."

Grand. & Décad. des Rom. c. 1.

²² Liv. L. xl. c. 21.

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his prepara-
tions for war.

abilities to make a right use of this new connexion, it had probably laid Italy open to such inroads, as would have left her little leisure for the invasion of other kingdoms²³.

Philip, besides, without making any show of war, or giving the Romans the least suspicion of his operations, had collected at home an army more numerous and better disciplined than any he had ever brought into the field. He had laid up, Plutarch²⁴ tells us, in his arsenals, arms for thirty thousand men; in his garrisons eight millions of

²³ It appears, that the Romans were soon sensible of their danger, had Philip's plan been carried into execution. We are informed by Livy (L. xl v. c. 1.) that, about eight years after this period, the consul Cassius would have attempted to penetrate from the Lower Gaul through Illyricum into Greece, in order to join the other consul; but that the senate, upon the first intimation of his project, sent him peremptory orders not to proceed, "lest he should show the neighbouring barbarians the way by which they might enter Italy." Mithridates, we read, some time before his death, had adopted Philip's plan, and, had not his son's revolt baffled his schemes, would probably have executed it. Upon the same principle, Augustus, who, from the fate of Lollius and Quintilius Varus, had found what formidable foes these fierce tribes were, and how vain it was to attempt the wilds and deep forests they inhabited, appointed the Danube for the boundary of the Roman empire on that side, having secured the hither-banks of it by a strong line of forts and military stations; and even left an express injunction to his successors, not to pass beyond it (Dio Cassius) as if foreseeing, that from this quarter were to issue forth those nations who, during a length of ages, were to be the terror and the scourge of Rome.

²⁴ In Paul. Aemilio,

measures of wheat ; with money in his treasury to defray the charge of maintaining ten thousand mercenaries for ten years. And all this was executed, after he had been reduced and plundered by the Romans, cut off from the benefits of commerce, and obliged to retire within the ancient boundaries of Macedon. A striking proof of his abilities, and of the resources of that kingdom under an able and active prince.

But all the designs of Philip were defeated by the machinations of treacherous policy : the flame of jealousy and division was kindled in his family to which the unhappy Demetrius fell a victim, and by which the aged monarch himself was sent broken-hearted to the grave. Rome exulted in her success, beheld with joy all his bold and well-concerted projects at an end ; and, in the future vassalage of Macedon, contemplated one more prostrate kingdom groaning under Roman domination.

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HISTORY OF GREECE.

BOOK VII.

SECTION I.

CONTENTS.

Perseus ascends the throne of Macedon — begins his reign with some appearance of vigor — courts the affections of the Macedonian people, and the friendship of the neighbouring states. — The Romans jealous — prefer sundry complaints against him, and invade Greece. — Perseus, with advantages in his favor, loses the benefit of them by his avarice and pusillanimity. — Suffers himself to be over-reached by the Romans — neglects to improve the repeated opportunities, which, during the space of three years, the incapacity or the corruption of the Roman commanders presented to him.

BOOK VII. **T**HE first years of the reign of Perseus exhibit scenes which by no means justified that contempt in which the Romans appear to have held Macedon
Sect. I. in which the Romans appear to have held Macedon
Perseus begins at the time of his accession¹, or the opinion which

¹ OLYMP. CLI. BEFORE CHRIST 175.

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his reign with
an appearance
of ability;his conduct at
home,

historians tell us had been generally entertained of Perseus himself. His chief object was, to establish himself in the affections of the Macedonian people; and, as if the late sanguinary measures had been altogether his father's crimes, he immediately assumed an air of benignity and gentleness. Antigonus, his rival in the kingdom, had suffered the fate which usually attends the unsuccessful rivals of kings²; but Perseus prevented the apprehensions of farther severities, by publishing a general pardon to offenders of every description. He not only recalled all those whom fear or judicial condemnation had, in the course of the late reign, driven from their country; but he ordered even the income of their fortunes, during their exile, to be reimbursed³. To the rest of his subjects, his whole deportment, in like manner, exhibited princely dignity and parental tenderness. Whatever debts were due to the crown of Macedon at the period of his father's death, he remitted. Skilful in the art of war, which he had studied under his father, he made the discipline of his troops, and the improvement and strength of his kingdom, his principal occupation; and he carefully avoided those illiberal excesses which disgraced a great part of Philip's reign.

His conduct to foreign states was equally conciliating. Ambassadors were sent to the Roman senate, and abroad, to notify his accession to the throne, and to request a confirmation of the treaties subsisting between

² See Liv. L. xlii. c. 5. Plut. in Paul. Aemilio.

³ Polyb. de virtut. & vitiis, p. 1440.

B O O K Rome and Macedon. Rome answered with the
VII. same dissimulation with which he had probably
Sect. I. addressed her; acknowledged his title, and pronounced him the friend and ally of the Roman people *. To the several states of Greece and Asia he made his application with more sincerity. Sensible of what importance it was to strengthen himself by alliances with the powers around him, he studied to remove those jealousies, to which his father's ambitious projects had given birth. With the Rhodians † he found little difficulty. Relieved from the uneasy suspicions which Philip's naval improvements had occasioned, they saw the mistake they had been guilty of, in assisting the Romans to overthrow the power of Macedon; and espoused with cordiality the interests of Perseus. Prusias ‡ of Bithynia was prevailed on with the same ease; and, to render the connexion betwixt this prince and himself more binding, Perseus gave him his sister in marriage. The Syrian court was not less favorably disposed. Antiochus was dead, and his son Seleucus on the throne; who, irritated by his father's sufferings and his own, willingly gave ear to every thing Perseus had to urge against the Romans †. He found, therefore, no difficulty in convincing

* Liv. L. xl. c. 58.

† Polyb. Legat. lxxv. & lxxvii.

‡ Liv. L. xlii. c. 12.

§ This was, according to Livy (L. xlv. c. 24.) the purport of the embassy sent afterwards by Perseus to Antiochus; but it is evident he had before applied to Seleucus; and as his views in both embassies were the same, so, very probably, in both were the same arguments employed.

Seleucus, that these republicans were, from principle, the enemies of kings; and that whatever portion of empire they had left him, would be violently wrested from his house on the first favorable occasion. But the weak and impoverished state of Syria permitted not his following the dictates of his heart. All he could do was, to wish Perseus success; and, as a pledge of his regard, to give him his daughter Laodice in marriage. The Rhodians⁸ distinguished themselves on this occasion; as if to make amends for having employed their arms against Macedon, they equipped a most superb fleet, and desired to have the honor of convoying the princess to her royal husband. The same disposition prevailed throughout the greater part of the Lower Asia. Perseus looked even as far as Carthage for confederates, and dispatched ambassadors accordingly. The opportunity favored his views; exasperated by the encroachments of Masinissa, and the duplicity of Rome, the Carthaginians were ripe for violent councils; they gave audience to the ambassadors by night, in the temple of Aesculapius⁹, in order to conceal the transaction from the Romans; and immediately dispatched some of their chief men, to concert measures with the Macedonian king.

Meanwhile, the emissaries of Perseus had been employed in every quarter of Greece; and in support of their negotiations, he made a progress to Delphi¹⁰. He courts the states of Greece.

⁸ Polyb. Legat. lx.⁹ Liv. L. xli. c. 22.¹⁰ Liv. L. xli. c. 22.

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Religion was his pretence; but his real objects were a display of his power, a show of moderation, and an appearance of a regard for the liberties of Greece. Attended by a formidable escort, the flower of the Macedonian army, he passed through Greece without hostility or depredation; and, having performed his devotions, returned in the same pacific manner to his own kingdom.

The general temper, at this period, of most of the Grecian states.

What rendered these intrigues the more effectual, was the general temper of the Greeks themselves¹¹. Most of them began to have prophetic fears of what they had to expect, should the Roman dominion be once fully established in Greece, and looked on Macedon as the last bulwark of their liberties. Accordingly, a revolution of interests took place almost every where. The people of Epire favored Perseus. Several of the Thessalian tribes inclined to the same side. The Boeotians declared themselves avowedly; and, having put to death the most strenuous of the Roman partisans, entered into an alliance with Macedon; and, to give the stronger sanction to the treaty, caused it to be engraven on tables of brass, and set up in the temples of Delphi, Delos, and Thebes. The Aetolians, though divided into two factions, animated by all that virulence which civil discords produce, agreed in one point, that Perseus should be the arbiter of their differences. Athens and Achaia alone stood firm to the Roman cause; though even Achaia was nearly lost to Rome. The Achæan

¹¹ See Liv. L. xlii. c. 12 & seq.

states, in the days of Philip, had prohibited by law all communication with Macedon; many of the Achaean slaves availing themselves of this interdiction, had fled from their masters, and taken refuge in the Macedonian territories. Perseus, to ingratiate himself with the Achaean people²², caused as many of these slaves as could be found to be sent back; accompanying the present with a letter, in which he requested the rescinding of this unsocial edict; and that a friendly intercourse should again be opened between the two nations. The request was plausible, and met with powerful advocates in its favor among the Achaeans. But upon a representation by the friends of Rome, that it was beneath the dignity of the Achaean states to take public notice of a letter, sent by a private messenger, conveying a requisition, which should have been made in form by ambassadors, in order to be laid before the next general diet, the farther consideration of the matter was postponed; and afterwards, when the national convention was held, they had influence sufficient to defeat the proposition.

Exclusive of the advantages Perseus might derive from the well-grounded jealousy of Roman ambition, which was entertained by most of the Grecian states, he succeeded to all those mighty preparations which his father had made during the latter years of his life. He had a rich treasury; an army, numerous, well disciplined, and well

The domestic
advantages
possessed by
Perseus.

²² Liv. L. xli. c. 23.

B O O K appointed; and, both in Thrace and Illyricum,
VII. a number of petty princes, connected with his
Sect. I. crown, were ready to march at his command. The
 vigor of his operations appeared at the same time
 not unworthy of his power. The Dolopians¹ had
 contested some of his claims, and had made their
 appeal to Rome; but, regardless of this appeal,
 he entered their country, and reduced them to
 subjection. The people of Byzantium, pressed by
 Eumenes, had applied to him for aid; when he
 immediately sent forces to their assistance, and
 obliged the king of Pergamus to retire. Abrypolis,
 who reigned over a district of Illyricum, and
 was one of the allies of Rome, having made an
 inroad into Macedon, Perseus marched immedi-
 ately against him, put him to flight, and pursued
 him into his own dominions, of which he took
 possession. And even afterwards, when attacked
 by the Romans themselves, he maintained war against
 them for three years, with considerable success.

In what manner all this seeming strength came
 to be annihilated, and so many advantages to
 terminate in discomfiture, and the utter extirpation
 of him and the house of Macedon, is a fit subject
 for historical inquiry.

His error in
 relation to the
 Bastarnae.

Perseus, at the very commencement of his reign,
 was guilty of a capital error. The Bastarnae, of
 whom mention has been made, were on their
 march through Thrace when his father died. Philip
 had stipulated the subsidy they were to receive,

¹ Liv. L. xli. c. 22. L. xlii. c. 12.

and

and the different sums to be paid to the chiefs of the Thracian tribes for granting them a free passage through their territories. Perseus, who, although possessed of immense treasures, was under the dominion of the most sordid avarice, would not abide by these stipulations; in consequence of which, the Bastarnæ refused to advance, thirty thousand men excepted, who having already entered the Macedonian frontiers, pursued their route to Dardania. The rest halted in Thrace; where, provoked by the treatment they had met with, they fell on the people of the country, and, as if to indemnify themselves, plundered wherever they came: so that Perseus lost an ally, who had probably rendered Macedon, at least for the present, exceedingly formidable; whilst he at the same time forfeited the confidence of his Thracian neighbours, who were not only defrauded of the promised subsidy, but compelled, through his perfidiousness, to take up arms in their own defence.

From the importance of the services performed by the thirty thousand Bastarnæ who entered Dardania²⁴, the consequences are obvious had the whole force of those emigrants, said to amount to upwards of a hundred thousand men, been poured into this country. The Dardanians, heretofore the most active enemies of Macedon on that side, now finding more than sufficient employment at home, were forced to retreat to their strong-holds, where, with difficulty, they maintained themselves against

²⁴ See Liv. L. xli. c. 19. & Polyb. Legat. lxii.

B O O K those bold invaders. The Bastarnae found powerful auxiliaries in the Scordisci¹⁵, a fierce nation to the north-west of Dardania, whose settlements extended to the confines of Italy; and who, originally from the same neighbourhood, and similar in language and in manners, rejoiced in the opportunity of joining their kindred tribes. At length, however, neglected by Macedon, and hopeless of supplies from their own country, the Bastarnae were under the necessity of retiring homewards; but even then, not dispirited by their situation, they made good their retreat, and without any material loss regained the banks of the Danube. The sequel of their adventures¹⁶ seems, by the Roman historians, to be heightened by the marvellous. We are informed, that the Danube being frozen over, as they approached their own confines, they attempted to pass over on the ice, which breaking under them, they all perished. The like fate, Livy¹⁷ tells us, involved their countrymen who had halted in Thrace; most of them, according to him, being miraculously destroyed by a violent tempest of thunder and lightning. The

¹⁵ Justin, or rather Trogus, (L. xxxii. c. 3.) is of opinion, that they were a part of those known by the name of Gauls, who had emigrated under Brennus and his fellow-leaders, and who had settled in this country after their unsuccessful attempt on Delphi. According to this historian, they had their head-quarters near the confluence of the Save and the Danube, in that part of Hungary where Belgrade now stands.

¹⁶ See Liv. L. xli. Supplem. French.

¹⁷ L. xl. c. 58.

truth of both these accounts is much to be questioned: they probably took their rise from some vague reports, at first readily believed, and afterwards industriously propagated, by a people whose vanity it was to imagine, "that, to have marched forth in support of the enemies of Rome, was an impiety which it concerned Heaven to punish." And it even appears from Strabo¹⁸, who is silent as to these tales of wonder, that the Romans of those days, far from having a knowledge of the history of the different tribes of this part of Germany, scarcely were instructed even in their names.

The Romans soon discovered, or at least suspected, the designs of Perseus. The invasion of Dardania by the Bastarnae; his reducing the Dolo-
pes; the relief he had sent to the Byfantines; and his progress to Delphi; had raised an alarm at Rome. Commissioners had repeatedly been dispatched to demand the reason of these hostilities, and, above all, to inspect narrowly into the situation of affairs in Macedon. During the first years of his reign, Perseus had submitted to the pleasure of the senate, and had given the different commissioners an honorable reception. But provoked at length, that messengers from Rome should still continue to infest his court, renewing inquiries, of which he plainly saw the design, he began to show his resentment at the indignity; and Caius Valerius Laevinus, with some other Roman patricians, having, in the seventh year of his reign, come to Macedon on

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The Romans;
jealous of
Perseus;

send commis-
sioners into
Macedon;

Perseus treat
them with
contempt.

¹⁸ See L. vii. p. 203, 204. Casaubon.

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The machi-
nations of
Eumenes:

the usual errand, he put them off from day to day, under various pretences, until at last they were obliged to leave Macedon without an audience¹⁹.

The report of the contempt with which their commissioners had been treated, had already reached the senate, when Eumenes of Pergamus afforded new matter to strengthen their suspicions²⁰. Mortified at the increase of power which he saw Macedon was acquiring, and apprehensive of the consequences to himself, should that kingdom be restored to its ancient splendor, he hastened to Rome; and having obtained a private audience of the senate, laid before them a full account of the formidable appearance of the Macedonians, and of the enterprising spirit of their king; of the treasures he possessed; the mighty armaments he had in readiness; and the alliances he had formed with most of the Greek and Asiatic states, who, from a settled jealousy of Rome, were prepared upon the first opportunity to unite against her as a common foe.

is received
favorably at
Rome:

The senate acknowledged the zeal which Eumenes manifested on this occasion, by bestowing on him extraordinary honors; he was presented not only with magnificent gifts, but also with the highest ensigns of Roman magistracy, the curule chair and the ivory wand. The utmost precaution was at the same time taken, that no part of his information should transpire. It only was whispered in

¹⁹ See Liv. L. xli. c. 25 & L. xlii. c. 2.

²⁰ Liv. L. xlii. c. 11 & seq.

Rome, that Eumenes had attended the senate with very interesting intelligence; and it was not till after the overthrow of Perseus, that the particulars were made public²¹. This affectation of secrecy, together with their effusions of gratitude to the Pergamenian king, were evidently designed to impress the Roman people with apprehensions of mighty dangers from Macedon, and of the absolute necessity of a war; the most urgent motives to which, were however the ambition and avarice of the senators themselves.

Perseus, who had notice that Eumenes had set out for Rome, caused ambassadors to follow him; where for several days they attended in vain, soliciting an audience; which having at length obtained, they were treated with such marks of slight and disrespect, that Harpalus, at the head of the deputation, could not suppress his indignation: "The king," said he to the senate, "wishes to be believed, when he declares, that neither by words nor by actions has he given the Roman people cause to think him an enemy; but if he finds that you are seeking a pretence against him, he wants not courage to defend himself. The chance of war is alike to both; the issue uncertain."²²

Perseus sends
ambassadors
to counteract
Eumenes;

their remon-
strance to the
Roman senate.

The Macedonian king had no positive information of the business of Eumenes at Rome; but, from the character of that prince, and the hostile purposes the Romans seemed now to avow, he

²¹ See Liv. L. xlii. c. 14.

²² Liv. L. xlii. c. 14.

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Perseus seeks
to revenge
himself on
Eumenes.

suspected it, and meditated vengeance. In his service was Evander of Crete, a captain of auxiliaries: this officer, with three Macedonians accustomed to the perpetration of such crimes, he employed to assassinate Eumenes, who had declared his intention of taking the route of Delphi, in his return homeward, in order to sacrifice to the Delphic god. The situation of Delphi, on the declivity of a mountain, rendered the road to it for the most part steep and difficult; and the path leading to the temple, winded through a valley so narrow, that only one person could pass at a time. Here the assassins took their stand, concealed by a wall that hung over this hollow way, and waited the approach of the king²³. His retinue had moved forward, and last of all came Eumenes himself, preceded by Pantaleon an Aetolian chief; when the wretches, just as the king came under the wall, tumbled down upon him two huge stones, one of which falling on his head, and the other on his shoulders, struck him to the ground, and a shower of small stones succeeding, seemed to have overwhelmed the unfortunate monarch; when the assassins, thinking they had effectuated their purpose, made their escape up the mountain, after having killed one of their accomplices, whose slowness of pace exposed them to a discovery.

Eumenes
escapes with
life.

Eumenes, however, was not dead. His attendants, Pantaleon excepted, had all fled upon seeing their master fall; but now gathering round, they

²³ See Liv. L. xlii. c. 15 & seq.

found him, though senseless, still warm and breathing. They immediately conveyed him to a place of safety in the neighbourhood, and soon after to Aegina, where he lay concealed till he was in a condition to be removed to Asia. For some time a report of his death prevailed, and so confidently was it believed, that his brother purposed to take possession of the kingdom, and to marry the wife of Eumenes. Already had he been *talking*, as Livy terms it, *with* the queen, and the commander of the citadel of Pergamns, when tidings arrived, that his brother was returning. From another brother, and a prince, this precipitancy might have provoked the sharpest reprehension. Eumenes, however, contented himself with telling Attalus in a whisper, "not to think for the future of marrying his brother's wife, until he was certain that her husband was dead."

All the friends of Eumenes considered Perseus as the author of the assassination, although no direct proof could be brought against him. The Romans undertook the tracing of this dark affair. A woman of some distinction, named Praxo, who lived at Delphi, was known to have connexions with the Macedonian king, and at her house the assassins were said to have lodged. Valerius, lately one of the commissioners at the court of Macedon, who was now at Chalcis, contrived to carry off this woman to Rome; where Rammius of Brundisium, who had informed Valerius that he had important discoveries to make, also attended him. From the testimony of these two persons, accord-

Perseus is charged with the assassination.

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ing to the Roman writers, the clearest evidence appeared of Perseus's guilt. Praxo confessed she knew the assassins, and that they were employed by Perseus, having received them into her house in consequence of his directions. And Rammius, who generally entertained at Brundisium every eminent person, Greek or Roman, in their passage to and from Greece, deposed, that Perseus had practised with him to poison not only Eumenes, but other persons whom he was to have named; that, apprehensive for his own life, Rammius had promised compliance; and that a poison of the most subtle kind had been delivered to him, for the proposed purpose, by Perseus himself.

Commissioners sent to Perseus to demand reparation :

With a prince of such a character (for at Rome these several charges were considered as undoubted facts) the senate held it a reproach to be on terms of amity; commissioners²⁴ were therefore immediately dispatched, requiring him to desist from all further acts of violence, and to make ample reparation for what he had already been guilty of; and, should he refuse to comply, to renounce, in the name of the Roman people, all friendship and alliance with him. Perseus, probably apprized of the purpose of the embassy, after making the deputies wait several days for an audience, condescended at last to admit them, when they were on the point of returning to Rome unheard. The freedom of their remonstrances added to the indignation which already swelled within him, and he retorted on them the keenest recriminations;

he treats them with insult.

²⁴ Liv. L. xlii. c. 25.

exclaimed against the haughtiness of the Romans; their insolence to kings; their insatiable lust of empire; and their infesting his court with their daily ambassadors, who joined the mean artifices of spies to the imperiousness of despots, to whose control they expected he should subject all his actions. Unmoved by this intemperate language, they calmly demanded an answer to the requisitions they had made. "To-morrow," said he, "you shall have it under my hand." Accordingly, next day he delivered them a writing, in which he declared, "That as to the treaty of alliance said to subsist between Macedon and Rome, he held himself no way bound by it; that it was a contract entered into by his father, and binding on him only; that at his accession, when not yet firmly seated on his throne, he had submitted to it from policy; — yet he was still ready to conclude a treaty of alliance with Rome on equitable conditions, and if they had such to offer, he would take it into consideration." The reply of the Roman deputies was short. They pronounced Perseus to be no longer the ally of Rome. And Perseus, in the voice of defiance, commanded them, within three days to quit Macedon.

This apparent vigor was but poorly supported on the part of Perseus. The senate, upon the report of their ambassadors, had ordered a body of eight thousand foot and four hundred horse, under the command of the praetor Cn. Sicinius, to march into Epire². The instant Perseus heard of this,

A Roman
army passes
into Greece:

² OLYMP. cli. 4. BEFORE CHRIST 202.

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Perseus sends
ambassadors
to solicit
peace.

who are or-
dered to leave
Italy.

Roman com-
missioners
sent into
Greece.

Perseus ap-
plies to
Marcius;

he seems to have shrunk with dismay from the approaching contest; for he sent ambassadors to Rome, to solicit terms of peace. They were received as he might have expected: they had audience, not in the senate, but without the city, in the temple of Bellona²⁶, as coming from a prince the declared enemy of Rome; and after some questions, relative to certain hostile attempts lately committed by the king of Macedon in Perrhaebia and Thessaly, concerning which, the ambassadors said they had no instructions, they were ordered to leave Italy within eleven days, and to tell their master, never more to presume to send embassies to Rome, but to make his future application to the commanders of the Roman armies in Greece.

Sicinius was soon after followed by five commissioners, appointed by the senate to visit the Grecian states, and to confirm them in the interests of Rome; of whom Aulus Hostilius and Quintus Marcus Philippus had Epire, Aetolia, and Thessaly, assigned to them for their department. The father of Marcus had been the guest and friend of the late king of Macedon. The mean-spirited Perseus laid hold of this circumstance; and though he had already applied by letter to the five commissioners upon their arrival on the coast of Greece, desiring to be informed why he was threatened with hostilities, and had been answered with manifest contempt; he nevertheless renewed his application to Marcus at Larissa, reminded him of the

²⁶ Liv. L. xli. c. 46.

mutual hospitality by which their families were united; and requested, that he might be admitted to a conference²⁷.

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Marcus received the application in the most gracious manner. "He had often," he said, "heard his father mention his connexions with the Macedonian king; and it was chiefly in the view of doing Perseus service, that he had accepted of his present commission; he therefore cheerfully granted him the conference which he desired." Accordingly, on the appointed day, the Macedonian king and the two Roman commissioners arrived on the opposite banks of the Peneus. The Romans were accompanied by deputies from most of the Grecian states, who, either anxious for their own fate, or as a mark of respect to Rome, had come to witness the important issue; and Perseus was attended by his guards, with a number of Macedonian lords and Thracian chiefs. The adjusting of the ceremonial was the first point in question, whether the king should pass the river to the Romans, or the Romans to the king. The compliment seemed to be due to regal dignity: but it was the policy of Rome to manifest a contempt of royalty; and, as the king had requested the conference, the Romans alledged, that he should yield the point of precedence. At length, by an insipid kind of jest, Marcus put an end to the contest: "let the younger," said he, "pass to the elder, the son to the father," alluding to

²⁷ Liv. xlii. c. 38. & seq.

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his own name, Philip. The next point was, whether the king should pass over with only a few of his guards, or with all his retinue. The latter Perseus insisted on, as most honorable: but in that case Marcius required hostages, that no act of hostility should be committed. To this humiliation also the Macedonian king was obliged to submit.

his artful
charge against
Perseus.

Marcius opened the conference with many professions of his personal regard for Perseus, at the same time acquitting the Romans of having provoked the impending war, of which he asserted the king alone was guilty, whose repeated acts of violence had made it necessary for Rome to send an army into Greece. In one point only, he told Perseus, the senate thought he had acted wisely, in sending his ambassadors to renew the treaty of alliance with the Roman people; and yet, how much better had it been never to have renewed the treaty, than to have broken it as soon as renewed. Abrupolis, the friend of Rome, he had driven from his kingdom. Artetarus, the most faithful confederate that the Romans had among all the Illyrian princes, had fallen by domestic treachery, and to his murderers he had given an asylum in his dominions; evidently showing, to speak in the mildest terms, how much he rejoiced in their treason. In direct contravention of the late stipulations, he had marched an army through the midst of Greece to Delphi; he had sent succours to the Byzantines; he had entered into a league with the Boeotians; he had made war on the Dolopes. Everfa and Callicritus, the Theban

ambassadors, perished as they were returning from Rome; "I would rather ask," continued Marcius, "whose crime this was, than fix it on any individual. Violent commotions have arisen in Aetolia, in which some of the principal men have lost their lives; by what party but the Macedonian were those commotions excited? Eumenes had nearly fallen a sacrifice to treachery before the altars at Delphi; I am unwilling to name the person he accuses. As to Rammius, what discoveries he has made, your own ambassadors, no doubt, have already informed you. The hearing of these things is irksome to you. You brought it on yourself, by inquiring, in the letter which you addressed to us, why the Romans send an army into Macedon, or garrison the cities of their allies. You have now heard their reasons. And, harsh as you may think the answer, you would probably have thought yourself more severely treated had your inquiry been left altogether unanswered. Mindful of the friendship that subsisted between our fathers, I shall lend a favorable ear to whatever you can offer in your justification; and I wish you may furnish me with arguments to plead your cause in the senate."

So severe a charge, delivered in this manner, not only before a number of his own subjects, but also in the presence of the deputies of the Grecian states, shows little of that tender concern for Perseus, by which the Roman pretended to be actuated. And, what renders this conduct more worthy of

The king's
answer.

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notice, it appears from the defence which Livy has put in the mouth of the Macedonian king, that of these accusations, some were evidently ill-grounded, and many heightened with much unfair aggravation. Rammius, Perseus declared, had never been at the court of Macedon but once, nor was he ever expected there again: how improbable therefore was it, that he should intrust a person, in whose fidelity he could not repose confidence, with a commission of so delicate and hazardous a nature? The Theban ambassadors, it was well known, had perished by shipwreck. The murderers of Artetarus he had ordered to be expelled from his dominions the instant he heard that they had taken refuge there. With relation to Eumenes, he was sensible he had been pointed at as the author of his assassination; but upon what kind of evidence! had that prince, whose oppressions had made him odious throughout Greece and Asia, no enemies to fear but from Macedon? — This was his reply to those articles, that concerned him as an individual; as a king, his answer was yet stronger. Abrupolis, unprovoked, had made an inroad into Macedon, and had spread his depredations as far as Amphipolis, before Perseus took up arms against him; on whom lay the blame, if the issue of the war proved fatal to this lawless invader? The province of Dolopia had been assigned to the Macedonian king by the Romans themselves; the Dolopians nevertheless had risen against Euphranor, the Macedonian governor, and had put him to death, with circumstances of the most barbarous

cruelty; when did it become criminal in a prince, to reduce rebellious subjects to obedience? He had marched through a part of Greece to Delphi, in discharge of his vows; but if any of the states that lay on his way, could make it appear, that the smallest outrage had been offered to them, or if, under the disguise of religion he had been found to conceal any ambitious design, he was willing to submit to condemnation. Respecting his assisting the Byzantines, and his league with the Boeotians, his ambassadors had already explained those matters to the senate, who, notwithstanding the opposition of a few, had accepted of his apology. “This defence of mine,” he added, “will be received by those who hear me, according to their passions and affections; nor is it of so much importance, what my conduct or my views have been, as in what light you mean to see my actions. My conscience bears me witness, that I have not offended knowingly; and if through ignorance I have transgressed, instructed by your reproof, I shall endeavour to correct whatever is amiss. I have certainly done nothing wrong, which I may not remedy, nor for which you can think I merit all the horrors of an impending war. With little reason therefore are you renowned for moderation and dispassionate councils, if, for causes that scarcely deserve expostulation, you take up arms against princes who are your friends and allies.”

Marcus seemed much moved, and wished the king again to send ambassadors to Rome, with

An insidious
truce proposed
by Marcus;

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conciliating proposals. The difficulty was, how, in the mean while, to suspend hostilities. After many labored objections from the Romans, Marcius, “who could not,” he said, “but reverence the sacred ties of hospitality, which subsisted between Perseus and him,” appeared to yield at last to the solicitations of the king, and granted him a truce, until his ambassadors should have time to return.

All this specious show of friendship to the Macedonian king, was no more than a feint²⁹, which Marcius employed, in order to betray him into this very truce, the most ruinous measure that the unhappy prince could possibly have adopted. It will be proper to enter into an explanation of this matter.

the ruinous
consequence
of it to Per-
seus.

When Sicinius and the Roman commissioners arrived in Greece, they found the situation of things very different from what they had expected. Perseus was at the head of an army the best appointed and most numerous that Macedon had seen since the days of the great Alexander; his exchequer rich, and his magazines of war completely supplied; whilst his subjects appeared united and hearty in his service. Besides the interest he was at the same time said to have with the Asiatics, as well as with his Illyrian and Thracian neighbours, there was, throughout all states of Greece, a general disposition in his favor. The people were every where for Macedon; and though several of their leaders

²⁹ Liv. L. xli. c. 43.

were,

were, from a principle of venality or ambition, attached to Rome, yet even among the chief men, Perseus had many personal friends; and, in general, the wisest and the best men in every city, apprehensive of what must be the fate of Greece should the Roman power remain without control, wished success to Perseus. As Licinius, the new consul, at the same time, had not yet made the necessary levies, and the force of the Romans in Greece was but inconsiderable, had Perseus, instead of sending his dastardly deputations to the Roman commissioners, to inquire what brought them into Greece, taken advantage of this fortunate assemblage of circumstances, and attacked his enemies the instant they landed, he could hardly have failed of victory; when, encouraged by such an act of vigor, the greater part of Greece had probably declared in his favor. But the timidity and irresolution of this devoted prince relieved the Romans from their embarrassment; and they improved the opportunity. Their troops they cantoned in the strong holds of Epire, so as to form a line along the western frontier of Macedon, whilst the five commissioners, taking their progress through the different states of Greece, most of them seeing the hopes they had placed in Perseus disappointed by his spiritless conduct, readily promised whatever was asked. The truce completed what the Romans had in view. It gave them time to provide more effectually for the war; and it showed to all the confederates of Macedon, how little dependence there could be on a king, who, after all his boastings, and with

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The art employed by
Marcius to
dissolve the
Boeotian confederacy.

the numerous advantages he possessed, was abject enough to become an humble suppliant for peace.

The Boeotians first experienced the consequences of this fatal measure³⁰. They had, as we have seen, entered into a league of alliance with Perseus. And several of their cities, when charged with this fact by the Roman commissioners, had alledged, that it was the act not of any particular city, but of the whole Boeotian body; in which, however, some of the cities had not concurred. This apology furnished Marcius with a hint, which rendered the league abortive, and at the same time destroyed the Boeotian power for ever. He offered to consider every city as a separate and independent state, and as such, to conclude with it an alliance. The pride of independence, or perhaps the dread of Rome, induced most of them to accept of the offer. Thus was the Boeotian confederacy, which derived its whole strength from its union, crumbled into separate and inconsiderable states; and never afterwards recovered its ancient importance. Two Boeotian cities only, Corona and Haliartus, refused to depart from their alliance with Macedon; and being threatened on this account by the Thebans, now in the Roman interest, applied to Perseus for protection. His answer was worthy of his character. "The truce had tied up his hands, and they must provide for their safety as they could"³¹.

The conduct

The Roman historians, however, tell us, that

³⁰ Polyb. Legat. lxiii. Liv. L. lxii. c. 38. 43.

³¹ See Polyb. Legat. lxvi. Liv. L. xlii. c. 46.

upon Marcius's return to Rome, the finesse by which he had deceived Perseus, obtained him but little praise. The old senators, who remembered ancient manners, could not, without abhorrence, hear a Roman senator pride himself in having practised deceit even on an enemy, especially under the disguise of friendship, and a pretended reverence of the sacred rites of hospitality³². "Not so our forefathers," said they; "who, disdaining a victory that was not the prize of generous valor, in their war with the Falisci delivered up to the prince of the country, the wretch who had betrayed into their hands the royal children intrusted to his care; and who again, in their wars with Pyrrhus, warned that king, though wanting only invading them, of his physician's traiterous designs." But their remonstrances were overruled. The majority of the senate, now governed by other principles, approved of the conduct of Marcius; and, as the reward of his services, appointed him to the command of part of the fleet to be employed on the coast of Greece.

Meanwhile, Perseus, proud of his fancied superiority in the late conference, soothed himself with the thoughts of an approaching peace. "I have," said he, in his dispatches to some of his Asiatic friends, "been heard before the Roman commissioners in vindication of my conduct, and have fully answered all their objections" The return of his ambassadors awakened him from this delusion.

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of Marcius
disapproved of
by many old
senators.

Perseus finds
himself de-
luded:

³² Liv. L. xlii. c. 47.

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They informed him, that, after having been admitted to the parade of an audience before the Roman senate, where their representations had been treated with the utmost contempt, they had been ordered to leave Rome instantly, and Italy within thirty days; and that the consul Licinius, whose levies were now finished, was on his way to Greece.

irresolute and
fearful of en-
tering upon
a war.

Perseus, roused from his dream of security, immediately convened at Pella a council of his principal nobility, in order to consider what was to be resolved upon in the present emergency³³. Every expedient which fear could suggest, were successively mentioned by the king, or by those who possessed his confidence: they even proposed “to pay whatever tribute, or to give up whatever portion of territory the Romans should demand; nay, should other conditions, still more humiliating, be insisted upon, to submit even to these, rather than abide the hazard of a war.” Some of the council, however, protested warmly against these ignominious measures, and urged the certain ruin which must attend them. They insisted, that if the king did not mean to cede all, he must resolve to give up nothing; that the rapaciousness of Rome would not be satisfied with less than his whole kingdom; that he was now in a condition to bid them defiance; and that, supposing even the worst, it was far more honorable to encounter any dangers in the defence of his throne, than tamely to resign it. — “Be war then our choice,” replied

³³ Liv. L. xlii. c. 50.

the king, whether from conviction, or from shame; B O O K
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 “and may the gods grant us success!”

The spirited loyalty of the Macedonians on this Sect. 1.
Spirited loyalty of the
Macedonian
people.
 occasion³⁴, shows, that whatever were the vices
 of the man, Perseus was not wanting in those
 qualities which usually endear kings to their people.

As soon as it was known that war was resolved
 upon, from every part of Macedon he had offers
 of large subsidies, and ample supplies of all things
 necessary for the maintenance of an army. His
 conduct did him no less honor. He thanked his
 subjects for their honest zeal; but told them, that
 his own treasures were sufficient to answer all his
 demands; and that the only service with which
 he should burden them, was the furnishing of
 carriages for transporting his machines and imple-
 ments of war.

Perseus was early in the field³⁵; and having made Perseus takes
the field;
 himself master of the streights which open from the
 Macedonian frontier into the vale of Tempe, had
 advanced, before the Romans appeared, as far as
 Sycurium, a city situated at the southern extremity
 of mount Ossa. He had now a favorable oppor- has an oppor-
tunity of be-
ginning the
war to advan-
tage;
 tunity of opening the campaign with advantage.
 The consul, on his march through Athamania to
 Thessaly, was at this very time intangled in the
 defiles and intricate passes which intersect this moun-
 tainous part of Greece. Had Perseus attacked him
 here, the Romans themselves confessed, that a
 total defeat was almost unavoidable: but fearful of

³⁴ Liv. L. xlii. c. 53.

³⁵ Ibid. c. 54, 55.

B O O K engaging in any hazardous enterprize, say the
VII. Roman writers, or more probably, not having
Sect. 1. proper intelligence of the enemy's motions and
loses it: situations, which in those days was often difficult
to be obtained, the Macedonian king contented
himself with the opportunity which his position
afforded him, of covering Macedon and the northern
Thessaly

the Romans
advance
against him.

Battle of the
Peneus;

At length Licinius reached Larissa; and, having
been joined by a thousand auxiliaries from the
Achaean states, a reinforcement of five thousand
men under Humes from Asia, and a body of
Thessalian horse, he encamped on the north-side
of the Peneus. The two armies were now within
a few miles of each other³⁶; but though the forag-
ing parties from the Macedonian army overspread
the country, and had extended their ravages into
Pheraea³⁷, and though Perseus had for several days
appeared every morning in order of battle, and
even insulted the Roman camp, in the hopes of
bringing on an engagement; the consul, neverthe-
less, seemed industriously to avoid it. Embolden-
ed by this, Perseus moved his camp seven miles
nearer; and the ensuing morning, by the first dawn
of day, having formed his whole army, advanced
at the head of his cavalry and light-armed infantry
to the verge of the Roman intrenchments. The
sudden appearance of the enemy at an hour much

³⁶ Liv. L. xlii. c. 57 & seq.

³⁷ One of the fairest provinces of Thessaly, and under the
immediate protection of the Romans.

earlier than usual, and their resolute and firm appearance, threw the Roman camp into confusion; the tumultuous hurry of the soldiery making the danger from without appear greater than it was. The consul, in this critical situation, commanded all his cavalry, with the light-armed and auxiliary troops, to sally forth and repulse the enemy, he himself remaining within the trenches with his legionaries, ready to answer any exigency. The Roman detachment found the task assigned to them, much more difficult than they expected. Unable to stand the furious charge of the Thracian horsemen, who, to use the expression of the Roman historian, "rushed forward with a ferocity like that of wild beasts springing on their prey," they gave way on every side, after having sustained considerable loss; and had been all cut to pieces, if the Thessalian cavalry, who covered the left wing, and had hitherto stood their ground, had not received them within their ranks, and sheltered them from the pursuers.

The instant it was known that the advantage was on the side of Macedon, Hippias and Leonatus, who commanded the phalanx, advanced to the field of battle, in hopes of crowning the glory of the day by storming the Roman camp. And had the king yielded to their martial ardor, there had been little doubt of success: but so daring an exploit was more than Perseus durst aspire to. His natural pusillanimity returned; and Evander, who was no stranger to his master's weakness, and probably discovered his wishes in his looks, at

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the Macedonians victorious:

Perseus wants spirit to improve his victory;

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fight of the phalanx advised him, "not to tempt fortune any further for the present, but rather be satisfied with the success he had already obtained, which would certainly facilitate a peace, if peace was his object, or, if he chose to continue the war, would induce numbers to join him." Perseus, with much commendations of Evander's prudence, ordered the phalanx to halt, and a retreat to be sounded²⁸. In this action, there fell of the Roman infantry two thousand, with two hundred of their cavalry; two hundred more of their horsemen being made prisoners. Forty foot and twenty horse were all the Macedonians lost.

fees his mis-
take:

Next morning discovered to Perseus his fatal error²⁹. Dreading the very enterprise which the Macedonian durst not attempt, Eumenes had advised the consul to decamp by night, and retreat to the other side of the Peneus, where he might remain in safety; and Licinius, notwithstanding the humiliating confession which such a step implied, found it expedient to follow the advice. Perseus now saw, what might have been done had he followed his victory, or even been attentive to the enemy's motions during the night, and attacked them in their retreat over the river.

his victory
occasions
general exul-
tations
throughout
Greece.

From the temper of mind with which the news of this success, imperfect as it was, were received throughout Greece, we may judge what the real dispositions of the people were, and how difficult the Romans would have found this war, had a

²⁸ Plutarch in Paul. Aemilio.

²⁹ Liv. L. xlii. c. 60.

prince of abilities, and worthy of public confidence, been then seated on the throne of Macedon. The different states had before shown their disaffection to the cause of Rome, in the scanty succours they sent to the consul; which, in general, says Livy⁴⁰, were so inconsiderable as not to be worth recording, whilst they apologized under various pretences, and still professed an ardent zeal for her service. That disguise which the dread of Roman power had obliged them to assume, was now thrown off⁴¹; and not only the friends of the royal house of Macedon, but even the men who were supposed to have been warm in the interests of Rome, joined in the general joy. The Romans, it appears from the confession of their own writers, had already made Greece feel their insolence and oppression; and many of their most zealous partisans began to entertain the most melancholy apprehensions of impending servitude.

Perseus, by his own conduct, soon weakened the impressions which, properly cultivated, might have been highly advantageous. As if former experience had not taught him that a vigorous prosecution of the war was his only resource, he renewed his solicitations for peace with all the abjectness of a vanquished enemy⁴²; offering to cede to the

Perseus
meanly sues
for peace;

⁴⁰ Quorum pleraque (adeo parva erant) in oblivionem adducta. Liv. L. xlii. c. 55.

⁴¹ "Fama pugnae," says Livy, speaking of this battle, "nudavit voluntates hominum." L. xlii. c. 63.

⁴² Polyb. Legat. lxix. Liv. L. xlii. c. 62.

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is refused:

Romans, all the cities and provinces which had been ceded by his father Philip, and to pay the same tribute he had agreed to pay. But the Romans, whose maxim it was, "never, in whatever fortune, to make peace with a victorious enemy," rejected his offer with scorn, imperiously requiring Perseus "to surrender himself and his kingdom to the Romans at discretion," as the only way by which peace was to be obtained. Incensed at this haughty answer, the king's counsellors advised him to abandon all thoughts of accommodation; but the very haughtiness of the answer terrified his spirit, and became a new argument with Perseus for renewing his application. He thought it impossible that the consul should manifest such firmness, without an assurance of success; and sent a second deputation with an offer of a much larger tribute; to which the Romans returned the same answer.

Bad conduct
of the Roman
commanders.

The manner in which the consul prosecuted the war during the remainder of this year, showed but little of that firmness or assurance of victory, which these spirited answers seemed to imply⁴. In Theffaly, the two armies were employed in attacking or defending, with various success, places of little importance, except merely on account of their situation; or in occasional skirmishes, mostly between the foraging parties, which, though sometimes bloody and attended with loss to the Macedonians, made no material alteration in the state of affairs. Perseus, in defiance of all the Roman efforts, still

⁴ See Liv. L. xlii. c. 64 & seq.

kept possession of the passes and strong holds that commanded the Macedonian frontier. In Illyricum⁴⁴, one of the consul's lieutenants had made himself master of two opulent towns, and had granted the inhabitants their effects, in the view of alluring to submission, by this apparent clemency, another strong town in the neighbourhood: but finding his expectations disappointed, and that neither his subtlety of contrivance nor force of arms could give him possession, he returned and pillaged both the places which he had formerly spared. In Boeotia⁴⁵, the praetor Lucretius laid siege to Haliartus, and having taken it after an obstinate and vigorous defence, plundered it of every thing valuable, appropriating most of the spoils to his own use, and then razing it to the ground. From thence he proceeded to Thebes, which, though she opened her gates, he nevertheless treated with all the severity of an exasperated enemy; not content with restoring the citizens that had been banished for their attachment to the Roman interest, but also selling, with their families, as slaves, all who were suspected of favoring the cause of Macedon.

Perseus having, in the mean time, surprised a part of the Roman fleet⁴⁶ which lay at Oreum in Euboea, had taken twenty of their store-ships, sunk the rest, laden with wheat, and made himself master of four gallies, of five benches of oars. Intelligence having been received, that some of

Perseus acts
with vigor and
success.

⁴⁴ Liv. L. xliii. c. 1.

⁴⁵ Liv. L. xlii. c. 63.

⁴⁶ Plutarch. in Paul. Aemilio. Liv. L. xliii. c. 2.

B O O K VII. Sect. I. the Thracian tribes, instigated and assisted by Eumenes of Pergamus, had broken into the dominions of Cotys, a king of Thrace in alliance with Perseus, and an auxiliary in the Macedonian camp; he immediately dismissed the Thracian king with large presents, and a considerable sum of money, to the defence of his own territories; and so little now were his apprehensions of danger from the Romans, that he himself marched soon after to the aid of Cotys, and obtained for him a complete victory over the invaders.

The consul Hostilius succeeds to the command;

fails in every attempt.

Licinius was succeeded in the command by the consul Hostilius, who was more unsuccessful than his predecessor. Upon his very entrance into Epiro, of whose defection there was not, as yet, any suspicion, he narrowly escaped falling into an ambuscade of Epirots; who had lain in wait for him, in order to deliver him up to Perseus. He afterwards endeavoured to penetrate into Macedonia by the province of Elymaea; and was defeated. He attempted a passage by the Cambunian mountains; and found it impracticable. He detached his lieutenant Appius Claudius, to infest the Macedonian frontier from the side of Illyricum; who having formed the design of plundering Uscana⁴⁷, a city on the confines of Macedon, suffered himself to be caught in a snare by a stratagem of the Cretan garrison: they had promised to betray the place to him; but upon his approaching the walls with a careless security, they sallied out with the inhabitants, and attacked

⁴⁷ Liv. L. xliiii. c. 10.

him so vigorously, that scarcely a fourth part of his army escaped.

This train of bad success became the more reproachful from the cause to which it seemed justly to be ascribed, "the rapacity and insolence of oppression," with which most of the Roman commanders of the present year, as well as the preceding, stood charged. Decimus⁴⁸, who at the beginning of the war had been sent on an embassy to Gentius of Illyricum, was, with good reason, suspected of having sold himself to the Illyrian king. Complaints, supported by the strongest proofs, had been laid before the senate, against Lucretius⁴⁹, one of the prætors of the last year, who, after enriching himself with the pillage of the enemies of Rome, had not even spared her friends; despoiling the very temples of Chalcis, then confederate with the Romans, of their most precious ornaments, in order to add to the magnificence of his villa in the neighbourhood of Antium. There was also reason to suspect, that Licinius himself had not been guiltless. The like complaints were now brought against the consul Hostilius, and the officers under his command. Cassius, one of his prætors, was infamous for his depredations. His admiral, Hortensius⁵⁰, had put to death the chief men of Abdera, on the Thracian coast, and sold for slaves the rest of the citizens because they had refused to comply with his merciless exactions,

⁴⁸ Liv. L. xlii. c. 45.

⁴⁹ Liv. L. xliii. c. 4.

⁵⁰ Liv. L. xliii. c. 7.

B O O K and had dared to appeal to the consul for relief;
VII. so that the neighbouring cities, alarmed by these
Sect. 1. enormities, and dreading similar acts of violence, had shut their gates against him. On his return to Chalcis, the unhappy Chalcidians again experienced all the cruelty and rapine of Lucretius. Even the army under the immediate command of Hostilius¹¹, had been rendered unfit for service, either by the facility or avarice of the consul and his principal officers; numbers of the soldiers having, for money, or through favor, obtained leave of absence, and returned to Italy.

The Macedonian affairs in a prosperous situation;

The Macedonian affairs, on the contrary, wore a prosperous appearance¹². Perseus had defeated every attempt against Macedon during the summer; and as soon as winter had set in, and the snows had rendered the mountains and glens around him impassable to the Romans, he attacked and defeated the Dardanians, who, probably upon the retreat of the Bastarnae, began again to be troublesome, leaving ten thousand of them dead on the field. From thence he had advanced into Illyricum, with the view of recovering some places of strength, formerly taken by the Romans, which were of consequence to the security of the Macedonian frontier; and, at the same time, of entering into alliance with Gentius, the most powerful of the Illyrian princes. He found little difficulty in the accomplishment of the former, and might as easily

¹¹ Liv. L. xliii. c. 11.

¹² See Liv. L. xliii. c. 18, 19, 20.

have effected the latter, had not his own avarice⁵³ been the only obstacle. Gentius wanted money; and Perseus could not think of supplying him; so that, after a repeated interchange of messages, the negotiation ended without effect. He had not yet entered Illyricum, when he received the pleasing intelligence, that the Epirots, at the instigation of Cephalus, one of their chieftains, had renounced the friendship of Rome, and declared in his favor. The Aetolians too solicited his presence, offering to put Stratus into his hands, a considerable city of Acarnania on the Acheolus, which at this time was in their possession. The invitation was eagerly accepted, and Perseus was instantly in motion. But the severity of the season and the difficulty of the roads rendering his march exceedingly tedious, a Roman commander, who was stationed in the country, conceiving some suspicion of the design, had entered the city with a strong body of troops the evening before Perseus reached it. He made himself, however, some amends, by getting possession of Aperantia, a neighbouring district of Aetolia; and this success was soon followed by advice, that Clevas, one of his generals, had defeated the Romans on the borders of Epire, in two successive engagements, in which, two thousand of the enemy had fallen, and three hundred been made prisoners.

Nothing, indeed, seems now to have been want- but injured by

⁵³ See Polyb. Legat. lxxvi. lxxvii.

⁵⁴ Liv. L. xliii. c. 25.

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the sordid
avarice of
Perseus.

ing to Perseus, but to have known how to employ properly, the treasures of which he was master. The corruption and insolence of the Roman commanders, had made them generally odious. Polybius himself acknowledges, that, had the Macedonian king (whose avarice, to such a wonderful excess of sordidness and folly, must, says he, have been a judgment on him from the gods⁵⁵) improved the present opportunity, by giving moderate subsidies to the kings and states of Asia and Greece, gratifying at the same time with presents the principal men in the different cities, he had effectually ruined the Roman interest with most of the Greek and Asiatic nations.

Consternation
and prosecu-
tions at Rome.

When tidings of these matters were received in Rome, they occasioned the deepest consternation. Upon the first complaints, commissioners had been immediately sent into Greece⁵⁶; and their report exceeded even the voice of fame. Ambassadors also had now arrived from those states which had suffered most from the oppressions and rapacity of the Roman commanders, to implore justice from the senate and Roman people. To the Romans the crisis was alarming: they were in danger of losing Greece, if not Asia: and some of the first nobility were among the accused criminals. Orders were immediately issued, requiring all the senators throughout Italy, unless employed on public service,

⁵⁵ Δαιμοναβλάβεια is the expressive name that Polybius gives to the amazing avarice of this wretched prince. See Legat. lxxvii.

⁵⁶ Liv. L. xliii. c. 8. 11. 17.

to repair immediately to Rome, and forbidding any senator to go farther than one mile from the city. Lucretius⁵⁷, the late praetor, had already been summoned to appear. The nobles would gladly have saved him, but they found it impossible. Two tribunes of the people, M. Juventius Thalna and Cn. Aufidius, were active in the prosecution; and his trial being brought on, the thirty-five tribes, with one voice, pronounced him guilty. Several others, not less criminal, had probably shared the same fate, had not their trials been put off, under pretence, that they were necessary persons in the army abroad, and could not therefore appear in their own defence.

The next business was, to guard against the consequences to be dreaded from the resentment of an injured people. An edict was accordingly passed⁵⁸, which enacted, "That henceforth the
" allies of Rome should not pay obedience to any
" requisitions made by any magistrate whatsoever,
" unless it appeared, that these requisitions had
" proceeded from the senate themselves." Orders were likewise transmitted to Hostilius⁵⁹ and the other commanders in Greece, to conduct them-

Edict to check
the abuses
committed by
the Roman
commanders;

⁵⁷ When the charge against him was first laid before the senate, it was pretended, that he was abroad with the army, and that therefore it was necessary to postpone the inquiry. It afterwards appeared, that at this very time he was at his villa; employing in expensive works, the vast sums which he had brought home from the pillage of Haliatus, and the plunder of the Chalcidians. See Liv. L. xliii. c. 4.

⁵⁸ Liv. L. xliii. c. 17.

⁵⁹ Ibid. c. 8.

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ambassadors
sent to the
Grecian states
to notify the
edict:

infidious in-
structions
given to those
ambassadors:

selves for the future with greater caution; and wherever reparation could be made, to make it as speedily as possible. To the several states also ambassadors were deputed, to assure them of the affectionate regard paid to their interests, and to notify the new edict, which the senate, *ever attentive to the LIBERTIES of GREECE*, had been graciously pleased to issue.

This, however, as appears from Polybius ⁶⁰, was only the *ostensible* part of their commission. Beneath all this semblance of affection, lurked the most treacherous designs. The ambassadors had secret instructions to seize the opportunity, when these gracious assurances should have lulled every suspicion, to destroy all those, whom eminent abilities and zeal for the liberties of their country had rendered obnoxious to Rome. In those states, where their opponents were too many to be thus dispatched, they were to endeavour at least, to get into their hands a number of the most considerable persons, by way of hostages; or to obtain permission to introduce Roman garrisons into their cities, in order to lay those states under the necessity of submitting to whatever terms Rome might thereafter think fit to prescribe.

The ambassadors were to have entered on the execution of this part of their instructions in Achaia: and three Achaeans of the highest distinction, Lycortas, Polybius, and Archon, whose virtue had withstood every temptation, were the first victims

⁶⁰ Legat. lxxiv. lxxv.

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the reception
they met with
from the
Achaean;

marked for destruction. But upon the opening of the Achaean diet, it was found, that matters were not yet ripe for their purpose. Even the question, "whether Achaia should take part with Rome against Macedon?" was likely to produce great heats. And the ambassadors began to fear, that, should they venture on the attempt they had in view, it would only serve to disclose what it was their interest to conceal, and perhaps involve their whole party in ruin.

With the Aetolians, from whom they were to have exacted hostages, they had no better success. The diet was a scene of tumult and confusion; and to such an excess of mutual violence did the Macedonian and Roman parties proceed, that those in opposition to Rome, stoned, in the very diet, and in the presence of the ambassadors, one of the contrary faction. From such an assembly it had been to little purpose to have demanded hostages; and the ambassadors took care to withdraw without mentioning them.

From thence they proceeded to Acarnania, too inconsiderable a state in appearance to be capable of much firmness. And here, besides, Rome was supposed to have a strong party; yet, the instant it was proposed that they should receive Roman garrisons into their cities; the greater part of the assembly expressed the highest indignation¹; and

¹ Livy (L. xliii. c. 17.) has given some account of this transaction, but in a very slight and cursory manner. However, what he mentions of the opposition made to the

B O O K the ambassadors, who saw it would be in vain
 VII. to contend against so general an opposition, had
 Sect. I. the prudence to desist.

These proceedings need no comment. They clearly develop the Roman character at this period. And show what powerful aids Macedon might still have drawn from Greece, had not Perseus been wanting to himself and to his cause.

Quintus
 Marcius Phi-
 lippus elected
 consul, and
 appointed to
 conduct the
 Macedonian
 war.

The conduct of the war now devolved on Quintus Marcius Philippus, the *trusty friend* by whom Perseus had been circumvented; who, with Q. Servilius Caepio, had been elected to the consulship. His setting out had an appearance of vigor that promised great things; his necessary levies were completed with unusual expedition; and by the first opening of the spring he had already joined the army in Thessaly. The commencement of his operations was equally spirited. Ambitious of succeeding where the preceding commanders had failed, and sensible, that the artifice which he had practised before, could not avail him again, he staked all his hopes on boldness and enterprise; declaring himself resolved to force his way "through some of those formidable barriers which had hitherto defied the Roman arms. Upon inquiry, he was told there were three passes where he might possibly succeed; one by the way

article of *garrisons* in the Acarnanian convention, is remarkable. "Pars," his words are, "recusare, ne quod bello captis & hostibus mos esset, id pacatae & sociæ civitates ignominiae acciperent."

"See Liv. L. xlv. c. 2. & seq.

of Pythium, another by the Cambunian mountains, where Hostilius had failed, and a third by the lake Ascuris. For some part of the way, one common road led to all, which afterwards branched into three, each leading to one of the above mentioned passes. Undetermined which to chuse, he nevertheless began his march, purposing to form his plan according to the discoveries he should make as he advanced. Being arrived at the place where the road divided, he detached, for what reasons we are not told, a body of four thousand men under two commanders, one of them his son, to attempt the pass by the lake Ascuris; halting with the rest of the army, until he had intelligence of the event.

The road through which this detachment had to march; was rugged, steep, and worn into channels by the mountain-floods; so that after two days incessant labor, they had scarcely proceeded fifteen miles. At length, on the evening of the second day they gained the top of a hill, where they ventured to encamp; and the ensuing morning, having moved on about seven miles farther, they reached the summit of another mountain, from whence they could descry one of the enemy's stations about a mile from them, and at a farther distance, Dium, the camp of Perseus, with all that part of the Macedonian coast that is washed by the gulph of Thessalonica. Advice was immediately dispatched to the consul, who, fortunately for them, was already on his march; anxious to know the fate of his men, whom, inconsiderately

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He attempts
the Macedo-
nian frontier;

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attacks a Ma-
cedonian post
without suc-
cess.

enough, he had ventured into the midst of the enemy's posts, defiles, and hollows, to which they were strangers. No sooner were the army somewhat recovered from their fatiguing march, than Marcius prepared to drive the Macedonian party from the post, without which it was impossible for him to advance. The Macedonians were not less ready to receive them. The party which Hippias commanded was twelve thousand strong; and having only a mountain's summit to defend, where he knew every advantage of ground, and where only a few combatants could engage, he was more than a match for the Romans; who were repulsed. On the second day they renewed the attack; and in like manner on the third; but still without success.

Perilous situ-
ation of the
Roman army;

The consul saw his critical situation. It was impossible for his army to subsist on the sharp ridge of a barren mountain. He could not advance: and to retreat was highly dangerous, from the nature of the road, through which he must pass, and from the enemy's commanding the mountain heights, from whence they might pour down destruction on him and his army. It is scarcely conceivable, that at this critical conjuncture, Perseus should have shown that imbecillity of conduct, of which he appears to have been guilty. Had he done what was in his power, had he supported Hippias, or endeavoured to cut off Marcius's retreat, the Romans themselves confessed their ruin had been inevitable. Instead of this, though during the three days that the engagement lasted, he was so near

folly of Per-
seus in not
advancing
against them.

the scene of action as probably to hear the shouts of the combatants, he employed himself in parading along the shore at the head of his cavalry, without sending the smallest reinforcement up the mountain.

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Marcus, however, resolved not to return back, but at all hazards to descend the mountain, and endeavour to penetrate into Macedon through the glen below, leaving Popilius with a party of the army on the summit to cover his rear. This was an enterprise of infinite toil. The mountain was in many places exceedingly steep, and even where it seemed to be less abrupt, there was no sure footing to be found in those untrodden paths; so that the troops, rather than trust to their feet, for the most part rolled themselves down. To add to the difficulty, the elephants refused the precipices, and became outrageous, throwing their riders, and scaring the horses with their hideous cries. During the general confusion which this occasioned, had only a small part of the enemy appeared, the consul himself acknowledged afterwards, there had been an end of the Roman army. After trying several expedients, it was contrived to let down these unwieldy animals by wooden platforms, one end of which was joined to the cliff, and the other end supported by posts fastened in the slope beneath; over the floor of the platform was spread a covering of earth, that the elephant might not be shy of venturing on it. As soon as he had gotten on the platform, the posts that upheld it being cut, he was made to slide off to

Marcus ventures down from the mountain;

B O O K a second, which began where the first ended; in
VII. like manner to a third; and so onward to the bot-
Sect. I. tom. In this tedious and laborious employment
 was the whole day consumed. Towards night
 they reached a level spot, which, though they
 were ignorant where they were, or with what
 dangers they were still encompassed, was a cir-
 cumstance which greatly relieved them, as they
 could now stand on firm ground. The morning-
 light afforded them no better information. They
 found themselves in the hollow of a gloomy forest,
 through which it was impossible to descry what
 lay beyond. Here, however, they remained all
 that day, in order that Popilius, who had received
 directions to follow as soon as he safely could,
 might have time to join them. The two succeed-
 ing days they moved forward without meeting
 any obstruction, excepting what arose from the
 deep and wood-entangled glens through which
 they had to march; when at length their prospect
 opened into the champaign country between He-
 racleum and Libethrum, a considerable way above
 the entrance into the streights of Tempe, and a
 few miles from Dium, where Perseus had his head-
 quarters.

with great
 risque makes
 his way to the
 neighbour-
 hood of the
 Macedonian
 camp.

Terror of
 Perseus.

Perseus was bathing, when tidings were brought
 him that the Romans had passed the defiles, and
 were advancing. Every part of his conduct now
 betrayed his abject character. In an agony of fear
 he flung out of the bath, exclaiming he was van-
 quished without fighting; and, as if he gave up
 all for lost, instantly sent off orders to burn his

naval stores at Theſſalonica, and to throw his treasures at Pella into the ſea; recalled Hippiaſ from his poſt at the Aſcuris, and in like manner all the other commanders from the ſeveral paſſes where they were ſtationed; and, having removed on board his fleet the ſtatues of Alexander's ſoldiers that were at Dium, abandoned that city to the enemy, and fled to Pydna. Even now, had there been the ſmalleſt firmneſs on his ſide, Marcius had paid the full price of his temerity. He had got beyond the paſs of Aſcuris, and the ſtreights of Tempe; but what did this avail him?

Unable to advance, without a poſſibility of retreat; having no means of ſubſiſtence from the country in which he was, and cut off from all foreign ſupplies; he muſt, had Perſeus continued only to guard the ſeveral paſſes, have inevitably periſhed. He could not have retreated by the way he had come; as the Macedonians were maſters of that road, and with eaſe could have deſtroyed him from the heights, of which they were in poſſeſſion. And, ſhould he have attempted to penetrate farther into Macedon, the only opening into it from that quarter was by Dium, and that flanked on the one ſide by Mount Olympus, and on the other, partly by a dangerous morafs, and partly by the ſuburbs of the city, ſo that only a narrow ſtrait remained, where a ſmall force was ſufficient to diſpute the paſſage againſt the moſt formidable army. The ſole reſource, therefore, that he had left, was, to have returned into Theſſaly through the vale of Tempe. But that was hardly to be

The dangers
to which the
Romans
were expoſed,
had Perſeus
shown firm-
neſs.

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effected. For the length of five miles the road through this vale was so exceedingly narrow, that it was not possible for two beasts of burden to pass abreast; and on each side so frightful was the precipice, that the traveller with averted eye shrunk from the tremendous prospect; below also rolled the Peneus, the stunning noise of whose waters, tumbling over the rocky bottom, and broken into frequent falls, deepened wonderfully the horror of the scene. In addition to all this, the Macedonians had forts and intrenchments strongly garrisoned at all the important posts along the valley. So that had not Perseus weakly given up every advantage which he possessed, he had now the enemy at his mercy. But the unthinking temerity of the consul, say the Roman writers, found its apology in the *puffillanimity* of the king⁶⁵. Whatever Marcius's folly was, luckily for him, it was conspicuously outdone by the king's superior imbecillity.

The Roman
consul enters
Dium:

pushes on
northward:

The consul, in amazement that the Macedonians had evacuated Dium, entered the city with great caution, apprehensive, that under so strange an appearance of timidity, some hostile ambuscade must be concealed. His wonder increased when he saw the strength of the place, and what a stand might have been made there, had it been properly defended. From Dium he pushed on northward with the same success; the Macedonians every

⁶⁵ “ Quae temeritas consulis videri potuisset, quod eo
“ processisset, unde invito hoste regredi nequiret, eam non
“ inconsultam audaciam (rex) fecit.” — Liv. L. xlv. c. 6.

where submitting as he approached. But though he had no enemy to oppose him, he soon found, that he had advanced farther than prudence could justify. The country was poor; and as he proceeded farther north, it became every day more difficult to procure provisions. His fleet also, which he had ordered to follow, and on which he depended for the support of his army, disappointed his expectations; it had arrived off the coast, but the store-ships, by some mistake, had remained at Magnesia. At last, when at the height of distress, he received advice from Lucretius, that the Macedonians had abandoned all their posts in the streights of Tempe, and had left plenty of provisions behind them; and that sufficient supplies should, with all possible expedition, be hastened forward to his relief. But whether Marcius began to fear, that the necessities of his army might provoke them to mutiny; or that the Macedonians, recovering from their panic and dejection, might intercept the supplies, and perhaps cut off his retreat; he immediately marched to Phila, near the entrance of the vale, where he had reason to suppose the provisions were by this time arrived; thus abandoning all his conquests with the same rapidity with which he had acquired them. Whatever induced this extraordinary step, it fixed a considerable blemish on his military character “.

Perseus now saw, with shame and regret, what his terror had not permitted him to see before,

“ Liv. L. xliv. c. 8.

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finds himself
in distress:

abandons all
his conquests.

Perseus stung
with shame at

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his own mis-
conduct :

“ that to his own spiritless conduct the Romans owed their preservation ;” and having returned to Dium, and repaired what the Romans had dismantled, he encamped on the Enipeus, five miles to the south of that city, with a design to cover this part of Macedon from farther insult. What mortified him most, were the orders he had given concerning his treasures at Pella, and his naval stores at Thessalonica ; they were a confession of fears, which at present he was unwilling to avow, and he resolved, at any rate, to wipe off the reproach.

the cruel
manner in
which he seeks
to wipe off the
reproach.

The persons he had employed in this service, were Andronicus and Nicias ; the one had been sent to Pella, the other to Thessalonica. Nicias, punctual to the directions which he received, had caused the treasures to be sunk in the sea. Andronicus, suspecting that his master would soon repent, had delayed the destruction of the stores until farther orders. To have, or not to have obeyed, Perseus considered as equally criminal, and put both his agents to death. To recover the treasure, he procured divers, who brought up the greater part of it. They met with the reward of Nicias and Andronicus ; the tyrant vainly imagining, that all remembrance of his pusillanimous conduct would be obliterated, by destroying those who had it more immediately in their power to discover it “.

The consul

The remainder of the operations of the year

“ Liv. L. xliv. c. 10.

did little towards restoring honor to the Roman arms. The only town the consul was able to take, was Heracleum, a place of no great consequence, and which the Macedonians, though their camp on the Enipeus was within sight of it, made no motion to relieve. He next attempted certain cities on the Thermaic gulph, Theffalonica, Torone, Cassandrea, with Meliboea and Demetrius on the confines of Theffaly; but all without effect; the whole of his achievements, amounting to some tumultuary depredations, in one of which he was even repulsed with considerable loss.

. His conduct in relation to Appius Cento the praetor, was not less disreputable. Appius commanded in Illyricum, and, finding the superiority of the enemy, had applied to the Achaeans for succours. The Achaeans had before sent Polybius to the consul, with an offer of marching a body of troops to his aid⁶⁶, which, probably despairing of making any impression on the Macedonian frontier, he had refused; and such was his illiberal spirit, he would not permit Appius to be reinforced from that quarter, notwithstanding his application and present necessity, that he might not be in a better condition than himself. The case was delicate. It was of importance to the Achaeans, to be considered as the faithful allies of the Romans. And the situation of the Roman commander required instant relief. Polybius, artfully enough, contrived to elude the praetor's application, and withal to

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does nothing
else consider-
able;meanly pre-
vents succours
being sent to
Appius.

⁶⁶ See Polyb. Legat. lxxviii.

B O O K VII. affect the highest respect for Rome. He represented
Sect. I. to the Achaean states, that by the senate's late
edict, they were not to pay regard to any requisition made by a Roman commander, unless that requisition appeared to have the sanction of the senate. Appius had no such sanction to produce; and therefore his demand could not be complied with.

The consequences of the consul's mean jealousy, proved nearly fatal to Appius; for history " informs us, that with the utmost difficulty he escaped being cut off by the enemy.

⁶⁷ Liv. L. xlv. c. 20.

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S E C T I O N II.

C O N T E N T S.

Lucius Aemilius Paulus elected consul, and appointed to conduct the Macedonian war — restores and improves the discipline of the Roman army, which had suffered from the mismanagement of the preceding commanders — advances against Perseus — forces him from his intrenchments on the Peneus — engages, and defeats him at Pydna. — Perseus flies to Pella — to Amphipolis — to Samothrace — surrenders himself to the Roman admiral — is brought to Rome — produced before the triumphal car of the victorious Roman, and dies in wretchedness. — Humiliation of Macedon under the Romans — their inhuman treatment of the people of Epire — the people of Aetolia — and most of the other Grecian states. — Cruel designs entertained by them against Achaia, not carried into execution — for what reasons.

THREE years and upwards had the Roman arms been employed against Macedon, to little advantage. At Rome, the fault of this dilatory and unsuccessful war was altogether imputed to the incapacity or the corruption of the several commanders, to whom the conduct of it had hitherto been intrusted; and it was now the

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B O O K general voice of the people, that, regardless of
VII. the intrigues of ambition, some person should be

Sect. 2. called forth to this service, whose known abilities
and integrity merited the public confidence ¹. In

Lucius Aemi. Lucius Aemilius Paulus they seemed to have found
lius Paulus; the man whom they were seeking; son to the

his character: consul Aemilius Paulus, who had refused to sur-
vive the carnage of his countrymen on the fatal
day of Cannae: He had been consul fifteen years
before, and in the discharge of that office, as

well as the other offices through which he had
passed, was conspicuous both for military skill and
unblemished honor. But having stood a second
time for the consulship without success, he had
retired from public life, untainted by the conta-
gion of dissipated manners, which began to be the
disgrace of the Roman nobility. His only reproach
was, that he had divorced this wife Papiria, a
lady unexceptionable in her conduct, and descended
from one of the noblest families in Rome. She had
lived with him many years in wedlock, and had
brought him several children, two of them sons,
who promised to be the ornaments of their illustri-
ous house. At the same time it must be confessed,
that this was not so much the reproach of Aemi-
lius as of the times; the Roman law and man-
ners, by the free permission of divorces, having
now entirely levelled that important fence of do-
mestic happiness and national virtue, reverence for
the marriage-bond ². He made, however, some

¹ Plutarch in Paul. Aemilio.

² How lightly the Romans accounted the marriage-
amends

amends to his young family, for the loss which they sustained in being deprived of their mother, by the extraordinary care he bestowed on their education. Removed from the bustle of the world, he gave up his whole attention to the cultivation of their minds, superintending their studies and exercises with the most watchful tenderness and attention. At this period Aemilius was in his sixtieth year, but still in the full vigor of body and mind; and from his natural firmness and severity of manners, was well qualified to correct that licentiousness of the Roman soldiery, to which the late relaxation of discipline had afforded much encouragement.

Aemilius having been prevailed on to appear among the candidates, was elected consul by the unanimous suffrages of all the tribes; and, if we are to believe Plutarch, immediately upon his election was appointed to the command in Macedonia, without suffering the lots to be cast, as generally was the custom in the disposal of provinces.

is appointed
to the consulship, and
the conducting
of the Macedonian war;

The spirited and judicious manner in which he entered on the department assigned to him, showed,

compact, we may judge from an anecdote mentioned by Plutarch (in Paul. Aemilio). A certain Roman had divorced his wife, and being pressed by the expostulations of his friends, who asked, *was she not fair? was she not chaste? was she not fruitful?* holding up his shoe to them, replied, *is it not handsome? is it not new? yet none knows where it pinches but he that wears it.*

³ Livy (L. xliv. c. 17.) says otherwise.

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his judicious
precautions.

that their choice had not been misplaced. Report had made very unfavorable representations of the situation of the Roman affairs in Greece. But report was not to be trusted. He therefore obtained of the senate, that commissioners ⁴ should be sent thither, with orders to inquire minutely into the state both of the fleet and armies on service in the Macedonian war; what progress the land forces had made; what magazines they had established, and how they were supplied; what posts and places of strength they were masters of; how near they were to the enemy; what allies the Romans had, and how far these allies were to be depended on.

The distressful
state of the
Roman affairs
in Greece;

The report of the commissioners fully explained why so little had been done ⁵. The late consul Marcius, they said, had, with the utmost risque, passed certain defiles, which he might as well not have passed. The Romans, it is true, were in sight of the Macedonian camp; but besides that the Macedonians had the command of all the country, Perseus, who was posted on the Enipeus, seemed unwilling to hazard an engagement, and to force him to it was not in the power of his enemies: thus were the Romans hemmed in on all sides, without a possibility of attempting any thing, and with provisions for only six days. The condition of the Roman fleet was equally bad; disease had carried off a great number of the seamen; most of those who had survived,

⁴ Liv. L. xlv. c. 18.

⁵ See Liv. *ibid.* c. 20.

had deserted; and the few that remained on board, had neither subsistence nor even clothing. The situation of Appius Cento in Illyricum, was still more wretched; a strong and immediate reinforcement being necessary to prevent a Roman commander from owing his safety to *flight*!

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Aemilius made it his first care, to recover every part of the Roman army under his command from this state of debility. Anicius the praetor was ordered into Illyricum with a large body of forces. Octavius, another of the praetors, was appointed to command the fleet. Aemilius himself hastened the necessary levies with all possible expedition; and in eleven days from the time of his leaving Brundisium, though on his way he stopped at Delphi to sacrifice, he was in person at the head of the army in Macedon.

he endeavours
to restore
them.

But, whatever advantages Aemilius might obtain from these vigorous exertions, he derived more from the timidity and sordidness of Perseus*. During the winter, which had been uncommonly severe, whilst the Romans, hemmed in on every side, had scarcely the means of subsistence, and every road, excepting to the hardy and experienced native, was utterly impassable, the Macedonian king had not made the least attempt to drive his enemies from that part of the country, and to regain the streights of Tempe. A winter's campaign, to his Thracian auxiliaries, a matter certainly of little difficulty or hardship, had probably com-

Faults com-
mitted by
Perseus.

* Liv. L. xliv. c. 20.

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pleted the ruin of this part of the Roman army, and restored the king to the possession of all those important passes which in the phrenzy of fear he had abandoned.

his sordid
treatment
of the Bastar-
nae.

What is still more extraordinary, Perseus had at length prevailed on a tribe of the Bastarnae⁷ from the banks of the Danube, to march to his assistance, by the promise of a large subsidy, ten pieces of gold to every horseman, five to every foot-soldier, and a thousand to every chieftain; and they were already, to the number of ten thousand horse and as many foot, within seventy miles of the Macedonian camp. When the king saw that he must part with his money, his predominant passion interfered; and in hopes of putting off the payment, or perhaps of eluding it, he sent Antigonus with splendid presents to the leaders, and the strongest assurances, that they should find plenty of provisions and every kind of refreshment prepared for them, on their march. But, barbarians as they were, they were not to be so trifled with. Clondicus their leader, immediately demanded of Antigonus, "Have you also brought the promised subsidy?" who returning an evasive answer, "Let your master then know," replied the barbarian, "that the Bastarnae shall not advance one step farther, until the stipulated gold is paid down to them." The sole expedient that now occurred to Perseus, was, at least to save a portion of his darling treasure, by

⁷ Liv. L. xliv. c. 26. Plutarch in Paul. Aemilio.

taking into pay a part only of the auxiliaries; pretending to his lords, that they might prove dangerous inmates, should so large a body be permitted to enter Macedon. Antigonus was again dispatched, to inform Clondicus, that his master had only occasion for five thousand horsemen. This prevaricating proposal was answered with a cry of indignation from the whole army: "How-ever", said Clondicus, "have you brought the gold for these five thousand, whom you demand?" when, perceiving by the confusion of Antigonus, what the case was, he turned from him with indignant rage, instantly commanded his troops to move homeward, and in revenge, as well as for subsistence, marked his return with ravage and desolation. It was extraordinary, that Antigonus was not made the victim of their fury. His escape, as Livy tells us, was more than he himself expected. These barbarians, it seems, of whose manners we are apt to conceive very injurious ideas, respected the sacred character with which Antigonus was invested,* notwithstanding the perfidiousness they had experienced from his master.

* The learned reader will recollect, that the sacking of Rome by the Celtic tribes from Gaul, was occasioned by the violation of the rights of nations, of which the Roman ambassadors had been guilty: these ambassadors had been sent to the Gaulish camp before Clusium, to deprecate the destruction of that neighbouring city; but not succeeding in their suit, they departed from the character of ministers of peace, and fought under the Clusian banners; provoked at which, the Gauls instantly raised the siege, and marched to Rome.

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The loss
sustained by
him in conse-
quence of it.

The return of the Bastarnæ proved an irreparable misfortune to Perseus. They were, Plutarch informs us, the finest body of men Macedon had ever seen. In stature, in activity, agility of body, and expertness at every kind of martial exercise, they were not to be excelled; while energy was given to all these advantages, by an uncommon boldness of spirit and contempt of danger. The occupations of navigation, agriculture, and pastoral life, being accounted disreputable among them, to fight and to conquer was their only object. Had the whole of this fierce emigration therefore been permitted to advance, and been employed in spreading devastation through Thessaly, whilst Perseus, by maintaining his post on the Enipeus, kept the consular army at bay, the Romans, Livy acknowledges, had with difficulty escaped.

The same sordidness of temper prevailed through all the transactions of this weak and impolitic prince. He might at this time have gained the friendship and assistance of Eumenes; but he lost both by his avarice. That king, long the zealous friend of Rome, was said to be disgusted by certain insults, which he had received from the haughty Marcius⁹; and he began perhaps also to perceive what he himself might expect from this formidable power, which he was aiding to advance to universal dominion. He entered therefore into a secret negotiation with Macedon.¹⁰ On the payment of a thousand talents, he offered to withdraw his

Negotiates
with Eu-
menes, and
loses him by
his avarice.

⁹ Liv. L. xliv. c. 13.

¹⁰ Liv. *ibid.* c. 25.

assistance from the Romans; and for fifteen hundred, to oblige them to conclude a peace; engaging at the same time to give sufficient hostages for the performance of his stipulations. The bargain to Perseus was highly advantageous; but with him, the difficulty was, to part with his money. He was willing enough to promise; but Eumenes, from experience of the man, was unwilling to place confidence on such unsolid grounds. After much negotiating, little to the honor of either party, Perseus consented to pay down the sum required, provided it was deposited in the temple at Samothrace, until Eumenes should fulfil his engagements. But this island being subject to Perseus, Eumenes considered it as perfectly the same, whether the money were in the coffers of the Macedonian king or in the temple at Samothrace: and thus the negotiation proved abortive ¹¹.

But the baseness of the Macedonian monarch appears most conspicuous in his treatment of Gentius the Illyrian ¹². The district of Illyricum which he reigned over, was washed on its western extremity by the Hadriatic, on the eastern it was divided from Macedon by a ridge of mountains, and it extended southward to that part of Illyricum which the Romans claimed by right of conquest. The situation therefore of this prince rendered him to Rome, as

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His mean and
perfidious
dealing with
Gentius.

¹¹ Some time after, the Romans discovered the intended treaty, and never forgave Eumenes for the share he had in the transaction.

¹² Liv. L. xliv. c. 27. Plutarch in Paul. Aemilio.

B O O K well as to Macedon, a convenient friend or a
VII. troublesome enemy. Perseus and the Romans had
Sect. 2. both sought his alliance; but his inclination led him to the Macedonian interest; which he offered to join, on payment of three hundred talents. Perseus, however, had hitherto protracted the negotiation, in hopes of bringing him down to lower terms. But the present emergency would not admit of a longer delay. Peace, he saw, was not now to be obtained; and two envoys had at this very time arrived at the court of Gentius, in order to put the finishing hand to an alliance, between Illyricum and Rome. In this situation Perseus had recourse to a stratagem. He agreed to the terms of Gentius, and desired that his ambassadors might attend to receive the subsidy, and to swear to the due performance of the treaty; when he ordered the three hundred talents to be delivered to them: and in order to give the greater solemnity to the act, the treaty was executed in presence of his whole army. It was now proper, that messengers should be sent to the Illyrian king with an account of the transaction; and as the weight of treasure would have prevented the necessary dispatch, they took with them only ten talents, leaving the remainder sealed up with the signets of the Illyrian ambassadors, to be delivered to confidential persons, who were to convey it without delay. Gentius entertained no suspicion; the money he was told was on the way; and, as a proof of his attachment to Macedon, he immediately seized and imprisoned the Roman envoys. This was the very

thing that Perseus had in view. "He has now," said he, "advanced too far to recede; and should he even repent, it is impossible the Romans should forgive him." Exulting in the success of his scheme, he commanded the money to be stopped. This despicable policy, however, produced no advantage to Perseus. It sacrificed, on the contrary, an ally, by precipitating the ruin of Gentius. This wretched prince, by the perfidy of the Macedonian king, losing both his crown and his liberty; Anicius, the Roman praetor, having soon after attacked him, reduced his whole kingdom, and carried him, with all his family, into captivity.

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Gentius undone by it.

This transaction strongly marks the character of Perseus. Gentius indeed appears, from history, to have been a prince of a very unamiable character¹³; being a violent, merciless tyrant, rendered still more brutal by intemperance, to which he was much addicted. He stands charged with having sacrificed to caprice or jealousy, some of his most valuable subjects, and with having even imbrued his hands in the blood of his brother, whose virtues he probably considered as his own reproach. But however unworthy of our pity the Illyrian may have been, the conduct of Perseus was not the less impolitic and unprincipled.

Character of
this Illyrian
prince.

Had the king of Macedon adopted a more manly and more liberal system; had he made a proper use of the wealth and other resources of which he was

¹³ See Liv. L. xliv. c. 30.

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The Greek
and Asiatic
states well
affected to the
interests of
Macedon:

Perseus ne-
glects to im-
prove these
favorable
dispositions.

Activity of
Aemilius;

his attention
to the disci-
pline

still master, the Romans had found his overthrow a work of infinite difficulty. Had he been brave, generous, and honest, not only mercenaries, but voluntary succours had poured in to him from every quarter. Most of the Grecian states secretly wished him success, well knowing, that in the fortune of Macedon was involved the fate of Greece. The Asiatics, in like manner, whatever connexions many of them appeared to have with Rome, could not, without the most painful apprehensions, look forward to the probable consequences of the extinction of the Macedonian power. Even Prusias of Bithynia¹⁴, the most servile of the Roman vassals, had ventured to remonstrate, by his ambassadors, against the continuance of the war. The Rhodians did more: they required both the Romans and the Macedonian king to lay down their arms, threatening to declare war against whichever power should refuse to adopt pacific measures. But such was the folly of this prince, that every resource which might have contributed to his safety, was either rejected or misemployed; and he was at last deserted by all, only because he was the first to desert himself.

The presence of Aemilius gave new vigor to the Roman arms. He began by improving their discipline¹⁵. The advanced posts had been permitted the use of shields, from which many inconveniences had arisen. Trusting to this defensive armor,

¹⁴ Liv. L. xliv. c. 14.

¹⁵ Liv. ibid. c. 33. Plut. in Paul. Aemilio.

they were often less watchful of the approach of the foe; and even ventured to stand and skirmish, when their duty was to have retreated, and alarmed the posts behind them. They had frequently been found reclined on their shields asleep; and the gleaming of the brags had been known to discover them to the enemy: the consul, therefore, gave directions, that when employed on this duty, they should leave their shields ¹⁶ behind them. It had been the custom also, to give out the daily orders aloud to the whole army; hence the pretence, that they had not been heard distinctly, afforded an excuse, or at least a palliation for every failure in duty; and what was still more dangerous, no sooner had the orders been delivered out, than the enemy generally was apprized of them. The consul, therefore, gave it in command, that thenceforth the military tribunes should whisper their orders to the first centurion, he to the officer under him, and so on, until every person had received them. At the same time, notwithstanding the severity with which these regulations were enforced, the attention he paid to every thing which could contribute to the security or refreshment of the troops, endeared him to them all. At his arrival, they were in great want of water, which, in this climate, and at this season of the year ¹⁷, was exceedingly distressing; and those who had

and wants of
his army:

¹⁶ Plutarch says, their *pikes* also were left behind, that they might guard the more against sleep, when they were sensible that they had nothing to defend themselves.

¹⁷ It was now midsummer.

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been sent to look out for some, reported, that none but brackish water was to be found. The verdant and leafy summits of the mountains around, induced Aemilius, nevertheless, to pronounce, that springs could not be far distant; but possibly the water was absorbed in the sands, or discharged through some subterraneous ducts into the neighbouring ocean; deep pits were, therefore, sunk at certain distances along the shore, he himself superintending the workmen. The consul's opinion was justified by the event. Fresh water gushed out in great abundance, and the army was relieved. The diligence of the soldier was equal to the attention of the general. Instead of fullen murmuring, or the uproar of tumult, lately the disgrace of the Roman arms, nothing was now to be heard throughout the camp, but the polishing or sharpening of arms, and the chearful bustle of men busied in preparing for action.

Ands it difficult to force the Macedonian lines;

Perseus, meanwhile, was still posted ¹⁸ on the opposite side of the Enipeus, and as the channel at this time was fordable in many places, he had added to the security of his camp, by fortifying it towards the river with a strong palisade, which, together with the height and steepness of the bank, rendered the approach difficult, and an attack exceedingly hazardous. Aemilius, after some attempts, finding, that here no impression was to be made, changed his plan ¹⁹. Being informed of a bye-path

¹⁸ OLYMP. CLII. 4. BEFORE CHRIST 164.

¹⁹ Liv. L. xliv. c. 35. Plutarch in Paul. Aemilio.

over Mount Olympus, by the castle of Pythium, which led to the rear of the Macedonian camp, where it was not defended by any intrenchment, he detached a body of eight thousand men, under the command of Scipio Nafica; and Fabius Maximius his eldest son. This detachment had public orders to embark on board the fleet then on the coast, and make a descent on some of the maritime parts of Macedon; but with secret instructions to return as soon as night had set in, and ascend the mountain, the summit of which, by computation, they were to gain early in the morning of the third day; Aemilius, mean time, employing the enemy's attention in the plain, by repeated attacks on their lines. The Macedonians had neglected the pass by Olympus, so that the Romans advanced without opposition, till a Cretan deserter having at length given notice of their approach, a detachment of twelve thousand men was sent to repulse them. But it was now too late; the enemy were already in possession of the summit; and, after a short though sharp conflict, drove the Macedonians down the mountains; who, in their flight to the camp, spread the alarm, that the Romans were pressing hard upon their rear.

Struck with terror, the king, as usual, lost sight at once of all the advantages of his situation; and as if on the point of being immediately surrounded, broke up his camp, and fled to Pydna: he wished to have retreated even farther. He talked of disbanding his army; of securing all the cattle and grain in the several strong holds throughout Macedon; of laying

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attacks, by
surprise,
the rear of
the Macedo-
nian camp.Terror of
Perseus;
who flies to
Pydna:

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the country waste to deprive the Romans of subsistence; and of retreating into his interior provinces, where the numberless defiles and intricate windings would enable him to baffle for ever the pursuing enemy. The representations of his officers checked these timid and unmanly purposes. He had still, they told him, a force far superior in numbers to the Roman army; and his men, fighting as they now would, in defence of their altars and their families, those pledges which every generous mind holds most dear, and animated besides by the presence of their sovereign sharing every danger with them, would certainly exert a vigor that could hardly fail of proving victorious. Ashamed, though probably not convinced, he assumed a more resolute countenance, and commanded his army to form under the walls of Pydna; where, soon after, Aemilius appeared in order of battle, having been previously joined by the detachment from the mountains.

Aemilius
advances
against him;

but defers
fighting until
the ensuing
day;

and on what
account.

Nasica, flushed with his late success, urged the consul to begin the attack instantly¹⁹. But the Macedonians were refreshed, while the Romans were fatigued and almost parched with drought after their precipitate march through sandy roads, exposed to the sultry heat of the mid-day sun. "Young man," replied the consul, "at your years I should have thought as you do; at mine, you will act as I shall:" and having given directions to mark out the ground for incamping; and to inclose it with a ditch and rampart, he ordered the rear to move into it, as soon as it was completed; the front-ranks still presenting

¹⁹ See Liv. L. xlv. c. 36. Plutarch in Paul. Aemilio.

an unbroken face to the enemy, until the rest of the battalions having successively quitted the field, they also fell back in like manner without confusion, though in the presence of an embattled foe: a remarkable instance of the excellence of Roman discipline.

The ensuing night, there happened an eclipse of the moon²⁰. The Roman soldiers were apprized of it, the tribune Sulpicius Gallus having foretold it to the consul, and, with his permission, to the whole army. But in the Macedonian camp it occasioned the greatest dismay. This phaenomenon they were accustomed to view with terror; and they now considered the darkening of the lunar orb as a sure presage of the extinction of the glory of Macedon.

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Eclipse of the
moon;

different ef-
fects it had on
the Roman
and Macedo-
nian soldiery.

Next morning the two armies were drawn out in order of battle; but, however spirited and determined in appearance, probably rather for the purpose of observing each other's motions than with any serious intentions to engage²¹; the consul as well as the king betraying, in their whole conduct much irresolution and anxiety. Early in the day Perseus withdrew from the field into Pydna, "to offer," he told his soldiers, "his supplications to Hercules;" a god, says Plutarch, who never hears the coward's prayer. Aemilius, more artfully protracted the time, sacrificing beast after beast, under pretence that the omens were not yet propitious, until, upon the slaying of the twenty-first victim, the aruspices had orders to announce to the army, "that the gods had promised them the victory, "on condition they stood on the defensive." The

Battle of
Pydna 3

²⁰ L v. L. xliv. c. 37. Plut ubi sup.

²¹ Liv. ibid. c. 37. 40.

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Roman writers scruple not to acknowledge, that this language of piety was all an artifice devised by the consul himself. During the former part of the day, the Romans had the fun in their faces; Aemilius wished to defer engaging, until his declination to the west had relieved his army from this inconvenience. The Macedonian phalanx, besides, was posted on advantageous ground, and presented to view such an impenetrable front of interwoven shields and pikes, as seemed to bid defiance to the most vigorous assault. Aemilius himself was wont to confess, that so strong was the impression which the sight of this formidable phalanx had made on his mind, that a certain terror always attended the recollection of that day. He was therefore desirous, that the Macedonians should begin the attack, in hopes they might break their ranks as they advanced.

brought on by
an unlooked-
for incident

These were the reasons which the consul alledged for his conduct. Livy²², however, is of opinion, that his real purpose was to amuse and restrain the Roman soldiery, who were impatient of delay; and, at least for that day, not to have ventured a battle. At length, an unlooked-for incident²³ put an end to all farther hesitation. Towards three in the afternoon, some Thracian soldiers endeavouring to intercept a Roman convoy, or, according to others, to seize a horse that had escaped from the Roman to the Macedonian lines, a skirmish ensued, and large reinforcements being detached from both armies, the engagement soon became general.

²² Liv. L. xlv. c. 40.

²³ Plutarch in Paul. Aemilio.

An exact detail of this battle is not at present to be obtained, as most part of the narrative, which Polybius and Livy had given of it, is long since lost; the principal circumstances, however, may be gathered from the few facts which Plutarch and the later historians have preserved.

It began in a manner that threatened utter discomfiture to the Romans. Having attempted to make an impression on the front of the Macedonian phalanx, the length of whose pikes rendered it impossible for the Roman soldiers to reach the enemy with their swords, their first line was broken, and cut in pieces; and the second, discouraged by the fate of their companions, declined the charge, and retreated. Could this body of Macedonian infantry now have pushed on, without losing that compact form and solidity which constituted its strength, the fate of the Roman army had been at once decided. The consul's presence of mind saved them from destruction. He immediately ordered his men to divide into small platoons; and, instead of rushing against this dangerous rampart with unavailing intrepidity, to mark the several breaks and interstices into which the long-extended front must necessarily open as it advanced, from the irregularity of the ground, and the different exertions of the combatants; to penetrate between the pikes into those vacant spaces, and charge the enemy sword-in-hand. This manoeuvre had all the success that could have been expected. The instant a void space appeared, the Romans, piercing through it into the very heart of the phalanx, dealt destruction on every side. The pike, meanwhile, remained a cumber-

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The Romans
in danger at
the beginning;

but obtain a
complete vic-
tory.

B O O K ous embarrassment in the hands of the Macedonian
VII. soldier; and the ranks, from their being wedged to-
Sect. 2. gether, were slaughtered without the power of resist-
 ance. The Roman armor, besides, had considerable ad-
 vantage over the Macedonian in close combat. The
 sword of the Macedonians was short, and their buck-
 lers small and slight; the Romans, on the contrary, had
 shields that covered them from head to foot, and swords
 ponderous, well-tempered, and of powerful execution.

At the same time that discomfiture was thus
 spreading along the whole front of the phalanx, both
 the flanks and the rear were likewise successfully
 attacked. So that this formidable mass of warriors,
 which had lately so fierce an aspect, now exhibited
 one continued scene of disorder and carnage.

The victory was no longer doubtful, and the rage
 of battle was beginning to subside, when an unex-
 pected event unhappily added to the slaughter of this
 bloody day. The younger Cato, son to the censor,
 and afterwards married to one of the consul's
 daughters, had lost his sword²¹. After distinguishing
 himself in the attack on the phalanx by many acts
 of valor, it had sprung from his hand in the heat
 of action, and he had hitherto searched for it in vain.
 For a soldier to have returned without his sword,
 though he had even returned victorious, had been
 highly reproachful²². He hurried from rank to rank,
 bewailing the disaster and imploring the assistance of
 every companion and friend. A considerable number
 soon joined him, and under his command, again

Young Cato's
 distress at
 losing his
 sword;

its effects fatal
 to the enemy.

²¹ Plutarch. in Pa. l. A. m. io. & in Catone.

²² Excerpt. Polyb. L. vi. c. 25.

rushed impetuously on the foe, relentless slaughter marking their way as they advanced; until at length they discovered the fatal sword under a heap of arms and dead bodies. Elevated with this success, they charged the few that remained unbroken, with redoubled ardor. Three thousand Macedonians, all chosen men, had hitherto kept their ranks; they were now cut off to a man. The rest of the army fled; but few escaped; neither flight nor darkness saving them from the Roman sword; the pursuit being eagerly continued during the night, for upwards of fifteen miles. The sides of the neighbouring hills were covered with the dead and dying; and the river Leucus, which the Romans passed the following morning, was even then tinged deep with blood²⁶.

If we are to believe Plutarch²⁷, this important action was determined in less than one hour. It began, he tells us, at the ninth hour²⁸, and before the tenth hour the Romans were in full possession of victory. The returns which he gives us of the dead, is not less amazing. Twenty-five thousand of the Macedonians fell; and of the Romans, one hundred at most; according to Scipio Nasica, only eighty²⁹.

Remarkable
circumstances
that attended
this battle:

²⁶ From this memorable day, the Macedonian phalanx seems to have been held in low estimation. It gained little credit at Cynoscephalae; but the battle of Pydna completely ruined its reputation.

²⁷ In Paul. Aemilio.

²⁸ The same with our three in the afternoon.

²⁹ The circumstances of this battle, as related by Plutarch, will suggest to the reader of reflection, many reasons for doubting the truth of this account.

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the Thracian
auxiliaries
desert.

It is also remarkable, that the auxiliary troops of the Macedonian king, and particularly the Thracian horse, who at the battle on the Pencus had done important service, and might have retrieved, perhaps, the fortune of the day, appear to have taken no share in the engagement³⁰. Are we to suppose, that they had received the consul's gold? or that they disdained to fight for a prince who had not the spirit to fight for himself? We certainly have it on Livy's³¹ authority, that the Bisaltae, a Thracian tribe to whom Perseus made application in his flight, denied him assistance; and that the Thracians he had in pay, as soon as they had reached the banks of the Strymon, abandoned his service, and retired homeward.

Perseus flies to
Pella;

Immediately on the defeat of his army, Perseus, in terror, fled from Pydna, escorted by a considerable body of cavalry; but numbers of the Macedonian infantry, who were making their escape from the field, coming up, and insulting the horsemen, to whose cowardice and treachery they imputed the discomfiture, Perseus began to fear, that an affray would follow, in which he might possibly be involved. Apprehensive of the consequences, he struck off from the road into the thickest part of a wood, through which, with great difficulty, and with only a few attendants, he at length, about midnight, made his way to Pella.

his distraction
and ferocity:

The anguish of disappointed ambition, remorse, and terror, racked the tyrant's mind, and added to his natural ferocity. Euetus and Eudaeus, two principal officers of his exchequer, having ventured

³⁰ Liv. L. xlv. c. 42.³¹ Ibid. c. 45.

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Sect. 2.

to blame some part of his conduct, he stabbed them with his own hand³². Shocked and alarmed at this act of barbarity, his other lords refused to approach him; so that, not knowing where to hide himself, or whom to trust, he set off again from Pella before break of day, taking with him what treasure he could carry. The whole force he had now to attend him³³, consisted of three captains of auxiliaries (every Macedonian having deserted him) Evander the Cretan, Neon the Boeotian, and Archidamus the Aetolian, together with five hundred Cretan mercenaries, who had been allured by the hopes of sharing the treasure of which they saw him in possession. He suspected their motive; and, to save the rest, suffered them to carry off a number of vessels of gold and silver, which he had designedly caused to be scattered in their way.

obliged to
leave Pella;abandoned by
the Macedonians;

The third day after the battle, he entered Amphipolis³⁴, to as little purpose as he had entered Pella. He would have addressed the people, before whom he presented himself with his eldest son, in hopes of exciting their compassion, when a gush of tears stopping his utterance, he made signs to Evander to speak for him; but they unanimously refused to hear him, exclaiming with indignation, "Away, away, lest we also should be involved in ruin." Driven in this disgraceful manner from Amphipolis, he hastened to the sea-

flees to Am-
phipolis,and is driven
from thence;seeks to
escape to Sa-
mothrace;³² Plut. in Paul. Aemilio.³³ Lib. ubi sup. c. 43. Plut in Paul. Aemilio.³⁴ Liv. L. xlv. c. 45.

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over reaches
his Cretan
mercenaries.

Total re-
volution
throughout
Macedon.

side, in order to pass over into Samothrace, where the reputed holiness of the place promised him, he imagined, a secure asylum. But anxious to save his treasure, not less than to save his life, he could not think of leaving with the Cretans what his fears had induced him to disperse among them. Among the vessels which they had carried off, he told them, were certain vases which had belonged to Alexander the Great, for which, if restored, they should receive the most ample recompence. The Cretans of those days are said to have surpassed all the nations of the earth in fraud and artifice: they were, nevertheless, overmatched on this occasion. Depending on his royal word, they restored to Perseus most of the vases he required, to the amount of thirty talents; but he forfeited his promise: they received nothing in return.

By this time, a total revolution had taken place throughout Macedon, one of the most rapid recorded in the page of history. In fifteen days after Aemilius had begun to put his army in motion, all that formidable armament under Perseus was broken and dispersed; and in two days after the defeat at Pydna, the whole country had submitted to the consul. This extraordinary change, effected so soon and with so much facility, Plutarch³⁵ seeks to ascribe to some miraculous interposition of the gods, exerted in favor of Rome; “that a people, hitherto eminent for the love they bore to their kings, should now, as if the chief bulwark of

³⁵ In Aemilio.

“ their constitution were overthrown, and all were
 “ fallen with it, have at once given up all thoughts
 “ of resistance, and have renounced their native
 “ and kindred princes!” But the cause is easily
 discovered in the conduct of Perseus himself. The
 pusillanimity, the cruelties, and fordidness of this
 unhappy prince, had lost him that affection which
 he certainly possessed in the beginning of his reign,
 and from which a wise and virtuous king had
 derived strength and security. But even a foreign
 yoke seemed now, to the Macedonian nation,
 more tolerable than the domination of a native
 tyrant, equally merciless and oppressive ³⁶.

As soon as it was known that Perseus had fled to Samothrace, the praetor Octavins sailed thither in pursuit of him ³⁷. Perseus had taken shelter in the temple of Castor and Pollux. The difficulty was, how to draw him from thence without violating the privileges of a sanctuary, held in the highest reverence by the pagan world. Evander had accompanied him; and the Romans availed themselves of this circumstance. The priests to whom the superintendency of the island belonged, were asked, whether it was not a defilement of the sacred

The Romans
pursue Per-
seus to Sa-
mothrace:

“ We are sometimes apt to question the character which the Roman writers have drawn of this prince, and to suspect, that the coloring has been overcharged: but that he should have been thus abandoned by his own subjects, forms a presumptive evidence against him, to which it is difficult to give an answer. Forsaken by a people, lately zealous in his service, it is hardly possible, but his administration must have been beyond measure oppressive.

³⁷ See Liv. L. xlv. c. 5 & seq.

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the dastardly
and perfidious
arts he has
recourse to:

ground, that a polluted person should there find a retreat? and why this holy asylum was permitted to Evander, the assassin of king Eumenes, and the impious profaner of the Delphic temple? Perseus, who soon had notice that Evander was not to be protected, felt, with excruciating agony, the consequences of his being delivered up. The king had not one guilty secret, to which this worthless associate was not privy; and in the hands of the Romans, the hopes of life might tempt him to reveal all. Apprehensive of the event, he endeavoured to persuade Evander to prevent, by a voluntary death, the tortures that certainly awaited him, should the Romans once have him in their power. The Cretan seemed convinced, and agreed to poison himself; but the king perceiving that he procrastinated, and beginning to fear that he meditated an escape, procured him to be murdered; and corrupted Theondas, chief of the Samothracian priests, to report that he died by his own hands. This perfidious treatment of the unhappy instrument he himself had employed, and whose chief guilt it was, that he had too faithfully obeyed the orders of such a master, deprived Perseus of his few attendants that remained, almost all of them going over to the Romans. The Macedonian monarch had before this, solicited Aemilius¹¹ to accept his submission; but though this request was conceived in the most abject terms, the consul refused to listen to any proposal that was not

¹¹ Liv. L. xlv. c. 43

accompanied with a resignation of the regal title. B O O K
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The only resource that now remained to this wretched prince, was to attempt an escape to the Thracian coast, and to implore the protection of Cotys his late ally. Oroandes, the captain of a Cretan vessel, who lay off Samothrace, had engaged to take him on board the ensuing night, when under favor of the darkness he might elude the vigilance of his enemies. He had accordingly caused his treasure to be shipped; but when he reached the shore, to his inexpressible mortification, Oroandes was already sailed with all his wealth. Thus bereaved of his treasure, and exposed to his enemies, he wandered disconsolate for some hours along the beach, and was forced, at the approach of morning, to shrink back to his sanctuary, which with difficulty he reached before the Romans could prepare to intercept him. In addition to his misfortunes, Ion of Thessalonica, his chief favorite, to whose care he had intrusted the younger part of his family, now deserted also to the Roman admiral, to whom he delivered up all the royal children committed to his charge. Abandoned thus by all but his eldest son Philip, without a probability of escape, without means even of subsistence, he was under the necessity of surrendering at last to Octavius, who immediately set sail with his prisoner to Amphipolis, and from thence transported him to the consul's camp.

finds it impossible to save himself, and surrenders to the Romans.

Aemilius received the king ¹⁹ in a manner which, *The behaviour of Aemilius.*

¹⁹ Plutarch. in Paul. Aemilio.

B O O K whatever Perseus deserved, did the victor little
VII. honor. The Macedonian, remarkably mean under
Sect. 2. every reverse of fortune, approached with the most
abject servility, bowing his face to the earth, and
endeavouring, with his suppliant arms, to grasp
the knees of Aemilius. "Why, wretched man,"
said the proud Roman, "dost thou acquit fortune
" of what might seem her crime, by a behaviour
" which makes it appear that thou deservest her
" indignation? Why dost thou disgrace my laurels,
" and detract from my glory, by showing thyself
" an abject adversary, and unworthy of having
" a Roman to contend with? Courage in the
" unfortunate is revered even by an enemy, and
" cowardice, though attended with success, is,
" by the Romans, treated with contempt."

This stern and humiliating address, which a
more generous conqueror would have spared, he
seemed afterwards to temper, by raising him from
the ground, and bidding him nevertheless, to hope
every thing from the clemency of the Roman
people. Of this boasted clemency, Perseus soon
had the most bitter experience. A spectacle to his
enemies in the streets of Rome, he was forced to
adorn the victor's pomp, exposed, with all his
family, before the consul's triumphal car. With
much earnestness he begged of Aemilius to save
him from this ignominy: "It is in his own power
" to save himself," replied the obdurate Roman.
The triumph ended, he was cast into a dank and
dreary prison, the common receptacle of the
meanest malefactors, and fed on the same allowance

with these outcasts of society; until Aemilius, probably ashamed * of such excess of cruelty, procured his removal to a cleaner apartment, and took care he should be supplied with better food; but, unable to brook his almost unparalleled reverse of fortune, and the contempt with which he was treated, this wretched prince soon after starved himself to death. If we are to believe others, he ended his days in a manner yet more dreadful. The soldiers who guarded him, from some provocation which he had given, marked him as the object of their vengeance; and, finding no other means more effectual, contrived to hinder him from sleeping. They watched him by turns, and used such diligence to effect their purpose, that, worn out at last with want of rest, he expired. His eldest son Philip ** and one of his younger sons, are supposed to have died before him. Another son, Alexander, became so great a proficient in the Roman language, as to be able to discharge the office of a writing-clerk; in which capacity he is said to have been employed by the chief magistrates of Rome.

Such the uncertainty of human greatness! and such the close of the royal house of Macedon, once one of the most illustrious the world had ever seen, and whose empire seemed, by its strength and

* Plutarch tells us, that those Macedonian nobles who were obliged to remove to Rome, found afterwards an active protector in Aemilius.

** Livy (L. xlii. c. 52.) says he was his brother, and his son only by adoption.

B O O K vigor, to promise stability for a length of ages !
VII. Perseus reigned eleven years. And from the death
Sect. 2. of Alexander the Great, to the final subversion of
 the Macedonian monarchy, one hundred and sixty
 years only had elapsed.

Settlement
 and humilia-
 tion of Ma-
 cedon.

The spirit of Rome appeared still more glaringly despotic in the settlement of Macedon⁴², and the policy she now observed towards the several states of Greece. Ten commissioners were appointed to assist the consul in arranging the Macedonian affairs; the principal outlines of which arrangement, had previously been traced out to them at Rome. In consequence of this plan, a new form of government took place throughout Macedon. The whole kingdom was divided into four districts; the inhabitants of each were to have no connexion, intermarriages, or exchange of possessions, with those of the other districts, but every part to remain totally separated and distinct from the rest. They were neither to fell timber themselves, nor to permit others to fell any. They were not to import salt; nor even where they had it in plenty, to export it, but under certain regulations laid down by their Roman masters. They were prohibited the use of arms, unless in those places which were exposed to the incursions of the barbarian borderers. They were permitted to work their iron and copper-mines; but the working of those of gold and silver was strictly prohibited; probably lest the Macedonians, by thus acquiring wealth, should regain any portion of their former greatness. They were

⁴² Liv. L. xlv. c. 29.

excluded from all share in the administration of government; some unimportant offices in the civil department excepted, which were delegated to certain municipal officers annually chosen by the Macedonian people. Whilst all the nobles of Macedon, all who had held any command in the king's fleets or armies; all governors of towns, and officers of his court; all, in a word, who had been in any shape distinguished by high birth, large possessions, elegant living, or any circumstance which raised them above the level of the vulgar, were ordered, with all their children above the age of fifteen, under pain of death, to leave their native land, and transport themselves into Italy".

A more severe humiliation could hardly have been devised: indeed, a more complete debasement almost baffles imagination. Must we not then turn with disgust and indignation from those writers, who, after the narration of such facts, wish to convey the idea, that the Roman conquest bestowed liberty on Macedon? But it seems, that the overthrow of royalty, and the subjecting a kingdom to the far more oppressive yoke of a Roman senate, was, in the language of Rome, *to give liberty to a people*. In one point alone, the alteration seems at first sight to have been favorable to the conquered. They were to pay the Romans one half only of the taxes they were accustomed to pay to their kings. Had this indulgence been even meant as a relief, it had been a poor com-

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Misrepresentations of the Roman writers in favor of Rome.

2' Liv. L. xlv. c. 32.

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Prodigious
value of the
plunder of
Macedon.

penfation for a difmembered kingdom, bereaved of its chief ftrength by the expulfion of its nobleft and moft respectable families, and laid prostrate beneath a foreign yoke. But, in truth, even this diminution of taxes, in the prefent impoverished ftate of Macedon, far from being dictated by mercy, was the refult of neceffity. It was the utmoft that Macedon could bear. The Roman conful had not only poffeffed himfelf of the numerous magazines and granaries which Perfeus had erected throughout his territories, and plundered the royal palaces of all the rich furniture, precious vases, and other coftly manufactures, in which they are faid to have abounded; he had alfo drained the kingdom of its wealth, having every where feized on all the treasure he could find. The amount there is reafon to conjecture, muft have been prodigious, as it appears, that the Romans themfelves were indutrious to conceal it, every one of their hiftorians giving us a different account of the matter. From one circumftance, however, which we have on the authority both of Cicero⁴⁴ and Plutarch, fome judgment may be formed. In confequence of the money brought into the treasury by Aemilius on his return from the Macedonian war, the Romans were exempted from taxation during the fpace of a hundred and twenty-five years⁴⁵.

⁴⁴ *Tantum in aerarium pecuniae (Paulus) invexit, ut unius imperatoris praeda finem attulerit tributorum* — fays Cicero. *De Off. L. ii. 22.*

⁴⁵ Until the confulship of Hirtius and Panfa, who were confuls in the firft war between Caefar and Antony.

The arrangement of the administration of government in Illyricum, was conducted on the same plan with that of Macedon. B O O K
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Aemilius concluded the settlement of Macedon with the celebration of triumphal games at Amphipolis⁴⁶; to which all the neighbouring nations both of Europe and of Asia were invited. The magnificence exhibited on this occasion surpassed, we are informed, all that this part of the world had ever seen. Besides the extraordinary pomp and elegance with which the various sports were introduced, and the richness of the prizes bestowed on the successful candidates, all the ornaments of gold and silver, with every thing precious, elegant, and rare, that had been found in the numerous palaces of the Macedonian princes, were ostentatiously displayed, and the scenery beautifully diversified with such prodigious quantities of curious armor, exquisite paintings, and finished statues, that the eye was not only filled, but dazzled with the variegated profusion. The consul prided himself in exhibiting these splendid marks of victory, and he was probably no less pleased with the opportunity of impressing on the different nations who witnessed them, an awful idea of the power of Rome, before which, an empire, seemingly so formidable, and provided with such ample means of strength and defence, had not been able to stand. The vast concourse of people that crowded to the sight, as well as the Roman armies in the neighbourhood, were all entertained, at the same time, by Aemilius,

Triumphal
games celebra-
ted by the
consul at
Amphipolis.

⁴⁶ Liv. L. xlv. c. 32, 33. Plut. in Paul. Aemilio.

B O O K in the most sumptuous manner, from the stores
VII. which had lately belonged to the Macedonian king.

Sect. 2. And such was the abundant provision of all things, that these feasts were not only continued as long as the games lasted, but the guests were, at their departure, presented with whatever they chose to take away. In the midst of the different pompous pageants produced at this festival, was seen to arise an immense pile of various weapons and instruments of war, which at the close of the solemnity the Roman soldiers, upon a certain signal, set on fire and destroyed. These, it seems, were the least valuable part of the Macedonian arms, not worth the transporting to Rome, and improper to be left in the hands of a vanquished people.

Treatment
 of Epiro by
 the Romans;

From Amphipolis Aemilius directed his course to Epiro. The Epirots had submitted some time before; and those leaders who had been instrumental in promoting the alliance with Macedon, and who had not saved themselves by flight, had all fallen by the sword, or been delivered up to the Romans. The consul now gave out, that the Roman garrisons were immediately to be withdrawn from Epiro, and the whole country restored to the enjoyment of its liberties; and having summoned ten of the principal inhabitants from every town to attend him, commanded them to collect whatever silver or gold was to be found in their houses or temples, in order to be delivered, at an appointed day, to persons to be commissioned by him for that purpose. The requisition was punctually complied with: and, lulled into profound

found security, the Epirots fondly pleased themselves with the thought, that this heavy contribution was all the penalty they were to incur.

But they knew not the atrocity of Roman policy. Parties of soldiers¹⁷, under various pretences, were dispatched to their different towns so as to arrive about the same time; with orders, that on the same day, and at the same hour, they should seize, for slaves, every native of Epire, level the walls of their cities, and totally despoil them of all they possessed. The gold and silver having, in obedience to the consul's commands, been accordingly brought in and delivered to the Roman officers, the signal was given, and a hundred and fifty thousand persons, unheard, unconvicted, unsuspecting, without any particular crime even alledged against them, were, at one instant, doomed to slavery, their dwellings given up to the spoiler, and all their towns, to the number of seventy, laid in ruins: a deed so horrid, and of such exceeding perfidy, that, to use the words of a judicious historian, *I should not believe it, had any one writer said to the contrary*¹⁸.

their perfidiousness and cruelty.

Plutarch¹⁹ endeavours to exculpate Aemilius. This military execution, he would have us believe, was altogether contrary to the gentleness of his

¹⁷ Liv. L. xlv. c. 34. Plut. in Paul. Aemilio.

¹⁸ Raleigh's History of the World.

¹⁹ Plutarch says, Every soldier had only eleven drachmas to his share (somewhat more than seven shillings.) Livy says, That every horseman got 400 denarii (about 12l. 18s. 4d.) and every foot soldier half that sum.

BOOK VII. Sect. 2. disposition: and he only yielded obedience to orders, which it was not in his power to control. Should this excuse be admitted, in what light must the Roman senate appear! But from the manner in which Aemilius had just before treated the Aetolians, we are led to form of him a very different judgment. Violent disputes had for some time prevailed among the people of Aetolia, a great number of them having declared in favor of the Romans, whilst others were still for maintaining an opposition to a power, which they saw threatened ruin to the Aetolian liberties. Encouraged by the success of Aemilius in Macedon, two chiefs of the Roman faction⁶⁶, Lyfiscus and Tisippus, obtained from A. Baebius, the Roman commander in Aetolia, a body of soldiers; and surrounding the place where the convention of the Aetolian estates was held, fell unexpectedly on those in the contrary interest, and having put to the sword five hundred and fifty of the principal persons, banished the rest, and confiscated the possessions of them all. The matter was soon after laid before Aemilius; and the families of those who had perished, together with the unhappy exiles, made application to him for redress. His answer is memorable. The only question before him, he said⁶⁷, was, "To what party the sufferers had belonged; if not friends to Rome, whatever they had suffered, they had suffered deservedly:" nor would he reverse the iniquitous decree. Yet so flagitious in the eyes of the Romans themselves was the barbarous deed,

Barbarous
treatment of
the Aetolians.

⁶⁶ Liv. L. xlv. c. 48.

⁶⁷ Ibid. c. 31.

that this acquittal of the perpetrators of it, did not save Baebius; he was pronounced guilty of having debased the Roman soldiery, by making them the inhuman instruments of the perfidious massacre.

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From Livy it appears, that this decision of the Aetolian cause, in which Rome seems indeed to have laid aside all disguise, completed the humiliation of most of the Grecian commonwealths. The creatures of Rome became now all-powerful in almost every place: they obtained possession of every magistracy; and the direction of every measure: whilst those who presumed to vindicate their ancient liberties, or even to recommend temperate counsels, were marked out as harbouring treasonable designs against their Roman lords, or of having some secret connexion with their enemies.

Humiliation
of Greece.

The Romans, on their part, did every thing to confirm them in this servile dejection. Neon the Boeotian, and Andronicus the Aetolian, two persons of the first rank in their respective countries, had served under Perseus; they were both beheaded, as having departed from the allegiance they owed to Rome. Emissaries were dispatched throughout Boeotia, and all the adjacent states, with special instructions, to make inquiry concerning all who had favored the Macedonian interest, and report them to Aemilius; when the accused were commanded immediately to attend him to Italy, in order to take their trial. This mode of inquiry was extended even to Asia. And it having appeared that Antissa, a city of Lesbos, had in the course of the late war received the Macedonian

Tyrannical
proceedings
of the Romans
throughout
the Grecian
states;

B O O K VII. fleet into her harbour, and supplied them with provisions, Labeo was sent to exterminate the inhabitants, and to lay the place in ruins.

Achaia excepted;
whence this exception.

Of all the Grecian states, Achaia alone remained not yet totally subdued; having hitherto been exempted from this species of inquiry. The reasons of this apparent lenity, however, we are not to look for in the moderation of the Romans. A portion of the spirit of ancient days still animated that republic, from which they apprehended much opposition. And though even there they had gained over several leaders, who were prepared to betray the liberties of Achaia, it was necessary to proceed with great circumspection, lest the destruction of their own creatures should defeat the Roman designs.

Designs of
Rome against
the Achaeans.

These considerations Livy²² himself mentions. He adds another consideration; which, for the honor of his country, a less candid historian had concealed. "After the severest scrutiny, not the least vestige was found of a correspondence having ever subsisted between any member of the Achaean body and the late king of Macedon." Accordingly, in order to ground an accusation, *invention* was to supply the place of *evidence*. On this account it was thought expedient, that some of the Roman commissioners should, in person, pass over into Achaia, and either by terror or subtilty, bring the Achaean diet to make concessions, of which advantage might be taken at some future period.

The dishonorable scheme was accordingly carried into execution; with what success, will be seen in the following pages.

²² See Liv. L. xlv. c. 31. See also Polyb. Legat. xciv.

HISTORY OF GREECE.

BOOK VIII.

SECTION I.

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ACHAEA, guiltless of any connexion with Macedon, remained unsuspicious of the Roman

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Cautious
councils of
the Achaean
states.

machinations. Whatever jealousy she might have entertained of the designs of Rome against Greece, or however averse, in general, the Achaeans might have been to the total overthrow of the Macedonians; yet the follies and the crimes of Perseus, with the apprehension of being involved in his ruin, had given a bias so different to the national councils, that, far from assisting that depraved and pusillanimous monarch, repeated offers had even been made to second the Roman operations in Macedon with the united strength of Achaia. But their innocence or guilt was a matter perfectly indifferent to the Romans. *Is Achaia formidable?* was the sole question at Rome.

Rome jealous
of Achaia;

Though much fallen from her ancient splendor, Achaia still maintained a respectable appearance. That form of government, which had been the foundation of her power, notwithstanding the wide breaches made by foreign cabals and domestic faction, still subsisted. She was at the head of the Peloponnesian states, and she possessed a territory well cultivated and populous. Her cities were numerous; and some of them, Corinth particularly, superbly ornamented with those works of magnificence and taste, which are considered as indications of opulence and power. All these, to a Roman eye, were objects of envy and of rapacious desire. The Achaeans were besides distinguished by their discipline, and that kind of warlike knowledge which experience alone can teach; while many of their leaders were equally conspicuous in the cabinet and the field. What rendered all these

circumstances the more formidable to Roman jealousy and suspicion, was, that they could not be supposed to have beheld the fate of Macedon with an indifferent eye; and yet not the least trace was to be discovered of their having had any correspondence with Perseus; an alarming proof, according to the interpretation of Rome, of their well-concerted schemes, and of the art with which they were conducted.

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Fraught with these impressions, C. Claudius and Cn. Domitius Aenobarbus, the two Roman commissioners¹ who had Achaia for their department, entered the Achaean diet. The infamous Calliocrates, whose perfidious practices against his country have been already recorded, had previously delivered to Claudius and his colleague a list of all those citizens who were most distinguished by their zeal for the liberties of Achaia, and from whom an opposition to Roman measures was of course to be expected. The commissioners accordingly opened their address to the diet with a complaint "That some of the first men of Achaia had acted in concert with Macedon." At the same time, they required that sentence of death should be immediately pronounced against them; and promised, that after sentence should be given, they would produce the names of the guilty. "After sentence is given!" exclaimed the assembly; "what sort of justice would that be? first name those whom

sends commissioners to the Achaean diet.

¹ See Polyb. Legat. xciv. Liv. L. xlv. c. 31. Pausan. in Achaicis.

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Roman dup-
plicity.

you accuse, make good your charge, and we shall
“be ready to proceed against them.” — “I name
“then,” resumed the commissioner; “all those,
“who have borne the office of chief magistrate of
“Achaia, or have been the leaders of your armies.” —
“In that case,” answered Xeno, a noble Achaean
of eminent worth, “I also shall be accounted guilty,
“for I have commanded the armies of Achaia;
“and yet I am ready to make proof of my inno-
“cence, either here, or before the senate of Rome.” —
“You say well,” replied the subtle Roman, laying
hold on his last words; “Let the *senate of Rome*
“then be the tribunal, before which you shall
“answer.” A decree was accordingly obtained,
by which all whom he should name were to be
sent as delinquents to Rome, in order to answer
for their conduct².

The Achaean
chiefs trans-
ported into
Italy;

Thus, by a sentence general, indiscriminate,
arbitrary, and ill-founded, was the strength of
Achaia, her noble leaders, her ablest and most
faithful counsellors, in number above a thousand,
transported into a foreign land. It was an act of
oppression, says a Grecian writer³, beyond the
most daring attempts even of Philip or Alexander,
in the meridian of their power.

the principal
cause of this
iniquitous
measure.

This transaction, so reproachful to Rome, ex-
hibits the noble remains of virtue which still existed
in the midst of Grecian degeneracy. Every other
probable expedient to enslave, had doubtless been
already tried by the Romans; and it was not,

² OLYMP. CLIH. I. BEFORE CHRIST 163.

³ Pausan. in Achaicis.

we may safely pronounce, till after the failure of all those arts of corruption, which they had practised with such fatal success throughout the other Grecian states, that they had recourse to a deed so replete with unblushing and infamous oppression. What then must Achaia have been! that in this little corner of Greece, not three or four chosen spirits only, but upwards of one thousand patriots should have been found, whose integrity had remained unshaken amidst every effort of corruption, and every impression of fear; who, unseduced by the splendid offers of Rome, and unintimidated by her arms, devoted themselves with a manly steadiness to the service of their country.

This, as a famous historian * justly calls it, was truly *the captivity of Greece*. From the subsequent treatment of these illustrious prisoners, the designs of Rome appeared notoriously conspicuous. Instead of admitting them to a hearing, and instead of the smallest inquiry into the truth of the accusation; the senate imperiously decreed, that they should be dispersed through the cities of Etruria. This was to add cruelty to injustice, by depriving them of that mutual intercourse which alleviates the sorrows of the unfortunate. The only coloring they could give to these unjustifiable proceedings was, that their cause had been already heard, and their condemnation pronounced, by their own countrymen. Repeated deputations † were in vain

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VIII.
Sect. I.

Cruel treatment of the
Achaean
exiles.

* Raleigh, History of the World.

† See Polyb. Legat. 105. 122. 129, 130. 137. and Pausan. ub. sup.

B O O K VIII.
Sect. I. sent from the Achæan states, disavowing this pretended trial, and requesting the senate to take cognizance of the matter. But these cares were ineffectual. The united power, however, of Roman influence and policy could not prove the prisoners to be guilty; and yet their acquittal was a measure which Rome was determined never to permit. The answer of the senate to one of these deputations, addressed to the chief magistrates of Achaia, has been preserved by Polybius⁶. It betrays the whole secret, and discloses the shameless rapacity of Roman artifice. "It is neither advantageous for *you*," say the senate, (who, by the removal of so many illustrious personages, are now at the head of the Achæan affairs) "nor for the good of your *people*." (whose wisest policy it is to submit in silence, and who might be raised to bolder hopes than we mean they should, were their high-spirited chieftains to be restored to them again) "that the exiles should be suffered to return into Achaia." Thus did the Roman fathers endeavour, at the same time, to work upon the hopes and fears of the Achæan magistrates, by reminding them, in this indirect manner, that the exile of their countrymen had placed them in the seat of power, and that a secure possession could only be insured by the absence of those illustrious citizens; whose return, with their superior talents, and influence in the state, would reduce *them* to their former insignificancy, and rouse the spirit of the

⁶ Legat. 105.

people to a vain struggle against the imposition of a yoke, which Rome was determined to impose. At length, after a period of seventeen years, when more than two thirds of the unfortunate victims had perished, either by the lawless outrage of their tyrants, or by that consuming anguish which preys on the unhappy⁷; and when Achaia was so reduced, that the interposition of the remaining few could be of little avail; the senate granted to the survivors the permission so often applied for in vain⁸. Nor had even this indulgence been obtained, had it not been for Cato's repeated expostulations: "Shall we for ever be debating," said he to the senate, "whether a few old Greeks shall have leave to be buried in their native land?" An expression of his to Polybius the historian, who was one of the exiles, paints, on this occasion, in the strongest colors, the opinion which that venerable Roman entertained of his countrymen. When the permission to return home had been at last granted

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Sect. 1.

⁷ Pausanias informs us (in Achaicis) that "as many of these illustrious captives, as were found attempting to escape out of the hands of their oppressors, were put to death without mercy by the Romans." What a dreadful charge is this against Rome!

⁸ After some years, Polybius informs us, the solicitations of the Achaean states were only employed in behalf of a few of those captives, whom they applied for by name; for, says he, *length of time had consumed almost all the rest: men, whose memories well deserve to be held in reverence;* τοὺς μὲν γὰρ πλείστους σχεδὸν ἅπαντας ὁ χρόνος ἤδη καταναλῶκει, τοὺς γὰρ καὶ μνήμης ἄξιους. See Legat. 122.

⁹ Plutarch in Catone.

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Sect. I. to them, Polybius implored Cato's mediation with the senate, that they might also be restored to their honors. "Polybius," said he, "you do not imitate the wisdom of Ulysses; you are for going back to the den of the Cyclops, in quest of the hat and belt you left behind you."

Seventeen years, abounding in events, had elapsed, as we have observed, from the first perpetration of this act of despotism, to the return of the remaining exiles¹⁰. We have given an unbroken and circumstantial detail of the whole of this memorable event; and shall now endeavour to delineate the other transactions of this period, which are not less important or interesting.

Farther attempts of the Romans against Achaia;

The carrying to Rome as delinquents the chief men of Achaia, was only a small part of the Roman plan of subjugation. Having removed that barrier against her tyrannical designs, the Romans took the remaining steps with more confidence of success, and contemplated with a secret satisfaction the future completion of her schemes. What had principally contributed to render the Achaeans formidable, was the association, which they had framed, of the several states of Peloponnesus and the adjoining parts. To dissolve this confederacy was the object the Romans had in view¹¹. For this purpose Sulpicius Gallus was sent to Greece, with instructions to encourage faction and dissension among the states composing the Achaean league, and in the name

¹⁰ OLYMP. CLVII. 2. BEFORE CHRIST 146.

¹¹ Just. L. xxxiv. c. 1. Pausan. ub. sup.

of the Roman senate to hold out the lure of protection and assistance to all who should consent to be dismembered from that powerful body. The temper of the times was but too favorable to this insidious plan. Numbers, to ingratiate themselves with the Romans, were assiduously employed in sowing every where the seeds of discontent, and in fostering a jealousy of the present establishment. The Spartans, above all, bore with impatience their present abject condition, and wished eagerly for an opportunity of attempting a revolution. The Achaean councils too were perplexed, unstable, and turbulent; the families of those, who had been carried off into Italy, filled all Achaia with their complaints; the people warmly espoused the same interest; and, under the pretence of supporting this public-spirited cause, the factious and most contemptible of the citizens had got possession of the administration. A general ferment thus prevailed throughout all Greece; and there was scarcely a single state or city that was not tainted with corruption, or inflamed with anger.

In such a situation of affairs, it was hardly possible that Sulpicius could have failed to operate the purposes of his commission. Pleuron, a city of Aetolia, which some time before had been incorporated into the Achaean league, now applied to be relieved from this connexion, and was pronounced an independent state¹². A difference about their boundaries, between the Lacedemonians and

and their success.

¹² Paus. in Achaicis.

B O O K VIII. Sect. I. Argives, was referred to the arbitration of the Roman commissioner. He might easily have settled the dispute; but this would not have accorded with his views. He chose rather to leave it to the decision of Callicrates the Achaean; who, being the most insolent of all the Greeks, and one of the most flagitious instruments of Rome, was therefore the most likely to widen the breach. There was, besides, a farther policy in this. The Spartans, exasperated by the treatment which they were probably to receive from Callicrates, would have an additional reason for resenting the domination of Achaia, to whose supreme court of judicature they, as part of the Achaean body, were now amenable; and they might resolve upon a separation, and demand their independency. Sulpicius, accordingly, gave them a private intimation, that Rome was ready to encourage and assist them in their expectations of this kind. Similar intimations, it appears from Pausanias, were given to all the states belonging to the confederacy of Achaia. So that this noble fabric of alliance being shaken and disjoined, became every day more feeble and more ruinous.

Affairs of
Oropus.

The Athenians, mean time ¹³, impoverished by their continual wars with Macedon, had been tempted by the prosperous circumstances of the people of Oropus ¹⁴, to make a predatory incursion on their territory, and had taken and plun-

¹³ Pausan. *ibid.* Plutarch in Catone.

¹⁴ A city on the confines of Attica.

dered their capital. The Oropians carried their complaint before the senate of Rome; who, with what view is obvious, instead of determining the matter themselves, left it to the decision of the Sicyonians. They accordingly condemned Athens to pay a fine of five hundred talents; from which sentence the Athenians having appealed to the Roman senate¹⁵, the Romans, still farther to excite

¹⁵ The contest, in which this affair of Oropus involved the Athenians, holds a distinguished place in history, from the share it had in introducing the arts of Greece into Rome. The Athenians, according to Plutarch (in Catone) had sent thither Carneades the Academic, and Diogenes the Stoic, (to whom Cicero (Orator. l. ii.) and Aulus Gellius (vii. 14.) add Critolaus the Peripatetic,) to plead their cause before the senate; the three persons, doubtless, from whose eloquence they thought the greatest success was to be expected. Some years before, certain Greek philosophers and orators had attempted to establish themselves in Rome; but those Romans who still retained the ancient spirit of their ancestors, apprehensive that this kind of study might check that martial ardor, which they rather wished to encourage, procured an edict to be issued, by which they were expelled the city. This, according to Suetonius, (de Clar. Rhetor.) happened in the year of Rome 592, in the consulship of Caius Fannius Strabo and Marcus Valerius Messala. The present philosophers stood on a different footing. They came invested with the sacred character of ambassadors; and by the law of nations were entitled to an honorable reception upon their arrival. All the Roman youths, therefore, who had a taste for learning, crowded to hear them. Above all, they were charmed with the impetuous and forcible eloquence of Carneades, who, says Cicero, *never attempted to support an argument, which he did not establish, or to combat*

B O O K the mutual enmity and contention of the Grecian
 VIII. states, pronounced the punishment to be excessive,
 Sect. I. and reduced it to a mulct of a hundred talents,

*an opinion, which he did not overthrow: "qui nullam
 " unquam rem defendet, quam non probârit; nullam op-
 " pugnavit, quam non everterit,"* so that his reputation
 filled in a short time the whole city, and drew an au-
 dience of the politeſt and moſt conſiderable perſons in Rome.
 The report was, " that there had come from Greece a
 " man of aſtoniſhing powers, whoſe eloquence, more than
 " human, was able to control and diſarm the fierceſt
 " paſſions, and who had made ſo ſtrong an impreſſion on
 " the Roman youths, that, abandoning every former
 " amuſement and purſuit, they burned with an enthuſiaſ-
 " tic love of philoſophy alone." The fathers in general
 were delighted to behold their ſons thus fondly receive
 the Grecian literature, and follow theſe wonderful men.
 Cato on the contrary, was alarmed. From the moment
 he perceived this paſſion for Grecian learning prevail, he
 began to fear, that the Roman youths would turn their
 ambition that way, and prefer the glory of eloquence to
 reputation for arms. When he found, that the fame of
 theſe philoſophers was riſing higher every day, and that
 even ſome of the ſenatorial order did not diſdain to trans-
 late their ſpeeches into Latin, he had no longer patience,
 but went to the ſenate, and preferred a complaint againſt
 the magiſtrates for detaining ſo long ſuch ambaffadors as
 theſe, who could perſuade the people to whatever they
 pleaſed. "Decide in their affairs," ſaid he to them,
 "as ſpeedily as poſſible, that, returning to their ſchools,
 "they may hold forth to the Grecian youth; and that
 "our young men may again give attention to the laws
 "and the magiſtrates." He had conceived an opinion,
 Plutarch tells us, which he was wont to deliver with a
 kind of prophetic confidence, "that, when the Romans
 "came thoroughly to imbibe the Grecian literature, they
 but

but without taking the least step to enforce its payment. The Oropians, thus baffled, implored the protection of Menalcidas, at this time first magistrate of Achaia; who, in consideration of a reward of ten talents, engaged to oblige the Athenians to do them justice. Callicrates, then at the head of the Roman faction, and therefore exceedingly powerful in the state, was prevailed upon, by the promise of three talents, to join with him in persuading the Achaean diet to support the cause of Oropus. This compact, however, was of little service to that city; for the Athenian garrison, as soon as they heard that the Achaeans were hastening to its relief, pillaged it a second time, and, carrying off every thing of value, had evacuated the place, and marched back to Athens, before Menalcidas appeared. This hireling protector contrived, however, to extort the ten talents

Character of
the Achaean
magistrates.

“ would lose the empire of the world.” The event in some measure justified the prediction; Rome having lost her constitution and liberties, at the very time she had reached the summit of Grecian literature, and had made the greatest progress in every kind of erudition. This, however, is not to be charged to the account of literary improvement; the cause is to be sought in that irreligion, that luxury, that dissoluteness and general immorality, the attendant and disgrace of those times, in which the greatest politeness of taste and refinement of living are found. Rome ceased to be free, not because she ceased to be rude and ignorant, but because, corrupted by prosperity, she ceased to be virtuous. The reader will readily conclude, that, defended by such able advocates, the Athenian cause was victorious.

B O O K from the wretched Oropians; and, to complete
VIII. his baseness, he defrauded Callicrates of his share,
Sect. 1. under the pretence that this Achaean, who in fact
 had fulfilled his engagements, having failed in the
 performance of the stipulated services, was entitled
 to no reward. The vengeance of disappointed
 avarice is blind and unrelenting. As soon there-
 fore as Menalcidas was out of office, Callicrates,
 though himself a traitor to his country, accused him
 before the convention of the Achaean estates, of
 having betrayed the interests of Achaia to the
 Romans, and of having labored to detach Sparta
 from the Achaean confederacy. And, so powerful
 was his influence, that the condemnation of Menal-
 cidias was inevitable, had he not, with the three
 talents which were to have been the portion of
 Callicrates, bribed Diaeus of Megalopolis; his suc-
 cessor in the office of chief magistrate; who ma-
 naged the business with such dexterity, that he
 was acquitted, in opposition to the general sense
 of the assembly.

Attempts of
 Diaeus
 against the
 liberties of
 Sparta.

These intrigues in the Achaean councils, which
 strongly marked the degeneracy of Grecian man-
 ners, had serious consequences. Diaeus, finding ¹⁶
 that the protection given to Menalcidas had lost
 him the confidence of his countrymen, became
 solicitous to reinstate himself in their affections, and
 formed the plan of bringing the Spartans into a total
 subjection to Achaia, a measure most grateful to
 the Achaean people, whose jealousy of Sparta

¹⁶ Pausan. in Achaicis.

nothing could extinguish. By the last arrangement made by the Romans, all matters of a civil nature, in which Sparta had any concern, were to be finally determined by the Achaean diet. Diaeus pretended, that by this arrangement all their criminal causes were likewise to be decided by the same tribunal. The admission of this claim, with their former subjection in civil matters, invested Achaia with full power over the property and lives of the Spartans, and reduced them to the most abject state of dependence. The legality of the claim was therefore denied, and Sparta would have appealed to Rome; but the Achaeans alledged, that such an appeal could not constitutionally be made, unless with the concurrence of the Achaean states, and immediately prepared to establish their pretended right by force of arms. It was in vain for Sparta to attempt resistance. And Diaeus, to insure the success of his schemes, imperiously demanded, that twenty-four of their principal citizens, who had most strenuously asserted this *last* immunity of their country, should be delivered into his hands. The Spartans durst not refuse; and to have obeyed, had been the highest cruelty. They took a middle course. The obnoxious persons were suffered to escape, and, under color of having fled from justice, their estates were confiscated, and the sentence of banishment was pronounced against them. They had, however, been previously instructed to repair to Rome, in order to lay the whole matter before the senate; and the Achaeans, being soon apprized

B O O K

VIII.

Sect. I.

The Spartans
appeal to
Rome.

B O O K of their intention, sent also a deputation thither to
VIII. justify their proceedings.

Sect. I. The Romans acted on this occasion with their
The artifice of usual duplicity. They heard, and gave hopes to
the Romans, both parties; and at last, instead of deciding, appointed commissioners, whom they promised to send into Greece, to investigate and determine the matter in dispute. But these commissioners, being on various pretences artfully detained in Rome, every thing was still left in suspense; and both parties returned elated with the success of their negotiations, without having obtained any formal decision. The Achaeans asserted, with exultation, that the subjection of Sparta was unquestionably decided: while the other party maintained, with equal confidence, that she was henceforth to be considered a independent.

War between
Achaia and
Sparta.

These contradictory accounts led to consequences which were agreeable to the wishes of the Romans. The contending powers had recourse to arms; the Spartans in vindication of their liberties; the Achaeans to enforce their subjection. A battle ensuing, the Spartans were defeated, with the loss of above a thousand of their best troops: and Sparta itself must probably have fallen, had not Damocritus, then at the head of the Achaean commonwealth, preferred plunder to the main object of the war; for which he was afterwards condemned, and fined in fifty talents. To Damocritus, Diaeus succeeded; who, at the request of Metellus, then commanding in Macedon, granted the Lacedemonians a truce, which was merely illusory; for

Diaeus employed the respite it afforded in gaining over and garrisoning all the circumjacent towns; so that the unsuspecting Spartans soon found themselves environed by their enemies. Irritated by these treacherous proceedings, they renewed the unequal war; which, from their enfeebled condition, turned out as unprosperous as before; their depopulated country could not raise an adequate military force¹⁷, nor could their exhausted treasury afford the necessary supplies.

After the strength of Peloponnesus had thus, during more than two years, been wasted in these intestine wars, the Roman commissioners at length appeared, with Aurelius Orestes at their head, and required the attendance of the Achaean chiefs at Corinth, in order to receive the final determination of the senate. The Roman plan now began to unfold itself. The Achaeans were commanded to retire within their ancient boundaries; and those states, not originally of the Achaean league, but which, in the course of time, had been incorporated into their confederacy¹⁸, were pronounced by the Romans to be dissevered from it, and henceforth unconnected and independent. This was evidently no more than a prelude to future humiliations; and was probably intended by the Romans as a kind of experiment. Should the Achaeans tamely submit, it was easy to proceed by degrees to the total dissolution of the league; if they made resist-

Roman commissioners come to Corinth;

and decree the dismemberment of Achaia.

¹⁷ Pausan. ub. sup.

¹⁸ Sparta, the Arcadians of Orchomenus, the people of Heracleum, near Mount Oeta, Argos, and Corinth.

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ance, that would serve to palliate whatever violent measures Rome should find it necessary to adopt. The best expedient that seemed left to this devoted nation, was apparently to have submitted for the present to what it was not in their power to prevent. But the republican fire was not yet extinguished; and it burst forth on this occasion with uncommon spirit.

Insurrection
of the
Achaeans.

The Roman envoys had not yet made an end of reading the decree, when the Achaean chiefs quitted the assembly in a transport of indignation, and spread the alarm among the populace, who had crowded in numbers to Corinth. The rage of the multitude was inexpressible; and, as if Sparta alone had been guilty, it proved fatal to every Spartan that could be found. Popular fury, as blind as it is violent, could not discern that Rome was the source of all the mischiefs of which they had to complain, and that, under this pretended regard for Sparta, she was only executing her own designs. The sacred character with which the Roman ministers were invested, could not, however, command respect amidst this storm of tumultuary violence. Their house was forced open, and every Spartan torn from that asylum: nay, the envoys themselves, say the Roman historians, owed their safety only to their flight¹⁹.

The Romans
affect gentle-
ness;

It was to be expected, that the Romans would have called Achaia to a rigorous account for an outrage so violent. They nevertheless sent a second

¹⁹ Just. L. xxxiv. c. 1. See also Polyb. Legat 143, and Florus L. ii. c. 16.

embassy thither, with particular instructions, not to animadvert with severity on the insult, but to employ only gentle expostulations; to conciliate, if possible, the minds of the Achaeans; and to leave to themselves the detection and punishment of the guilty. It is not difficult to trace the reasons of this uncommon and unexpected lenity²⁰. They are discoverable in the situation of the Roman affairs at this period. The final destruction of Carthage,

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Sect. I.

on what ac-
count.

²⁰ Polybius, (Legat. 140, and 144.) willing to excuse the Romans, pretends to believe, that their purpose, in thus threatening to dismember from the Achaean commonwealth the states which had been incorporated into it, was, not to carry their menaces into execution, but only to intimidate a people, whose high spirit had often been troublesome to them, and to awe those turbulent republicans into a more respectful observance of the dictates of Rome. And hence, according to him, arose that conciliatory temper, which they showed on this occasion. However, there were others, he himself acknowledges, who accounted for this lenity in a very different manner; ascribing it, not to any regard they had for the Achaeans, but to their own apprehensions of what the consequence might be, should they at this time have provoked Achaia to take up arms against them, when Carthage was not yet destroyed, and Spain was endeavouring to throw off the yoke. But nevertheless, says Polybius, the charge is ill-grounded: "the intentions of Rome towards Achaia had nothing hostile in them; she had admitted the Achaeans into her friendship, and reposed a confidence in their faith, far greater than in that of any other of the states of Greece." — Is it possible to read this without amazement! And could Polybius, who knew so well how treacherously the Romans had brought humiliation on Achaia, and with what excess of cruelty they had treated her illustrious chiefs; Polybius, who was himself one of the number, (see

B O O K
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Sect. I. alike the object of the hatred and dread of Rome, was not yet effected. The Roman arms, besides, had lately been unsuccessful in Spain; while new commotions, on a detail of which we are just about to enter, and which were not yet composed, had arisen in Macedon. In these circumstances, a war in Greece, an event to be expected from the present violence of the Achaean counsels, would have added considerably to the embarrassment of the Ro-

Legat. 105, and 122.) Polybius, who was able to point out, as he fully does, the flagitious motives that engaged them in the Dalmatian war, viz. *to keep their military men in practice*, who, now the Macedonians were subdued, had no other nation in those parts, in whose blood they could drench their weapons, (see Legat. 125.) Polybius, who had been himself a witness of the prevarication they had been guilty of in the case of Demetrius of Syria, son to Seleucus Philopator, and grandson to Antiochus the Great, whom, in the view of having Syria at their disposal, they endeavoured to despoil of his paternal throne, (see Legat. 114.) Polybius, who had also witnessed how insidiously they had drawn in, first the Aetolians, (see Legat. 13.) and afterwards the Carthaginians, (see Legat. 142.) *to intrust their dearest interests to the faith of the Roman people*; I say, with such examples before his eyes, could Polybius be at a loss to know, by what motives Rome was now actuated?

It is not impossible to discover what misguided the pen of this excellent historian. He was a captive of Rome, and Scipio's friend. Either therefore his attachment to the one led him to think more favorably of the Romans than they deserved; or his dread of the other induced him to suppress sentiments, which he could not avow without danger. So difficult is it for the historian, who lives near the times of which he writes, to keep close to the line of truth, unwarping by fear or by affection.

man affairs. The Achaeans, however, from all that now appears, might have derived important advantages from the mild and pacific aspect which the Romans assumed on this occasion. It certainly presented them with the opportunity of soothing a power, which they could neither expect to subdue nor to resist; and of obtaining more favorable terms upon the subversion of their constitution, which, it was obvious, could not long be preserved.

Guided, however, only by their resentments, they acted in direct opposition to all such prudential considerations. Unfortunately too for the Achaeans, their chief magistrate, Critolaus ²¹, was a man daring and precipitate. He had risen to power by encouraging the frantic multitude in their defiance of Rome, and, of consequence, besides the impulse of his natural temper, was impelled to violent measures by the additional instigations of popularity and ambition. Sextus, who was at the head of the Roman embassy, had, upon his arrival, demanded of him, to convene the national council, that he might lay before them his commission from the senate ²². Critolaus, in appearance, complied; and accordingly issued his summons; but he sent at the same time private directions to the several members of the Achaean diet not to obey it; so that, upon the appointed day, the Roman ambassadors had none but Critolaus to confer with; who, as if to add to the mockery, told them, that they had only to wait the expiration of six

Resentment of
the Achaeans.

Character
and impru-
dent conduct
of Critolaus,
their chief
magistrate.

²¹ See Pausan. in Achaicis. ²² Polyb. Legat. 144.

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months, and a second diet should be convened. The consequence was, that the Romans, highly offended, returned to Italy without executing the business of their embassy; and no sooner were they departed, than Critolaus, to evince that he meant to keep no measures with Rome, assembled the national council at Corinth²³, and, notwithstanding the conciliatory interposition of Metellus, by his deputies Papirius and Scipio Africanus the younger, obtained a declaration of war against Sparta, though avowedly protected by Rome; to which mad resolution Thebes and Chalcis imprudently acceded.

Views and
policy of
Rome.

We have entered into a minute detail of the intrigues and contests, which appear to have agitated these petty republics during this period, in order that the insidious policy of Rome, as far as regards them, might be developed and exposed to view. We have beheld her affecting the most solicitous concern for the immunities of some particular city, that she might kindle the fire of variance and contention in the neighbouring states, and thus excite them to mutual hostilities, and mutual destruction. We have seen her bestowing her favors on the meanest and most worthless among the Greeks, because, false to their country, they were the ready and pliant instruments of her ambitious purposes; whilst those distinguished by wisdom, authority, and temperate counsels, by whose faithful services the public ruin might have been retarded, were

²³ Polyb. Pausan. *ibid.*

discountenanced, oppressed, and banished. And lastly, we have seen her employing the very mischief which she herself had encouraged, the madness of an incensed populace, which her own oppressions had provoked, as an excuse for the violence and flagrant cruelty she exercised on this unfortunate people.

During these transactions in Achaia, a war had again broken out in Macedon²⁴; which, from the few imperfect hints history has preserved to us, appears to have been attended with circumstances of a very extraordinary nature. Andriscus, a man of obscure extraction, say the Roman writers, originally of Adramyttium, a town of Troas, was thought to bear a strong resemblance to the late Macedonian king. Sixteen years had elapsed since the defeat of Perseus. Upon the credit, nevertheless, of this supposed resemblance, a story was fabricated, that he was son to Perseus by a concubine; that his father had directed that he should be educated in the utmost privacy, lest, if his parentage should be known, he should be involved in the same destruction with the rest of his royal house; and that he had intrusted the secret to certain persons, who had authentic vouchers to produce in support of the allegation. Andriscus first applied to Demetrius Soter, king of Syria, whose sister had been wife to Perseus; who doubting the truth of the story, or probably fearing the Romans, seized him as an impostor, and sent him to Rome.

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War in Ma-
cedon.

Claims and
history of
Andriscus;

²⁴ Liv. Epitom. L. xlix. and l. Florus, L. ii. c. 14. Zonaras, Tom. 2.

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Sect. I.

is acknow-
ledged by
the Mace-
donians;

But in such contempt, from his appearance and manners, was he held by the Romans, that they paid no attention to the confinement of their prisoner; who soon after effected his escape, and fled for refuge into Thrace. Here, the tale of his birth and misfortunes being eagerly listened to, and readily believed by this plain people, he had soon formed a party, and through them had introduced himself to their Macedonian neighbours. The spirit of discontent which, at this time, universally prevailed in Macedon, secured him a favorable reception: the nation began to feel the severity of the Roman yoke; and, without scrupulously investigating the claims of Andriscus, considered him only as a daring adventurer, through whom they had a chance of being delivered from their oppressors. There is much reason to suspect, that the Romans were not ill pleased at seeing these discontents ripen into open rebellion; and that they at first connived at them, in the hope of availing themselves of the pretence with which they furnished them. Exhausted and humbled as the Macedonians were, still a little property, and a few privileges remained to them; and a new war would afford the Romans an excuse for doing what they had hitherto been restrained from by motives of policy alone. But the despair of an oppressed people found resources, of which the Romans were not aware; and where they expected only to find an opportunity of gratifying their despotism and rapacity, they met a war difficult and dangerous. When accounts arrived at Rome, that the

insurrection in Macedon would probably become a much more serious business than had been imagined, Scipio Nasica, who, since the time he had served under Aemilius Paulus, had a considerable influence in Greece, was dispatched thither to observe the situation of affairs. His report was, that, by the assistance which he had obtained from the Achaeans and some of the cantons of Thessaly, he had with difficulty covered the northern provinces of Greece from the incursions of the enemy; but that the revolt was general throughout Macedon, where Andriscus was in possession of the throne, and had assumed the name of Philip; that most of the Thracian tribes had likewise declared for him; that several of the Grecian states were suspected of favoring the same cause; and that, unless the Romans exerted themselves speedily, and with vigor, the issue of the war was to be dreaded. In consequence of this intelligence, a considerable army was immediately ordered into Greece, under the command of the praetor Juventius Thalna. Juventius, at the same time rash and conceited, marched immediately against the usurper, with a settled contempt of this pageant-king, and in the full assurance that he durst not meet him in the field. His vanity had its reward. The Macedonian took care, by various feints, to confirm the presumption of the praetor, until at last he drew him on to an engagement, on the terms he wished, in which the Romans were totally defeated, with the slaughter of the greatest part of the army; and Juventius himself falling, while he endeavoured in

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meets the
 Romans in
 battle,

and defeats
 them.

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Sect. 1.

The Romans
alarmed;

vain, by personal courage, to compensate for his want of abilities as a general.

This unfortunate event was attended with circumstances exceedingly alarming. Thessaly, with most of the northern provinces of Greece, acknowledged the claims of the victor, and took up arms in support of him. And though the Achaeans had not followed their example, yet the present discontents of that people, and the manner in which their services had been repaid in the beginning of the Macedonian war, afforded little hopes that they would again be active in the interests of Rome. Even as far as Africa did the influence of this revolution appear to have reached; and an embassy arrived from the Carthaginians to congratulate the new king, and to negotiate an alliance with Macedon. To guard against these impending dangers, a powerful force was levied with all possible expedition, and Metellus, an illustrious Roman, of high reputation, was appointed to conduct the war.

Send Metellus
against him.

Close of the
fortunes of
Andriscus:

By this time, if the historians of Rome may be depended on, the blandishments of royalty were beginning to effect what the Roman arms had in vain attempted. Andriscus, thinking himself established upon the throne, abandoned himself to a viciousness of disposition, which he had before concealed. Not content with indulging to a shameful excess in all the gratifications of luxury, he ruled with all the wantonness of insult, rapacity, and cruelty; so that the unhappy Macedonians, instead of that freedom, in hopes of which they had crowded to his banners, experienced all the

miserics of slavery. This as a Roman account, especially when compared with facts to be gathered from the same historians, seems liable to some objections. Notwithstanding his dubious title, the Macedonians, unprovoked by all these alledged vices, preserved to him an unalterable fidelity; a kind of proof, that either he was not altogether so dissolute and oppressive as the Roman writers pretend, or that the Romans themselves were such execrable masters, that the yoke of the most outrageous tyrant was deemed light, and thought preferable to theirs. And so far was he from being odious among his allies, that, even when overpowered by the Romans, he found a friendly and safe retreat in Thrace, nor was he delivered up until Roman gold, it is to be suspected, proved an overmatch for Thracian honesty. His misfortunes seem to have been chiefly owing to his temerity, and the contempt he entertained of his enemy. Though Metellus, who had advanced against him, was far superior in cavalry, yet the Macedonian ventured an engagement, and obtained a complete victory. Elated with this success, and thinking that the Romans would hardly, for some time, hazard a second battle, he made a considerable detachment for the security of Thessaly. This proved fatal to him. Metellus marked the opportunity; and, attacking him with a great superiority of numbers, cut his little army to pieces, and obliged him to take refuge among the Thracians. The Thracian princes soon supplied him with fresh troops. But the Roman commander had improved

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his contempt
of the enemy
the cause of
his ruin.

B O O K in such a manner the advantages derived from his
 VIII. late victory, and was so well prepared for his
 Sect. 1. reception, that, notwithstanding the most spirited
 exertion on the part of Andriscus, he was routed,
 with the loss of the greater part of his army, and
 found himself under the necessity of again retiring
 into Thrace. The prætor could not pursue him
 thither; the commotions, we have before mentioned,
 in Achaia, which now threatened to involve all
 the adjacent states, calling off his attention to the sou-
 thern provinces of Greece. Mean while, it was not his
 purpose that Andriscus should escape. He had already
 entered into a negotiation with the Thracian chiefs,
 at whose court the fugitive prince had taken sanc-
 tuary, who, for certain considerations easily to
 be conjectured, but which the Roman writers have
 not thought proper to specify delivered him up
 to Metellus.

The unhappy fate of Andriscus, it might have
 been expected, would have restored peace to
 Macedon. But, such now was the deplorable situa-
 tion of the miserable Macedonians, that they were
 eager to support the pretensions of every claimant,
 through whom they had the most distant prospect
 of deliverance. No sooner had Andriscus perished,
 than Alexander, another pretended son of Perseus,
 made his appearance, and met with the same loyal
 welcome from this oppressed and credulous people;
 and nearly with the same success. A considerable
 party had taken up arms in support of his title,
 but, unequal to a contest with Metellus, who,
 upon the first tidings of this insurrection, had
 hastened

A second ad-
 venturer as-
 cends the
 throne of
 Macedon;

hastened back into Macedon, they were soon dispersed; the pretended prince making his escape into Dardania. To the hospitality and incorruptible honesty of the inhabitants of this country, he was much more indebted than the unfortunate Andriscus had been to those of Thrace. The Romans, after the strictest inquiry and the most lavish offers, could never discover his place of concealment. And from this time, as history is silent, nothing more is known of this adventurer.

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Sect. 1.

is over-
thrown,
but escapes,

These repeated insurrections in Macedon effectually answered the end, which the Romans doubtless had in view. We have already seen the severity of the terms imposed on that kingdom, by the arrangement of Aemilius Paulus. These terms, nevertheless, the Romans considered as the excess of mercy. It was thought expedient to finish more completely the subjection of the Macedonian people; which accordingly we are told was now fully accomplished. This event took place about twenty years after the settlement by Aemilius. And henceforward Macedon remained in the humiliated state of a Roman province. By what arrangements the final humiliation of the Macedonians was effected, history has not exactly informed us; but of this it is easy to form very probable conjectures. The Macedonians had, at first, been allowed to have judges of their own for the decision of trivial matters; but even this faint shadow of judicial power they now lost, and, according to the customary Roman practice with conquered nations, a general confiscation probably took place of all the

The Romans
turn these
insurrections
to advantage,

B O O K estates throughout Macedon, which were in the
VIII. smallest degree objects of desire to these rapacious
Sect. 1. conquerors.

In this manner did Rome establish her dominion on the ruins of every national constitution. At first, her yoke was for the most part laid on with an affectation of gentleness; but, afterwards, repeated arbitrary and oppressive proceedings having provoked resistance, every manly effort against them became an excuse for additional exertion of power; until the system was by degrees completed, and appeared in all the stern severity of despotism.

A third adventurer appears in Macedon;

Some years after, there appeared a third adventurer²¹, a second Philip, and another pretended son to Perseus; who found that Macedonian credulity was not yet exhausted, and that their desire of liberty was not yet at an end.

and meets with no success.

But his career was soon run. Having hazarded an engagement with Tremellius Scrofa, the Roman commander, his army was totally defeated, and he himself was slain.

²¹ Liv. Epitom. L. iii. Eutrop. L. iv.

B O O K VIII.

S E C T I O N II.

C O N T E N T S.

The Achaeans, provoked by the perfidiousness of Rome, take up Arms — Metellus marches against them — defeats them — is superseded by Mummius, — who continues the war — obtains a decisive victory — takes, and burns Corinth — puts an end to the Achean Commonwealth, and to the liberties of Greece. — The principal causes that produced the decline and final overthrow of the Grecian states.

THE Macedonian insurrection under Andriscus was not yet completely suppressed, when the flames of war, which the Achaeans had lighted up, were already spreading through the southern provinces of Greece. Metellus had at first endeavoured, by repeated remonstrances, to stop the progress of these commotions. But, finding his representations to be ineffectual, he had, as soon as the Macedonian affairs permitted him, advanced southward, to intimidate, since he could not persuade; and perhaps not without the hope, that to the reduction of Macedon, he should have the glory of adding the conquest of Peloponnesus.

From the extraordinary spirit displayed by the inducements Achaeans on this occasion, and from the precipi- to it;

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imprudence
in attempt-
ing it.

Siege of He-
racleum.

Achaean
defeated by
Metellus;

pitancy with which they rushed into this war, a judgment may be formed of the violence of their resentment. The Roman arms, from their late success in Macedon, were become more formidable than ever; and of all the Grecian states without the Isthmus, whatever might be their secret wish, not one had ventured to avow itself the confederate of Achaia; Thebes, and the people of Chalcis excepted. The Achaeans nevertheless, as if unconscious of their own weakness, and insensible of the recent fate of Macedon, provoked a contest, which was evidently to terminate in discomfiture and servitude.

The siege of Heracleum, near Mount Oeta, which had revolted and declared for Rome, was the commencement¹ of hostilities. It was invested and taken by Critolaus²; who afterwards hearing, that Metellus was on his march to attack him, endeavoured to retreat to Scarphaea³, where, the Romans coming up with him, before he could get into the city, he was forced to engage*. The issue was fatal to the Achaeans. They were defeated,

¹ See Pausan. in Achaicis.

² OLYMP. CLVIII. 2. BEFORE CHRIST 144.

³ A city of the Locri.

* Pausanias (in Achaicis) blames Critolaus for his retreat to Scarphaea; and thinks that he ought rather to have secured the straits of Thermopylae, and thus have stopped the progress of the Roman army. But the way over the mountain was no longer considered as impracticable; and, unless he had secured the passes above, for which probably his forces were not sufficient, his being possessed of the straits below had been of little service.

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and the greater part of their army slain or made prisoners. The fate of Critolaus himself is uncertain, his body not having been found. He is supposed to have perished in some of the morasses *, which then covered a great part of his country, from the Maliac bay towards the foot of Mount Oeta. In addition to the loss sustained by the Achaeans in the field, a thousand Arcadians, who had escaped, were intercepted in their retreat homeward by Metellus, and all put to the sword.

The Roman general marched then to Thebes, who takes Thebes; which he found deserted; most of the inhabitants having fled to the mountains upon his approach. To induce them to return and submit, he gave orders to spare the city; and required only, that Pytheas the Boeotian chief, who had advised the league with Achaia, should be put to death.

His intention now was, to enter Peloponnesus, offers terms of peace to the Achaeans, and at once, if possible, to put an end to the war. However, as if averse from the decision of arms, he once more endeavoured to gain the Achaeans by expostulation and friendly professions; and even offered to conclude a peace, on the condition that Sparta, and the other states they held in subjection, should be restored to their ancient privileges. But, either governed by passion, or perhaps distrusting an enemy by whom they had been so often deceived, the Achaeans rejected his proposals. It appears indeed which are rejected. from the account given by the Romans themselves,

* So says Pausanias: Livy's epitomizer, (l. lii.) in contradiction to him, says, that he poisoned himself.

B O O K that this proffered peace was but a political expedient, in which the Achaeans would have found but little security; and that in fact, under the pretence of serving them, the Roman general was only consulting the interests of his own ambition. For Mummius, one of the new consuls, had been appointed his successor; and, jealous of having the fruits of his victory wrested from him, it might be his wish to settle the affairs of Peloponnesus on any terms, rather than allow his successor to reap the glory of terminating the war*.

Metellus superseded by Mummius.

The Achaeans prepare for a vigorous defence;

emboldened by a trifling advantage;

Mummius soon after arrived, and assumed the command. But neither the arrival of the new general, nor the supplies he brought with him, occasioned the least alteration in the Achaean councils. Diaeus the Megalopolitan, a man not inferior in daring enterprise to Critolaus, had been appointed chief magistrate in his stead. Immediately upon his appointment, he summoned to the field every Achaean and Arcadian who was able to bear arms, and considerably augmented his forces by the manumission, and inlisting of the slaves. With an army, amounting at most to twenty thousand men, this impatient and adventurous commander prepared to dispute the fate of Achaia with Rome. A trifling advantage, obtained at the beginning, emboldened him the more. Mummius, being encamped within the Isthmus, that he might be apprized of the motions of the enemy, had posted a body of auxiliaries at its southern extremity,

* See Pausan. ub. sup.

where the strait opens into Peloponnesus. The apparent remissness and security of this advanced guard, tempted the Achaeans. They attacked, and carried the post, after having slain about five hundred of the detachment. This success to these vain republicans was a sure presage of victory. In full confidence that the defeat of Mummius might as easily be accomplished, they with the utmost ardor demanded to be instantly led against him; and their demand was readily complied with by the impetuous Diaeus.

Mean while Mummius, who marked the exultation and confidence of the Achaean troops, and foresaw the consequences, had already formed his army in order of battle; and, upon the approach of the enemy, commanded his horse to charge the Grecian cavalry; who, thrown into confusion by this unexpected vigor, after a short resistance, were broken, and put to flight. The infantry, undaunted by this misfortune, for some time maintained their ground with resolution and firmness; but, deserted by their cavalry, and attacked in flank by a detachment, which the consul had kept in reserve for that purpose, they were at length totally routed^{*}. are totally routed.

This battle was fought within the straits. And so well assured were the Achaeans of the victory, that all the hills around were covered with their women and children, whom they had brought to be spectators of the discomfiture of the Roman

^{*} Pausan. ub. sup.

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Corinth
abandoned,

taken;

army. The pursuit⁷ was continued by the consul, as far as Corinth, to which it was his intention to lay siege; but, to his great amazement, he found the gates open, and the city deserted. The remains of the Achaean army had pushed through it; and the bulk of the inhabitants, abandoning themselves to despair, accompanied them in their flight. This extraordinary appearance, so different from what he expected, struck the cautious Roman. A city, the pride of Greece, famous from the sieges it had sustained, and known to be of considerable strength, forsaken, without an attempt to save it, induced him to apprehend a snare. Impressed with suspicions, it was not until the third day, after he had encamped before it, that he ventured within the walls. On entering the city, a scene, the most splendid that Greece had to display, was exhibited to the eyes of the Roman army. Beside the advantages derived from the fertility of its territory, Corinth had for ages been the great emporium of both the eastern and western worlds; and, since its restoration to freedom by Aratus, it had become the principal city of the Achaean confederacy. From these copious sources, its opulence had increased to a wonderful degree. Whatever decorations either private wealth or public magnificence, under the direction of the most delicate and refined taste, had ever bestowed on any city, it had accordingly enjoyed. Its noble edifices, porticos, temples, and palaces, were the admiration even of the Greeks, to whom objects

⁷ Just. L. xxxiv. c. 2.

of this kind were familiar; and its paintings and statues, in number as well as in value, were not inferior to what Athens herself had to boast. Its elegance accordingly had passed into a proverb^a.

Of all this wealth Mummius became now the master. The possession of Corinth, a prize of such value, and so easily gained, afforded such a striking acknowledgment of the humiliation of Achaia, as might have disarmed the resentment of the victor. But the sternness of Roman severity was not thus to be softened. The situation of Corinth made it formidable^b, and consequently pointed out its destruction, according to the desolating plan of Rome. The horrid scene began with the massacre of the few men found in it, and the sale of the women and children. The Consul having then directed his soldiers to remove the most valuable of the paintings and statues, with which the temples and other public buildings were adorned, commanded the city to be set on fire, and all its boasted monuments of art and genius to be consumed. And such, it is said, was the quantity of curious works in gold, silver, and brass, thus devoted to the flames, that, during the conflagration, the united streams of these various metals poured along the streets of this unhappy city^c, forming that famous consolidated mixture, which obtained the name of

and burnt

^a Horat. Epist. L. i. Epist. xvii. v. 36.

^b "Non cuivis homini contingit adire Corinthum."

^c This reason is assigned by Cicero himself. See Leg. Manil. 32. Offic. L. i. 11.

^d Flor. L. ii. c. 16.

B O O K VIII. *Corinthian brass*, and which, for many ages, was held in the highest estimation. This unprovoked destruction many of the Romans, however, seem to have lamented; and the *nollem Corinthum*¹¹ of one of the finest geniuses of Rome, is a lasting testimony of this opinion.

The integrity
of Mummius:

To the honor of Mummius, it is nevertheless to be observed, that he stands altogether clear of a species of guilt, with which other Roman commanders are generally charged. To the unpolished taste of the rough soldier, history has, with some apparent reason, ascribed his contempt for those exquisite productions of art, which an improved and travelled Roman would have beheld with admiration. Being present, we are told¹², at the sale of some of these Corinthian paintings, when the *Bacchus* of Aristides, a piece esteemed one of the finest in the world, was purchased for king Attalus, at the price of six hundred thousand sesterces¹³; "it is impossible," cried out Mummius, "it should be of such value, unless some magical power is concealed in it; and if so, it must not be possessed by an Asiatic." He then commanded it to be set aside. And so little was he acquainted with the unrivalled excellence of the great Grecian masters, that he is said to have bargained with the commanders of the vessels, to whose care he intrusted the statues and paintings, which he was sending to Italy, "that, in case any of them were lost, they

¹¹ See Cicer. de Offic. L. i. c. 11. & L. iii. c. 11.

¹² Plin. L. xxxv. c. 4.

¹³ L. 4843. 15s. od.

“ should deliver him new ones in their stead ”.¹⁴ However much, at the same time, men of taste may lament the unrefined manners of the Roman Consul, his disinterestedness stands unimpeached in history. No portion of the riches of Corinth were applied by Mummius to his own private emolument: Cicero himself informing us¹⁵, that, though several of those curious works of the painter and statuary, which he had saved out of Corinth, were to be seen in the temples and public edifices throughout Italy, yet in the house of Mummius not one was to be found. And in such indigence, after all his conquests, did he leave his daughter, an only child, that provision was made for her by the senate out of the public treasury¹⁶.

May it not then be suspected, that these Corinthian works owed their destruction rather to the virtuous and patriotic apprehensions of the honest Roman, than to inelegance of mind? While the fine arts had been progressively carried to an uncommon degree of perfection in this part of Greece, every kind of luxury had kept pace with them. And, distinguished by their delicacy of taste, the Corinthians had not been less remarkable for their voluptuousness and dissolute manners. Hence probably the apprehensions of Mummius, that the introduction of the same arts into Italy should give rise to a similar degeneracy. The statues and paint-

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Sect. 2.

his motives
for destroying
Corinth.

¹⁴ See Vell. Patercul. L. i. c. 13.

¹⁵ In Verrem. i. 21. & Offic. L. ii. 22.

¹⁶ Front. Stratag. L. iv. c. 3. 15.

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ings he preserved, as they appeared to him the least dangerous articles of Corinthian splendor¹⁷: the rest, he considered as tending only to enervate; and, in this view, he destroyed what he feared might prove fatal to his countrymen. To save Rome, he burnt Corinth¹⁸.

Thebes and
Chalcis razed
to the ground.

Thebes and Chalcis, now fell the victims of their Achaean alliance. Mummius, to whom an affectation of lenity was no longer necessary, razed them to the ground¹⁹. Meanwhile Achaia remained in a state of inactivity, without forming a single plan, or attempting the least exertion for self-defence. Diaeus, whose rashness had principally contributed to bring on the present calamity, had fled from the field of battle to Megalopolis, and in the frenzy of despair, murdered his wife, and laid violent hands on himself. The Achaean cities were, most of them, forsaken by their chiefs; many of them were abandoned by numbers of their inhabitants; and all of them waited the determination of their fate with anxious and trembling solicitude. The

Despair of the
Achaeans.

¹⁷ And yet this very introduction of these productions of the great Grecian masters into Italy, Sallust, certainly an able judge, numbers among the causes of the corruption of the Roman people. Velleius Paterculus uses the same language. *Better*, says he, speaking of Mummius's ignorance in the arts, *that the Roman taste had still remained thus unimproved, than that it should have acquired the improvement it now has, at the expense of the public manners.* See Vell. Paterc. L. i. c. 13.

¹⁸ About 103 years after, it was rebuilt and colonized by Julius Caesar.

¹⁹ Liv. Epitom. L. lii.

demolition of three great cities, seeming in the mean time to have stayed the victor's fury, he now contented himself with dismantling every place of strength, and with obliging the inhabitants to surrender up their arms. Even this, however, was but a temporary suspension of servitude and ruin. Mummius, in fact, could not proceed farther, till the arrival of commissioners from Rome, jointly with whom, he was to be impowered finally to settle the affairs of Achaia. And, accordingly, upon their arrival, the long-projected scheme of Roman policy was carried into execution. They began by the dissolution of the Achaean constitution, and by declaring the several states and cities, formerly component parts of that respectable league, to be henceforth entirely distinct and independent. All popular assemblies were forbidden throughout Peloponnesus, and that small share of the civil administration which the natives were permitted to retain, was transferred from the people, and placed in the hands of the richer few, whose responsible circumstances the Romans considered as a pledge of their subjection. At the same time, lest any individual should acquire an influence that might be troublesome to Rome, by the possession of extensive property, they not only took care to impoverish the more opulent families, by fines and severe taxations, but also enacted, that a Grecian should be incapable of increasing his possessions by the purchase of any lands in Greece.

It had, in former times, been the constant policy of Rome, in giving laws to the conquered, at first

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Dissolution of
the republic
of Achaia.Reasons for
the Roman
severity.

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to disguise the severity of the humiliation to which she destined them. But now Achaia, for many years the most respectable of the Grecian states, of whose aid Rome had frequently availed herself, and whose greatest crime was, that she had liberties, which were dear to her, saw herself doomed at once to the most abject vassalage. The reason is evident: in those days of seeming gentleness, Syria, Macedon, and Carthage were still formidable; and had Rome at once avowed her purposes, the mingled feelings of interest, indignation, and despair, would surely have united these nations in a cause, which was in reality the cause of them all; and Rome might have been involved in a contest pregnant with difficulty and danger; whereas now, neither Syria nor Macedon was in a condition to excite her apprehensions, and the final destruction of Carthage by the younger Africanus, which had taken place about the same time with that of Corinth, enabled them to throw aside the mask of gentleness, as it left them not an enemy to fear.

The terms granted to Achaia, which we have mentioned, are recorded by Pausanias²⁰. But the particular severities employed on this occasion, he and every other historian have passed over in silence. Indeed an exact relation of all occurrences of this kind, which such a revolution must have produced, was hardly to be expected from the writers of those days; who, whether Grecian or Roman, influenced either by fear or shame, would avoid a minute

²⁰ In Achaicis.

detail of the melancholy story. With what unrelenting acrimony the Romans pursued these wretched remains of the Grecian people, we may, however, gather from a circumstance which Polybius²¹, though in a great measure the advocate of Rome, has preserved to us. The commissioners encouraged the preferring an accusation against those Achaean chiefs, who of old had distinguished themselves in advancing the prosperity, or vindicating the liberties of Achaia. Philopoemen and Aratus were arraigned as criminals! and even Achaeus, the supposed founder of the Achaean people, as if on this account he ought to be numbered among the enemies of Rome, was to have suffered by a posthumous condemnation! A request was preferred to the commissioners, that all the decrees which had been enacted to the honor of these patriots should be rescinded, and their statues overthrown. But while this extraordinary trial was carrying on, and when sentence was on the point of being pronounced, Polybius arrived in Peloponnesus, in his return from the siege of Carthage, whither he had accompanied his friend Scipio. Disposed, as Polybius might be, from a regard to his personal safety and interest, and still more, perhaps, from an attachment to his Roman friend, to give way to the prejudices of that all-powerful people, and well apprized of the jealousy they entertained of these illustrious citizens, the boast and honor of Achaia;

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Extraordinary
prosecution
set on foot by
the Roman
commission-
ers.

²¹ See Polyb. de virtut. & vitiis, p. 1483, & seqq. Casaub. 8°.

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The spirited
conduct of
Polybius :

still this great man could not suppress his indignation at the ungenerous attempt. Philopoemen he had personally known in his earlier years, and had in part been a witness of the exalted virtues of that excellent patriot; “and shall then,” said he, “that integrity of conduct, which was his glory, be now his guilt! Far from having been the inveterate enemy of Rome, he supported your cause, he fought under your banners, against Philip, against Antiochus; and if at any time he engaged in opposition to you, it was only when, impelled by the leading motive of all his actions, regard for his country. Such as he was, such were also Aratus, and those other Achaean chiefs, whose statues you are about to demolish; criminal, only because unalterably faithful to the interests of Achaia. And will you condemn in a Grecian, what in a Roman you would have accounted worthy of the highest praise?”

The commissioners seemed convinced; and, probably conscious of the infamous part they were acting, artfully gave up to Polybius what they could not have insisted on, without making themselves altogether odious. They not only dropped the prosecution, but likewise caused the statues of Achæus, Aratus, and Philopoemen, which had already been transported out of Peloponnesus, to be brought back. They even affected to do Polybius particular honor; and orders were issued to present him with whatever portion of the confiscated estates he should think worthy of his acceptance; an offer which he nobly refused, disdaining to grow rich
by

by the spoils of his unhappy countrymen. His disinterested spirit raised him still higher in the estimation of the Romans; and he had a commission given him, to visit the several districts of Achaia, and to re-establish tranquillity and cultivation throughout that distracted and desolated country. The ability and zeal with which he acquitted himself in the discharge of this delicate office, endeared him to all. To have encouraged the Achaeans in the most distant hopes of that liberty which they were never more to enjoy, would have been the highest cruelty. He therefore endeavoured to reconcile them to their present fate; to allay the various discontents and personal animosities which the late times of tumult and confusion had engendered; and to induce them to acquiesce in a peaceable submission to those laws, under which they were now destined to live.

Amidst unavailing regret for having been so long deprived of the presence of a citizen, whose salutary instructions might possibly have prevented their ruin, the Achaeans gratefully acknowledged the importance of his present services by every mark of public esteem. Some of the statues then erected in honor of this patriot, Pausanias, who lived three hundred and twenty years after the destruction of Corinth, tells us, remained till his time. On one, which he saw in Arcadia, within the sacred precinct of the *Despoina*, the most revered of the Arcadian deities, appeared the following honorable inscription²²: "Polybius, from whose counsels Greece

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his disinter-
estedness;honors paid
him by his
countrymen²² See Paus. in Arcadicis.

B O O K " might have derived safety, had Greece suffered
 VIII. " herself to be guided by them; and in whom she
 Sect. 2. " found her only protector, in the day of her
 " distress."

Greece formed
 into a pro-
 vince;

The overthrow of the Achaean commonwealth finished the debasement of Greece, which soon after sunk into a Roman district, under the denomination of the province of Achaia; because with the overthrow of this republic was completed the final reduction of the Grecian states²³. In this province were comprised Peloponnesus, Attica, Boeotia, Phocis, and all that part of Greece lying to the south of Epire and Thessaly. All to the north of that line, as far as the utmost verge of the Macedonian frontier, was the province of Macedon. These two provincial governments of Macedon and Achaia, including the ancient dominions of the Macedonian princes, together with the several states and republics of Greece — that once illustrious land! ennobled by a number of glorious achievements! the chosen seat of liberty, science, polity, and arts! were henceforward to be consigned to humiliation and servitude!

The Roman writers, however, speak of Greece, and particularly of Athens, as still retaining, under all the disadvantages of this provincial establishment, that pre-eminence in literature, by which she was distinguished in her days of freedom and glory. Accordingly, for some ages after, we find the Roman youth resorting thither, in quest of that

²³ Pausan. in Achaicis;

improvement, or at least of that reputation, which the arts and sciences of Greece were supposed capable of bestowing. But nevertheless, rather to the fame of ancient days, than to any merit she from this period possessed, is the estimation of Rome to be ascribed. The liberties and genius of Greece gradually declined, and at last expired together. For, though her philosophical schools for a while maintained a respectable name; though, at distant intervals, a few writers of distinguished merit made their appearance, especially in the antiquarian and historical lines, yet did the general turn of the Grecian people soon become frivolous, and, in resemblance of their fortunes, groveling and servile. Their walk of learning seldom produced any thing higher than the professional rhetorician or the captious disputant; and what abilities they possessed were meanly prostituted in humoring the follies, or in administering to the depravity of their Roman masters. By degrees, therefore, the very appellation of Greek, which once implied superior talents and the highest mental improvement, came to signify somewhat exceedingly abject; and under the Roman Caesars was frequently used, by the satirists²⁴, as a term of the utmost reproach. Even those literary productions, which in this decline of Greece do her most honor, when compared with what went before, can only be considered as the feeble rays of the evening sun, when contrasted with his meridian splendor. What praise

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its decline in
literature
after this
period.

²⁴ See Juvenal passim.

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soever we may be willing to allow them, we search in vain for that originality; that just observance of nature; that richness of invention; that nervous sense; that glow and dignity of sentiment; that power of expression, which characterize her earlier poets, historians, philosophers, and orators.

Age of glory
of the Grecian
people;

From the days of Cimon, when Greece had attained the summit of her glory, to her final subjection to the Roman power, about three hundred and twenty years had elapsed; and from the death of Alexander the Great; when the whole Persian monarchy confessed the Grecian dominion, about one hundred and sixty. It may then be matter of useful instruction to inquire, from what causes that total alteration was brought on, which, within this period of time, appears to have taken place in the Grecian character; and whence, a people, whose civil institutions, prowess, and extensive accomplishments, seemed to lead to universal empire, should have thus declined, and with so little struggle have sunk into dependence and insignificance.

causes of
their decay
and final
overthrow.

Division in-
to small, and
independent
principalities;

I. There was originally a principle of weakness and decay in the very constitution of the Grecian government. Greece, parcelled out into a number of small states, each enjoying an independent sovereignty, was incapable of that exertion of strength, which results from conspiring counsels, and the joint efforts of an embodied people. On the important day of Marathon, of all the Grecian states, only ten thousand Athenians, and one thousand Plataeans appeared in support of the common cause.

And though afterwards, roused by the example of Athens, other Grecian powers armed against the Persians, yet was this the armament only of a few states; formed too by most of them on a partial and confined plan, rather for the preservation of their own particular territories, than in vindication of the general liberties, and the defence of the country at large; so that, had not the artifice as well as the firmness of Themistocles been employed on this interesting occasion, it had been hardly possible to have saved Greece. The council of the Amphictyones was indeed a kind of national senate, and probably in its first institution was designed to be the centre of unity of the several states, whose representatives composed this august assembly. But this tribunal was chiefly adapted to the infant times of Greece. As particular states advanced in power, it was often too feeble to control the refractory, and at length found itself, as in the case of the second sacred war (that fatal era, from which Greece dates her decline) under the necessity of calling in foreign assistance to render its decisions effectual.

II. From these numerous sovereignties there arose, besides, endless jealousies and contests; the weaker states still suspecting the stronger; and the stronger by their ambitious encroachments justifying but too much the suspicions of the weaker. Scarcely had Greece recovered from the terror of the Persian invasion, when Sparta, regardless of the noble part that Athens had lately acted, could not conceal her envy at seeing this rival-city spring

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jealousies
and contests
thence arising.

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more powerful from her ruins, and endeavoured to perpetuate her desolation. Throughout all the Grecian commonwealths the same unhappy spirit of envy and dissension prevailed, which was constantly encouraged and fomented, by the policy of the several princes who sat after Xerxes on the Persian throne. Conscious of their inferiority in arms, they endeavoured to divide those whom they could not subdue, and their intrigues and treasure were but too successfully employed. "Ten thousand archers"²⁵ have driven me out of Asia," said Agesilaus²⁶, when the orators of Athens and Thebes, pensioners to the Persian king, had stirred up a war against Sparta, which obliged him to abandon his Asiatic conquests, and hasten to the defence of his own kingdom. To the like practices the Macedonian kings owed whatever advantage they obtained over Greece: And the Romans pursued the same arts with still greater effect; until, exhausted by her own domestic feuds, Greece fell an easy prey to her oppressors.

Difference in
thei forms of
government.

III. The flame of intestine animosity acquired more fierceness, and more destructive rapidity from the difference in the forms of government that subsisted in the several Grecian commonwealths. Throughout Greece the establishment, was, at least in part, democratical, but in some places, as in Athens, the power was lodged in the hands of the people at large; in some, as in Sparta, it was delegated only to a few. Where the *many* had the

²⁵ An archer was the impress on the Persian coin.

²⁶ See Plut. in Agesilao.

power, they not only were suspicious of whatever seemed to threaten their own privileges, but wished to establish the dominion of the multitude in every state around them. And, in like manner, the *few*, not content with securing themselves at home against the encroachments of the *many*, aimed at the introduction of their own contracted form of government, into all the neighbouring cities. Private ambition had here many tempting opportunities: the seeds of dissension every where prevailed: in every city two parties were at all times prepared for civil broils; mutually jealous, and mutually credulous of every misrepresentation; and equally violent in executing their resolves, as precipitate in forming them. So that under the specious pretence, either of defending the cause of freedom, or of controlling the excesses of a licentious populace, interested and ambitious leaders had always numbers at their call. The powers of Asia, of Macedon, and of Rome, in their successive attempts on the liberties of Greece, practised the same kind of artifice; under the guise of friendly interposition, playing one party against the other, and thus betraying the true interests of the state, and gradually wasting it into debility and subjection. At one period of time, we see in Diodorus, the number of exiles, whom party-violence had driven out of their native cities, amounted to twenty thousand. In the days of Polybius, we find the same spirit of dissension still continued; and it was happy for the sufferers, when this atrocious spirit was contented with banishment alone.

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Difficulty of
preserving a
democracy in
its purity.

IV. The democratical form, which, as we have seen, prevailed under various modes throughout Greece, however friendly we may suppose it to liberty, was attended with inconveniences of considerable detriment to the national prosperity. It opened an ample field to the factious and the turbulent; to the pretended patriot and the venal orator: It frequently rendered the public councils passionate, insolent, capricious, and unstable: It banished the ablest chiefs: It gave birth to those cruel and reproachful edicts, which we meet with even in the Athenian annals, against the Aeginetae, against the Samians, against the ten admirals: and, what is yet a stronger instance of the folly often prevalent in popular assemblies, it produced that absurd Athenian law²⁷, which diverted to the amusement of a giddy multitude those funds, which had been originally appropriated to the most important department of government, “the support of their naval strength.” That, in a political form, of which we are apt to conceive great things, and which, it must be confessed, had often wrought the noblest achievements, these mischiefs should be found, arises from the very nature of that form. The *vital principle* of democracy, as a celebrated writer *justly* observes²⁸, is *virtue*. And therefore, whilst invigorated by this exalting principle, democracies have reached a height of glory, which other forms of government emulate in vain. But

²⁷ It was made death to move for a repeal of this law.

²⁸ *Esprit des Loix*, L. iii. c. 3.

on this very account also have democracies been more rapid in their declension than other political constitutions. Great opulence, and extent of empire, those darling objects of human ambition, whose allurements are so seldom resisted by political wisdom, have been always fatal to them; because, so prone to corruption is the human heart, that it is hardly possible this *vital principle* should preserve its vigor, beneath the baneful influence of an opulent and wide-extended dominion. The sage founder of the Spartan laws saw this, and endeavoured to provide for the security of Sparta, by excluding the pursuit of wealth and of extensive empire. But the temptations of successful war, and the avidity of man, defeated the purposes of the lawgiver²⁹. In contempt of the barriers, which he had raised, avarice and the lust of conquest made their way into Sparta, and produced their wonted effects of corruption and dissolution. The truth of this observation appears yet more remarkably in the fate of Athens. The history of the Pagan world has not a more august scene to produce than what Athens exhibited, from the third year of the sixty-seventh Olympiad, the expulsion of the Pisistratidae, to the third year of the eighty-second, the death of Cimon. During this memorable period, she told the number of her heroes by that of her citizens; and every virtue, that can give strength and dignity to a state, was found among that illustrious people. But too soon there

²⁹ See Polyb. L. vi. c. 46, 47.

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Sect. 2. succeeded the intoxication of prosperity ¹⁰; and that very democracy which, whilst they continued virtuous, was a source of glory, now, as their degeneracy advanced, added to the public calamity. Corrupted by that excess of power which they enjoyed, and which made them supreme in the dispensation of rewards and punishments, in the disposal of honors, in the decision of the most important questions of government; corrupted by the adulation with which their leaders and orators generally addressed them, the people considered themselves as above control; and, in full confidence of their own strength, and vain, at the same time, of the glory derived to them from the prowess of their ancestors, they looked down with contempt on other nations, and with fond credulity entertained every visionary scheme of conquest, with which their flattering demagogues sought to amuse them. Athens had extended her establishments along the coasts of Thrace and of Asia, and over most of the adjacent islands; yet, as if this were little, both Sicily and Egypt became the objects of her ambition; and a city, that scarcely mustered twenty thousand citizens, is said to have conceived the mad project of attempting the empire of the world. Meanwhile, they had rendered their yoke insupportable even to their Grecian neighbours; their confederates they treated as vassals; and the contributions which they received from them, and which they were to have adminis-

¹⁰ See Polyb. L. vi. c. 42.

tered for the general good, they wantonly lavished on the pride and magnificence of their own city; in name the *protectors* of Greece, but in reality its *oppressors*. Amidst all this insolence and bold show of enterprise, the Athenians nevertheless had nothing of their ancient vigor remaining. Employed in the bustle of their popular assemblies, or in the ostentatious display of those trappings of sovereignty, with which the citizen of Athens was invested, they had substituted the clamor and chicanery of debate to military exertion; and while they were careful of their proficiency in intrigue and cabal, they were backward to maintain a superiority in arms. This debasement was manifested at Chaeronea; and, as if the reproach of that defeat had only served to increase their cowardice and abjectness, they showed it in a manner still more opprobrious at Lamia. Only two hundred Athenians, Pausanias³¹ tells us, had fallen there; and yet, as if cut off from all resource, they tamely opened their gates, and submitted, without reserve, to Antipater. But indeed prosperity, the pride of dominion, the vacant and unwarlike ease of a municipal life, had produced a total change in the Athenian character. That, people, whom the devastation of their territories, and their city in flames, had not discouraged from supporting the liberties of Greece against the powers of Asia, were now reduced to the most pusillanimous despondency, by the slightest reverse of fortune; and,

³¹ In Achaicis.

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strangers to the spirit of their ancestors, because strangers to their virtues, they resigned themselves to servitude with an abject timidity, scarcely to be believed of a republic, lately the haughtiest to be found in the annals of history.

Fatal influence of ir-religion.

V. But what seems to have had the largest share in bringing decay and humiliation on the Grecian people, was *the fatal prevalence of Atheistical tenets*, which, for above a century; had been spreading from the Epicurean school through every part of Greece. It was the wish of Fabricius³², when told by Cineas of the opinions which Epicurus was then propagating, "that they might be adopted by the enemies of Rome!" The event did honor to the wisdom and foresight of this virtuous Roman. The baneful doctrine completed the ruin of Grecian manners. Naturally volatile, of a sceptical turn, and, from the arts of refinement and elegance which were familiar to them, prone to dissipation and pleasurable indulgences, the Greeks but too eagerly embraced a system, that levelled all religious restraints, and left them without a God to inspect human actions. The consequence was, what in the like case it will ever be. We have it from Polybius³³, who was an eye-witness, that venality, fraud, treachery, an utter disregard of country, of the most sacred oaths, of all ties whatsoever, human and divine, crimes which indicate in the strongest

³² See Plut. in Pyrrho.

³³ See Polyb. L. ii. c. 45. L. vi. c. 54, 55. L. xii. c. i. L. xiii. de virtutibus & vitiis.

manner the corruption of a nation, and are the surest presages of its ruin, soon became prevalent throughout most of the states of Greece. The Achaeans seem to have been the only exception. Possibly, as they were a plainer people, and less conversant in philosophical researches, the contagion had made less progress among them. Accordingly the Romans, who, from the vicious and enervated state of the other Grecian commonwealths, had obtained an easy conquest, met here with a vigor and strength of virtue, such as they little expected; and, amidst that general wreck of principle that marks those degenerate days, it was the glory of Achaia, to have a number of citizens who, steady to the interests of their country, treated the temptations held out by Rome with their merited contempt, and beheld her warlike operations without dismay. To defeat this formidable opposition, the Romans contrived the expedient already related. Under the pretence of transmitting them to Rome to prove their innocence of a charge which the Romans themselves knew to be groundless, they seized on upwards of a thousand of the most respectable of the Achaean nobles, and sent them to perish in Italy. In the mean while, taking advantage of the distracted councils of a people who were now abandoned to the misrule of demagogues of equal turbulence and incapacity, they effected their long-concerted project, the final overthrow of the Achaean liberties.

It would have been, however, some recompence to Greece, for the loss of her independence, if she

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Sect. 2.

Abject state
of Greece

B O O K had found an effectual defence in that power, to
VIII. which she was thus subjected; and if, under the
Sect. 2. protection of her new masters, she had seen her
 after its sub- tranquillity re-established; but she had not even this
 jection to the consolation. Confounded in that mass of nations,
 Roman power. which formed the enormous and unwieldy body
 of the Roman empire, she ceased to have any
 fortunes of her own; and at the same time, though,
 from her situation, it was forbidden to her to
 partake unmixed of whatever prosperity the Romans
 happened to enjoy, she shared largely in most of
 their calamities; in the distresses of the Mithridatic
 war; in the depredations of the Cilician pirates;
 in the bloody contests between Caesar and Pompey;
 between the republican party of Brutus, and the
 avengers of Caesar's death; between Octavius and
 Mark Antony; in the various oppressions, of
 which the despotism of the emperors was afterwards
 productive; and, at length, in that general devas-
 tation which overspread this mighty state from the
 repeated incursions of barbarian nations. Not to
 mention, how severely the private vices of the
 Romans themselves were often felt by this unhappy
 country, in the exactions and insults which she
 had often to suffer from her despotic governors;
 the common fate of all the provinces under the
 yoke of Rome. Until, from these several causes,
 Greece finally was left, as she is at this day, with
 hardly a trace of her former glories.

A cursory view of what is most memorable in
 these latter events shall close this part of our
 history.

B O O K V I I I.

S E C T I O N I I I.

C O N T E N T S.

Greece threatened by the Cimbri—joins Mithridates.— Character and views of that prince. — Siege and ruin of Athens by Sylla. — Sylla overthrows the armies of Mithridates — close of the fortunes of Mithridates.—Greece ravaged by the Cilician corsairs — involved in the civil wars between Cæsar and Pompey; between the republican party and the avengers of Cæsar's death; between Octavius and Mark Antony. — Abject condition of Greece under the Roman Emperors. — Irruption of the Goths. — Reigns of Constantine — Constantius — Julian — Jovian — Valentinian — Valens — Gratian — — Theodosius — Arcadius, and Honorius. — Overthrow of the Roman empire in the West. — Ruin of Greece by the Barbarians. — Decline and fall of the empire of Constantinople. — Present state of Greece.

GREECE, debilitated and exhausted, and still bleeding from the wounds of Rome, beheld, with all the terror of conscious weakness, the Cimbri hovering on her northern boundaries. To complete

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Greece
threatened
by the Cimbri.

^x Liv. Epitom. L. lxiii.

B O O K VIII. her misfortunes, this impending storm of war had scarcely blown over, when the ambitious schemes of Mithridates of Pontus exposed her to new dangers, and involved her in fresh calamities.

Mithridates ;

This extraordinary prince, the most powerful of his time, and the most able and enterprising who had ever taken up arms against Rome, demands particular notice². He was the eighth in descent from that Mithridates who, fleeing from the presence of Antigonus to the Euxine sea, had laid the foundation of the kingdom of Pontus. The voice of flattery gave him an origin still more illustrious, tracing his ancestry down from the ancient line of the princes of the house of Cyrus.

his early fortunes :

A minor at the time of his father's death, who had perished by domestic treason, and himself exposed to a similar fate, he was driven to seek for safety in the forests; where, under the pretence of pursuing the chase, he changed his haunts night after night, taking his repose on the ground, like the inhabitants of the wild; and never, during seven years, entering into any city, nor venturing under the cover of a roof. By this means he acquired a hardiness of body, that was proof against every extreme of weather, and not to be subdued by any toil. The danger of his situation suggested an additional precaution: he fortified himself with a certain medicine, of which he is said to have been the inventor, and which is

² See Appian de Bello Mithridat. Plutarch. in Syllâ, Lucullo, Pompeio.

reported

reported to have been an infallible antidote against the effects of the most powerful poison. B O O K
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His father had been in friendship with the Romans, and had done them important services in their war against Andronicus, the last of the Pergamenian kings. The son was too formidable to be admitted to the same friendly intercourse. The Romans viewed him with jealousy, and resolved to accomplish his humiliation. With this view, the senate judged it expedient to circumscribe his sovereignty within narrower limits. Provoked at the presumption of this arbitrary attempt, Mithridates conceived the bold design of overthrowing the Roman empire in Asia; a great part of which he soon united under his own banners. Three Roman generals marched against him; the proconsul Lucius Cassius, Quintus Oppius, and Manius Aquilius, a man of consular dignity, who had been honored with a triumph, and was at this time at the head of the Roman commissioners for the settlement of Asia. Mithridates defeated them all, and having gotten the three commanders into his hands, regardless of their quality, exposed them to ridicule and scorn, producing them by way of spectacle through the Asiatic cities. Aquilius particularly, whom he charged with being the author of the war, was treated with the utmost contumely. He loaded him with chains, and mounting him on an ass, compelled him, as he passed along, to inform the gazing multitude of his name, and his rank in the Roman armies³. To mark yet farther

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attempts to
overthrow
the Roman
empire in
Asia.

³ Mithridates probably considered this as an act of justice.

B O O K the execration in which he held the Roman name;
VIII. he issued orders to the Asiatics in the several pro-
Sect. 3. vinces throughout his dominions, on an appointed
 his sanguinary day to massacre ^{*} every Roman and Italian they
 orders. could find among them, without regard to age,
 sex, or condition; the debtor to have half the
 fortune of the creditor, whom he should murder,
 and the slave, who had slain his master, his liberty;
 and forbidding them, under the pain of death, to
 save any of their lives, or, when dead, to give
 them burial. The atrocity of these orders, and,
 still more, the horrid zeal with which they were
 executed, strongly evince how odious the Romans
 must have been to the Asiatic nations; eighty
 thousand, by the lowest accounts ^{*}, having perished
 in this massacre; neither the feelings of humanity,
 the claims of gratitude, the ties of friendship, nor
 the reverence of religion, shielding those unhappy

Massacre of
 the Romans
 and Italians
 throughout
 Asia.

Manius Aquilius was in fact a person who merited infamy: he had triumphed at the close of the Pergamenian war, though, in the conduct of it he had done little service; Perpenna having brought that war nearly to a conclusion; but, he dying, Aquilius stepped into the command, and claimed the merit of what another had achieved. A few of the Asiatic cities still remaining to be reduced, he, in violation of the laws of war, treacherously poisoned the springs, from whence they were supplied with water, and thus compelled them to surrender. We may judge, accordingly, how the Asiatics, who had suffered so much from his perfidiousness, must have enjoyed his humiliation.

See Florus, L. ii. c. 20.

^{*} Liv. Epitom. L. lxxviii. Appian. ub. sup.

^{*} A hundred and fifty thousand, says Plutarch (in Sylla).

victims from the savage fury of unrelenting vengeance; even those who fled for refuge to the temples, being torn from them, or slaughtered at the altars. The death of Manius Aquilius closed this scene of horror; Mithridates causing molten gold to be poured down his throat, in reproach of Roman avarice.

The object of Mithridates was now to attempt an alliance with the states of Greece; with their assistance to pursue his plan of hostilities in the neighbourhood of Italy; and, should circumstances favor him, to carry the war into the heart of the Roman empire. The conjuncture was favorable to his designs. The Romans, distressed at home, first by the Italian insurgents or the confederate war, and afterwards by the dissensions which Marius and Sylla had excited, seemed to have withdrawn their attention from Greece. These circumstances, with the powerful arguments that Mithridates had to offer, "of the exploits already achieved by him," and "of his avowed enmity to Rome, could not fail of establishing an interest with a people, in their happiest days impatient and changeable, and at this time sharpened to a keener sense of the oppressions they endured, by the very remembrance of the liberties which they had enjoyed. The Athenians even prevented his wishes. Exasperated by certain fines, which the Romans had lately imposed on them, they had sent an embassy to the king of Pontus, to implore his protection. Nothing could coincide more opportunely with his views. A considerable body of land-forces, under the command of his son

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Mithridates
forms an al-
liance with
the Grecian
states.

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Ariarathes⁷, and another under that of Archelaus, with a large naval armament, were immediately ordered to their assistance. At the same time that his troops under Archelaus took possession of Athens, his fleet was employed, with the most rapid success, in reducing the numerous islands that cover the Aegean sea; Ariarathes extended his conquests through Thrace and Macedon. In Greece, the Roman commander Brutius Sura opposed Archelaus at first with vigor, and in one engagement obliged him to retreat to his ships. But this check produced nothing decisive. And the whole province of Achaia, from Thessaly to the Cretan sea, had soon acknowledged Mithridates; the little city of Thespiæ having been, it is said, the only place, whose resistance rendered a siege necessary.

Sylla enters
Greece;

marches
against
Athens.

Mean while Sylla, having expelled the Marian faction, prepared to punish the Grecian revolt. His very name impressed terror and dismay. As soon as his approach was known, the Grecian cities, Athens alone excepted, conscious of guilt, sent to deprecate his wrath, and to tender their submission. The other more important wars, to which his ambition was exciting him, probably saved them. Disdaining to stoop to any mean game, he marched with rapidity to Athens, where the chief of the Mithridatic force seemed to be collected. His aim was, to extinguish at once the war in Greece, by storming Athens. But this he found a task more difficult than he expected.

Athens was divided into two parts, the upper

⁷ Appian calls him Arcathias.

town, and the lower. The upper, comprehending the city properly so called, together with the Acropolis or Athenian citadel, was inclosed within one common wall of considerable strength. The lower, distant about five miles from the upper, was the great sea-port of Athens, generally known by the name of the Piraeus, famed for its noble arsenal, for its docks, and the variety and extent of its buildings for naval purposes; for the number of seamen and artisans with which it was crowded; and above all, for its harbour, the work of Themistocles, said to have been large enough to afford shelter to a thousand ships*, and opening its capacious bosom to the trade, not only of the adjacent islands, but to that of Asia and Egypt. Around it was a fortification of stone, raised by Pericles, sixty feet in height, and of proportional thickness, remarkable for the massy size of the stones with which it was constructed, and yet more so for the compactness and solidity of their junctures. From the Piraeus to Athens there was a road, secured on each side by a strong wall, which formed a communication between the port and the city.

* So says Pliny, L. vii. c. 37. Strabo, probably more exact, says four hundred. Spon (*Voyage de la Grece*, tom. ii.) supposes, that in its present state it could hardly be capable of receiving fifty of our large ships. See Chandler's *Travels in Greece*, chap. 5. for a full account of this famed harbour. From a marble lion, of admirable workmanship, ten feet high, which was placed at the inmost extremity of this harbour, it has been known by the name of Porto Draco, or Porto Leone. The lion has been carried away by the Venetians, and is now to be seen before the arsenal at Venice.

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defended by
Aristion,

In the upper town Aristion possessed the command; a factious demagogue, who had risen to power by an abject compliance with the follies and vices of the multitude; and who by profession was an Epicurean philosopher, but, like many of that dangerous sect, concealed under this philosophic disguise the blackest flagitiousness of mind. By intrigue he had been appointed ambassador to Mithridates, into whose favor he had insinuated himself by the servility of his deportment, and by betraying to him the interests of his country. On his return, he had amused the Athenians with assurances, that the great views of Mithridates were pointed solely to the humiliation of Rome, with the restoration of the popular government, and all the ancient liberties of Greece. Having, by these arts, obtained by degrees the unlimited confidence of the multitude, he soon usurped the sovereign authority, and used it like a tyrant, exercising the severe scourge of arbitrary sway on the very people who had trusted him with power; murdering or banishing, under pretence of having discovered their connexions with Rome, every man whose wealth could tempt his avarice, or whose station or virtues could alarm his fears. Urged on therefore by his crimes, Aristion, though not truly brave, which a villain never is, was desperate; and had embraced the resolution to suffer every extremity, rather than yield to a foe, from whom, he well knew, he had no mercy to expect.

and Archelaus.

In the lower town, Archelaus had the direction of the military operations, a brave and experienced officer, who was attentive to improve every advan-

tage of his situation. Beside a numerous garrison, he had a strong fleet at his disposal, which enabled him to command from abroad every necessary supply. And, in addition to these advantages, there was an army of above a hundred thousand men in Macedon, ready to march to his assistance.

Sylla, on the contrary, after some fruitless attempts to carry the place by storm, saw himself beset with difficulties. He had brought with him only five legions and a few cohorts, in all about thirty thousand men; a force far inferior to that of the enemy. Besides, he had neither the machines necessary for a siege, nor military stores of any kind, nor money to purchase. But in his own daring mind he found resources for every want. He sent Lucullus into Egypt for naval succours. He prevailed on the inhabitants of Aetolia and Thessaly, probably by way of atoning for their late defection, to send him a reinforcement of men, and a supply of arms and provisions. He cut down all the sacred groves round Athens, and spared not those of the Lycaean and Academy in the Athenian suburbs, in order to procure timber for his engines; and he seized on the holy treasures at Epidaurus, Olympia, and Delphi. His answer to Caphis, a certain Phocian, whom he dispatched on this errand to the Delphic temple; is memorable; and shows, that this stern Roman was as little embarrassed by scruples of religion, as by the feelings of humanity. Just as Caphis was preparing to seize the sacred offerings, the priests contrived that the lyre of Apollo should be heard to sound from the inmost sanctuary; Caphis, struck with a religious

Sylla's difficulties.

and resources.

B O O K VIII. Sect. 3. horror, immediately desisted, and sent the Roman commander an account of the tremendous prodigy. Sylla replied jestingly, "that he was surprised Caphis did not know, that music was the expression, not of anger but of joy. And that he might therefore boldly take the treasures, since Apollo gave them with such good will."

He is baffled
in his several
attempts;

forms the plan
of reducing the
place by fa-
mine.

With all these aids, however, Sylla had not much to boast of. He attempted to scale the walls, and was repulsed. His warlike engines were set on fire, and destroyed in a sally of the besieged. He battered their works in vain, while a new wall instantly appeared behind every breach that had been made. He tried to proceed by mining; but the Athenians countermined his works, and slew or put to flight his miners. Thus baffled in every attempt, and winter coming on, he resolved to change the siege into a blockade, in hopes of reducing the place by famine. He had already thrown down part of the long walls, which joined the Piraeus to Athens, and had made a lodgement on the very road, which served as a communication between them, so that the former method of conveying provisions from the port to the city, was rendered almost impracticable. Difficulties, however, he still had to combat; and these arose chiefly from Archelaus, who, active and enterprising, took every opportunity, and often with success, to attack the Roman lines, and to throw relief into Athens; but the treachery of two Athenians belonging to the

Plut. in Sylla.

Piræean garrison, at length enabled Sylla to prevent even these precarious and hazardous supplies. Expert at the sling, they discharged a number of leaden bullets into the Roman camp, day after day, inscribed with notices of whatever Archelaus was preparing to do—"to-morrow we shall make a sally"—"on a part of your lines is the attack to be"—"at such an hour the convoy sets out"—and Sylla took his measures accordingly.

Deprived in this manner of every resource, Athens soon began to feel the utmost severity of want. A bushel of wheat was sold for a thousand drachmas¹⁰; the people feeding not only on the herbs and roots that grew spontaneously in the citadel, but on sodden leather and oil-bags, some even on human carcases, while the tyrant indulged in plenty and riot; and when applied to by the priests and chief men of Athens, who conjured him to compassionate the public misery, and treat with the Romans, he commanded his guards to answer them with a shower of arrows, and drive them from his presence. Sylla had information of all these proceedings; and rightly judging, that now was the favorable moment, determined once more to try whether storming might not succeed. A part of the wall having been observed to be lower than the rest, there he directed the attack to be made; and taking the opportunity of the dead hour of the night, he carried his point with little difficulty; the inhabitants, from surprise, or from their present feeble condition, or perhaps from the disaf-

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Distress of
Athens:

taken by storm.

¹⁰ L. 32. 5. 10.

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fection of many to a service, which terror alone had made them submit to, scarcely attempting opposition. These considerations, the last especially, from a more merciful conqueror, might have obtained some degree of favor for Athens in this hour of its misery. But of a temper naturally rigid and vindictive, and by long practice made familiar with deeds of blood Sylla had become a perfect stranger to all the tender feelings of humanity. He had besides been irritated by the obstinate resistance he had met with; and still more, if we are to believe Plutarch¹¹, by certain personal insults he had received from Aristion, who, during the siege, fearless of the issue, had wantonly insulted the Roman general as he passed under the walls; and Sylla possessed not that greatness of mind which forgives or contemns such indignities.

Vindictive
spirit of Sylla

Eager therefore for revenge, he abandoned to his soldiers the plunder of the city, with express orders, that all within the walls, whether citizens or soldiers, male or female, young or aged, should be indiscriminately put to the sword. The scene that followed is one of the most dreadful that is recorded in the Grecian annals. Goaded on by the fierceness of Sylla, and, not less strongly perhaps, by their own resentments and avarice, the soldiery rushed furiously against this emaciated, dispirited, defenceless multitude; the darkness of the midnight-hour, the sound of trumpets, the blowing of horns, the clang of arms, the shouts of the conquerors, and the screams of despair, all contributing to the horrors of this

¹¹ Ubi. sup.

inhuman massacre. Unchecked by any resistance, slaughter had soon made its way from quarter to quarter; many of the miserable inhabitants, worn out with want, offering themselves to the stroke of death; and some even before the sword of the enemy reached them, unwilling to outlive the liberties, or the existence of their country, or wishing to prevent the violence of the brutal soldier, falling by their own hands. The number of the slain, according to Plutarch, was so great, that it exceeded all computation, and was only to be judged of from the quantity of blood, which is said to have poured in torrents through the gates of the city.

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Sated at length with carnage, Sylla yielded to the importunities of those about him, and with ill-feigned mercy, consented to spare what remained of this wretched people. He granted their lives, he said, from the high respect he bore to their illustrious ancestors, "forgiving the *many* on account of the *few*, the *living* for the sake of the *dead*."¹²

his ill-feigned
mercy.

Amidst the confusion of the night, Aristion and his minions had escaped into the citadel; but in a few days the want of water obliged them to surrender: the tyrant was put to death by the command of Sylla, and together with him according to Appian¹³, all who had shared in his councils.

Fate of Aristion.

Soon after the taking of Athens, the Piræus was evacuated; Archelaus, who saw that it was no longer defensible, now that the higher grounds were in the possession of the enemy, drawing off his troops, and

The Piræus
taken.

¹² Plut. in Sylla.

¹³ De bello Mithrid.

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contenting himself with blocking up the mouth of the harbour with his fleet. Here therefore human victims were wanting to satisfy the exterminating spirit of the conqueror; and instead of these the magnificent structures, and various decorations, with which Athenian pride and genius had during three hundred years been adorning this favorite port, supplied fresh objects to his fury. He set fire to the place, and then demolished whatever the flames had not destroyed. In the sacking of the upper city, a considerable part of it had been levelled with the ground. But here Sylla reduced the whole to one dismal mass of ruins, not a single edifice escaping from his more than gothic barbarity.

Destruction
of Athens.

This was the most complete destruction that Athens had ever experienced since the Persian invasion! and it was with difficulty, and by slow degrees that she ever rose again to consideration. When the devastations of war had ceased, the few Athenian families that survived returned to their ruined city; and both public and private munificence were employed from time to time in repairing her breaches. But still many monuments of Sylla's vengeance remained long; and it was not till the days of the emperor Hadrian, the most bountiful of her latter benefactors, that she began to resume somewhat of her former splendor.

The destruction of Athens was, however, but a part of what Greece had to suffer from the hands of Sylla. He had scarcely taken possession of that city, when Taxiles, who had succeeded to the command of the army of Mithridates, on the death of Ariarathes,

the king's son¹⁴, and now, by repeated supplies, had increased his forces to a hundred and twenty thousand men, marched against him from Macedon; and having been joined by Archelaus, advanced into Boeotia. Sylla's numbers, with all the reinforcements he could procure, were two thirds short of those of the enemy. To intrench himself within the Athenian ruins, where it had been difficult for the Asiatics to force him, seemed his only resource. But the country of Attica being now a waste, and his troops being in danger of perishing by famine should he attempt to remain in his present position, he determined to advance into the plain, and boldly trust the event to Roman courage. A particular account of the action that followed, belongs to another history. It is sufficient to say, that, the two armies having joined battle at Chaeronea, Sylla obtained a complete victory, with the possession of the enemies camp, while a hundred and ten thousand of their men were left dead upon the field, Mithridates, unappalled by misfortunes, and fruitful in resources, immediately dispatched Dorylaus at the head of an army of eighty thousand men, to oppose Sylla. They engaged at Orchomenos in Boeotia; where, notwithstanding the most spirited exertion on the part of the Asiatics, which at one time had nearly proved fatal to the

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Sylla defeats
the armies of
Mithridates;

¹⁴ From the private papers of Mithridates, which Pompey (Plutarch in Pompeio) found in the castle of Caenon, it appeared, that the young prince had fallen a victim to *eastern jealousy*; he was taken off by poison by his father's orders; whose envy and suspicions were probably both awakened by the martial reputation he had acquired in Macedon.

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Romans¹⁵, Sylla proved again victorious. History speaks highly of his valor as well as conduct on both these occasions. It is suspected, however, that another cause contributed much to his success. Archelaus is said to have been drawn into a treasonable correspondence with Sylla, and to have sold his master. Of this Mithridates himself, in a letter to Arsaces, king of the Parthians¹⁶, appears to have entertained strong suspicions. It is certain, that Sylla ever after treated Archelaus with extraordinary regard, presented him with a large tract of land¹⁷, in the island of Euboea, and conferred on him the title of the FRIEND AND ALLY OF THE ROMAN PEOPLE; favors, which he would never have bestowed, had they not been purchased by important services.

executes
vengeance on
the Boeotians.

The first use that Sylla made of his victories, was, to execute vengeance on the Boeotians. This unhappy people, whose country had been the scene of the late battles, had already suffered severely by the common desolations of war, and the insolence and rapine of the Asiatics¹⁸ as well as Romans. Sylla's resentment

¹⁵ The Romans were retreating in confusion, when Sylla, frantic at the sight, leaped off his horse, seized one of the ensigns, and rushing in among the fugitives, "here," cried he, "shall I die with honor: and you, Romans, when asked, where you betrayed your general, remember to tell, it was at Orchomenos". Shame, and a sense of honor, stopped their flight, and turned the fortune of the day. Plut. in Sylla.

¹⁶ Fragm. Sallust. L. iv.

¹⁷ Ten thousand acres.

¹⁸ A short time before the battle of Chaeronea, the barbarians, though seemingly in friendship with the Boeotians, had in their excursions sacked two Boeotian cities, Panopea and Lebadæa, and pillaged the oracular temple, for which the latter was famed. Plut. in Sylla.

was not so easily to be appeased. Beside the guilt of the first defection, in which they shared with the rest of Greece, they were charged, and probably not without reason, with having given assistance to both the Asiatic armies. In revenge, he abandoned Boeotia to massacre and devastation; many of the cities¹⁹ were laid in ruins²⁰, and the inhabitants condemned to indiscriminate slaughter. To complete the whole, he deprived the Thebans of half their territory, consecrating it to the Pythian Apollo and the Olympian Jupiter, "to make compensation," said the pious ravager, to those gods "for the treasures that he had taken from them."

As to Mithridates, though Greece had no connexion with his subsequent fortunes, yet here the following short sketch of them may not improperly be placed. However humbled by repeated overthrows, he still rose superior to every disaster; continuing, through a long series of wars, of victories, of defeats, of negotiations, and of conventions, the irreconcilable enemy of Rome. Though opposed at different periods by three of the greatest generals of his time, Sylla, Lucullus, and Pompey, yet he was never totally subdued. At last, when seemingly

Latter fortunes of Mithridates;

¹⁹ Three of them, Anthedon, Larymna, and Alaeae, are particularly mentioned.

²⁰ We have from Plutarch (in Syllâ) the following anecdote, from which we may judge, with what an unfeeling severity these wretched cities had been treated. Sylla one day in his walks meeting with some fishermen, who presented him with a curious dish of fish, inquired, whence they were; when hearing they were Aleans, "what" said he, "are any of the Alaeans alive!"

B O O K bereaved of all his hopes, and driven into a remote
 VIII. and inhospitable corner of his dominions, we see
 Sect. 3. him with astonishment forming the bold design of an
 irruption into Italy, by the very road, which some
 ages after the northern bands attempted and pro-
 secuted with such fatal success. At the time he con-
 ceived this daring plan, he was drawing near his
 seventieth year; and yet, even thus circumstanced,
 Rome had probably found him a second Hannibal,
 had not the revolt of his son Pharnaces disconcerted
 his councils, and put an end to all his schemes. Of
 all his sons he held him dearest, considered him as
 the last support of his royal house, and had appointed
 him his successor; as from him, amidst the various
 treasons, which he had experienced from the rest
 of his children, he had always met with attachment
 and fidelity. Overwhelmed by this unexpected blow,
 the hoary monarch, in a fit of despair, at once put a
 period to his own misfortunes, and to the fears of
 Rome. How formidable he must have been to the
 Romans, we may judge from the intemperate joy they
 indulged upon receiving the tidings of his death, "as
 if," says Plutarch, "ten thousand of their enemies
 had been slain in Mithridates ²¹."

his death.

Rise and pro-
 gress of the
 Cilician cor-
 sairs;

To the calamities of the Mithridatic war there
 soon succeeded, what proved nearly as fatal to
 Greece the depredations of the Cilician corsairs. These
 lawless rovers had their original settlement among
 the rocks and fastnesses of the Cilician coast ²²,

²¹ Plutarch. in Pomp.

²² See Strab. L. xiv. p. 459. Flor. L. iii. c. 6.

where,

where, enriched by numerous prizes, which the adjacent seas and islands afforded them, and taking advantage of the contests or the weakness of the Asiatic princes around, in whose service they were occasionally employed, they acquired a degree of strength, which rendered them at length the terror of all the neighbouring states. In this situation Mithridates found them, when that enterprising prince was meditating the empire of Asia. He saw at once the important advantage to be derived from the intrepidity and naval experience of these ravagers, and disdained not to enrol them among his confederates. Emboldened by this alliance, they now adventured on expeditions more distant and hazardous, and had soon extended their excursions from the pillars of Hercules to the shores of Egypt; whilst the Romans, embarrassed on every side by intestine commotions, and the precarious condition of many of their most valuable provinces, marked the gathering storm, without being able to guard against it.

Elated and assisted by incidents so alluring and favorable, these sons of rapine rose to a degree of power, that seemed to promise nothing less than the sovereignty of the Mediterranean. Not contented with attacking ships, they assailed towns and islands. They had in various parts their arsenals, their ports, their watch-towers, all strongly fortified. The number of their gallies amounted to a thousand, which were most completely equipped; and the cities, of which they were in possession, were not fewer than four hundred. Nor was there one place almost of note throughout the whole Mediterranean sea, that

B O O K
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B O O K had not paid them contributions, or suffered from
 VIII. their depredations. Even the legions of Italy could
 Sect. 3. not secure her from these piratical invaders. They insulted her coasts; they even ventured upon inland incursions plundering villas, and carrying off both plunder and people; so that within a certain distance of the sea-side there was no longer any travelling with safety.

they ravage
 Greece;

To these predatory invasions Greece, by her situation, was necessarily much exposed. The multitude of islands which surrounded her, and the great extent of coast open to the Aegean, the Cretan, and the Ionian seas, abounding with creeks and harbours, and presenting to the view flourishing cities, rich pasturages, and various scenes of rural wealth, which overspread this beautiful country, were objects too inviting to be passed over without a visit from these rapacious spoilers. Accordingly, few countries appear to have suffered more. They plundered her ships; they pillaged her towns; they laid waste her territory. And on the Peloponnesian coast with such success were their depredations carried on, that the promontory of Malea, the south-east point of this part of Greece, received from them the name of the *golden promontory*²³. They did not spare even the temples of the gods. Plutarch reckons seven of the most revered temples of Greece, which, until that period, the rapacious hand of the invader had never dared to violate. But these now were laid in ruins; amongst which number we find the famous temple

²³ Florus, ubi sup.

of Juno at Argos, and that of Aesculapius at Epidaurus. B O O K
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During a period of near forty years, these enemies of mankind had thus continued their outrages, when the Romans, now in some measure relieved from their late embarrassments, resolved to employ every effort for their extirpation. The arms of Pompey, to whom the conduct of the war was committed, were completely successful. He destroyed their fleets, pursued them to their most secret haunts, and dispossessed them of all their fortresses. Having at last reduced them to unconditional submission, he dispersed them in different countries, appointing them inland settlements, that, having no prospect of the sea, they might not again be tempted to renew their naval depredations. As to Greece, from a remarkable circumstance, recorded by Plutarch on this occasion, we may judge what at this period was her deplorable state of depopulation, in consequence of these calamities. It was found expedient, in order to re-people the country, to transplant a considerable body of these pirates into Peloponnesus. Pompey assigned them the territory of the Dymeans, lately one of the principal tribes of the Achaean confederacy; this whole district, as large, and formerly as fruitful as any in Achaia, being now, to use Plutarch's words, *widowed of inhabitants* ²⁴.

The guilty scenes, that soon after followed, are well known; when ambition finished what corrup-
The Romans
lose their
liberties.

²⁴ Χηρεύονσαν ἀνδρῶν. In Pompeio.

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The civil
wars of the
Romans fatal
to Greece.

tion had begun; and when the ruin of the Roman liberties, which rapacity, venality, and dissoluteness had been preparing, was completely effected by the bold and ardent spirit of Caesar, the dissipation of Antony, and the calm time-watching hypocrisy of Octavius. The sword of civil discord had not long been unsheathed, when Italy poured the whole war into this unfortunate land; and by the contending factions of Rome were the plains of Pharsalia drenched in blood. Upon Caesar's death, the contest was renewed; and Greece became again the field, in which the prize of empire was to be disputed. The jealousies of Octavius and Antony produced a third war; and still was Greece, as before, the scene of action; on the coast of Epire being fought the battle that gave to Octavius the world.

Without the aid of history, the mind may easily conceive what must have been the desolations²⁵ of a country, the theatre of all these hostile operations,

²⁵ When Antony was preparing to fight Octavius, Plutarch (in Antonio) informs us, the reapers and assemblers, even the very boys, throughout Greece, were forced away to man Antony's fleet. Plutarch's great grandfather, Nicarchus, was at this time at Chaeronea, his place of residence; and he used to relate, that the inhabitants of this part of the country, not having horses, were compelled to carry the corn on their own backs to the sea-coast, as far as Anticyra on the Corinthian gulph, and were driven by the soldiers with stripes, like beasts of burden. And after the battle of Actium, in such extreme indigence were the cities of Greece, having been plundered of all they had, that Caesar, though highly displeased with

compelled to take an active part in civil broils, and thinned of its people by wars not its own; whilst a multitude of foreign bands, many of them fierce barbarians, from Gaul, from Thrace, from Africa, from the forests of Germany, and from the wilds of Caucasus, invited thither by the hopes of spoil, completed the distress. Yet even these calamities, inseparable perhaps from convulsions such as these, and which, it might be expected, would have terminated with the cessation of hostilities, Greece found to her sorrow only the commencement of her sufferings. The war being ended, whoever had not been the victor's friends, were now considered as his foes; vengeance and rapaciousness, easily found out pretences against all, from whom plunder might be expected; and the pillage of cities, and the confiscation of territories, were as the right and the reward of the conqueror. Caesar himself, the most clement tyrant that ever rose to power by the sword, was not altogether innocent of these vindictive executions. The Athenians had declared against him; and their whole country, now beginning to recover from Sylla's desolations, he again reduced to a ruinous waste. The people of Sicyon, who together with the rest of Peloponnesus, had been active in the interests of Pompey, he despoiled of the Corinthian territory, which had formerly been assigned to them; and, probably to humble this part of Greece, he raised them for their attachment to Antony, was induced by their distress, to order the corn, which had been provided for the use of the war, to be distributed among them.

B O O K VIII. Corinth from its ruins, colonizing it with a body of his veterans, and a number of enfranchised slaves from Italy ²⁶.
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State of
Greece under
Augustus;

When, upon the fall of Antony, Octavius or rather Augustus, for so had flattery now named him, saw himself in the uncontrolled possession of sovereign power, the suppression of the spirit of liberty, wherever in the course of the late contests any exertion of it had appeared, became his principal object. Greece was not forgotten. Several of her states had not only enlisted under Pompey's banners, but had afterwards espoused the cause of the conspirators, and latterly that of Antony. The Athenians had even celebrated the death of Caesar as the aera of the re-establishment of freedom, and had placed the statues of Brutus and Cassius next to those of Harmodius and Aristogiton. Augustus made it his study to humble these *insolent* republicans. He abridged the few privileges that remained to the Athenians, and deprived them of Aegina. The Messenians he reduced to a state of vassalage; and he plundered the Arcadians of their very statues and the monuments of their antiquity. He observed a similar policy towards every other Grecian state. And though the Lacedaemonians had declared in his favor, he thought it expedient, in order to reduce their power, to dismember from them twenty-four cities of Laconia, declaring them to be thenceforward independent, and distinguishing

²⁶ See Plutarch. in Caesare. Pausan. in Corinth. Strabo Casaub. L. ix. p. 263.

them by the name of *Eleutherolacons*, or free Laconians ²⁷. B O O K
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From the days of Augustus the iron sceptre of despotism has been extended over this unhappy land. Sect. 3.

Under the first Roman emperors, indeed, Greece is said to have scarcely felt the severity of her lot; and her own writers who lived in these times, Strabo ²⁸ and Pausanias ²⁹, speak largely of the prosperity she derived from the Roman government. It is not difficult to account for this partiality. The latter days of Grecian liberty had been times of confusion and intestine misery. From the commencement of the war of the Triumvirs, Greece had been one continued scene of devastation and bloodshed. In the establishment therefore of the imperial power, which extinguished all these contests, this unhappy country found relief; and without regret gave up a freedom, long since little more than nominal, in exchange for domestic peace and protection from foreign invasion. It is likewise to be observed, that the crimes of the earlier Roman tyrants were generally confined to Italy, where the objects of their desires or of their jealousy were

under the
succeeding
emperors.

²⁷ See Pausan. in Corinthiac. Laconic. & Messeniaticis.

²⁸ Μέχρι νῦν (says Strabo, L. ix. p. 274, speaking of Athens) ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ ἔσται καὶ τιμῇ παρὰ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις. Strabo tells us he lived under Augustus and Tiberius, during whose reigns, says he, Rome and her subject provinces enjoyed a prosperity such as they had hitherto never known. See Strab. L. vi. in fin. May not the testimony of such a witness be questioned?

²⁹ See Pausan. in Atticis, Eliacis, Achaicis.

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Testimony of
the Greek
writers not
to be relied
on.

mostly found; and the provinces, whether from their supposed insignificance, or from the policy of their Roman masters, were often permitted to enjoy a security, which was denied to the first families of Rome. "I will have my sheep shorn, not flayed," said the unfeeling but subtle Tiberius to a certain governor of Egypt, who, with the view of recommending himself to his favor, had labored to augment the imperial revenues by merciless exactions³⁰. He would *enjoy*; but, attentive to his own interest, he was unwilling to *exhaust*. The legionary armies, besides, afterwards the formidable controllers of the Roman world, seemed as yet unconscious of their own strength, and disdained not to receive orders, which they were soon to impose. In addition to these considerations, there is much reason to suspect, that this very representation of the prosperity of Greece under the Roman Government was in a great measure the language of servitude, in order to court the favor of these lords of nations; and that Greece was far from possessing³¹ that share of happiness, which some

³⁰ Dion. Cassius. Hanov. 1606. LVII. 608.

³¹ It is not to be supposed, that a detail (which there were so many powerful reasons for suppressing) should have reached us, of all the sufferings of Greece under the imperial despots of Rome; but among Pliny's letters, there is one (viii. 24.) to his friend Maximus, upon his being appointed to the government of Achaia, still extant, where, from many expressions, and the earnest charge he gives him, "to remember the respect due to this once-illustrious people, whom," says he, "to despoil of that little shadow and name of liberty, now left to them,

of her writers would persuade us she enjoyed. What strengthens the suspicion is the servile adulation, which Greece appears to have paid even to a Nero. Never did a more flagitious tyrant disgrace the imperial purple. And yet has Greece inrolled him among her deliverers. Vain of his musical and dramatic excellence, he had passed over thither, to exhibit himself on the Greek stage, and to dispute the wreath of victory with the Grecian performers, who had the reputation of being the most excellent then existing. His success in the course of this whimsical expedition equalled his utmost vanity. Wherever he appeared, and in whatsoever character, (and he attempted every character, high or low, male or female) the judges with one voice, as may well be supposed, when the lord of legions was the performer, proclaimed him victor. At the celebration of the Isthmian games, which soon after followed, he expressed his gratitude by publicly declaring Greece free and independent. This was a grant of little value to a people, who had neither the virtue to enjoy nor the power to preserve it; and it tended only to renew among them the fatal contests of their popular assemblies. It was a grant also, which Nero himself violated with the same levity with which it was bestowed: having, at

Greece restored to freedom by Nero &

“ it were hard, it were cruel, it were barbarous!” one is apt to conclude, that they had not been always treated with a gentle hand. Pliny’s representations to his friend seem to form a kind of contrast between what Greece had experienced from former governors, and what Pliny required of Maximus.

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This resto-
ration an e-
vent of little
importance.

the very time he announced freedom to them, seized every relic of Grecian splendor which could be found; and having plundered the very temples of all the valuable statues which had hitherto escaped the hand of the spoiler³². For this piece of mockery Pausanias³³ nevertheless is lavish in Nero's praise, as if *the restoration of Grecian liberty* had been really his intention; and he considers it as a mark of "innate greatness of mind" in that emperor, "to have been, with all his crimes, capable of so generous a purpose." Certainly little of the spirit of ancient Greece was remaining when the pen of her historian could thus attempt to dignify the capricious follies of a madman.

Greece is
again reduced
into servitude
by Vespasian.

This pretended restoration of freedom ended, as it was easy to foresee it would. With the revival of the municipal rights of the Grecian tribes their contentions revived also; such at least is the Roman account. In order therefore to re-establish tranquillity in Greece, Vespasian declared it necessary to reduce it again to servitude³⁴.

Characters of
the succeeding
emperors, and
in what man-
ner Greece
was affected
by them.

In reviewing the list of the succeeding emperors, it is painful to reflect, how few of their names³⁵ deserve to be recorded with honor, in comparison of those who in cruelty, and in dissoluteness, were the scourges, and, still more, the reproach of

³² Pausan. in Boeotia. Dion Chrysostom. Orat. XXXI.

³³ In Achaicis.

³⁴ Pausan. ibid. Suetonius in T. Vespasiano.

³⁵ The two illustrious Antonines, a Trajan, a Titus, a Nerva, perhaps are all that can be mentioned with approbation.

human kind. To add to the severity of the oppression, these tyrants seldom rose to the seat of dominion by peaceable succession, but generally made their way to it by military force; so that the defeat of the unsuccessful candidate, and the subsequent deposition of the successful one, proved fatal to all who, however innocent of their crimes, were even suspected of having had any connexion with their fortunes. When Geta fell by the hand of Caracalla, "it was computed, that under the
 " vague appellation of the friends of Geta, above
 " twenty thousand persons of both sexes suffered
 " death. His guards and freedmen, the ministers
 " of his serious business, and the companions of
 " his looser hours, those, who by his interest had
 " been promoted to any command in the army,
 " or in the provinces, with the long-connected
 " train of their dependents, were included in the
 " proscription, which endeavoured to reach every
 " one who had maintained the smallest correspon-
 " dence with Geta, who lamented his death, or
 " who even mentioned his name ". Marked in

" See Gibbon's Decline of the Roman Empire, Ch. vi.
 With particular pleasure I take the opportunity of acknowledging my obligations to the elegant work, from which the above quotation is borrowed. I have had frequent recourse to it in this part of my history. If I have attempted to place some matters in a different light from that in which this ingenious writer seems to have considered them, I shall hope, from the liberality of sentiment which his writings assure me he possesses, that he will not disapprove of a freedom of inquiry, always serviceable to the cause of truth.

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like manner with blood and devastation was every revolution, that placed a new family on the imperial throne; the removal of even the most guilty tyrant becoming a public calamity, from the sanguinary and extensive mischiefs of which it was productive. Not only party-rage armed the military ruffian; private animosity also availed itself of the opportunity, and under the semblance of loyal zeal executed its selfish and vindictive purposes. What vengeance did not perpetrate, avarice executed; the plundering of every wealthy individual being frequently the only resource that remained to the tyrant of the day to satisfy the demands of the clamorous soldiery, whose sedition had raised him to the purple. Not less than thirteen of these revolutions within the space of seventy years, from the death of Commodus to the accession of Decius, have disgraced the Roman annals, and now excite a mixed sensation of pity and detestation in the human breast.

Amidst that variety of misery, which Greece, in common with the other Roman provinces, had to suffer from this fierce line of tyrants, she had hitherto however been safe from the inroads of those barbarian tribes, which for a considerable time had insulted the Roman frontier; and at a distance from the scene of hostilities she paid little attention to dangers, which she fondly thought were never to reach her. The reigns of Decius, of the unhappy Valentinian and his son Gallienus, showed her the vanity of her security. The Goths, a new race of adventurers, hitherto almost unknown

The Goths
invade
Greece.

to the Romans even by name, had issued from the northern extremities of Germany, and after various fortunes had proceeded to the Danube; the several tribes of barbarians that lay on their way, having either fled before them, or, by joining the invaders, added strength to the increasing hive. Against this irruption of ravagers, the feeble efforts of an exhausted empire could avail little. Decius, a prince worthy of happier times, attempted to oppose their progress; but, together with his son, his associate in the empire, he unfortunately perished in the attempt; and but few years had elapsed since their first appearance, when almost every province, from the banks of the upper Danube to the shores of the Euxine sea; and along the Asiatic coasts, from the mouth of the Phasis to the opening of the Hellespont, had felt their violence, or been forced meanly to purchase with gold a temporary and precarious forbearance. They now entered the Archipelago, and plundered most of the islands. They advanced into Attica; and getting possession of the once-famed Piræan port, they spread themselves over the whole country. Greece, after all her sufferings, still possessed many valuable remains; and could yet display various monuments of the magnificence and arts of ancient times. From a civilized conqueror, these noble memorials of human genius would have challenged some degree of respect; but they now served only to provoke the indignation and scorn of barbarians accustomed to live in the open field, to whom the dwelling in houses was imprisonment, and the knowledge

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B O O K of letters the badge of servitude. Hence the
VIII. whole of this devoted country, from the eastern
Sect. 3. point of Sunium to the farthest verge of Epire, presented one continued scene of desolation. Finding it necessary at length to retire from the desert, they prepared to pass over into Italy, where the dastardly Gallienus completed the disgraces of the Roman name. The defence of the empire rested on him; and he had actually assembled a powerful force, under pretence of covering the Italian coasts from the insults of these plunderers. But subdued by his fears, he declined opposing them in battle, and submitted to accept of peace on terms at once pregnant with ignominy and with danger, "the receiving of a considerable body of
 "them among his troops," and "the investing one
 "of their chieftains with consular honors." The remainder of these bold invaders filed off to the northward laden with the spoils of Asia and of Europe; returning home unopposed, to display to their countrymen what splendid rewards awaited the daring adventurer.

Greece enjoys
 a temporary
 relief.

Under the succeeding emperors, from the warlike Claudius to the bloody Dioclesian, Greece, though her coasts were still exposed to the tumultuary descents of barbarian rovers, began to enjoy better days, and had little more to complain of than her share in the general humiliation, the common fate of every people in subjection to the yoke of Rome.

The accession
 of Constantine;

The accession of the great Constantine seemed to promise to the Grecian annals a new æra of

glory. Sole master of the Roman world by the removal of his imperial rivals, he saw himself relieved from the consequences of that jealousy ever incident to a divided empire, and which had often drenched the Roman provinces in blood. Of the barbarians, many of the most formidable had either felt and dreaded his strength in war; or, having acquired an establishment in the countries, which the fears of Rome had formerly assigned to them, had formed an acquaintance with the arts of peace, and assisted in cultivating the lands they once had ravaged. The emperor himself, intelligent, enterprising, resolute, and vigorous, appeared to have both the desire and the ability to advance the prosperity of his people. The confines of Greece, also, he had made choice of for his place of residence, and the shores of the Thracian Bosphorus, where the Grecian colony of the Byzantines had been seated, were now to give a new capital to the world. Amidst these interesting events, a revolution still more important took place; the gloomy shades of paganism fled before the light of the Gospel, and instead of the absurd and frequently impure fictions which had hitherto disgraced the religion of Greece, there succeeded the beneficent and exalting doctrines of Christianity.

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why favorable
to Greece.

Establishment
of Christianity:

The disciples of Christ, from their earliest appearance, had to encounter the most obstinate contradiction, first from the Jewish zealots, and afterwards from the pagan votaries; and ten¹⁷ perse-

why hitherto
impeded.

¹⁷ Sulpic. Severus (L. ii. c. 48.) says nine only.

B O O K cutions had tried and attested the sincerity and
VIII. undaunted firmness of the professors of the Gospel.
Sect. 3. Their virtues, their fervent piety, their resolute spirit superior to reproach, to tortures, to death, had often made a deep impression on their enemies; and even of those, who had been the most inveterate persecutors of the Christian faith, many had become its most zealous preachers. Some of the emperors themselves are said to have beheld with admiration these uncommon exertions of the human mind; and to have entertained a strong suspicion, if nothing more, “that a faith so active, so generous, so much superior to every worldly concern, must have had a divine origin.” Still however the ancient superstition, supported by the deep-rooted bigotry of the multitude, by the illusive pageantry of pompous rites, by the captivating decorations of painting and sculpture, with which the temples of Greece especially abounded, where the beings of fiction seemed to start into life, and fable assumed a kind of reality. But, above all, by the intrigues of an interested, subtile, and numerous priesthood, paganism still kept its ground; and its most strenuous advocates bore witness in behalf of Christianity, by their alarms at every appearance of its success, and the earnest endeavours they employed for its suppression.

**Constantine's
conversion.**

Such, during near three hundred years, had been the state of the Christian church, when the great Constantine, in obedience to a heavenly vision, according to some writers, or, according to others, instructed by his mother Helena, who, in

in full persuasion of the truth of Christianity, had taught him from his early years to hold the gospel in reverence, avowed himself the disciple of Christ, renounced the worship of the gods of paganism, and invited the various nations, who lived beneath his imperial sway, to embrace with him *a religion*, whose DIVINE OBJECT, whose PRECEPTS, and whose PROMISES, presented to the mind whatever can alleviate, purify, and enliven, the hope of man; whatever can either adorn and bless private life, or give increase and security to public happiness.

Every circumstance here seemed to announce to Greece a prosperity which, in the times that follow we look for in vain. It may be of use to trace the causes, to which the disappointment is principally to be ascribed.

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Greece disappointed of the advantages expected from it, and the causes of this:

I. The crowd of pagan worshippers, firmly attached, from the strong dominion of ignorance, domestic example, and habit, to the altars of their country, saw with a kind of religious horror the triumphs of Christianity; and employed every device³⁸, that priestly craft or popular superstition could suggest, to obstruct its establishment. Paganism had always abounded with prodigies. These were now the arms employed in defence of her cause. Spectres were seen; the order of nature was inverted by monstrous births; the hallowed grove resounded with nocturnal voices; all omens of tremendous import, menacing the empire with the

Opposition to Christianity,

³⁸ See Montesquieu Grand. & Décad. des Romains, c. 19.
See also Libanius & Ammian. Marcellin. passim.

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vengeance of its deserted gods. At the same time, every public disaster became a convenient instrument, to impress new terror on the credulous multitude. Was any part of the Roman dominions desolated by earthquakes, laid waste by tempests, or afflicted with contagious disease? it was the indignation of Aesculapius, the vindictive arm of Apollo, the wrath of Neptune, the anger of the capitoline Jove, that had sent forth the judgment. Or did the barbarians spread again the waste of war, and had discomfiture disgraced the imperial banners? it was the goddesses of victory who abandoned a people, by whose daring hands her statue, once the pride of Rome, had been overthrown. Or did intemperate seasons blast the hopes of the husbandman? the goddesses of harvests was the cause, who, defrauded of her due honors, had resented the impious violation.

by the sophists,

With the same active zeal, and with still greater art, the Grecian sophists joined in the opposition. These sophists, the boasted successors of the Grecian sages of antiquity, ashamed of the legendary tales of paganism, and not honest enough to confess with the excellent Socrates, the weakness of human reason, had adopted the subtle but illiberal plan of disguising what they could not support. With them the whole pagan theogony became the mysterious repository of wisdom. Beneath the rough covering of the most uncouth fable some valuable truths, they pretended, lay concealed; and the several pagan divinities were, according to their interpretation, to be considered as subordinate

ministers of the Sovereign of the universe, or as allegorical personages, emblems of his operations or his attributes.

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The attempt was specious. Ancient wisdom had frequently been employed in reducing many of the fables of heathen story to the allegorical rank, which seems primarily to have belonged to them; and in withdrawing the reverence of the pagan world from those beings of fiction, whom the simplicity of the timorous and superstitious villager, or the artifice of some designing impostor, had erected into gods.

Far different were the views of the sophists. By clearing away the various absurdities, which enveloped and obscured the pagan system, their purpose was to give it a more plausible appearance, and a permanent establishment. For, whilst they paid their offerings at the shrine of every fabulous god, and required of their disciples a strict compliance with every idolatrous and absurd rite of the pagan worship, it was their artful boast, that to the SUPREME ORIGIN OF ALL GOOD their piety was ascending gradually, and in HIM was ultimately to terminate.

In support of this last refuge of paganism (to which probably it had been driven by the bold attacks of the Christian converts) all the various aids that Grecian literature could furnish, and the keenest weapons that sophistry had to wield, were incessantly employed³⁹; with what success, the

³⁹ See Julian. Epist. ad Athen. & Epist. passim. Ammian. Marc. L. xxi. c. 1, &c. Liban. Or. Eutrop. in Maxim.

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The Grecian
converts too
fond of ab-
struse dispu-
tation.

length of time during which the schools of the sophists continued to flourish, bears ample testimony. Sixty years elapsed from the issuing of Constantine's edict in favor of Christianity, before these sons of fallacy had sunk into the neglect and obscurity, which they had long deserved.

II. These however were not the enemies, from whom the churches of Greece had most to fear. In these days of Grecian degeneracy, versatility of genius, an acute and ready wit, a restless inquisitiveness, a fondness for argument and cavil, formed the principal lines of the Grecian character. This was more conspicuously the characteristic of the Athenians. As long as their democracy had subsisted, political contests, and the bustle of popular assemblies had been their favorite occupation; after its dissolution the captious disputations of the sophists, to whose direction the several schools of philosophy in Athens were now intrusted, became their chosen amusement. Many of the Greeks therefore, who embraced the Gospel, brought with them into the Christian church the practice of disputation, with a strong habitual fondness for curious disquisition and subtle argument. Not satisfied to abide within the boundaries, which the Almighty seems to have prescribed to man here below, their bold fancy attempted to explore the regions of the invisible world; and to pry into, to unfold, and to judge, the secret counsels of Infinite Wisdom. Points the most abstruse, and probably not meant for human discussion, were brought into debate. The pride of science begot

contention, obstinacy, and mutual hatred. The haughty disputant levelled his anathemas at those who presumed to question his decisions; and his opponents, not less absurd, by way of vindication, retorted on him the condemnation he had dared to pronounce. Doctrine was set up against doctrine; tribunal against tribunal; and at the very time it was uncertain, and perhaps even of no importance, which of the two parties was in possession of the truth, the cause of the highest importance to the happiness of mankind, the cause of real religion, of brotherly affection and mercy, was deeply injured by both *.

III. Love of fame, the imperious pride of the decisive dogmatist, and impatience at being vanquished in the field of argument, had almost in the earliest periods disturbed the peace of the Grecian church: considerations still more sordid soon contributed to provoke new contests, and to spread the flame of animosity. Constantine chose to signalize his zeal for the Christian establishment by the favor he showed to its ministers. The ample revenues and sumptuous offerings, with which the mistaken piety of the early ages had enriched the temples of paganism, and the magnificent and ostentatious display employed in the celebration of its festive solemnities, were known to have contributed principally to the veneration of its votaries. Constantine

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The emperor's
munificence
to the church;

* See Euf. de vitâ Constant. L. iii. c. 4, 5. Supl. Sev. L. iii. c. 50. & sqq. See also Fleury Hist. Eccl. L. x. xi. xii. &c.

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would have thought he had been wanting in what he owed to the true God, had he assigned a less respectable situation to those who were more immediately engaged in his service. Emoluments and honors were therefore liberally, perhaps profusely, bestowed⁴¹. The noble and wealthy emulated the example⁴²; till, by a natural progression, to add to the sacred patrimony was accounted the surest pledge the disciple of the church could give of his piety, or of his repentance.

attended with
dangerous
consequences.

The days of tribulation had been days of glory to the Christian church⁴³; she was dishonored by splendor and opulence. The experience of many generations has sufficiently informed us, that the human heart, even within the sanctuary of religion, is not exempted from frailty; it found here numberless temptations to avarice, to ambition, to insolence, and but too often confessed their fatal influence. With many, the station more than the duties of the churchman became the object of pursuit. Religious debates multiplied, and were maintained with additional acrimony, when an episcopal throne, and princely treasures were to be the rewards of victory. And within less than forty years after the death of Constantine, the prudence of a Christian emperor, Valentinian⁴⁴, was exerted to consult

⁴¹ Euseb. de vit. Constant. L. iii. c. 15. & L. iv. c. 1.

⁴² For an account of the liberalities of Helena, the emperor's mother, see Euseb. L. iii. c. 44, 45.

⁴³ See Sulp. Sev. L. ii. c. 47.

⁴⁴ By an edict of his (Cod. Theod. L. xvi. tit. 2. leg. 20) addressed to Damasus bishop of Rome in 370, and published

the real interests of religion, by prescribing limits to the property of the church. B O O K
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IV. The unbounded munificence of the first Christian emperors had brought reproach on the church; and the excess of their zeal in behalf of the purity of her doctrine proved nearly as dangerous. Constantine himself had led the way. Too fond of taking an active share in religious controversy, he frequently encouraged and fostered those contentions, which he ought to have repressed or terminated [“]. Instead of extending a parental, and perhaps conciliatory tenderness to all those of his subjects whose opinions were their only crimes, he set up party against party, and by lending the sanction of his imperial name to whatever tenets he happened to honor with his approbation, often gave strength and continuance to passions and enmities, which it was in his power at least to have soothed, and perhaps to have extinguished. Constantine went too far; his successors proceeded farther; and the disciple of the gospel has it to lament [“], that under Constantius [”], Valens, Sect. 3.
His zeal in
behalf of her
doctrines;

improperly
exerted.

in the several churches on the 3d of the kalends of August, the director was no longer permitted to receive from his spiritual daughter any gift, legacy, or inheritance: every testament contrary to this edict was to be null and void. See Fleury Hist. Eccl. L. xvi. Mr. Gibbon (ch. xxv.) thinks, that by a subsequent regulation, all ecclesiastical persons were rendered incapable of receiving testamentary gifts.

[“] See Euseb. de vit. Constant. L. iii. c. 64 & 65.

[“] See Sulp. Sev. L. ii. c. 64, 65. See also Fleury, L. xiii. xiv. xv. & seq.

[“] The words of l'Abbé Fleury are worthy of notice. Il

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The vicinity
of Constanti-
nople not fa-
vorable to
Greece.

Constantine
dies ;

disposal of
his dominions,

Gratian, Theodosius, Justinian, &c. &c. the church, emboldened by the imperial protection, frequently exerted against the unhappy recusant the same merciless violence, which she herself had so justly complained of, when the scourge of power was exercised by pagan authority.

V. Even the neighbourhood of Constantine's imperial city, whose rising glories Greece beheld with conscious pride and fond expectation, afforded little increase to the Grecian happiness. The opulence and pomp of Rome had been removed thither; but so had her vices. And all that Greece appears to have derived from the splendid vicinity of Constantinople was nothing more than what provinces bordering on a great city have generally to boast of, the fatal pre-eminence ⁴⁸ of being exhausted to support her magnificence, and of being corrupted by her example.

The act, that closed the life of Constantine was as injurious to the public prosperity as any that history has charged him with. His dominions he divided ⁴⁹ among his three sons, Constantine, Constantius, and Constans, and his two nephews,

troubla, says he, speaking of Constantius, la Religion Chrétienne, simple d'elle même, par une superstition de vieille; & s'appliquant plus à l'examiner curieusement qu'à la régler sérieusement, il excita plusieurs divisions, qu'il fomenta ensuite par des disputes de mots. Hist. Ecclés. L. xiv. p. 575.

⁴⁸ See Gibbon's Decline of the Roman Empire, Ch. xvii.

⁴⁹ See Gibbon, Ch. xviii.

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and the evils
that followed;

Dalmatius and Hannibalianus ⁵⁰; bequeathing to the Roman world the melancholy legacy of intestine wars and desolated provinces. Scarcely was the celebration of his obsequies ended, when Dalmatius and Hannibalianus perished in a military insurrection, excited by the creatures, and probably by the arts ⁵¹, of Constantius. The crime of these two young princes evidently was, that a part of the imperial dominions had been assigned to them; beside this, Dalmatius stood also charged with having inherited a large share of the late emperor's abilities. Such guilt was not to be expiated but with their blood. Seven other princes of the imperial house, uncles or cousins to the suspicious Constantius, shared their unhappy fate, together with all their friends, officers, and dependents; some of whom had been high in the favor and confidence of Constantine himself. Two princes more, Gallus and Julian, cousins likewise to Constantius, would have suffered in the massacre, had not the policy of the tyrant saved them. Julian, a child only six years old, was too inconsiderable to be the object

⁵⁰ Constantine had Spain, Gaul, and the British isles; Constantius Asia, with Egypt, and all the eastern provinces; Constans Italy, Africa, Sicily, and Illyricum; Dalmatius Thrace, and all Greece; Hannibalianus Cappadocia, Armenia, and Pontus. Aurel. Victor. 7 Epist. Eutropius (L. x. c. 9.) makes no mention of Hannibalianus. Socrates also (L. ii. c. 25.) mentions only Dalmatius.

⁵¹ *Constantio*, says Eutropius (ub. supra) speaking of the death of Dalmatius, *sinente potius quam jubente*. Socrates (loc. praedicto) speaks still plainer, οὐ κελεύοντος Κωνσταντίου τὴν φεγγήν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κωλύοντος.

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unfortunate
end of two
of his sons.

Constantius
reigns alone ;

revenge the
death of his
brother Con-
stans ;

of his kinsman's jealousy : Gallus was aged twelve, but his infirm state of health afforded to Constantius the pleasing hope, that nature would soon relieve him from the necessity of employing against him the hand of the assassin.

The three sons of Constantine had now the whole extent of the Roman empire to divide among them. But each aspired to the whole. Constantine, the eldest, fell by the sword in attempting to despoil his brother Constans of his dominions. Constans himself, a prince, if history may be trusted, of the most dispicable character, derived but little advantage from a victory, in which neither his prowess nor his conduct had any part. Magnentius, one of his chief officers, tempted by his incapacity and dissoluteness, conspired against him, put him to death, and boldly assumed the imperial purple, in those days of military despotism the customary reward of the successful traitor. Of the sons of Constantine the Great, Constantius alone now remained. Called forth by his brother's wrongs, and probably incited still more powerfully by the voice of ambition, he hastened from the eastern provinces, over which he reigned, to chastise the guilty usurper. He found in this enterprise more difficulty than his flattering courtiers had taught him to expect. And it was not until after a destructive war of three years, which in two bloody fields⁵² swept away the flower of the Roman legions,

⁵² At Murfa in Pannonia, now Essek in Hungary, and at Mons Selenei, in the Cottian Alps.

that vengeance at length overtook the perfidious Magnentius⁵³. B O O K
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During the intestine commotions of the western empire from the ambitious attempts of the younger Constantine, and the feeble administration of the dissolute Constans, Constantius had been engaged in a doubtful and unprosperous war against his Persian neighbours. Amidst the confusion of these busy times, Gallus and Julian had been suffered to live. And the cautious despot had contented himself with concealing them from public notice in a lonely castle of Cappadocia, formerly the place of residence of the Cappadocian kings. Upon the murder of Constans, and the erection of the standard of rebellion by Magnentius, the whole weight of the empire at this season of anxiety rested on Constantius. He felt the burden, and venturing to seek relief in the assistance of Gallus, removed him from a prison to his court; and, under the title of Caesar, associated him to the honors and toils of the imperial station; leaving him to provide for the security of the Asiatic provinces, whilst he himself advanced against the rebel. After the overthrow of Magnentius, and the re-establishment of the public tranquillity, Constantius found himself at leisure to

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his treatment
of Gallus
and Julian;

confers on
Gallus the
title of Caesar;

⁵³ During the revolt of Magnentius, Vetricius had assumed the purple in Illyricum, as colleague to Magnentius, but had afterwards abdicated in favor of Constantius. Nepotian also, the nephew of Constantine by the princess Eutropia, had been saluted emperor at Rome, in opposition to Magnentius, but perished, after a reign of twenty-eight days. Eutrop. L. x. c. 11.

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is jealous of
him.

Death of
Gallus.

Julian's dan-
gerous situa-
tion ;

examine more attentively into the conduct of Gallus, since his elevation. Gallus had faults, and he had enemies. The eunuchs, at this time the despicable and insolent rulers of a luxurious court, deadly foes to whomsoever they could not govern, had placed their emissaries around him, who marked with jealous observation all his moments of pride or of passion. It was discovered, that Gallus affected an independence, which the emperor and his ministers did not mean to allow him. And some unjustifiable acts of violence committed at Antioch against certain confidential servants of the emperor, with the connivance, if not by the orders of Gallus, had thrown a deeper shade on the errors of which he had been guilty. Credulous nevertheless of what was artfully suggested to him, that it was his interest to have an interview with Constantius, and that his presence would dissipate every complaint, he was prevailed on to intrust himself to this insidious court, and in a few days after his arrival in Pannonia, on his way, as he thought, to Milan, where the emperor then resided, he was on a sudden carried away under a strong guard to Istria, and there beheaded privately without even the formality of a trial⁵⁴.

Julian still survived. For some time his fate hung in suspense. And it was a question, whether the enjoyment of life could safely be permitted to a prince, who had so many domestic and personal injuries to revenge. To the generous interposition

⁵⁴ See Ammian. Marcellin. L. xiv. c. 1. 7. 9. 11.

of the empress Eusebia, wife to Constantius, he owed his preservation. Her lenient counsels, enforced by the multiplicity of cares with which the emperor found himself oppressed, did even more. Softened by her representations, Constantius at last consented to admit his young kinsman into his presence, to invest him with the same imperial honors that Gallus had been graced with, and to appoint him to the important service of defending the frontier of the Gallic province against the warlike tribes of Germany⁵⁵. Julian executed his trust with spirit and success. Repeated accounts assured the emperor of the abilities and achievements of the governor of Gaul. He became alarmed. At the head of a victorious army, by whom he was adored, the Caesar might be tempted to forget what he owed to the emperor; and the sword of Julian, which was to have guarded the throne, might be employed to invade it. It was resolved to secure his allegiance, by depriving him of the means of revolt. The Persian bands still infested the eastern borders of the empire, and often made inroads into the adjacent provinces. Orders were issued, that the strength of the Gallic legions should immediately be dispatched to protect the Asiatic frontier. The tidings spread a general consternation. These legions were mostly composed of provincials, fondly attached to their native soil; and who, in violation of a promise said to have

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is brought to
court;

created Caesar;
appointed to
the govern-
ment of Gaul;

Constantius
jealous of him.

⁵⁵ See Ammian. Marcellin. L. xx. c. 4. Eutrop. L. x. c. 14, 15. Abbé de la Bleterie. Vie de Julien; and Gibbon's Dec. of the Rom. Emp. c. xxii.

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Julian's artful
management;

is proclaimed
emperor by
his army;

been solemnly pledged to them, now saw themselves torn away from their families and homes, probably never to revisit them more. Julian, with much pretended zeal for the honor of the emperor, and a seeming firmness in requiring obedience to the imperial orders, appeared however to share deeply in their affliction; and having on the eve of their departure convened them together, that he might take his last farewell of the beloved companions of his toils and of his victories, after a grateful recital of their gallant actions, affectionately lamented a distress, *which, bound as he was to obey, it was not in his power to relieve.* The hint was greedily caught up. "The Caesar, once emperor, might prescribe the orders, instead of receiving them," was the cry of numbers of the friends of Julian, who doubtless had been duly instructed; and "Long live our emperor Julian!" instantly resounded from all the ranks.

It is scarcely possible to avoid remarking how much of the artifice "of the sophist, Julian's conduct betrays on this occasion. An apparent amazement at what he must have expected, and what probably his own dark arts had been laboring to accomplish, was first of all assumed; he next answered their acclamations with all the semblance of the most poignant concern; he expostulated; he conjured; he menaced; he bewailed; he even fled from their solicitations, and shut himself up during the whole ensuing night;

" See his dream in Ammian. Marcellin. L. xx. c. 5. and his own account of another dream (Epist. 17.) to which, he confesses, he gave credit.

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confirming them the more effectually, by this appearance of unambitious reluctance, in the very choice he affected to resist. The farce concluded with his *submissive* acceptance of their splendid offer, and his promising to reward their sedition with a suitable gratification; the plunder of the public treasure being, in these days of corruption, the usual recompence, which the gratitude of the new emperor bestowed on the instruments of his fortune.

The army of Gaul had created an emperor. Their next object was to support him. And these very legions who, rather than encounter the inconveniences of a distant service, had plunged into rebellion, were now impatient to brave every danger of an Asiatic expedition, under the banners of their favorite Julian. But the death of Constantius saved the new emperor from the guilt of civil bloodshed; he died at Mopsucrene ⁵⁷ in Cilicia, on his way to dispute the empire of the world.

prepares to
march against
Constantius;

Constantius
dies.

Julian did not long survive him. Ambitious of distinguishing himself in a war, which hitherto had generally baffled the Roman arms, he formed the plan of humbling the Persian king. Some considerable advantages obtained at the beginning encouraged him to penetrate into a country with which he was ill acquainted. A defeat was the consequence of his imprudence; and in the confusion of discomfiture, he was pierced by an arrow from an unknown, and probably an ignoble hand.

Julian makes
war on the
Persians,

and falls in
battle:

⁵⁷ The fountain of Mopsus. An oracle had formerly been there.

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his character
in private life;

as a foldier;

as a general;

as a reli-
gionist;

Few princes have been more variously spoken of than Julian, few more the object of exaggerated praise and reproach: dignified by some writers with all the attributes of the hero, he is held forth by others to universal execration. From both parties a more temperate decision ought doubtless to have come, and would perhaps have approached nearer to the truth. In his private life he seems to have been deserving of praise; his manners were unstained with licentious pleasures; his meals, his sleep, were the frugal, slight refreshments of the philosopher; and his leisure-hours, instead of being wasted in dissipation and frivolous amusements, were generally employed in the pursuit of knowledge, though in the road to it he was unhappily mistaken. As a *soldier*, the character he bears is high; not to be deterred by difficulty, nor discouraged by hardship; firm in the hour of battle, and always among the foremost in the path to glory. As a general, his abilities may be called in question. In his Gallic campaigns, he was supposed to have acquitted himself with honor; in the Persian war, where we have a more distinct view of him, he appears to have been injudicious, rash, presumptuous; and in the action in which he fell, he discovered himself to have been animated with a valor that bordered on insanity.

But what seems chiefly to have engaged philosophic attention in the history of Julian, is his character as a religionist. He had been educated in the Christian faith from his early years; had professed himself a Christian; and had grown up to
manhood

manhood in that profession. Yet no sooner were his fears from Constantius removed, than he threw off the mask, abjured the faith of his former days, avowed himself the determined enemy of the religion of Christ, and, with all the virulence of an enraged, but crafty adversary, labored for its extirpation to the last gasp of his life. What appears still more extraordinary; an infidel with relation to the Gospel, he became the zealous believer of the whole Grecian mythology; adopted its gods, its legends, and its sacrifices. Even its divinations, one of the most dangerous illusions that ever debased the human mind, of which, in the gloom of the dark ages, heathen priestcraft had frequently made fatal use, and which in a more enlightened age had been reprobated by the wisest of the pagan world, he restored, and protected with all the credulity of the most abject and uninformed bigot; importuning the altars of every divinity with anxious inquiries, and oftentimes with his own eyes, and an unfeeling curiosity, seeking his future destiny in the panting entrails of the innocent victim. Could it be from principle, that he renounced Christianity? If it was, how could the sceptic, who found it difficult to believe what the Gospel teaches, thus relax from the sturdiness of unbelief, and embrace with so easy a faith, all the absurdities of pagan fable? Or shall we say, with certain insidious advocates, that whatever might be his profession, Christianity or Paganism, the liberal-minded Julian was of both equally an unbeliever; a Christian by constraint, a Pagan from policy?

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The various revolutions of fortune which he experienced may perhaps, when more attentively considered, throw some light on this dark part of Julian's history.

what induced
him to leave
the Christian
Church,

He was a child, when the arm of violence deprived him of his father, and robbed him of his liberty. To the stern officers of a jealous tyrant was his education of course intrusted; and under the impressions of terror, natural in such a situation, he received the rudiments of Christianity. The truths of the Gospel, conveyed to the young disciple by instructors of this kind, instead of conciliating his affections, had all the stubborn prepossessions of dislike, of suspicion, of resentment, to contend with. These prepossessions, deeply rooted in the heart, grew up with his years, and strengthened with his strength. When he was first permitted to approach the imperial court, new and more powerful prejudices took place in his breast. He saw in Constantius the merciless assassin of his family. And Constantius was a *Christian*. The crowd of eunuchs, and fawning sycophants with which the throne was surrounded, the counsellors or ministers of the tyrant's crimes, and who in their treatment of Julian measured the respect they were to show to him by the degree of regard paid him by Constantius, were also *Christians*. How many objections to the religion they professed must have arisen here in the susceptible mind of Julian, irritated by past wrongs, and inflamed by present contempt! And is it a matter of wonder, that he should have been led to confound a *religion*, which they disgraced,

with the *principles* which seemed to actuate their conduct ?

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The votaries of paganism were still numerous ; Sect. 3.
and, though humbled, were powerful. Suspicious and to embrace paganism.
of Constantius and his ministers, they exulted in the thought, that in Julian their party might find a friend and protector. They marked, and strengthened, the impressions he had received. They courted his confidence. The most plausible and seducing of their sophists were employed to insinuate themselves into his intimacy. Julian's attachment to Christianity, if he had any remaining, was slight and wavering. A total rejection of all religion is a state ill suited to the human mind. Even the boldest pretender to infidelity will have his scruples, his moments of irresolution, diffidence, and anxiety. Julian felt, that a religion was wanting to him ; this the heathen sophists were ready to supply. They offered him a religion, the religion said they, of his forefathers, under whose propitious auspices Greece had reached the summit of human glory, and Rome had triumphed over a subjected world ; a religion now purified by philosophy, and set free from those absurd disguises that a pious ignorance had cast over it. A multiplicity of gods, indeed, crowded their temples, but in doing honor to these, they were in fact paying homage to the perfections of the Supreme Father of the universe, of which these emblematical personages were representations ; or expressing their gratitude to those intermediate intelligences appointed by the great First Cause to minister unto man. Neither were these intelligences

B O O K the airy creation of an enthusiastic fancy; their
VIII. existence had been ascertained by the strongest
Sect. 3. proofs, by the oracles, the dreams, the monitory
 omens, which they had repeatedly addressed to
 faithful votaries. They had even been known to
 assume a visible form, and personally to instruct
 or protect the humble suppliant in his hour of dif-
 ficulty. And the all-powerful evocations and holy
 rites, of which the guardian of the sacred mysteries
 was in possession, could summon them from their
 aerial or subterranean abodes, and force them to
 reveal the dark secrets of futury.

To this artful representation Julian listened with
 pleasure. His mind seems to have been predisposed
 to meet it with approbation. Homer was his
 favorite¹⁸, and there appeared a wonderful agree-
 ment between the poet's mythology and the
 sophist's system. Probably, the *one* was a transcript
 of the *other*. What rendered these tales of deceit
 the more captivating to Julian was a species of
 flattery well adapted to his hopes. They persuaded
 him that the oracular voice of all the gods, and
 the promise of every victim, announced to him
 the speedy possession of the imperial throne¹⁹. Julian
 was not ungrateful. He steadily adhered to the altars

¹⁸ He appears to have had most of his works by heart.

¹⁹ The dreams, and visions, which Julian's historians
 (Zosimus, L. iii. p. 155. Ammianus, L. xx. c. 5. Libanius
 passim) tell us he had, and which he himself avowed
 (Epist. xvii. ad Oribasium) speak him, if not an artful
 impostor, certainly a confirmed enthusiast. The latter probably
 is the truth. And in a mind so disposed, the fond persuasion,

of those gods, of whose veracity he had received such a *convincing* proof; and here perhaps it is not unjust to rank him among the most superstitious of the pagan zealots. B O O K
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It is the reproach of Athens, that she had a principal share in misleading the mind of Julian. Some time before he was invested with the honors of the Caesar, he obtained permission from Constantius to pursue his studies in that city. His passionate attachment to paganism has its date from that period; before the friend of that religion, here he became a bigot to it. Those pretended philosophers, also, who were afterwards most assiduous in fastening their bandage of illusion on this unhappy prince, were mostly from the Athenian school, in those days the great store-house of heathen superstition. In a succeeding reign we have a strong proof of the powerful dominion of superstition over that infatuated people. They petitioned the emperor Valentinian to permit the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries; which, upon the re-establishment of Christianity, had been suppressed; and to restore to Athens a solemnity on which depended her glory and happiness. So little had the city of Socrates profited by a LIGHT, which that venerable sage would have beheld with rapture! The people
of Athens
active in mis-
leading Ju-
lian's mind.

From this delineation of Julian's character, however we may be induced to pronounce less severely against him, and to behold him even with com- Summary of
Julian's cha-
racter.

that he was the peculiar care of the gods, and by them destined to the empire of the world, might easily find admittance.

BOOK VIII. Sect. 3. passionate indulgence, as a *deserter of the Gospel*, yet either as a *hero*, or a *philosopher*, the candid historian can afford him little praise. The oppressions of Constantius, and the manners of a servile court, may have driven him from the Christian church; but vanity, credulity, the curiosity of an ambitious mind, fixed him a pagan. How he has deserved the exalted name, which certain writers have been pleased to bestow on him, it is not for us to determine. Some perhaps will be apt to suspect, that his panegyrists would have been fewer, had he not inlisted among the enemies of Christianity.

The family
of Constantine
extinct.

In Julian ended the house of Constantine. From the death of the latter to that of Julian, about twenty six years had elapsed **. At the time of Constantine's death the imperial family was in the most flourishing condition; history numbers no less than thirteen princes, brothers, sons, nephews, to the deceased emperor, the ornament and strength of the imperial house. In this short period of time they had all perished, two only by the stroke of sickness, and one in war against a foreign foe, all the rest by the sword of discord or domestic treachery. Such, in those ages of arbitrary power was the precarious tenure even of imperial greatness.

Successors of
Julian;

The emperors, who succeeded Julian, restored the religion of the Gospel, but without being able to re-establish the public prosperity; of which a general profligacy of manners, and the fierce def-

** Constantine died in the year of Christ 337, Julian in 363.

spotism of a military government, had been long before preparing the ruin. To these internal evils were added the terrors of hostile invasion. An enemy, provoked by a wanton war, and now flushed with victory, threatened the eastern boundaries. And Jovian, whom Julian's army had called to the vacant throne, signalized his accession by yielding to the Persian monarch a considerable territory, to atone for his predecessor's rash attempt. Similar dangers surrounded the empire on every side. In Britain, the Roman rampart opposed but a feeble and impotent barrier to the impetuous valor of the warriors of the north, and even the legionary troops had been found unable to withstand the onset of the Caledonian ravagers. In Gaul, the defenceless condition of the frontier, most of whose bravest protectors had followed the banners of Julian, had encouraged the German tribes to renew their hostilities. Africa was in rebellion; and, among the barbarian tribes of the Danube, there were strong indications of a spirit of commotion.

What rendered this situation of things the more formidable, these several insurrections, and forebodings of war had been excited by repeated cruelties and oppressions. Most of the nations that bordered on the empire had revered the name of Constantine, but they could not continue their respect for a line of princes, of whose follies, incapacity, or crimes, they were incessantly the witnesses, often the victims. The measures pursued by the imperial court to defeat these impending

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their situa-
tion,and charac-
ters.

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dangers, fully show the guilty policy by which it was governed; and have left an indelible stain on the ministers that could advise, and the princes that could adopt, them. The following instances are a sufficient illustration of this truth. Two princes, a king of Armenia, and a king of " the Quadi, were both, within a few years of each other, under the vague pretence that their fidelity was suspected, murdered at interviews to which they had been treacherously invited; and, in both cases, was the unguarded hour of the hospitable banquet chosen for the perpetration of this work of blood. Valentinian, the successor of Jovian, is accused of the one; his brother Valens, to whom he had resigned the eastern throne, stands charged with the guilt of the other.

The Huns
attack the
Gothic settle-
ments.

Valens soon after received the merited reward of his perfidious counsels. The Huns, a new tribe of Barbarians ⁶², from the north-east extremities of Asia, in manners and aspect more horrid than any that had hitherto appeared on the Roman frontier, attacked the Gothic settlements on the further side of the Danube. The affrighted Goths implored the protection of Valens, and were permitted to take refuge within his dominions. The peaceful habits of a settled home had already considerably diminished the native ferocity of these Gothic tribes; and under the mild government of equal laws, and in possession of an established property, they might without much difficulty have

⁶¹ A Gothic nation.

⁶² Ammian. Marc. L. xxix.

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Valens's per-
fidious treat-
ment of the
Goths;

been improved into useful subjects. Valens had not the wisdom to avail himself of this valuable increase of population. Seduced by the fears of his ministers and perhaps not less by his own, he repented of what he had done; he had promised these strangers a supply of provisions, and he violated his promise. They complained; their complaints were disregarded; neglect was aggravated by insult; insult by violence. The Goths, naturally haughty and impatient, were exasperated; they flew to arms; and a long, fierce, and destructive war ensued, which in the course of it proved fatal to Valens himself. After having seen the total discomfiture of his army under the walls of Hadrianople, he was burned alive in a cottage, where he had taken refuge from the victorious and pursuing enemy¹.

his defeat
and death.

The calamities of the times raised Theodosius to the imperial throne. Gratian, the son and successor of Valentinian, the nephew and now the heir to Valens, was ill able to sustain the weight of two empires, one of them over-run by a revengeful and victorious enemy: he therefore consigned the precarious empire of the east to the valor of Theodosius; in whose history is seen one of those signal revolutions, that is sometimes to be met with in the fortunes of this world. His father, of the same name, was of all Valentinian's generals the ablest and most faithful. In Britain he had checked the inroads of the Caledonians; he had repulsed the

Gratian in
possession of
the whole
empire;shares it with
Theodosius.

¹ See Ammian. Marc. L. xxxi. c. 12, 13.

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Theodosius's
domestic his-
tory,

character,

and difficul-
ties;

Germans from the Gallic frontier; and he had reduced the insurgents of Africa. These several exploits had raised him in the eyes of a sordid court to a dangerous pre-eminence. Valentinian was dead, and his son Gratian, as yet a youth, was under the control of a vicious ministry, who pretended that Theodosius entertained ambitious views, and sacrificed his life to their suspicious jealousy. For some years the young Theodosius had served with glory under his illustrious father, and had shown himself already emulous of his noble example. But every aspiring hope being thus blasted by his father's death, he withdrew from a court which he must have held in abhorrence, and was cultivating the virtues of retirement on his paternal estate, in an obscure corner of Galicia, when the commands of Gratian called him forth to the public service.

Theodosius, with considerable abilities, had also many amiable qualities. But the licentiousness of a dissolute age often disappointed the *one*; and the baneful influence of despotic power sometimes contributed to obscure the *other*. No sooner was he placed at the head of the armies of the east, than he discovered, with equal amazement and regret, that the boasted strength of the Roman legions had ceased to exist. Corrupted by the example of the times, by the insolent dominion they had usurped over the throne, by the profuse donatives they extorted from the transient objects of their favor, by the indulgences they obtained from the fears or the ambition of their leaders, the

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legionary troops had become strangers to that frugal life, that patience of toil, and observance of discipline, which had triumphed over the successors of Alexander, and had laid Carthage in the dust. The ponderous helmet and massy shield were cast aside; and the effeminate soldier chose rather to expose himself defenceless to the weapons of the foe, than to submit to the oppressive weight of an armour, which his gallant ancestor deemed his ornament. Even the necessary work of intrenching a camp, which the companions of Caesar, and the partners of his glory, did not disdain to execute with their own hands, had become the scorn of a delicate and indolent soldiery *. One resource remained to Theodosius, and he adopted it. Those Goths, whom, after a four-years war, and many a bloody conflict, he found it impracticable to ex-
 terminate, he resolved to tempt with offers of amity and confidence; he received them into the imperial service, intrusted their leaders with important commands, and assigned them emoluments, honors, possessions; flattering himself that he should thus convert enemies into friends, and that the late ravagers of the Roman territories would now become the defenders of a country in which they had acquired rank and property. This expedient, the result probably not of choice but of necessity, proved however a ruinous measure. Acquainted with the legionary arms, and instructed in the Roman discipline, the Goths no longer felt that

dangerous
expedient he
had recourse
to;

* See Veget. de re militari, L. i. c. 20.

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feriority in war, which was owing to the want of military science; they saw, and despised, a weakness, which they were called to protect; the Danube, no longer guarded by a respectable barrier, supplied them with continual recruits from that variety of barbarian tribes, which, though divided against each other by internal feuds, yet always showed the utmost cordiality in their attacks upon the Roman empire; and these new confederates of Theodosius soon learned to control a government, whose existence or dissolution was totally in their power.

dreadful in-
fluence of his
vindictive
spirits

But if all the ruinous consequences of this fatal expedient are not to be imputed to Theodosius, he must surely bear the whole guilt of the massacre at Thessalonica⁶⁵. An insurrection had broken out in this part of Greece; and in the madness of popular fury an imperial officer had been torn in pieces. Such an insult to sovereign power was not, it seems, to be expiated but with the extermination of the Thessalonians. A body of troops marched into Thessalonica, with orders to put all the inhabitants to the sword, without distinction of guilt or innocence, of age, sex, or condition. These orders were executed in their fullest extent. And to cruelty was added perfidiousness. Care was taken to remove all apprehension of danger from these devoted victims; and when the whole city, fully assured of the emperor's clemency, had assembled in the circus to enjoy a festive spectacle,

⁶⁵ Soz. L. vii. c. 25. Ru. Hist. c. 18. See Gibbon, c. 27.

these military ruffians were let loose on the unsuspecting multitude. According to some writers, upwards of fifteen thousand persons perished in this massacre. Such a violation of all the laws of justice and humanity would at one time have armed more than one half of Greece against the tyrant that durst attempt it; but, such is the subduing power of despotism, it now served only to add to the terrors, and confirm the servitude of this abject people; and the episcopal reproof of Ambrose bishop of Milan was the only opposition Theodosius had to encounter. A penance of eight months, to which the emperor piously submitted, was supposed to have atoned for all this bloodshed. At the time Theodosius reigned in the east, Gratian held his imperial seat at Treves; Gaul, Spain, and the British isles were subject to his sway, while Valentinian, the youngest son of the late emperor Valentinian the second, reigned in Italy. But Maximus of Britain having revolted against Gratian, and deprived him of empire and life, and Valentinian having fallen by domestic treachery, Theodosius, after revenging both their deaths, remained in possession of all the Roman dominions.

gets possession
of the whole
empire;

From the abilities and personal valor of Theodosius, the empire, during his reign, maintained an appearance of vigor; the reign of his sons revealed the fatal secret of the public debility. Warped by the fond partiality of a parent, he divided his dominions between them; to the eldest, Arcadius, a youth of eighteen, he bequeathed the throne of the east; to the youngest, Honorius, aged only eleven, the

divides it be-
tween his two
sons, Arca-
dius and Ho-
norus;

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consequences
of this ap-
pointment.

western empire “: an appointment as unhappy to themselves, as it was unfortunate to their people. With a natural imbecillity of mind, in which their ripening years made little alteration, and brought up in the bosom of a luxurious palace, they both sunk into a slothful inactivity, the easy dupes of every minister, who had the boldness or the art to seize the reins of government, which fell from their feeble hands. The fatal partition of the imperial dominions brought on an increase of calamities. The empire was weak before; divided, it was weaker. A longer line of frontier was now to be defended; and the means of defence were lessened. Instead of the whole strength of the empire acting in concert, an opposition of interests and councils took place. Jealous of the sovereign of the west, the court of Constantinople saw with unconcern, and even with pleasure, the bordering nations pour the war on the western provinces, and enjoyed a distress, in which their own territories were soon to be involved; whilst the barbarian leaders, seated in the heart of the empire, many of them invested with offices of trust and dignity, and in full possession of the opportunity of marking and encouraging every internal mischief, profited by the follies of these nominal princes, and on the ruins of the imperial power planned an empire of their own. A detail of the disastrous events that ensued, belongs to another history. Here it is sufficient to observe, that the Roman empire in the west closed with the ignoble reign of Honorius. In less than twenty-five

“ A. D. 395.

years after the death of Theodosius, Alaric, the Gothic chief, who in the days of that emperor deemed it his glory to follow the imperial banners, after having spread the ravages of war throughout Italy, compelled Rome to submit to his victorious arms, and saw himself the uncontrolled arbiter of the throne of the Caesars.

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VIII.

Sect. 3.

Rome taken
by the Goths
under the
command of
Alaric.

Rome, long the haughty tyrant of the world, was now made to feel, what she had often imposed, the humiliation of servitude. The eastern empire, meanwhile, had not escaped. Previous to his irruption into Italy, Alaric, at the head of his fierce bands, had attempted the dominions of the east, and Greece, which seldom failed to share largely in the adverse fortunes of her imperial masters, was again made the scene of devastation⁷⁶. History has charged Rufinus, by whom the councils of Arcadius were then directed, with the guilt of having opened Greece to the ravagers; for, if we are to believe the united testimony of all the writers of those days, never did a more flagitious minister disgrace the confidence of his sovereign. It may however be a question, whether the abandoning of Greece to the barbarians was not rather his policy than his crime. Had this impetuous torrent of war rushed with unspent fury against the capital of the empire, the issue might have been doubtful. And it was possibly to save Constantinople, that Rufinus gave up Greece.

Alaric invades
Greece.

A calamity so great completed the desolation of this unhappy country. Whatever the cruelty, the

⁷⁶ A. D. 369.

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Sect. 3.

State of
Greece from
this period.

avarice, the lust, of an insolent and brutal conqueror could inflict, Greece now experienced. Her magnificent cities became a mass of ruins, her numerous towns were levelled with the ground, and those monuments of her glory, which had hitherto been preserved from violation, were all defaced and overthrown; while the inhabitants, either slaughtered by the barbarian sword, or dragged from their homes to a life of slavery, left this once-populous and well-cultivated country a lonely waste. Where every science and every art had, during a long succession of ages, established their abode, there now reigned a melancholy silence; the voice of the rural pipe was no longer heard on the hills of Arcadia; and of all the noble structures, which the piety, the gratitude, or the pride of ancient ages had erected, only mouldering palaces, desolated temples, defaced inscriptions, and mutilated statues, remained, at once the objects of regret and of admiration. In this humbled state, with very little variation, Greece continued from the Gothic invasion to the final overthrow of the throne of Constantine's successors; her principal inhabitants being the few families, who having escaped to the mountains during the late inundation of the barbarians, had afterwards taken up their dwelling amidst these sequestered ruins, and whose only wealth was the produce of their hives and of the silk-worm⁶⁶. Some of the emperors seem indeed

⁶⁶ The silk-worm is said to have been brought from India to Constantinople about the year 550. The artificers, who introduced the culture of silk into Sicily, from whence it
to

to have remembered what Greece had been, and to have wished to raise her again to a happier fortune. But the embarrassments of a declining empire still defeated the visionary plan. Constantinople herself, during the greater part of this gloomy period, retained little more than a faint shadow of imperial greatness. Governed mostly by weak or oppressive princes, distracted by domestic factions, and, what is worse, by endless controversies, which were disgraced by all the virulence of religious disputation, this empress-city sunk by degrees into contempt with every people around her. Having neither security at home, nor strength abroad, she was often compelled to purchase, at the price of her fairest possessions, a temporary peace from the barbarian tribes by whom she was encompassed; who, making use of the very concessions they extorted from the fears of one prince to exact larger concessions from his successor, reduced at length the extensive dominions of this mighty empire to the narrow compass of a few provinces. At the same time, a general profligacy of manners had prevailed. Private luxury and magnificence advancing as the public fortune declined, the people, with an unfeeling levity, indulged in all the gay dissipations of the highest prosperity, in the midst of the miseries of their

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Sect. 3.

Decline of
Constanti-
nople;

passed into Italy, were brought from Greece by Roger the first king of Sicily, in 1130. The slow progress of this art may serve as a proof of the low state of industry, and the difficulties of intercourse and communication during that period.

BOOK country. In addition to these menacing appearances,
 VIII. the throne itself, always insecure when founded
 Sect. 3. in despotism, was become more precarious than
 ever, stained not unfrequently with the blood of
 the short-lived possessor, and but too often the
 reward of the successful crime of the rebel, the
 traitor, the ruffian; so that Porphyrogeneta, of
imperial birth “”, came to be the distinguishing ap-
 pellation of those few emperors, who could boast
 so illustrious a parentage. Such is the melancholy
 summary of the Byzantine history, till, in the
 year 1453, the Othman arms put an end to this
 phantom of an empire.

taken by the
Othmans.

Greece ne-
glected and
forgotten;

Of the shock of the various revolutions, which,
 during this bloody period, began, advanced, and
 at length effected the final overthrow of the im-
 perial throne, Greece however appears to have
 felt little, probably from the obscurity of her con-
 dition. Too insignificant to be the object of am-
 bition, those who had in view the dismembering
 of the eastern empire, passed her by; beholding
 with indifference a land without inhabitants or cul-
 tivation; and leaving the possession of it to any
 of the rovers of those days, who were inclined
 to attempt a temporary settlement in that desolated
 country. For some centuries Greece even seems
 to have been altogether forgotten; or if remem-
 bered, was only considered as overspread with
 heaps of ruins, in which human industry might
 in vain seek to trace any of those venerable scenes

“ See Grandeur & Décadence des Romains, Ch. 21.

recorded in ancient story. The tale of the traveller, who talked of having discovered the site of Athens, and made his way to the remains of that illustrious city, was heard at first with amazement, if not with incredulity. The report, that amidst this rubbish of ages many vestiges of the arts of ancient Greece were still to be descried, induced others to visit this long-neglected tract; and numbers of adventurers from different countries, but especially from the Italian cities, formed establishments on various parts of the Grecian coast.

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Sect. 3.

is visited by
different ad-
venturers;

By degrees the modern Constantinople, now the capital of the Turkish empire, has once more re-assumed a dominion over the Grecian territory. Mustapha the second colonized anew several districts of it. And at this day Greece, with her adjacent isles, acknowledges subjection to the throne of the Othmans.

now subject to
the throne of
the Othmans;

The present Greeks appear to be a mixed race, of whom few, if any, are of the ancient Grecian lineage. Most of them have been transplanted into this country from different parts, and at different periods, by those who were attracted by curiosity, or views of gain. In addition to these partial colonizations, the Othman princes have, from their first invasion of Greece, at different times thrown in a considerable increase of inhabitants. These colonists, of every description, the Turks only excepted, have long since coalesced into one people, who, unmindful of their original extraction, seem to regard Greece as their parent-soil. And it is worthy of remark, that the Greeks of this day,

her present
inhabitants.

B O O K whether from the influence of climate, or from
VIII. having fallen into an early imitation of the man-
Sect. 3. ners, which on their arrival they found here estab-
 lished, bear in several particulars a striking resem-
 blance to the ancient inhabitants. Even now,
 instruments of music are to be met with in every
 hamlet, and song and dance are still the delight
 of the Grecian peasant. The Boeotians are remarked
 for credulity and ignorance. And among the Greeks
 of Attica, low as their state of literature now is,
 we find a considerable share of that vivacity and
 acuteness, by which the Athenians of ancient times
 were peculiarly distinguished. More strongly still
 does their speech exhibit this affinity to the Greeks
 of old, of whose language the modern Greek is
 a manifest corruption. The Turks still remain
 distinguished from the other inhabitants, perse-
 vering with a lordly inflexibility in their national
 dress, language, and mode of living; in obedience
 possibly to the law of their Koran, but more probably
 from a contempt for the manners of a people whom
 they equally despise and oppress.

The state of
 Christianity in
 Greece.

The Gospel was known early in Greece. Before
 the middle of the first century, Athens, Corinth,
 with most of Achaia, and many parts of Macedon,
 Thessalonica, Beroea, Philippi, had been enligh-
 tened by the labors of the great Apostle of the
 Gentiles. A species of Christianity ⁷⁰ Greece still
 retains, but such as would move the indignation


⁷⁰ See Spon. Voy. de la Grèce; Tournefort Voyage du
 Levant, Lettre iii; and Dr. Chandler's Travels into Greece,
 ch. 28.

of that excellent Apostle⁷¹, not less than did formerly the superstitious excesses of idolatrous Athens. A number of absurd observances, a paltry display of the figures of saints and martyrs in their places of worship, a profound reverence for the Panagia or *mother of God*, as they still blasphemously style the Blessed Virgin, an obstinate adherence to every opinion said to have been held by their Christian ancestors, and a loquacious zeal in defending these opinions, as far as their scanty portion of learning will permit them, make up nearly the whole of what is dignified with the name of Christianity by this ignorant and degraded people.

In the several arts, once the boast of Greece, they are equally uninstructed; and, for the most part, seem hardly conscious of the former glories of their country. What a Solon taught, or a Themistocles achieved, Athens herself has long since ceased to remember. And those precious monuments of the power and wisdom of ancient days, which might enrich the cabinets of princes, are now suffered to be spurned by the insolent foot of the illiterate Janizary, or perhaps employed, like vulgar materials, in fencing an inclosure, or in repairing the dwelling of some turbaned exactor. The cunning and interested Greek may sometimes be found to set a high value on the sculptured fragment he possesses; but what taste might be supposed to do in another, is in him the effect of avarice; he only seeks to enhance the price of what he wishes to part with; and, from the earnestness

The present
Greeks grossly
ignorant.

⁷¹ See Acts of the Ap. xvii. 16.



B O O K

VIII.

Sect. 3.

Remarkable
revolution in
the history of
mankind.


of the curious traveller, he judges of that which he would otherwise want the skill to estimate.


Of how uncertain a tenure are even the advantages of human genius! Greece, famed for arts and arms, from whose horizon beamed forth those rays of science, which have gradually illumined our European world, now stands in need of the instruction she was wont to give. From those nations, whom she held most in contempt, she is at this day to learn what Greece once was. And were it not for the learned researches of the descendants of those very barbarians, whom in her age of glory she had deemed it a reproach to have numbered among her denizens, the fierce German, the unlettered Caledonian, the barbarous Briton, the rude Gaul⁷², many of her most highly-valued marble records had remained unread, and some of her noblest memorials had been buried in oblivion.

⁷² It were superfluous, and indeed scarcely possible, to mention here all the illustrious personages of these nations, to whose munificence and labors these later ages owe the many instructive monuments we possess of the achievements and arts of ancient days. To Britain's glory be it however remembered, that among her sons ancient literature has found a greater number of bountiful patrons, than any other country has to boast of; and that at this very time there exists in the midst of her a society of persons, not less distinguished by their taste and public spirit, than by their opulence and noble birth, (The Dilettanti) who are employed in the generous plan of animating the studies and promoting the information of the rising generation. See Chandler's Travels, and the Ionian Antiquities, for which we are indebted to this respectable Society.

T H E E N D.

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